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This  thesis  seeks  to  analyse  the  "Camp  David  process"  and  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  in  an  attempt  to  answer  the  question  of  how  the  state  of  wart  equelly 
important  for  Egypt  and  Israel,  could  be  satisfactorily  ended  for  both 
parties,  how  the  territorial  claims,  equally  important  for  both  Israel  and 
Egypto  could  be  resolved,  when  the  issue  of  Palestinet  the  source  of 
virtually  all  the  present  conflicts  in  the  Middle  East  and  essential  for 
the  Egyptians  as  part  of  the  Arab  nation,  should  remain  unresolved,  despite 
the  provisions  of  the  Camp  David  Accords  and  the  Treaty. Page 
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12.  Jerusalem  af  ter  1967.366 The  Arab-Israeli  conflict  is  one  that  has  defied  solution  since  the 
commencement  of  the  British  Mandate  for  Palestine  in  1922.  Its  origin  goes  back 
to  early  history  when  the'Canaanites,  Philistinians  and  the  Israelites  contended 
for  the  land  and  its  resources.  Since  the  termination  of  the  Britsh  Mandate 
and  the  establishment  of  the  state  of  Israel  in  1948,  it  has  precipitated  six 
wars,  if  one  includes  the  Gulf  War.  A  recent  attempt  to  solve  the  problem  was 
the  Egypt-Israel  Peace  Treaty  of  1979. 
On  April  25,1979,  the  31-year-old  state  of  war  between  Egypt  and  Israel  was 
formally  ended  when  instruments  of  ratification  of  the  1979  Treaty  were 
exchanged  at  the  US  surveillance  post  at  Um-Khashiba  in  Sinai,  thus  beginning  a 
new  era  in  the  relations  between  the  two  states.  Certainly,  the  intention  of 
the  parties  at  Camp  David,  at  least  the  Americans  and  the  Egyptianso  was  not 
only  to  solve  the  Egyptian-  Israeli  coflict,  but  also  to  find  a  solution  for  the 
rest  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflicts  particularly,  the  Israeli-Palestinian  dispute. 
In  one  sense,  the  1979  Treaty  was  intended  as  af  irst  step  in  that  regard 
and  a  model  for  other  peace  treaties  between  Isreal  and  other  Arab  states. 
The  Camp  David  Accords  and  the  1979  Treaty  can  be  reduced  to  two  elements, 
the  territorial  issues  and  the  Palestinian  clause.  For  a  variety  of  reasons 
those  parts  of  the  Treaty  dealing  with  the  Egyptian-  Israeli  conflict  were  fully 
implemented,  whereas  the  Palestinians  clause  was  not.  In  facto  forthe 
Palestinians  the  "Camp  David  process"  was  a  failure'.  For  Egypt  and  Israel,  it 
was  successful  -  indeed  successful  to  the  extent  that  an  issue  not  resolved xviii 
during  the  process,  the  question  of  Taba  was  amicably  settled  by  Egypt  and 
Israel  through  arbitration. 
This  thesis  seeks  to  analyse  the  "Camp  David  process*  and  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  in  an  attempt  to  answer  the  question  of  how  the  state  of  war,  equally 
important  for  Israel  and  Egypt,  could  be  satisfactorily  ended  for  both  partiest 
how  the  territorial  claims,  more  important  for  Israel  than  Egypt,  could  be 
resolved,  when  the  issue  of  Palestine,  the  source  of  virtually  all  the  present 
conflicts  in  the  Middle  East  and  essential  for  the  Egyptians  as  part  of  the 
Arab  nation,  should  remain  unresolved,  despite  the  provisions  of  the  Camp  David 
Acccords  and  the  1979  Treaty. 
The  general  framework  of  this  study  is  as  follows: 
First,  a  general  background  has  been  provided  of  the  origins  and  the  evolution 
of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict.  Part  I  of  this  thesis  deals  with  the  roots  of  the 
Palestinian  problem  with  an  analysis  of  the  modern  Palestinian  problem 
and  its  evolution  from  the  Balfour  Declaration  in  1917  until  the  present  time. 
Consideration  is  given  in  Part  II  to  the  manner  in  which  the  1979  Treaty  has 
dealt  with  the  outstanding  territorial  issues  between  Egypt  and  Israel.  Although 
this  part  purports  to  give  a  comprehensive  acbount  of  the  major  territorial 
claims  between  Israel  and  Egypt,  certain  particular  issues,  because  of  their 
importance,  are  dealt  with  in  much  greater  detail  -  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli 
forces,  the  dispute  over  Taba,  the  Israeli  settlements  in  the  Sinai  and  the 
problem  of  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba.  These  proplems  are  examined  in  Chapters  Two 
and  Three. xiX 
Part  III  examines  the  provisions  relating  to  the  Palestinian  people  and  the 
question  of  East  Jerusalem  in  two  Chapters,  Four  and  Five. 
Some  general  conclusions  an  the  Camp  David  process  and  the  1979  Treaty  are 
drawn  at  the  end  of  this  work.  The  conclusions  evaluate  the  1979  Treaty  in 
the  light  of  the  expectations  of  its  drafters,  exploring  to  what  extent  the 
Camp  David  process  and  the  1979  Treaty  could  be  a  model  for  future  negotiations 
and  treaties  between  other  Arab  states  and  Israel.  We  will  also  propose 
solutions  to  the  problems  caused  by  areas  not  covered  in  the  Treaty,  and  by 
deficiences  in  the  wording  and  terminology  used  in  the  Treaty. 
By,  prese  nting  a  legal  analysis  of  the  issues  covered,  without  favouring  either 
Egypt  epý  Israel,  it  is  hoped  that  this  work  will  lead  to  a  better 
understanding  of  the  1979  Treaty.  It  is  also  hoped  that  it  will  f  ill,  at  any 
rate  in  part,  the  gap  caused  by  the  fact  that  legal  literature  on  the  subject  is 
scarce  in  both  Arabic  and  English. 2 
j!  A1-1RS111FR  !  EARLY  HISTORY 
In  its  broadest  definition,  the  Middle  East  extends  throughout  all  the 
countries  that  border  the  southern  and  eastern  coasts  of  the 
Mediterranean  Sea,  from  Morocco  to  Turkey,  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Gulf  of 
Aqaba  and  the  Persian  Gulf.  The  Middle  East  conflict  refers  to  that 
portion  of  the  region  comprising  the  area  most  directly  involved  in  the 
dispute  over  the  lands  of  the  former  mandate  of  Palestine-Israel  and  its 
neighbours  Egypt,  Jordan,  Syrial  Lebanon,  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  occupied 
territories  encompassing  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip.  ' 
The  area  known  as  Palestine  is  bordered  by  the  Mediterranean  Sea  an  the 
east,  the  Jordan  River  in  the  west,  the  Golan  mountains  and  the  Sea  of 
Galilee  on  the  north,  and  the  Negev  and  Sinai  Deserts  on  the  south. 
There  have  been  periodic  crises  in  the  Middle  East  since  early  recorded 
history,  notably  since  the  chosen  'people  escaped  Egyptian  persecution  by 
invading  and/or  infiltrating  into  the  lands  of  the  Canaanites.  1 
The  Canaanites  are  the  earliest  known  inhabitants  of  Palestine,  and  are 
thought  to  have  settled  there  after  3000  B.  C.  Despite  the  fact  that 
several  peoples  existed  at  one  time  or  another  in  ancient  Palestinet 
only  three  peoples  played  a  leading  role  in  that  country  and  left  a 
lasting  impact  on  it.  These  peoples  are  the  Canaanites,  the  Philistines# 
and  the  Israelites.  The  Palestinians  are  the  descendants  of  the 
Canaanites  and  the  Philistines.  3 3 
The  first  Jewish  kingdom  was  established  in  Palestine  In  1030  BC,  when 
the  twelve  Israeli  tribes  united  under  Saul  who  became  their  first  king. 
After  he  was  slain  by  the  Philistines,  his  son-in-law  David  succeeded 
him  and  expanded  his  kingdom  by  conquest.  Around  1000  BC,  David  invaded 
Jerusalem  and  made  the  City  the  capital  of  his  kingdom.  He  ruled  for  a 
period  of  33  years  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Solomon  who  in  turn 
ruled  the  kingdom  for  40  years.  4 
After  Solomon's  death,  the  unified  kingdom,  which  lasted  73  years,  was 
split  into  two  kingdoms,  the  Kingdom  of  Israel  in  the  north  and,  the 
Kingdom  of  Juda  in  the  south.  While  the  Kingdom  of  Israel  did  not 
remain  in  existence  for  long,  being  destroyed  by  the  Asserians  in  721 
BC,  the  other  Kingdom  of  Juda  remained  until  587  BC  when  it  was 
destroyed  by  the  Babylonians.  The  invaders  burned  Solomon'  s  Temple  and 
carried  the  Jews  into  captivity.  With  the  exile  of  the  Jews,  the  Hebrew 
language  disappeared  from  Palestine  and  was  replaced  by  Aramic  and 
Arabic.  For  several  centuries  Aramic  was  the  language  of  Christians-6 
In  538  BC,  the  Persians  invaded  Palestine  and  put  an  end  to  Bablyonian 
rule.  During  the  Persian  era,  which  lasted  two  centuriest  the  Jews  were 
allowed  to  return  to  Palestine.  In  332  BC  Alexander  the  Great  invaded 
Palestine.  In  166  BC  another  Jewish  Kingdom,  the  Maccabian  Kingdom,  was 
established  after  the  Jews  revolted  against  the  Greeks.  In  134  BC,  the 
Syrians  besieged  Jerusalem  and  levied  a  tribute  upon  the  kingdom.  6 
In  63  BC  the  Romans  occupied  Palestine  and  put  an  end  to  the  Maccabian 
Kingdom.  During  the  Roman  era,  the  Jews  revolted  twice  against  the 
Romans,  in  AD  66  to  70  and  again  in  AD  132  to  135.  As  a  result  of  their 
revolt,  the  Jews  were  either  killed  or  dispersed  to  the  four  corners  of 
the  Roman  Empire.  From  that  time  until  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 4 
century  there  were  practically  no  Jews  In  Jerusalem,  and  only  a  small 
number  lived  in  Palestine.  Also,  during  that  era,  one  of  the  important 
events  in  the  history  of  mankind  occured  in  Palestine.  This  was  the 
birth  of  Christ  at  Bethlehem.  From  that  time,  Bethlehem,  where  Christ 
was  born,  Nazareth  and  Galilee  where  he  lived,  and  Jerusalem  where  he 
was  crucified  and  buried,  became  Christianity's  holiest  places  and 
Palestine  itself  became  the  Holy  Land  of  ChristendoM.  7 
Ever  since  6349  Semitic  Arabs  incorporated  that  region  into  the  Islamic 
nation  after  defeating  the  Romans.,  When  the  Arabs  drove  the  Romans  out 
of  Palestine,  few  Jews,  following  their  expulsion  by  the  Romans  in  AD 
70,  remained  in  Palestine.  During  this  era,  the  Arabs  rescinded  the 
decree  of  banishment  and  allowed  the  Jews  to  return  to  Palestine.  Few, 
however,  returned.  8 
Palestine  remained  under  Moslem  Arab  rule  until  1099  when  it  was 
invaded  by  the  Crusaders  who  occupied  the  country  and  established  the 
Latin  Kingdom  of  Jerusalem  which  lasted  88  years.  In  1187,  Palestine 
was  reconquered  by  Saladin  and  was  restored  to  Moslem  Arab  rule.  9 
In  1517  the  Ottoman  Turks  conquered  Palestine  and  ruled  it  until  the 
outbreak  of  World  War  I.  The  British  forces  in  Egypt  which  were 
supported  by  an  Arab  army,  invaded  Palestine  and  occupied  Jerusalem  on 
December  9,1917.  Turkish  rule  in  Palestine  came  to  an  end  shortly 
thereafter.  It  has  been  rightly  observed  that  both  the  Moslem  Arabs  and 
the  Turkish  rulerst  during  their  occupation  of  Palestinet  did  not  make 
any  alteration  in  the  country's  demographic  structure,  but  only  a  change 
of  rule  and,  to  a  large  extent,  a  change  of  religion,  Specifically, 
they  brought  no  immigrants  to  the  country.  10 5 
THR  IRAUQUIR  DRCT.  ARATTnl  AND  THR  NAI[DATR 
There  had  been  a  long  history  of  anti-Semitism  in  a  number  of  European 
countries,  and  this  became  particularly  intense  in  the  19th  century. 
The  Drefus  affair  in  France  is  but  one  celebrated  example-" 
From  1815  Russian  Jews  suffered  increasing  restrictions.  Around  1881, 
Russia's  difficulties  were  attributed  to  Jewish  corruption,  and  Jews 
were  massacred  in  a  series  of  attacks.  In  1914  it  was  estimated  that 
over  2  million  Jews  had  fled  from  Russia.  12 
The  1819  "Hep  Hep"  riot  started  in  Wurzburg  and  spread  through  the 
German  states  and  into  Austria,  Hungary,  Poland  and  Denmark.  These 
states  accused  Jewish  financiers  and  bankers  of  being  responsible  for 
economic  difficulties,  and  some  central  European  Jews  emigrated  to  the 
United  States.  13 
In  1860  some  argued  that  an  assimilation  of  Jews  in  the  countries  in 
which  they  were  living  was  not  possible  because  of  the  fact  that  their 
racial  characteristics  were  unchangeable.  In  other  words,  "a  Jew  could 
not,  for  instance,  became  a  German  through  baptism  and  a  rejection  of 
heritage.  "',  '  Since  that  time,  the  word  anti-Semitism  came  into  general 
use,  signifying  that  Opposition  to  Jews  was  based  on  grounds  of  race  not 
of  creed.  Since  1880,  it  was  estimated  that  over  3  million  Jews,  due  to 
the  waves  of  anti-Semitism  in  Europe,  fled  over  three  decades  settling 
in  Britain,  Canadas  Australia  and  South  Africa;  but  the  vast  majority 
found  a  new  home  in  the  United  States.  A  few  of  them,  it  is  worth 
mentioning,  went  to  Palestine  which  was  then  part  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire-Is  Aware  of  the  problem  of  anti-Semitism  and  of  the  fact  that  the 
Jews  suffered  persecution  in  most  European  countriesp  particularly 
Eastern  Europe,  Theodor  Herzl  wrote  to  Baran  Rothschild  that:  "for 6 
nearly  2000  years  Jews  had  been  dispersed  all  over  the  world  without  a 
state  of  their  own;  if  only  the  Jews  had  a  political  centre  they  could 
begin  to  solve  the  problem  of  anti-Semitism.  "  16 
With  the  publication  of  Der  Judenstaat)7,  most  accurately  translated  as 
"The  State  Of  Jews".  Herzl  became  the  ambassador  of  the  emerging  Zionist 
movement,  as  well  as  the  father  of  political  Zionism.  According  to  his 
ideas,  the  Jews  must  be  granted  sovereignty  over  territory  adequate  for 
their  national  requirements.  Herzl  had  two  possible  regions  in  mind: 
Argentina  and  Palestine.  Argentina  was  one  of  the  most  fertile 
countries,  whereas  Palestine  was  the  unforgettable  historic  homelandq 
and  the  very  name  would,  Herzl  thought,  be  a  good  rallying  point.  "' 
In  Basel,  in  August  1897,  Herzl,  having  organized  the  Jewish  masses 
behind  his  ideas,  convened  the  first  Zionist  Congress  which  formulated 
the  specific  intent  and  purposes  of  political  Zionism  concluding  that 
"Zionism  aims  to  establish  a  publicly  and  legally  assured  home  for  the 
Jewish  people".  The  major  outcome  of  the  Basel  programme  was  the 
emergence  of  the  World  Zionist  Organization,  a  national  flag,  a  national 
antheno  "Hatiqva"l  and  the  Jewish  national  fund.  19  It  is  worth 
mentioning  that,  at  the  end  of  the  first  Zionist  Congress,  Herzl  noted 
in  his  diary  that  at  Basel  he  f  ounded  the  Jewish  state;  at  that  time 
such  an  idea  was  regarded  with  general  incredulity.  20 
Several  unsuccessful  attempts  were  made  in  subsequent  years  to 
establish  Jewish  settlements  in  the  Sinai  Peninsula  in  EgYPto  Cyprust 
and  Uganda.  However,  during  this  period,  there  emerged  a  few  Jewish 
settlements  in  Palestine.  The  seventh  Zionist  Congress  ruled  that 
settlement  should  be  confined  to  Palestine.  21  Herzl  died  in  1904,  and 
his  successor  was  Chaim,  Veizmann,  a  Russian  immigrantt  who  was  a 
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practical  leader  rather  than  a  theorizer.  The  new  Jewish  leader  was  in 
favour  of  the  idea  that  "saw  Palestine  as  being  the  focus  of  the 
renaissance  of  Judaism  based  on  the  positive  love  of  Zion.  1122  While 
working  to  increase  ihe 
number  of  Jewish  settlements  in  Palestine  from 
1904,  Veizmann  sought  to  put  pressure  an  European  governments  to  support 
Zionism.  Settling  in  Britain,  he  attempted  to  win,  by  all  means,  the 
support  of  the  British  government  for  the  Jewish  cause.  By  April  1919 
Zionism  had  achieved  a  new  status  in  British  political  thinking.  For 
reasons  which  V411  be  mentioned,  some  influential  British  officials  held 
the  opinion  that  an  accomodation  with  the  Zionists  could  help  British 
interests  in  the  Middle  East  and  elsewhere.  In  the  spring  of  1916  some 
politicians  had  gone  as  far  as  to  suggest  thatt  not  only  Britaing  but 
all  the  Allies  should  jointly  issue  a  declaration  pledging  to  take 
Zionist  aspiration 
.5 
in  Palestine  into  account  in  the  postwar 
settlement  .  23 
Undoubtedly,  the  present  crisis  of  the  Middle  Eastlas  Quincy  Wright 
observed,  began  with  the  Balfour  Declaration.  24  The  British 
declaration  of  sympathy  with  Jewish  Zionist  aspiration  was  communicated 
to  Lord  Rothschild  by  Arthur  James  Balfour,  in  his  capacity  as  Foreign 
Secretary,  in  a  letter  dated  November  2,1917,  and  made  public  a  week 
later:  "I.  have  much  pleasure  in  conveying  to  you,  an  behalf  of  His 
Majesty's  Government  týe  following  declaration  of  sympathy  with  Jewish 
Zionist  aspirations  which  has  been  submitted  to  and  approved  by  the 
Cabinet.  His  Majesty'  a,  Government  view  with  favour  the  establishment  in 
Palestine  of  a  national  home  for  the  Jewish  people,  and  will  use  their 
best  endeavours  to  facilitate  the  achievement  of  this  object,  it  being 
clearly  understood  that  nothing  shall  be  done  which  may  prejudice  the 
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civil  and  religious  rights  of  existing  non-Jewish  communities  in 
V16 
Palestine  or  theý  rights  and  political  status  by  Jews  in  any  other 
countries.  U26 
In  respect  of  the  Declaration,  Bassiouni  and  Fisher  have  pointed  to  two 
factors  that  must  be  carefully  weighed  and  contrasted:  first,  the 
political  promise  clause,  i.  e.,  the  establishment  of  a  national  home  for 
the  Jews;  and  secondly,  the  safeguard  clause  concerning  the  non-Jewish 
communities  .  2r,  As  far  as  the  political  clause  is  concerned,  there  is  no 
concensus  of  opinion  as  to  the  exact  meaning  of  the  term  "national 
home"  -  Clearlyt  the  term  is  vague,  presumably  deliberately  so. 
Neverthelesso  two  conflicting  views  had  been  forwarded.  The  first 
claimed  that  the  national  home  would  involve  the  establishment  of  a 
Jewish  state  in  Palestine.  This  view  was,  of  course,  held  by  many 
Zionists.  On  the  other  hand,  the  second  view  denied  that  such  was  its 
intention  or  meaning.  In  the  words  of  Sir  Herbert  Samuel  in  the  House 
of  Lards  in  1917,  "If  the  Balfour  Declaration  had  intended  that....  it 
would  have  said  so...  there  was  no  promise  of  a  Jewish  state.  .  027 
It  may  be  added  that  the  British  Government  declared  an  several 
occasions  that  the  Declaration  must  not  dislodge  or  disturb  the  Arab 
population  of  Palestine  since  it  did  not  involve  the  creation  of  a 
Jewish  state,  nor  the  subordination  of  the  Palestinians  to  Jewish 
immigrants.  26  As  to  the  safeguard  clause,  Bassiouni,  and  Fisher  pointed 
out:  "In  contrast,  the  safeguard  clause  seems  clear  and  unequivocal.  The 
words  'it  being  clearly  understood'  prove  that  however  vague  and 
ambiguous  the  political  promise  clause  might  be,  it  was  subordinated  to 
and  condtioned  upon  the  implementation  of  the  safeguard  clause  which 
reassured  the  non-Jewish  population  of  Palestine  that  there  would  be  no 9 
resulting  injury  to  their  rights  from  the  political  bargain  struck 
between  Britain  and  the  Zionists.  "  29 
There  has  never  been  a  consensus  of  opinion  as  to  the  legality  of 
the  Declaration.  For  instance,  the  Declaration,  according  to  one  view 
cannot  be  illegal  since  It  was  in  the  nature  of  a  mere  promise  of 
sympathy  lacking  any  legal  effect. 
inclusion  in  the  Mandate  provisions 
It  follows  that  only  after  its 
I  the  Declaration  possessed 
legal  effect.  On  the  other  hand,  some  argued  that  the  Declaration  was 
void.  An  advocate  of  this  view  is  Henry  Cattan  who  wrote:  *The  Balfour 
Declaration  is  legally  void,  and  morally  wicked,  and  politically 
mischievous".  311  Cattan'  s  argument  is  based  on  the  premise  that  the 
Declaration  denied  the  Palestinian  people  their  natural  right  of  self- 
determination,  and  therefore  was  in  violation  of  international  law. 
Other  reasons  have  been  given  as  a  basis  for  the  nullity  of  the 
Declaration.  It  has  been  rightly  argued  that  the  consent  of  the  people 
of  Palestine,  who  were  the  indigenous  and  sovereign  inhabitants  was 
never  asked  or  obtained.  The  British  government,  a  foreign  power  in 
regard  to  Palestine,  did  not  possess,  nor  had  it  ever  possessed,  any 
sovereignty,  right  of  disposition  or  Jurisdiction  over  Palestine  that 
enabled  it  to  grant  any  rights,  be  they  political  or  territorial,  to  an 
alien  people  over  the  territory  of  Palestine.  Finally  and  most 
significantly,  Turkey,  as  the  legal  sovereign  over  Palestine  at  the  time 
of  the  issue  of  Balfour  Declaration,  did  not  consent  to  it.  " 
The  question  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  Balfour  Declaration  has  been 
deliberately  overlooked  by  Britain  and  other  major  powers  supporting  it. 
In  the  words  of  Lord  Balfour,  11  ...  The  four  great  powers  are  committed 
to  Zionism,  and  Zionism,  be  it  right  or  wrong,  good  or  bad,  is  rooted  in 10 
age-long  tradition,  in  present  needs,  in  future  hopes,  of  far  profounder 
import  than  the  desire  and  prejudices  of  the  700,000  Arabs  who  now 
inhabit  that  ancient  land.  1132 
As  far  as  the  reasons  for  the  Declaration  are  concernedg  it  is  true 
that  the  influential  pressure  exerted  on  the  British  Government  by  the 
Jewish  Zionists  and  their  supporters  in  Britain  had  played  an  important 
role  in  obtaining  that  Declaration.  Nevertheless,  the  Balfour 
Declaration  had  been  approved  by  the  British  Cabinet  for  a  number  of 
other  reasons.  It  had  been  believed  by  some  British  politicians  that  it 
was  essential  for  Great  Britain  to  establish  a  firm  foothold  in 
Palestine  and  that  an  understanding  with  the  Zionists  could  help  to 
strengthen  Great  Britain's  position  as  a  partner  in  the  Anglo-French 
condominium  envisaged  by  the  Sykes-Picot  Agreement  of  May  1916.31 
It  was  also  thought  that  Zionist  sympathies  for  the  Allied  cause  could 
help  the  war  effort.  Zionists  in  Russia  could  stop  that  country's 
drift  out  of  the  war,  while  Zionists  in  the  US,  due  to  their  influential 
position  in  American  politics,  could  speed  up  the  American  contribution 
following  the  US  declaration  of  war.  34 
Finally  and  significantly,  during  this  period  there  was  increasing 
concern  in  Britain  about  the  many  Jews  fleeing  persecution  in  Russia  and 
other  Eastern  European  countries.  The  British  Government  was  also 
concerned  by  the  problem  seen  as  being  caused  by  Jewish  immigrants  in 
Britain.  There  is  no  better  quotation  In  this  respect  than  what  had 
been  written  in  "The  Times"  on  May  1,1905: 
"The  immigration  of  Russians  and  Poles,  nearly  all  of  whom  are  said  to 
be  Jewss  amounted  to  28,511  to  30,046  in  1903,  and  to  46,095  in  1904.  It 
is  at  least  probable  that  it  will  reach  50,000  in  the  year  now 11 
proceeding...  Apart  from  the  seething  mass  of  poverty  and  of  criminality 
Whic  h  has  thus  been  forced  upon  the  attention  of  the  public,  it  is  well 
known  to  all  who  have  inquired  into  the  subject  that  the  Russian  and 
Polish  immigrants  as  a  rule  consist  of  persons  who  are  habituated  to  a 
lower  standard  of  cleanliness  and  comfort  than  that  which  prevails  among 
even  the  humblest  of  our  own  poor,  and  that  they  are  content  to  work  f  or 
wages  upon  which  no  industrious  Englishman,  however  much  he  might  be 
said  to  be  sweated  by  an  employer,  could  attempt  to  live...  EThe  English 
inhabitants  of  the  East  End  of  London  are  becoming]  more  and  more 
impatient  of  the  presence  of  their  unsavoury  and  unwelcome  neighbours, 
and  more  and  more  anxious  that  the  plague  of  their  continual  coming 
should  be  stayed.  "36 
Turning  now  to  what  had  happened  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Balfour 
Declaration,  one  must  admit,  at  the  outset,  that  Britain  had  to  face  the 
problem  resulting  from  the  fact  that  the  Declaration  contained 
contradictory  promises.  In  the  words  of  Foreign  Secretary  Ernest  Bevin 
in  the  House  of  Commons: 
"There  is  no  denying  the  fact  that  the  Mandate  [which  incorporated  the 
Balfour  Declaration]  contained  contradictory  promises.  In  the  first 
place  it  promised  the  Jews  a  national  home  and  in  the  second  place  it 
declared  that  the  rights  and  position  of  the  Arabs  must  be  protected. 
Therefore,  it  provided  what  was  virtually  an  invasion  of  the  country  by 
thousands  of  immigrants  and  at'  the  same  time  said  that  was  not  to 
disturb  the  people  in  possession.  1136 
In  the  years  1918  and  1919,  the  British  military  administration, 
according  to  Jewish  sources,  37  showed  no  sympathy  with  the  Balfour 
Declaration.  During  these  two  years,  the  Declaration  was  not 12 
officially  published  or  referred  to  in  Palestine.  This  was  mainly  due 
to  the  hostile  attitude  to  the  Jews  existing  in  Palestine.  On  January 
3,1919,  an  agreement  was  reached  between  Amir  Fisal,  then  the  leader  of 
the  Arab  Awakening  Movement  and  Chaim  Weizmann,  President  of  World 
zionism.  3a  The  agreement  recited  that  the  "Surest  means  for  the 
consummation  of  their  EArabs'  and  Zionists']  national  aspiration  is 
through...  closest  cooperation  of  the  Arab  State  and  Palestine...  Arab  and 
Jewish  duly  accredited  agents  shall  be  established  and  maintained  in 
their  respective  territories...  The  definite  boundaries  between  the  Arab 
State  and  Palestine  shall  be  determined  by  a  commission  to  be  agreed 
upon  ...  The  constitution  and  administration  of  Palestine  shall  afford  the 
fullest  guarantee  for  carrying  into  effect  the  [Balfour 
Declaration]  ...  All  necessary  measures  shall  be  taken  to...  stimulate 
immigration  of  Jews  into  Palestine  on  a  large  scale...  In  taking  such 
measures  the  Arab  peasants  and  farmers  shall  be  guaranteed  in  their 
rights.  1139 
On  April  24,1920,  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Peace  Conference  at  San 
Remo  resolved  that  the  Mandate  over  Palestine  be  conferred  an  Britain, 
charging  her  with  the  establishment  of  a  national  home  for  the  Jewish 
people  as  laid  down  in  the  Balfour  Declaration.  This  was  in  fact  a 
turning  point  of  the  history  of  Palestine  .  40  In  the  same  year,  Sir 
Herbert  Samuel,  a  Jew  and  a  Zionist,  was  appointed  High'  commisioner  in 
Palestine.  As  soon  as  he  arrived  to  Palestine  in  June  19201  he  made 
Hebrew  an  official  language  in  -Palestine  side  by  side  with  Arabic  and 
English.  He  then  helped  to  increase  the  number  of  Jewish  immigrants  by 
creating  jobs  for  them  in  government  road  projects  in  the  north.  Also$ 
as  a  concession  to  the  Jews  who,  wanted  the  country  to  be  called  by  its 13 
historic  name,  Erpzt  Israel,  the  Hebrew  initials  were  added  in 
parentheses  to  the  Hebrew  form  of  the  name  Palestine  .  41 
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Map  1.  The  Palestine  Mandate,  1920  -  1948. 
In  1921  two  important  events  occured.  First,  Prince  Abdullah,  a  son  of 
King  Hussain  of  Mecca,  seized  the  area  known  as  Trans-Jordan  and  was 
recognized  by  Britain  an  March  27,1921,  as  emir  with  a  British  advisor 
and  a  subvention  from  Britain.  Subsequently,  Trans-Jordan  was  closed  to 
Jewish  settlement.  Trans-Jordan,  during  this  time,  was  part  of  the 
territories  of  the  Palestine  Mandate  entrusted  to  Britain.  42  At  this 
Point,  it  is  worth  observing  that,  according  to  a  prevailing  view,  the 
territories  of  Trans-Jordan  never  formed  part  of  historical  Palestine  as 
some  Israelis  have  claimed.  As  one  writer  indicateel  11  ...  The  area  lying 14 
east  of  Jordan  river...  which  was  called  Trans-Jordann.  had  not  formed 
part  of  historical  Palestine.  In  Ottoman  times,  it  had  been 
administratively  part  of  the  Province  of  Syria  and  was  called  the 
district  of  Balqa,  043 
The  second  event  in  1921  was  the  outbreak  of  violence,  in  Jaffa  and 
other  areas,  between  the  Arabs  and  the  Jews,  The  outcome  was  that  a 
number  of  victims  from  both  sides  were  killed  during  the  riots.  "  As  a 
result,  Samuel  ordered  a  temporary  halt  to  immigration  and  entered  into 
negotiations  with  the  Arab  Executive  Committee.  The  outcome  of  these 
negotiations  was  a  Vhite  Paper  issued  by  Churchill  an  June  22,1922.  It 
gave  a  restrictive  interpretation  of  the  Balfour  Declaration,  indicating 
that  "it  did  not  contemplate  that  Palestine  as  a  whole  should  be 
converted  into  a  Jewish  national  home.  904S  One  month  later  the  League 
of  Nations  Council  confirmed  the  Palestine  Mandate,  citing  the  Balfour 
Declaration  in  the  preamble  and  referring  to  the  "historical  connection 
of  the  Jewish  people  in  Palestine"  as  a  ground  for  reconstituting  their 
national  home  in  that  country.  It  also  provided  for  the  recognition  of 
the  Zionist  Organization  as  the  Jewish  Agency,  to  advise  and  cooperate 
with  the  administration  "in  such  economic,  social,  and  other  matters  as 
may  affect  the  establishment  of  the  Jewish  National  Home  and  the 
interests  of  the  Jewish  population  in  Palestine.  1146 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Mandate  referred  to  the  rights  of  the  Arab 
Palestinians,  then  constituting  the  vast  majority  of  the  population  of 
Palestine:  "it  being  clearly  understood  that  nothing  should  be  done 
which  might  prejudice  the  civil  and  religious  rights  of  existing 
non-Jewish  communities  in  Palestine.  6447 15 
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The  above  provisions  of  the  Mandate  require  some  observations.  In  the 
f  irst  place,  it  imposed  upon  the  mandatory  two  contradictory 
obligations.  It  provided  that  the  mandatory  would  permit  the  arrival  in 
the  country  by  thousands  of  immigrants;  at  the  same  time  the  mandatory 
had  to  safeguard  the  civil  and  religious  rights  of  all  the  inhabitants. 
Also,  it  is  noteworthy  that  "although  the  Mandate  speaks  of  Jewsithe 
Jewish  people  and  the  Jewish  population  of  Palestine,  it  does  not  once 
mention  the  Palestinians  or  the  Palestinian  Arabs  who...  then  constituted 
92  percent  of  the  population.  049  Only  the  World  Zionist  Organization 
and  its  representatives  were  consulted  about  the  terms'of  the  Mandate, 
and  they  also  participated  in  drafting  it.  The  Arab  Palestinians,  on 
the  other  hand,  were  neither  consulted  about  the  Mandate,  nor  was  their 
consent  obtained  as  to  its  terms. 
The  arguments  over  the  legitimacy  of  the  Mandate,  including  its 
injustice  under  international  law,  its  deprivation  of  the  indigenous 
people  of  Palestine  of  their  right  of  self-determination  and  its 
incompatibility  with  Article  22  of  the  Covenant,  are  well-known  and  do 
not  need  to  be  repeated  here.  49 
Turning  to  the  implementation  of  the  Mandate,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
the  British  policy  did  not  achieve  the  basic  purpose  of  Article  22  of 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  lead  the  people  to  full 
independence.  British  policy  could  not  develop  self-governing 
institutions,  as  stipulated  by  Article  2  of  the  Mandate.  This  is  due 
partly  to  Arab  opposition  and  partly  to  the  fact  that  the  Jews  rejected 
any  form  of  self-government  in  Palestine  so  long  as  they  were  a 
minority.  An  example  is  the  unsuccessful  attempt  made  in  1922  to  grant 
some  semblance  of  autonomy  in  the  form  of  legislative  council.  Hence, 16 
after  almost  three  decades  of  the  Mandate  there  was  no  sign  of 
self-governing  institutions.  60 
The  main  achievement  of  the  Mandate  was  its  authorization  of  a  massive 
Jewish  immigration  into  Palestine  which  resulted  in  the  modification  of 
the  demographic  structure  in  the  country  from  a  largely  Palestinian  Arab 
population.  to  a  mixed  Arab-Jewish  population.  In  facts  the  Jewish 
population  increased  more  than  ten  fold.  According  to  a  U.  N.  report,  " 
the  Jewish  population  increased  from  56,000  in  1918  to  83,794  in  the 
census  of  1922,  to  174,610  in  the  census  of  1931,  and  to  608,230  in  1946 
out  of  a  total  population  of  1,972,560. 
It  may  be  significant  here  to  indicate  that  this  immigration  and 
demographic  change  in  the  inhabitants  of  Palestine  was  achieved  against 
the  will  of  the  indigenous  population  and  in  the  face  of  their 
oppoSition.  62  The  Palestinian  opposition  took  the  form  of 
demonstrations,  disturbances  and  an  armed  rebellion.  An  example  is  the 
Arab  revolt  that  began  in  1936.  It  started  with  a  six-month  general 
strikes  guerilla  activities  and  effective  seizure  of  large  areas  of 
Palestine.  This  Arab  resistance,  however,  was  broken  by  the  British  and, 
by  the  spring  of  1939,  the  revolt  had  come  to  an  end.  63 
The  main  outcome  of  the  three  years  of  the  Arab  revolt  was  the  White 
Paper  of  1939,  whereby  the  British  Government  announced  its  intention  to 
limit  Jewish  immigration  into  Palestine  to  10,000  a  year  for  a  period  of 
five  years,  bringing  the  Jewish  population  to  a  third  of  the  totals 
after  which  further  immigration  would  depend  upon  Arab  consent;  the 
sale  of  land  to  Jews  was  to  be  severely  restricted;  finally,  the  White 
Paper  provided  for  granting  Palestine  its  independence  within  ten 
years.  64 17 
The  Vhite  Paper  of  1939  was  followed  by  a  British  policy  which  sought 
Arab  neutrality  in  the  period  1939-1945  and  which  led  Zionists  to 
change  their  tactics.  Instead  of  concentrating  on  the  mandatory  power, 
Britain,  they  focused  on  the  United  States.  "They  threatened  electoral 
punishment  through  the  Zionist  vote  if  the  American  administration 
failed  to  support  a  Jewish  state.  "  They  believed  that  the  U.  S.  could 
hand  Palestine  over  to  Zionists.  66 
In  the  meantine,  the  Zionists  used  new  methods  in  Palestine.  A  policY 
of  attrition  was  waged  against  the  administration.  From  the  middle  of 
World  War  II,  two  Jewish  terrorist  organizationsthe  Stern  and  the  Irgun 
Zvdi  Leumi,  made  a  number  of  attacks  an  British  forces  in  Palestine  and 
on  officials  abroad  (e.  g.,  the  assassination  of  Lord  Mayne,  the  British 
Resident  Minister  in  the  Middle  East  in  Cairo  in  1944).  sc' 
In  April  1947  the  British  Government  decided  to  submit  the  Palestine 
problem  to  the  UN.  Behind  this  was  the  fact  that  the  Palestine  problem 
had  become  too  complicated.  As  one  writer  pointed  auto  "Harassed  by 
the  Jewish  campaign  of  violence  and  terror,  unable  to  permit  any  further 
Jewish  immigration  against  the  wishes  Of  the  original  inhabitants, 
subjected  to  pressure  by  American  President  Harry  Truman  to  open  the 
gates  of  Palestine  to  Jewish  immigrants  while  the  US  Government  closed 
to  them  its  own  doors,  the  British  Government  decided  to  refer...  the 
question  to  the  U]W.  "67 
THE  UK  PARTIT1011  R&90LUTT_nN  OF  1947 
On  April  2,1947,  the  British  Government  informed  the  Secretary-General 
of  the  UN  that  it  wished  that  question-of  Palestine  be  placed  on  the 
agenda  of  the  General  Assembly  at  the  next  session.  Britain  intended  to 18 
ask  the  Assembly  "to  make  a  recommendation  under  Article  10  of  the 
Charter  concerning  the  future  government  of  Falestine.  "r*13 
The  General  Assembly  held  a  special  meeting  on  April  28,1947  to 
consider  the  Palestine  question.  In  the  debate,  the  Jewish 
representatives  and  the  Palestinian  representatives  were  invited  to 
submit  their  views.  The  Jews  asked  for  the  reconstitution  of  the  Jewish 
national  home  in  Palestine  in  accordance  with  the  Balfour  Declaration, 
whereas  the  Palestinian  representative  "opposed  the  plan  to  partition 
Palestine,  and  emphasized  that  the  Palestinian  Arabs  were  entitled  to 
their  independence  an  the  basis  of  the  Charter  and  their  natural  and 
inalienable  rights.  1169  The  Arab  states,  during  the  same  debate, 
expressed  the  view  that  the  only  course  open  to  the  UN  was  to  recognize 
the  termination  of  the  Mandate  and  declare  the  independence  of 
Palestine.  When  this  Arab  proposal  was  submitted  to  the  vote,  it  failed 
to  obtain  the  required  najority.  60 
On  May  15,1947,  the  General  Assembly  appointed  a  special  committee  on 
Palestine  (UNSCOP)  to  prepare  a  report  on  Palestine.  Its  terms  of 
reference  gave  the  committee  "the  widest  powers  to  ascertain  and  record 
facts,  and  to  investigate  all  questions  and  issues  relevant  to  the 
problem  of  Palestine.  "c-I  In  its  report,  published  on  August  31,1947, 
the  committee  recommended  unanimously  that  the  Mandate  for  Palestine 
should  be  terminated  at  the  earliest  possible  date  and  that  independence 
should  be  granted  in  Palestine  at  the  earliest  practical  date.  However$ 
the  committee  could  not  agree  on  a  unanimous  opinion  as  regards  the 
future  of  Palestine.  It,  thereforej  proposed  two  plans,  one  agreed  by 
the  MaJority  and  other  approved  by  a  minority.  62 19 
The  seven-  member  majority  called  for  the  partition  of  Palestine  into 
an  Arab  state,  a  Jewish  state,  and  a  corpus  separatum  for  the  city  of 
Jerusalem,  which  would  be  subjected  to  a  special  international  regime 
to  be  administrated  by  the  UK.  The  Arab  state  was  to  comprise  Western 
Gallilee,  the  hill  country  of  the  Vest  Bank  (excluding  Jerusalem),  and 
the  coastal  plain  from  Ashdod  to  the  Sinai  frontier;  the  Jewish  state 
would  include  eastern  Gallilee,  the  Jezreel  valley,  most  of  the  coastal 
plain,  and  the  Negev.  On  the  other  hand,  the  minority,  consisting  of 
representatives  of  India,  Iran,  and  Yugoslavia,  proposed  the 
establishment  of  a  bi-national  federal  state  which  would  comprise  an 
Arab  and  a  Jewish  state  with  Jerusalem  as  the  capital  of  the 
federation.  63 
When  the  report  of  UNSCOP  came  up  for  discussion,  Arab  states 
rejected  the  partition  proposals  for  two  main  reasons.  First,  the  UN 
General  'Assembly  was  not  competent,  under  the  Charter,  to  recommend  the 
partition  of  Palestine.  Secondly  and  most  significantly,  they  stressed 
that  both  the  Balfour  Declaration  and  the  Mandate  over  Palestine  were 
null  and  void.  64 
As  a  result,  sub-committee  2  of  the  ad  hoc  committee  on  the  Palestine 
question  was  asked  to  study  the  issues  raised  by  the  Arab  states 
rejecting  partition.  In  its  report,  the  sub-committee  recommended  that 
these  issues  be  referred  to  the  International  Court  of-  Justice  for  an 
advisory  opinion.  In  this  context,  it  suggested  a  number  of  important 
questions  to  be  submitted  to  the  Court.  It  seems  relevant  and  useful  to 
quote  these  questions  : 
(a)Vhether  the  indigenous  population  of  Palestine  has  an  inherent  right 
to  Palestine  and  to  determine  its  future  constitution  and  government; 
'A 20 
(b)Whether  the  pledges  and  assurences  given  by  Great  Britain  to  the 
Arabs  during  the  First  World  War  (including  the  Anglo-French  Declaration 
of  1918)  concerning  the  independence  and  future  of  Arab  countries  at  the 
"  rV 
end  of  the  war  did  not  include  Palestine; 
(c)Vhether  the  Balfour  Declaration,  which  was  made  without  the  knowledge 
or  consent  of  the  indigenous  population  of  Palestine,  was  valid  and 
binding  on  the  people  of  Palestine,  or  consistent  with  the  earlier  and 
subsequent  pledges  given  to  the  Arabs; 
(d)Vhether  the  provision.  1of  the  Mandate  for  Palestine  regarding  the 
establishment  of  a  Jewish  national  home  in  Palestine  are  in  coumformity 
or  consistent  with  the  provisiony  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations  (in  particular  Article  22),  or  are  compatible  with  the  provision 
of  the  Mandate  relating  to  the  development  of  self-government  and  the 
preservation  of  the  rights  of  and  position  of  the  Arabs  of  Palestine; 
(e)Whether  the  legal  basis  of  the  Mandate  for  Palestine  has  not 
disappeared  with  the  dissolution  of  the  League  of  Nations,  and  whether 
it  is  not  the  duty  of  the  Mandatory  Power  to  hand  over  powers  and 
administration  to  a  goverment  of  Palestine  representing  the  rightful 
people  of  Palestine, 
(f)Whether  a  plan  to  partition  Palestine  without  the  consent  of  the 
majority  of  its  people  is  consistent  with  the  objectives  of  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Rations,  and  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Mandate  for  Palestine; 
(g)Whether  the  United  Nations  is  competent  to  recommend  either  of  the 
two  plans  and  recommendations  of  the  majority  or  minority  of  the  United 
Nations  Special  Committee  on  Palestinetor  any  other  solution  involving 
partition  of  the  territory  of  Palestine,  or  permanent  trusteeship  over 21 
any  city  or  part  of  Palestine,  without  the  consent  of  the  majority  of 
the  people  of  Palestine  , 
(h)Vhether  the  United  Nations  or  any  of  its  members  is  competent  to 
enforce  or  recommend  the  enforcement  of  any  proposal  concerning  the 
constitution  and  future  goverment  of  Palestine,  in  particular  any  plan 
of  partition  which  is  contrary  to  the  wishes,  or  adopted  without  the 
consent  of  the  inhabitants  of  Palestine.  66 
Nevertheless,  despite  its  importance,  the  recomm  ndation  to  refer  these 
questions  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice  was  rejected  by  the  ad 
hoc  committee  on  November,  24,1947  by  25  votes  to  18.66 
The  General  Assembly  adopted,  on  November  .  29,1947,  Resolution  181(ID 
for  the  partition  of  Palestine  into  an  Arab  and  a  Jewish  state.  The 
partition  provided  for  the  majority  plan  with  slight  territorial 
modifications.  The  Resolution  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  33  to  13  with  ten 
abstentions.  The  UK  abstained.  67 
The  outcome  of  the  Partition  Resolution  was  that  the  Jews,  who 
constituted  less  than  one-third  of  the  population,  who  were  largely 
foreigners  and  who  owned  less  than  6  percent  of  the  land,  were  given  an 
area  almost  ten  times  greater  than  what  they  owned,  namely,  57  percent 
of  Palestine,  while  it  left  43  percent  of  the  land  to  the  Palestinians. 
Thus,  there  is  some  reason,  in  the  observation  of  Cattan  that:  "  This  is 
not  a  partition  but  a  spoilation.  1'rG 
THE  FOUR  VARq 
Two  years  before  the  declaration  of  the  creation  of  Israel,  Arab 
leaders  were  invited  by  the  Arab  League  to  meet  in  Bludan  (Syria)  in 
October  1946  to  consider  the  possibility  of  an  Arab  military  action  or 22 
Map  2  The  United  Nations  Partition  Plan,  November  1947 
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intervention  to  prevent  the  establishment  of  a  Jewish  state  in  Palestine 
and  to  help  the  Arab  Palestinians  to  defend  themselves  against  the 
Jewish  aggression  launched  by  the  "military  Jewish  gangs".  During  this 
meeting,  the  Egyptian  representative  expressed  the  view  that  it  had  been 
decided  previously  not  to  engage  in  military  operations  outside  Egyptian 
territories.  69  Nevertheless,  despite  this  decision,  some  Egyptian 
volunteers,  who  belonged  to  Egyptian  Islamic  movementso  were  sent  the 
same  year  to  take  part  in  the  Arab  struggle  in  Palestine  where  there 
had  been  a  state  of  a  civil  war  between  the  Jewish  immigrants  and  the 
Arab  inhabitants  since  1936.70 
Vith  the  departure  of  the  British  High  Commission  on  May  14,1948,  the 
state  of  Israel  was  proclaimed.  Reacting  to  that  Declarationt  the  Arab 
League  adopted  a  resolution  calling  on  Arab  States  to  intervene  to 
restore  peace  and  safeguard  Arab  lives  in  the  absence  of  any  settled 
authority.  In  his  cablegram  to  the  Secretary-  General  of  the  United 
Nations,  the  Secretary-General  of  the  League  explained  the  reasons  for 
this  intervention  as  being  "to  restore  law  and  order  and  to  prevent 
disturbances  prevailing  in  Palestine  from  spreading  into  their 
territories  and  check  further  bloodshed.  91  71 
According  to  the  military  plan  approved  by  the  Arab  League,  it  was 
decided  to  enter  Palestine  using  four  Arab  armies.  The  Syrian  and 
Lebanese  forces  were  to  enter  northern  Palestine,  the  Iraqis  and  the 
Arab  Legion  to  attack  south  of  Lake  Galilee  towards  Haifa  and  the 
Egyptian  army  to  be  essentially  diversionary,  pinning  down  Jewish  forces 
south  5>S'  Tel  Aviv.  However,  it  has  been  said  that  the  Arab  forces  were 
generally  restricted  to  the  area  alloted  to  Palestine  Arabs  in  the 
Partition  Resolution.  The  Egyptian  force  was  about  10,000  soldiers 24 
organized  into  two  brigades.  The  fighting  lasted  from  May  6  to  June 
11,19480  when  the  first  cease-fire  came  into  effect  in  response  to  a 
Security  Council  resolution.  At  this  time,  the  Egyptian  forces  had 
occupied  some  parts  of  south  Palestine,  including  Negev.  Fighting 
resumed  afterogyptian  government  refused  to  renew  the  truce.  During 
this  period,  Israeli  forces  were  able  to  defeat  the  Egyptian  armies  and 
enter  some  areas  behind  the  Egyptian  boundariesg  namely  the  Rafah 
Heights.  72  The  Egyptian  Government  invoked  the  Anglo-Egyptian  Treaty  of 
1936,  under  which  Britain  was  obliged  to  assist  Egypt  in  the  event  of 
attack  from  an  outside  party.  73 
On  December  29,  the  Security  Council  ordered  an  immediate  cease-f  ire 
and  Israeli  withdrawal  from  Egypt.  The  British  government  declared  that, 
unless  Israel  obeyed  the  Security  Council  resolution,  Britain  would 
employ  its  forces  in  accordance  with  the  Anglo-Egyptian  Treaty  of  1936. 
The  Egyptians  declared  that,  unless  Israel  withdrew  from  their 
territory,  they  would  not  begin  armistice  negotiations.  Israel 
responded  by  withdrawing  from  the  Rafah  Heightýin  the  second  week  of 
January  in  order  to  begin  peace  negotiations  with  Egypt  .  74  On  January 
13,1949  the  first  peace  negotiations  between  Egypt  and  Israel  began 
under  the  supervision  of  the  UN  an  the  Island  of  Rhodes.  Within  ten 
days  ,  the  two  states  reached  an  agreement  which  was  signed  an  February 
25,1949.  Then  followed  the  Armistice  Agreement  between  Israel  and 
Lebanon  an  March  23,1949;  then  the  Jordanian-  Israeli  Agreement  an 
April  3.1949;  andthe  Syrian-Israeli  Agreement  on  July  20,1949  .  76 
For  Israel,  the  main  outcome  of  the  war  was  its  seizure  of  78  percent 
of  the  territories  of  the  Mandate  of  Palestine.  Bolstered  by  its 
decisive  victory  over  four  Arab  armies,  Israel  refused  to  implement  the 25 
UN  Partition  Resolution  of  1949.  The  Egyptians,  who  realized  that  the 
main  reason  behind  the  defeat  was  the  fact  that  their  army  entered  the 
war  without  the  preparation  required,  began  to  wonder  about  the  reason 
behind  the  government's  decisions  which  brought  this  defeat  to  Egypt. 
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The  outcome  for  the  Arab  League  was  its  total  failure  to  face  the  first 
challenge  to  Arab  security.  Its  fai  lure  resulted  in  t  he  loss  Of  Most  Of 
Palestine.  The  main  reason  for  the  failure  was  the  lack  of 
coordination  among  the  Arab  armies  .  In  fact,  the  League  failed  to 
appoint  an  overall  Arab  military  commander  because  of  internal  Arab 
differences.  While,  for  instance,  the  Jordanian  army  accepted  a 
cease-fire,  the  Egyptian  army,  due  to  this  lack  of  coordination,  was 
still  fighti  ng.  7r- 26 
One  of  the  most  notable  outcomes  of  the  1948  war  was  the  existence  of  a 
state  of  war  between  the  Arab  states  and  Israel.  From  1948,  the  Arabs 
considered  themselves  at  war  with  Israel.  The  resolution  and  procedures 
adopted  by  the  League  since  1948  have  emphasized  this  state.  The 
economic  boycott  initiated  by  the  League  relied  partly  on  the  state  of 
war  doctrine,  as  did  the  political  boycott  of  Israel  by  the  ArabS77. 
From  1948,  Egypt  announced  that  she  still  regarded  herself  as  being  in 
a  state  of  war  with  Israel  since  that  status  continued  despite  the 
Armistice  Agreements  ands  therefore,  she  reserved  to  herself  for  her  own 
protection  certain  belligerent's  rights  of  visit,  search  and  seizure. 
As  a  result,  Egypt  barred  the  Suez  Canal  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  from 
Israeli  navigation.  The  Israelis  did  not  accept  Egypt's  argument  and 
practices  and  questioned  the  legality  of  the  existence  of  the  state  of 
war  with  Egypt7Q.  Reasons  in  support  of  these  two  views  need  to  be 
outlined. 
In  support  of  the  first  view,  it  has  been  argued  that,  under 
international  law,  the  rule  is  that  an  armistice  agreement  does  not 
terminate  the  state  of  war  existing  between  the  belligerents#  and  that 
the  rights  and  duties  of  the  belligerents  and  of  neutrals  remain  in 
being.  79  According  to  some  scholars  who  support  this  view#  the  Arab- 
Israeli  Armistice  Agreements  do  not  derogate  from  the  general  rule 
applicable  to  all  armistices,  i.  e.,  that  they  provide  for  a  complete 
cessation  of  all  hostilities,  for  a  specified  or  indeterminate  period, 
but  do  not  bring  about  peace  in  the  legal  sense  or  proscribe  the 
exercise  of  belligerent  rights,  save  those  fcr  the  conduct  of 
hostilities,  under  the  law  of  war.  "  This  view  is  supported  by  many 
writers  and  has  received  judical  approval  on  a  number  of  occasions-" 27 
State  practice  reveals  that  the  traditional  concepts  relating  to  the 
state  of  war  doctrine  still  form  a  significant  part  of  international 
law.  For  example,  when  Siam  applied  for  admission  to  the  UN,  France's 
objections  thereto  were  based  upon  the  continuation  of  a  state  of  war 
between  the  two  countries  resulting  from  Siam's  aggression  in  Indo- 
China92.  Furthermore,  at  one  stage  Greece  considered  itself  technically 
in  a  state  of  war  with  Albania,  a  ground  which  was  accepted  by  the 
International  Court  in  the  Corfu  ChAnnol  Case  as  justifying  certain 
measures  Albania  could  have  taken  in  respect  of  the  passage  through  the 
Channel  93.  Some  Allied  Powers  considered  themselves  in  a  state  of  war 
with  Japan  for  a  number  of  years  after  its  surrender.  94 
Also,  this  view  was  held  by  national  courts.  The  United  Arab 
Republics  Prize  Court  affirmed  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  despite 
the  armistice  agreement  as  long  as  there  existed  "the  need  to  be  in  a 
permanent  defensive  position  so  that  the  Arab  states  can  preserve  their 
existence,  independence  and  security.  96 
On  the  other  hand,  some  scholars  support  Israel  in  holding  that  the 
belligerency  between  the  parties  concerned  was  terminated  by  the 
conclusion  of  the  Armistice  Agreement  of  1949.  The  following  reasons 
have  been  advanced. 
First,  the  question  of  the  nature  of  the  Armistice  Agreements  and  their 
effect  upon  the  state  of  war  between  Israel  and  the  Arab  States  was 
debated  before  the  Security  Council  in  1951  when  Israel  complained  to 
the  Security  Council  against  the  restrictions  imposed  by  Egypt  upon  the 
passage  of  Israeli  ships  in-  the  Suez  Canal.  Both  Egypt  and  Israel 
expressed  their  own  view  on  the  issue.  On  September  1,1951  the  Security 
Council  adopted  a  resolution  which  provided  Inter  alla: 28 
"that  since  the  armistice  regime,  which  has  been  in  existence  for  nearly 
two  and  a  half  years,  is  of  a  permanent  character,  neither  party  can 
reasonably  assert  that  it  is  actively  a  belligerent  or  rb..  i.  lresnhat  to 
exercise  the  right  of  visit,  search  and  seizure  for  any  legitimýte 
purpose  of  self-defence.  1196 
Thus,  by  rejecting  the  Egyptian  claim  of  belligerent  rights,  the 
resolution  has  been  construed  by  some  authors  as  an  authority  for  the 
legal  proposition  that  the  Armistice  Agreements  were  a  de  factc, 
termination  of  war  and  that  belligerent  rights  were  no  longer 
available.  87  In  contemporary  practice,  an  armistice  agreement  may  have 
the  effect  of  terminating  the  legal  status  of  war,  particularly  if  the 
agreement  was  concluded  for  an  indefinite  duration.  As  is  well-knownt 
the  Armistice  Agreements  between  the  Arabs  and  Israel  were  concluded 
for  an  indefinite  duration,  thus  leading  to  a  de  facta  state  of 
peace98. 
Moreover,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  can 
in  no  way  be  reconciled  with  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  of  the  UK. 
In  this  respect  Feinberg  argued  that  "The  provisions  of  Article  2j 
paragraph  4,  prohibiting  the  use,  or  the  threat,  of  forcet  ares  of 
course,  no  guarantee  against  developments  which  might$  in  consequence  of 
a  breach  of  them,  lead  to  hostilities  between  member  states  of  the 
Organization,  and  even  to  military  operations  on  a  very  wide  scale.  But 
it  is  impossible  to  maintain  that,  on  the  cessation  of  such  hostilities 
(generally,  by  a  cease-fire  order  of  the  Security  Council),  a  State  can 
lawfully  argue  that  it  is'at-  war  with  the  State  with  which  it  has  been 
in  conflict...  The  authors  draw  a  distinction  between  a  "state  of  war" 
accompanied  by  hostilities  and  one  not  so  accompanied:  the  former,  in 29 
their  opinion,  is  forbidden,  the  latter,  permissible,  under  the 
Charter.  1189.  Lastlyj  the  Tel  Aviv  District  Court  declared  that  the  war 
between  Israel  and  Lebanon  had  been  terminated  not  later  than  March 
23,1949-1111. 
Another  outcome  of  the  1948  War  concerned  the  1950  Arab  Defence  Pact. 
By  1950,  the  lessons  learned  from  the  Arab  defeat  in  the  1948  war 
brought  about  the  conclusion  of  the  Arab  Joint  Defence  and  Economic 
Cooperation  Treaty.  The  Treaty  established  an  Arab  system  for 
collective  self  defence  to  replace  the  system  provided  by  Article  6  of 
the  League's  Charter.  91 
The  final  outcome  was  the  Arab  economic  boycott.  In  1951,  a  central 
boycott  officet  with  headquarters  in  Damascus,  was  established  to 
implement  the  League's  policy  and  the  boycott  programme.  The  boycott 
principles  and  detailed  regulations,  which  were  drafted  by  the 
directors  of  regional  offices  and  members  of  the  central  boycott  office, 
were  approved  by  the  League's  Council.  It  was  called  "the  unified  law" 
and  was  subsequently  approved  by  the  legislative  authorities  in  each 
Arab  State.  The  boycott  legislation  provided  a  number  of  principles: 
all  natural  and  legal  persons  were  prevented  from  entering  into 
transactions  with  any  persons  or  firms  resident  in  Israel,  or  of  Israeli 
nationality,  or  acting  on  behalf  of  or  in  the  interest  of  Israel,  if  the 
object  of  these  transactions  was  commercial,  financial  or  any  other  kind 
of  dealings.  The  entry  or  exchange  of,  or  commerce  in  any  goods, 
products  or  intangible  property  of  Israel  was  prohibited.  Any  person 
who  was  proved  to  be  dealing  with  Israel  and  violating  these  rules  would 
be  punished.  The  penalities  -,  ranged  from  a  fine  to  imprisonment. 30 
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with  the  foreign  companies  dealing  with  Israel  would  be 
banned  in  certain  circumstances.  92 
In  relation  to  foreign  banks,  they  would  be  banned  if  they  give  loans 
to  Israeli  firms  or  institutions  in  a  way  that  enabled  them  to  carry  out 
major  projects.  Moreover$  they  were  not  allowed  to  establish  firms  or 
companies  in  Israel.  The  principles  of  the  boycott  may  be  changed  and 
altered  to  coincide  with  the  interests  of  the  Arab  cause.  The 
regulations  of  the  boycott  cannot  be  applied  unless  an  approach  is  made 
to  the  companies  r':  to  enquire  about  their  relations  with  Israelo 
and  to  allow  them  to  comply  with  the  boycott  regulations. 
On  July  23,1952,  Gamal  Abdel-Nasser,  seized  control  of  the  Egyptian 
government  in  a  bloodless  military  coup.  His  hatred  for  the  British 
was  announced  in  his  speeches,  as  he  regarded  Britain-,  jesponsible  for 
the  establishment  of  the  Jewish  state  in  Palestine  and  for  occupying 
Egyptian  territories  for  seventy-two  years.  93 
After  seizing  power,  Nasser's  aim  was  to  liquidate  the  British 
occupation  in  and  outside  Egypt.  The  Egyptian  government  encouraged 
liberation  movements  against  the  British  in  the  Arabian  Gulf  and  Africa. 
Nasser  rejected  the  idea  of  linking  the  Middle  East  with  Western 
defensive  organizations,  such  as  the  organization  of  Baghdad  Pact  which 
was  sponsored  by  the  British.  He  nationalized  the  Suez  Canal  Company. 
The  British  government  owned  a  controlling  interest  in  the  company's 
shares,  a  quarter  of  British  imports  passed  through  the  Canal,  and  a 
third  of  the  ships  using  the  waterway  were  British. 
France  had  its  own  reasons  for  disliking  the  new  government  in  Egypt. 
All  the  liberation  movements  against  France  in  North  Africa  had  been 
encouraged  by  Nasser.  He  was  the  main  supplier  of'  weapons  to  the 31 
Algerian  revolutionary  movement.  During  a  meeting  in  Cairo,  on  March 
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I--  14,1956,  Nasser  assured  French  Foreign  Minister  that  Egypt  would  refrain 
from  supporting  Algerian  independence  but  did  not.  The  second  state 
after  Britain  to  be  affected  by  the  Suez  Canal  nationalization  was 
France.  For  Nasser,  Fance  had  been  regarded  as  an  enemy  since  it 
occupied  Arab  territories  and  supplied  Israel  with  modern  weapons. 
As  for  Israel,  Israeli  territory  was  subject  to  guerrilla  raids  by  the 
"fedaieen"  movement,  organised  by  the  Egyptian  government.  It  has  been 
said  that  there  was  no  specific  provision  in  the  Armistice  Agreement  of 
1949  between  Egypt  and  Israel  committing  Egypt  to  prevent  such  raids. 
Moreover,  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  had  been  blocked  to  Israeli  navigation  in 
the  Red  Sea,  and  no  goods  f  or  Israel  were  allowed  to  pass  through  the 
Suez  Canal.  Israel  was  also  worried  about  the  growing  influence  of 
Nasser's  policy  in  the  Arab  world,  as  the  leadership  of  the  Arab  world 
was  clearly  shifting  to  him.  On  February,  28,1955,  Israel  launched  an 
attack  on  Gaza  that  led  to  the  killing  of  thirty  eight  Egyptian  officers 
and  men.  Egypt  retaliated  with  guerrilla  raids.  Nasser  turned  to  the 
Eastern  bloc  for  weaponsg  since  he.  considered  that  attack  as  the  turning 
point  in  his  policy  toward  Israel. 
In  order  to  finance  his  great  economic  project,  the  Aswan  High  Dam, 
Nasser  nationalized  the  Suez  Canal  an  July  26,1956  to  use  its  revenues 
to  finance  the  dam  project.  The  British  government,  in  response,  decided 
to  take  military  action  against  Egypt  to  seize  the  Suez  Canal.  France 
and  Israel  had  agreed  to  take  part  in  that  action. 
At  this  point,  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  decision  of  the  British 
and  French  governments  to  intervene  militarily  in  Egypt  was  not 
Justified  under  international  law.  According  to  Henkin,  lawyers  told 32 
Eden  that  force  would  be  illegal  even  as  a  last  resort.  94  In  the  House 
of  Lords,  on  September  12,1956,  Lord  MacNair,  a  leading  British 
international  lawyer,  said  that  11  as  far  as  the  events  in  the  present 
controversy  up  to  date  are  known  to  us,  I  am  unable  to  see  the  legal 
justification  of  the  threat  or  use  of  armed  forces  against  Egypt  in 
order  to  impose  a  solution  of  this  dispute.  "96 
The  war  plan  agreed  by  the  three  was  that  Israel  would  attack  the 
Egyptian  boundaries  in  Sinai  Peninsula,  then  a  joint  British  and  French 
military  force  would  invade  Egypt  and  seize  the  area  of  Suez  Canal  to 
guarantee  international  navigation.  The  military  intervention  had 
several  aims:  to  control  the  Suez  Canal  navigation  by  the  British  so 
they  could  regain  their  prestige  in  the  Arab  world;  to  destroy  the 
leadership  of  Nasser  who  helped  liberation  movements  against  the  British 
and  French;  to  link  the  new  Egyptian  government  which  would  replace 
Nasser  with  Vestern  collective  defence,  an  idea  that  was  rejected  by 
Nasser. 
On  October  29,1956,  Israel,  supported  by  a  modern  French  army  attacked 
Sinai.  According  to  Defence  Minister  Dayan,  "the  purpose  of  the 
campaign  was  to  wipe  out  the  Egyptian  army  in  Sinai,  to  destroy  the 
"Fedaieen"  bases  in  Gaza  and  to  open  up  the  Straits  of  Tiran-1111  Yet, 
when  Israeli  forces  occupied  Sinai,  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian 
army  to  counter  the  Anglo-French  attack,  Ben  Gurion,  Israel's  premier, 
said  that  "Sinai  has  been  liberated  by  the  Israeli  army"s  and  he 
regarded  Sinai  as  a  part  of  the  homeland  which  had  been  occupied  by  the 
invader.  97 
On  the  day  after  the  Israeli  attack,  the  Anglo-French  military 
invasion  started.  The  city  of  Port  Said  was  occupied  and  the  forces 33 
began  marching  in  order  to  seize  all  the  Canal  area.  All  Egyptian 
airfields  were  bombed,  the  Egyptian  army  could  not  sustain  fighting 
against  the  forces  of  two  major  powers,  and  it  was  reduced  to  launching 
guerilla  attacks. 
On  November  2,1956,  the  UK  General  Assembly  adopted  Resolution  997 
whereby  it  called  for  an  immediate  cease-fire  and  withdrawal  of  all 
occupying  forces  from  Egyptian  territory.  On  November  4,  a  resolution 
to  create  a  United  Nations  Emergency  Force,  which  would  separate  the 
combatants  along  the  Suez  Canal  and  elsewhere  in  Sinai,  was  adopted  by 
the  General  Assembly.  99  Eventually,  the  British  and  the  French  forces 
withdrew  from  Egypt  under  the  pressure  of  the  two  superpowers$ 
particularly  the  direct  pressure  exerted  by  the  US  on  the  British 
government  and  Israel,  whose  f  arces  had  evacuated  Sinai  af  ter  the 
agreement  that  the  UK  f  arces  would  stay  in  Sharm-El-Sheikh  to  guarantee 
Israeli  navigation  in  the  Red  Sea.  Moreover,  Egypt  undertook  to  prevent 
guerilla  actions  against  Israel  from  Egyptian  territories  and  the  Gaza 
strip. 
The  outcome  of  the  1956  war  was  that  Israel  at  the  cost  of  180  killed 
and  4  captured  had  succeeded  in  opening  the  Aqaba  Gulf  for  Israeli 
navigation  and  preventing  guerrilla  raids  from  Egyptian  territory.  It 
failed  to  destroy  the  whole  of  the  Egyptian  army,  and  did  not  topple 
the  Nasser  government.  Moreover,  the  Suez  Canal  was  still  blocked  to 
Israeli  navigation  or  cargo.  On  the  Egyptian  side,  2000  soldiers  were 
killed  and  6000  were  captured.  Although  defeated  in  battlet  it  was 
widely  recognized  that  Nasser  had  won  the  war  politically.  His 
struggle  during  the  Suez  crisis  made  him  a  hero  before  his  nation  and 
his  leadership  in  the  Arab  world  was  enhanced. 34 
Another  outcome  of  this  war  was  that  the  episode  served  to  push  Egypt 
further  into  the  adoption  of  an  extreme  hardline  policy  against  Israel. 
Under  any  criterion,  the  Israeli  aggression  was  regarded  as  a  violation 
of  the  provisions  of  the  1949  Armistice  Agreement.  It  was  also  contrary 
to  international  law  and  the  Israeli  obligations  as  a  member  of  the 
United  Nations.  Consequently,  Egypt  expanded  its  economic  war  against 
Israel  through  the  policy  of  economic  sanctions  imposed  by  the  Arab 
League. 
Another  notable  outcome  was  the  failure  of  the  Arab  League  and  its 
Defence  Pact  vis-a-vis  the  attack  on  Egypt,  and  the  League's  role 
during  the  Suez  War  was  of  mere  political  nature.  Despite  the  fact  that 
the  League's  Council  adopted  several  resolutions  whereby  it  announced 
its  full  support  for  Egypt's  struggle,  nevertheless  the  League's  role 
was  neither  decisive  nor  influential.  In  fact,  it  was  undermined  by  the 
lack  of  any  form  of  Arab  military  support  for  Egypt  and  the  lack  of  a 
unified  and  strong  Arab  political  stand  alongside  Egypt.  One  must 
admit  that  the  Arab  League  system  for  collective  self-defence  failed  for 
the  second  time  to  repel  Israeli  aggression.  At  this  point,  it  is 
worth  mentioning  that  the  main  factor  behind  the  failure  of  the  League 
during  this  period  was  internal  differences  within  the  League.  99 
The  period  following  the  1956  war  was  one  of  the  coýnparative  quiet  in 
the  Israel  i-Egyptian  borders  both  along  the  Gaza  Strip  and  in  Sinai. 
This  was  largely  due  to  the  presence  of  UN  forces  (UNEF)  in  the  area. 
In  the  meantime,  Arab  states  were  preoccupied  with  internal  local 
crises,  e.  g.,  the  crisis  in  Lebanon  in  1958,  the  Syrian-Jordanian  crisis 
in  the  1960s,  and  the  Yemen  crisis  since  1961.1" 35 
Neverthless,  an  examination  of  Arab  League  policy  during  the  period 
1964-1967  would  suggest  that  the  strategy  adopted  by  the  League  had 
opened  the  door  to  Israel  to  initiate  her  aggression  on  June  5,1967. 
On  the  political  side,  the  Arab  League's  first  summit  (1964),  in 
reaction  to  the  Israeli  project  to  divert  the  River  Jordan,  established 
an  authority  for  the  implementation  of  an  Arab  counter-project  for  the 
exploitation  of  the  Jordan's  waters.  1c"  They  regarded  Israel  as  the 
most  dangerous  threat  to  Arab  security.  This  attitude  was  confirmed  by 
the  resolutions  of  the  second  summit  which  was  held  also  in  Egypt 
(Alexandria)  in  the  same  year  Q964).  102  During  their  third  summit 
(1965)  in  Morocco,  the  Arab  heads  of  states  decided  upon  a  specific  plan 
to  liberate  Palestine  and  'it  had  also  been  agreed  to  use  diplomatic 
strategy  to  raise  the  Palestinian  question  in  the  United  Nations.  103  In 
sum,  the  League's  political  strategy  was  characterized  by  its  severe 
hostility  towards  Israel.  On  the  military  side,  the  first  summit 
meeting  decided  to  establish  a  unified  Arab  military  command  to  defend 
Arab  territories  against  any  threat  by  Israel,  and  earmarked  t154 
million  for  this  purpose.  In  his  speech  before  the  second  summit 
(1964),  the  commander  of  the  unified  Arab  force  stated  that  the  eastern 
front  comprising  Syria,  Jordan,  and  Lebanon  could  not  in  its  present 
condition  stand  up  to  an  Israeli  attack,  and  should  be  furnished  with 
armies  and  facilities.  The  build-up  of  that  front,  it  was  estimated, 
needed  a  period  of  at  least  three  years.  At  the  end  of  the  meeting,  he 
was  requested  to  prepare  an  Arab  military  plan  to  face  Israel.  "' 
By  June,  1,1967,  two  military  Joint-defence  agreements  were  signed 
between  Egypt  and  both  Syria  and  Jordan.  An  Egyptian  military  officer 
was  sent  to  Jordan  as  the  commander  of  the  Arab  eastern  front.  Some 36 
Arab  states  sent  military  forces  to  Egypt  (e.  g.,  Algeria  and  Kuwait). 
There  was  also  full  collaboration  between  Egypt  and  the  Arab  states 
within  the  framework  of  the  Arab  League.  106 
The  1967  War  had  several  causes.  In  reaction  to  an  Israeli  irrigation 
project  that  would  affect  the  water  reaching  Jordan,  the  Arab  League 
decided  to  finance  a  project  to  divert  the  course  of  the  Rivers  Letani 
and  Banias  to  prevent  their  waters  from  reaching  Israel.  Israel 
attacked  the  engineers  working  in  the  Arab  project  and  their  equipment 
was  destroyed.  106 
At  that  time,  the  military  wing  of  the  PLO  was  launching  intensive 
guerilla  attacks  on  Israel  from  Syrian  territory  .  Israel  claimed  that 
Syrian  soldiers  took  part  in  this  military  action.  Its  aeroplanes 
retaliated  by  attacking  Syrian  territory  and  Israeli  military  forces 
gathered  at  the  Syrian  border.  11117  The  leaders  of  Israel  threatened  to 
launch  preemptive  attacks  to  prevent  guerilla  raids  and  to  secure  its 
borders.  109 
Egypt,  Igh"thd  other  hýalig,  which  had  a  mutual  defence  agreement  with 
Syria,  threatened  that  it  was  going  to  intervene  under  this  agreement 
if  Israel  launched  attacks  on  Syria.  Both  Egypt  and  Syria  were  also 
parties  to  the  Arab  Defence  Pact.  1119  In  May  1967,  Egypt  took  three 
steps  which  were  regarded  as  the  direct  reason  for  the  war:  the  blocking 
of  the  Aqaba  Gulf  to  Israeli  navigation,  the  removal  of  UNEF  from 
Egypt  at  its  request  and  the  deployment  of  large  numbers  of  Egypt  forces 
in  Sinai.  110  From  an  Israeli  official  viewpoint,  these  Egyptian 
measurest  as  well  as  the  Arab  leaders'  threats  to  destroy  Israel,  were 
regarded  as  legal  justification  giving  Israel  the  right  to  exercise 
anticipatory  self-defence  under  Article  51  of  the  Charter.  "' 37 
On  the  morning  of  June  5,1967,  Israeli  bombers  began  to  attack 
Egyptian  airfields,  destroying  aircraft  on  the  ground  and  putting 
runways  out  of  acti.  on.  In  less  than  three  hours  300  out  of  340  Egyptian 
aircraft,  representing  almost  all  of  the  Egyptian  air  force  were 
destroyed,  mostly  on  the  ground  .  Vithin  half  an  hour  of  the  beginning 
of  the  airstrikess  Israeli  ground  forces  launched  an  offensive  against 
Egyptian  positions  in  the  Gaza  Strip  and  the  Sinai  Peninsula.  and  within 
days  reached  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Suez  Canal. 
The  Israeli  airstrike  on  June  5  was  not  confined  to  Egypt.  Having 
destoyed  the  Egyptian  air  force,  the  Israeli  aircraft  attacked  Syrian 
and  Jordanian  airfields  before  noon  and  a  number  of  aircraft  on  the 
ground.  At  the  same  time  Israeli  ground  forces  invaded  Syria  and 
Jordan.  Vithin  six  days  Israel  occupied  the  whole  of  the  Sinai 
Peninsula,  the  Old  City  of  Jerusalem,  the  Vest  Bank,  the  Gaza  Strip,  and 
the  Golan  Heights.  112 
So  far  as  the  legality  of  this  war  is  concerned,  there  has  never  been  a 
concensus  of  opinion  as  to  whether  or  not  Israel  was  legally  permitted 
under  international  law  to  launch  such  an  attack.  Israel  and  its 
supporters  claimed  that,  in  the  circumstances,  the  attack  was  in 
accordance  with  the  right  to  exercise  anticipatory  self-defense.  Egypt, 
supported  by  many  states,  held  that  the  Israeli  attack  was  a  deliberate 
aggression.  In  Egypt's  view,  its  measures  taken  in  Sinai  were  to 
reinforce  its  defensive  position  against,  rather  than  to  attack, 
Israel.  Moreover,  Egypt  had  informed  the  UN  that  it  would  not  launch 
any  attack  against  Israel.  113 
From  the  Israeli  perspective,  the  outcome  of  the  war  was  amazing.  By 
the  end  of  the  war  it  was  in  control  of  the  whole  of  the  former 38 
territory  of  Palestine  under  the  Mandate,  the  Golan  Heights  in  Syria  and 
the  Sinai.  The  Gulf  of  Aqaba  was  opened  for  Israeli  navigation.  For  the 
f  irst  time  in  history,  Israel  achieved  a  decisive  victory  against 
Egypt  as  well  as  other  Arab  states.  Israeli  writers  began  to  write  of 
Israel  as  an  empire.  In  fact,  the  real  outcome  for  Israel  in  this  war 
was  that  the  priorities  for  Arab  countries  had  changed,  the  liberation 
of  all  Palestine  being  replaced  by  the  liberation  of  the  occupied 
territories. 
Map  4  The  Arab-Israeli  boundaries  after  1967 
From  1967  onward  the  Arabs  had  to  forget  about  the  1949  Armistice 
borders  and  the  UN  partition  resolution  of  1947,  and  to  concentrate  on 
the  restoration  of  the  lands  occupied  in  1967.114  For  the  Egyptians, 
the  war  ended  in  tragedy.  One  result  of  the  fighting  was  the  death  of 
20,000  men,  as  well  as  thousands  of  wounded.  President  Nasser  resigned, 
and  Marshal  Amer,  the  higher  militdry  commander,  committed  suicide. 
Nasser,  however,  reconsidered  his  resignation  under  public  pressure. 39 
Now  Egypt's  main  concern  was  to  liberate  Sinai,  either  by  peace  or  by 
war.  "r- 
At  the  UN,  the  Security  Council,  four  months  from  the  conclusion  of  the 
June  war,  agreed  an  a  peace  f  ormula  based  an  the  idea  of  "  land  f  or 
peace",  i.  e.,  the  Arabs  would  exchange  their  lands  occupied  in  1967  in 
return  for  peace  with  Israel.  This  formula  was  included  in  Security 
Council  Resolution  242  adopted  on  November  22,1967.  The  operative 
paragraph  of  the  resolution  called  for  the  establishment  of  a  just  and 
lasting  peace  which  requires  the  application  of  the  following 
principles:  M  Withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces  from  territories 
occupied  in  the  recent  conflict;  (ii)Termination  of  all  claims  or  states 
of  belligerency  and  respect  for  and.  acknowledgement  of  the  sovereignty, 
territorial  integrity  and  political  independence  of  every  state  in  the 
area  and  their  right  to  live  in  peace  within  secure  and  recognized 
boundaries  free  from  threats  or  acts  of  force;  2.  The  necessity  for 
guaranteeing  freedom  of  navigation  through  international  waterways  in 
the  area,  for  achieving  a  just  settlement  for  the  refugee  problem  and 
for  guaranteeing  the  territorial  inviolability  and  political 
independence  of  every  state  in  the  area,  through  measures  including  the 
establishment  of  demilitarized  zones.  111's 
In  spite  of  much  criticism  directed  at  Resolution  242,  both  on 
political  and  legal  grounds,  it  has  not  been  improved  uponý4-a6nýlater 
Security  Council  resolutions.  It  represented,  and  still  represents, 
the  only  resolution  accepted  by  nearly  all  the  parties  in  the  Middle 
East,  including  the  PLO  which  accepted  it  in  1988,117  as  well  as  the 
superpowers.  The  resolution  was  reaffirmed  in  Security  Council 
Resolution  338  of  1973.  It  is  widely  recognized  that  11  The  principles 40 
formulated  in  the  resolution  are  legally  sound  and  have  a  permanent 
value  and  relevance  to  the  Near  East  situation.  "110 
In  the  wake  of  the  1967  War,  the  role  played  by  the  Arab  League  was  of 
great  significance  as  it  sought  to  deprive  Israel  of  gaining  an 
overwhelming  victory.  On  August  29,1967,  the  Arab  heads  of  governments 
held  their  fourth  meeting  in  Khartoum  to  consider  the  consequences  of 
the  defeat  and  to  lay  down  the  League's  strategy  to  face  the  situation. 
The  League's  policy,  as  laid  by  the  Khartoum  conference  can  be  described 
along  the  following  main  lines: 
-The  frontline  states  were  to  obtain  regular  financial  support  to 
continue  the  struggle  against  Israel; 
-There  would  be  no  recognition  of  Israel,  no  negotiations,  and  no  peace 
with  Israel  until  its  withdrawal  from  the  Arab  occupied  lands; 
-The  Arab  oil  states  were  to  consider  an  oil  embarge  an  the  states 
supporting  Israel.  119 
The  main  outcome  of  this  policy  was  that  Egypt  was  compensated  for  its 
heavy  losses  and  was  able  to  reuild  its  military  forces.  Further, 
according  to  an  Israeli  historian,  "..  the  Khartum  Declaration  was  the 
first  serious  warning  to  the  Israelis  that  their  expectation  of  an 
imminent  phone  call  from  the  Arab  world  (declaring  surrender)  might  be  a 
pipe  dream.  11  120 
After  six  years  of  uneasy  peace  the  fourth  Arab  Israeli  war  broke  out 
on  October  6,1973l  when  Egyptian  and  Syrian  forces  launched  major 
offensives  across  the  Suez  and  the  Golan  front  respectively,  chosing 
the  day  of  atonement(Yom  Kippur),  the  holiest  day  in  the  Jewish  year,  to 
do  so  and  thereby  taking  the  Israeli  forces  by  surprise. Cease  Fire  of  24  October  1973 
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The  first  days  of  the  war  witnessed  Egyptian  victories  when  the 
Egyptians  destroyed  all  the  Israeli  positions  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Suez  Canal  and  occupied  10  miles  of  the  west  bank.  Howeveroby  the  end 
of  the  fighting  Egypt  had  large  casualties  when  the  Israeli  forces 
succeeded  in  penetrating  through  to  the  east  bank  of  the  canal  and 
occuping  certain  areas  there.  121  The  war  lasted  from  October  6  until 
22,  when  both  the  parties  announced  their  acceptance  of  Resolution  3380 
adopted  by  the  UK  Security  Council.  The  resolution  invited  all  the 
parties  to  observe  a  ceasefire  and  called  on  them  to  implement 
Resolution  242  of  November  1967.122  The  ceasefire  came  into  effect  on 
October  25  when  the  Security  Council  adopted  Resolution  340,  reiterating 
its  previous  decisions  and  deciding  on  the  formation  of  a  UK  Emergency 
Force  from  amongst  non-members  countries  of  the  Security  Council.  The 
UK  forces  arrived  in  Cairo  on  October  27,  and  helped  to  establish  the 
ceasefire. 
As  far  as  the  objectives  of  the  war  are  is  concerned,  it  is  important 
to  emphasize  that  the  war  launched  by  the  Egyptians  did  not  aim  to  gain 
territory.  According  to  Egyptian  sources,  the  main  aim  of  the  operation 
was  to  restore  the  Egyptian  army's  confidence  and  to  destroy  the  concept 
of  Israeli  security  by  launching  a  limited,  but  successful,  military 
operation.  123  Another  objective  was  to  reactivate  the  issue 
politically,  by  showing  that  the  entry  of  both  Egypt  and  Syria  in  the 
war  after  more  than  six  years  of  Israeli  occupation  was  ample  proof 
that  the  Arab  countries  would  not  accept  the  fait  accnnPli,  that  Israel 
wanted  to  impose.  124 
From  Egypt's  perspective,  the  outcome  of  the  war  was  successful.  By  the 
end  of  the  war  the  Egyptian  army  had  established  itself  along  much  of 42 
the  eastern  bank  of  the  Canal  north  of  Ismailia,  and  had  liberated  a 
narrow  strip  of  Sinai  varying  from  three  to  ten  miles  in  width  in 
different  sectors  and  amounting  to  some  500  square  miles  of  territory. 
For  the  first  time  in  the  Egypt  ian-  Israeli  wars,  the  Israelis  suffered 
heavy  casualties  at  the  hands  of  the  Egyptians.  This  military  success, 
though  eventually  negated  by  the  Israeli  achievements  by  the  end  of 
the  war,  has  been  recognized  by  several  military  experts,  including 
Israelis.  126 
As  regards  the  Israelis,  despite  their  successful  counter-offensives 
across  the  Suez  Canal  giving  them  control  of  about  500  square  miles  of 
Egyptian  territory  west  of  the  Suez  Canal,  they  lost  more  than  two 
thousand  dead  and  over  three  thousand  wounded  with  a  high  portion  of 
officers  among  the  casualties.  This  was  a  painful  attrition  for  them. 
Besides,  the  Israeli  army  lost  its  reputation  as  being  invincible,  and  a 
number  of  its  military  leaders  were  dismissed  or  suspended  after  the 
war.  12r- 
Neither  the  United  States  nor  the  Soviet  Union  would  allow  the 
complete  defeat  of  Lts  allies  in  the  war.  As  Kissinger  saidt  :  "we 
can't  allow  a  Soviet-supported  operation  to  succeed  against  an 
American-supported  operation.  If  it  does,  our  credibility  everywhere  is 
severely  shaken.  61127  A  survey  of  the  course  of  events  during  the  war 
reveals  that  the  US  policy  was  in  line  with  this  view.  Af  ter  the 
success  of  the  Egyptian  military  operations  for  a  ten-day  periodg  the  US 
threw  its  weight  behind  Israel  behind  Israel  by  its  airlift  and  military 
pictures  by  satellites  in  order  to  defeat  the  Egyptians.  Similarlyp 
the  Soviets  made  clear  that  they  would  no  longer  permit  the  Arabs  to 
suffer  a  decisive  defeat  on  the  battlefield.  By  the  end  of  the  war 43 
the  Soviet  Union  interfered  and  put  all  its  weight  in  imposing  a' 
ceasefire  to  stop  a  victory  by  Israel.  It  was  ready  to  send  Soviet 
troops  to  fight  in  the  Middle  East  to  impose  the  Security  Council 
decision.  129 
Thus,  bearing  in  mind  the  fact  that  warfare  had  failed  to  bring  a 
settlement  or  to  guarantee  Israeli  security,  and  the  fact  that  the 
States  involved  could  not  conduct  their  preferred  foreign  policy 
because  of  the  superpowers'  desire  to  maintain  their  policy  of  detente$ 
both  Egypt  and  Israel  had  realized  that  a  new  era  had  begun,  an  era 
during  which  all  Problems  had  to  be  resolved  by  negotiation  rather  than 
war.  I 
This  realisation  opened  the  way  for  the  Geneva  Peace  Conference  of 
December  1973,129  and  later  for  the  conclusion  of  two  agreements  for 
disengagement  of  forces  between  Egypt  and  Israel.  The  first  was  signed 
on  January  18,1974  and  provided  only  for  limitation  of  forces  and  the 
establishment  of  buffer-zones.  On  September  4,1975,  after  intensive  US 
peace  efforts,  Egypt  and  Israel  concluded  a  second  agreement  providing 
for  a  limited  Israeli  withdrawal  from  Sinai.  130 
The  success  of  the  League  in  influencing  the  attitude  of  Western 
policy-makers  towards  the  Arabs  was  the  result  of  two  important 
factors.  The  Arab  oil  embargo  threatened  the  European  economy  which 
imported  90  percent  of  its  oil  needs  from  the  Middle  Bast.  European 
economic  interests  in  the  Arab  world  led  to  the  establishment  of  an 
Euro-Arab  Committee  in  1974  to  negotiate  cooperation  between  the  Arab 
League  states  and  the  EEC  states.  131 44 
Thp  Arnh  Oil  Enbargo  Durlng  And  After  TbA  Var  Of  1973 
This  policy  was  one  of  the  important  components  and  features  of  the 
League's  policy  during  this  period,  and  it  gave  rise  to  a  lot  of 
controversy.  Using  Arab  oil  as  a  political  weapon  in  the  pursuit  of  the 
Arab  states'  inteKests  had  been  considered  shortly  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  1973  Var,  when  officials  of  Saudi  Arabia  revealed  plans  to  check 
the  increase  of  their  crude  oil  produqtion  if  the  United  States  did  not 
take  a  more  impartial  position  in  the  Middle  East.  132  The  general 
objective  of  Arab  oil  policy  was  to  gain  the  world's  attention  for  the 
justice  of  the  Arab  cause.  Among  the  obj  ectives'of  this  policy  were 
to  encourage  the  majority  of  world  states  to  severe  diplomatic  relations 
with  Israel  in  order  to  isolate  her  in  international  society;  to  put 
pressure  on  the  United  States  to  reduce  her  support  for  Israel;  and  to 
influence  Israel  to  withdraw  from  the  Arab  occupied  territories.  133 
In  applying  this  policy,  the  Arab  states,  as  a  point  of  departure, 
considered  the  United  States  ýthe  principal  and  foremost  source  of 
Israeli  power.  Bfecause  of  the  fact  that  the  production  of  oil  beyond 
certain  limits  did  not  make  economic  sense  for  many  Arab  states, 
unchecked  production  was  therefore  an  economic  sacrifice  that  could  be 
interpreted  as  a  political  favour  to  the  consuming  countries.  The 
latter,  instead  of  responding  positively  to  such  a  favour,  tended  to 
support  Israel  or  at  least  ignore  Arab  legal  rights.  Consequently,  the 
consuming  countries  were  classified  into  three  categories:  friendly, 
neutral  and  "supporting  the  enemy*"  Any  state  that  supported  or  took 
some  measures  to  support  Arab  rights  was,  to  be  treated  as  a  friendly 
state  that  should  recieve  the  same  oil  supply  as  prior  to  the  embargo. 
Neutral  states  would  be  subject  to  the  increasing  cutback  in  oil 45 
supplies.  Those  states  supporting  Israel  would  be  subject  to  a  total 
oil  embargo.  The  decrease  of  the  supplies  provided  to  the  various 
consuming  states,  and  the  embargo  imposed  an  other  states, 
ýmaý  be 
altered  proportionately  to  their  support  for,  and  cooperation  with, 
Israel.  This  meant  that  a  state  classified  as  supporting  the  enemy 
may  be  classified  as  a  friendly  state  if'  it  'changed  its  foreign 
policy.  134 
The  reasons  for  the  importance  of  Arab  oil  resources  to  the  world 
economy  are  well  known.  Saudi  Arabia  alone  is  thought  to  possess  one 
quarter  of  the  world's  known  oil  resources  and  is  the  world's  largest 
exporter.  Numerous  big  industrial  countries  are  dependent  upon  oil. 
Japan,  which  is  nearly  100  percent  dependent  upon  oil  imports,  obtains 
some  88  percent  of  its  oil  from  the  Arab  states  and  Iran.  Western 
European  states  depend  on  the  Middle  East  for  some  73  percent  of  their 
oil  imports.  13r-  It  is  widely  recognized  thet  the  maintenance  of  stable 
trade  relations  in  Western  countries  for  wealth,  well-being,  and  overall 
power,  including  the  power  to  maintain  their  national  defences  and 
security,  rely  on  the  imported  oil.  136 
Turning  to  the  outcome  of  this  policy,  it  is  widely  recognized  that  it 
achieved  considerable  success.  Perhaps  it  was  the  main  factor  behind 
the  change  of  the  United  States  peace  strategy  in  the  Middle  East. 
President  Carter  admitted  that  the  oil  crisis  in  the  USA  in  1973  was 
behind  his  efforts  that  led  to  the  Peace  Treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel 
in  1979.137  Arab  diplomatic  efforts  to  isolate  Israel  and  to  obtain  the 
support  of  international  society  were  eDh-Ruced  bv  this  DolicY-  The 
increase  of  the  oil  prices  doubled  the  national  incomes  of  the  Arab  oil 46 
countries,  which  enabled  them  to  support  the  economies  of  the 
confronting  states.  139 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  Arab  League  oil  policy  was  illegal  under 
the  rules  of  international  law  and  the  UN  Charter.  This  policyo  in  the 
view  of  some  writers,  was  a  weapon  for  blackmailing  the  West  and  a 
threat  to  international  peace.  139  Yet,  from  an  Arab  standpoint,  this 
was  not  true.  According  to  Arab  writers,  the  policy  was  employed  as  an 
instrument  for  the  respect  and  promotion  of  the  rule  of  law  in  an  area 
of  international  relations  where  such  a  rule  has  long  been  ignored  for 
the  rule  of  superior  military  force.  140  Consequently,  the  Measures  werlý 
not  taken  to  weaken  unfriendly  countries,  but  merely  to  dissuade  them 
from  continuing  their  encouragement  of  an  illegal  situation.  And  the 
Arab  states  have  the  legal  right,  under  the  rules  of  international  law, 
to  use  their  natural  sources  in  a  manner  which  suits  their  legitimate 
rights-"' 
SADATIS  VISIT  TO  JERUSALRIJ 
On  November  9,1977,  Sadat  declared  in  a  speech  at  the  People's 
Assembly  in  Cairo  that  for  the  sake  of  peace  he  was  ready  to  go  to 
Jerusalem.  In  his  words,  "I  am  willing  to  go  to  Geneva,  nay  to  the  end 
of  the  world.  In  fact  I  know  that  Israel  will  be  astounded  when  I  say 
that  I  am  to  go  to  their  very  home,  to  the  Knesset,  to  debate  with 
them.  11112 
An  invitation  from  Begin  arrived  an  November  9.  and  an  official 
spokesman  in  Cairo  announced  that  Sadat  accepted  the  invitation  and 
would  proceed  to  Israel  on  November  19  in  accordance  with  the  invitation 
which  he  received  from  Begin  through  the  US  embassy.  143 47 
In  his  speech  to  the  Knesset  on  November  19,  Sadat  spelled  out  in  very 
blunt  terms  what  the  Arabs  considered  the  fundamental  requirements  for 
a  just  and  durable  peace  in  the  Middle  East  He  made  it  abundantly 
clear  that  he  was  seeking  a  comprehensive  peace  and  not  a  separate  peace 
with  Israel.  He  presented  the  elements  of  Egypt's  peace  plan  in  the 
following  terms: 
-the  termination  of  the  Israeli  occupation  of  the  Arab  territories 
occupied  since  1967,  including  Jerusalem; 
. 
-the  realization  of  the  inalienable  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  and 
their  right  to  self  determination  including  the  right  to  establish  their 
own  state; 
-the  right  of  all  states  in  the  area  to  live  within  secure  boundaries# 
based  an  the  security  of  international  borders  established  through 
agreed-upon  arrangements  and  international  guarantees; 
-the  commitment  by  all  states  in  the  area  to  conduct  their  relations 
among  themselves  according  to  the  purposes  and  principles  of  the  UN 
Charter,  in  particular  the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  and  the 
abstention  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force; 
-the  termination  of  all  states  of  belligerency  in  the  area.  "' 
Reaction  to  the  visit  varied.  While  the  Americans  and  most  of  the 
Western  World  welcomed  this  visit  and  considered  it  as  one  of  the  most 
dramatic  events  in  modern  history,  in  parts  of  the  Middle  East  the 
reaction  was  just  the  opposite.  Syria  denounced  the  visit  and 
considered  it  as  a  violation  of  all  previous  Arab  agreements;  it  also 
broke  its  diplomatic  relations  with  Egypt.  Some  officials  in  the 
Syriant  Libyan  and  Iraqi  govermemts  called  for  Sadat's  assasination. 
Iraq  proposed  an  Arab  mini-summit  composed  of  the  presidents  of  Syria, 48 
Algeria,  Libya,  South  Yemen  and  the  PLO  to  form  a  rejectionist  front 
against  the  Sadat  initiative.  146 
Turning  to  the  outcome  of  the  visit,  it  is  clear  that  it  ended  without 
achieving  any  agreement  on  the  crucial  issues  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  On  the  other  hand,  the  visit  made  Sadat  very  vulnerable 
because  of  Arab  accusations  that  he  would  seek  only  a  bilateral 
agreement  with  Israel,  thus  abandoning  the  Palestinian  cause  merely  to 
get  back  the  Sinai.  146 
On  December  24,1977,  Begin  arrived  in  Ismaelia,  Egypt,  with  a  peace 
project  which  included  a  proposal  for  an  agreement  on  Sinai  and  another 
for  establishing  self-rule  (autonomy)  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  So 
far  as  the  proposal  on  Sinai  is  concerned,  its  main  outlines  were 
described  by  Dayan  in  the  following  terms: 
"On  demilitarization,  Egyptian  forces  were  not  to  move  beyond  the 
Milla-Gidi  line,  and  the  strip  of  territory  between  that  line  and  the 
Canal  was  to.  continue  to  be  subject  to  the  existing  Reduction  of  Forces 
Agreement  reached  after  the  Yom  Kippur  War.  Israeii  civilian 
settlements  were  to  remain,  and  to  be  under  Israeli  administration  and 
jurisdiction.  Israeli  forces  would  be  responsible  for  their  defence. 
There  was  to  be  a  transitional  period  of  several  years  during  which 
Israeli  forces  would  fall  back  to  a  line  in  central  Sinai,  and  maintain 
their  air  bases  and  early  warning  installations  until  their  final 
withdrawal  to  the  international  frontier.  Freedom  of  shipping  through 
the  Straits  of  Tiran  would  be  ensured  and  supervised,  either  by  a  UN 
force,  or  by  Joint  Egypt-Israel  units-  if  by  a  UN  force,  it  could  not  be 
removed  except  by  agreement  of  the  two  parties  and  a  unanimous  Security 
Council  decision.  The  Straits  of  Tiran  and  the  Gulf  of  Eilat,  to  which 49 
it  gives  entry,  should  be  recognized  by  the  two  countries,  in  a  special 
declaration,  as  an  international  waterway  open  to  all  vessells  under  all 
flags.  "  147 
As  to  the  Palestianians,  Begin  submitted  a  plan  for  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  which  he  described  in  biblical  language  as  Judea  and  Samaria.  The 
plan  envisaged  limited  autonomy  for  Arab  residents  without  statehood. 
Security  and  maintainance  of  public  order  would  remain  in  Israel's 
hands.  Also,  the  Israelis  would  have  power  to  buy  and  to  settle  in  the 
occupied  territories.  As  to  the  future  of  the  area,  the  plan  indicated 
that  Israel  maintained  its  right  and  its  claim  of  sovereignty  over  the 
area,  but  in  view  of  the  existence  of  other  claims,  it  proposed  that  the 
question  of  sovereignty  remain  open.  148 
After  the  talks,  at  the  press  confrence  held  on  December  26,  Begin 
declared  that  Resolution  242  did  not  require  a  total  Israeli  withdrawal 
from  the  occupied  territories.  Thus,  no  successful  outcome  resulted 
from  the  meeting.  As  Riad  observed,  "The  meeting  ended  without 
achieving  anything  beside  the  formation  of  two  committees:  one 
political,  at  the  level  of  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  two 
countries,  and  the  other  military,  at  the  level  of  the  Ministers  of 
Defence.  The  possibility  of  a  Geneva  conference  was  therefore 
completely  undermined.  11149 
In  1978j  the  Joint  Israel  i-Egyptian  Committees  convened  several  times 
but  they  failed  to  achieve  agreement.  1  60  When  Carter  became  aware  of 
the  failure  of  these  Committees,  he  decided  that  the  Americans  had  to 
play  a  leading  role  in  the  peace  negotiations.  He  wrote: 
"Sadat's  visit  to  Jerusalem  had  broken  the  Arab  shell  which  had  been 
built  to  isolate  Israel#  and  there  were  a  few  exploratory  talks  between 50 
the  Israelis  and  Egyptians.  However,  it  was  becoming  obvious  that  Sadat 
and  Begin  alone  could  not  go  very  far  in  resolving  the  basic  problems 
that  had  not  been  touched-the  Palestinian  issue,  the  withdrawal  of 
Israeli  forces  from  occupied  territory,  Israeli  security,  or  the 
definition  of  a  real  peace...  the  process  was  breaking  down  again,  and 
both  Sadat  and  other  Arab  leaders,  even  including  Assadg  informed  me 
that  it  remained  necessary  for  the  United  States  to  continue  playing  a 
leading  role  in  resolving  the  basic  Middle  East  questions.  ""' 
On  January  3,1978,  President  Carter,  upon  his  arrival  in  Aswan  for  a 
short  visit,  issued  a  statement  indicating  the  US  position  an  the 
principles  upon  which  an  ultimate  agreement  would  be  based.  The 
statement  included  some  carefully  crafted  phrases  about  the  Palestinian 
question: 
"First,  true  peace  must  be  based  an  normal  relations  among  the  parties 
to  the  peace.  Peace  means  more  than  just  an  end  to  belligerency. 
Second,  there  must  be  withdrawal  by  Israel  from  territories  occupied  in 
1967  and  agreement  an  secure  and  recognized  borders  for  all  parties  in 
the  context  of  normal  and  peaceful  relations. 
Third,  there  must  be  a  resolution  of  the  Palestinian  problem  in  all  its 
aspects.  The  solution  must  recognize  the  legitimate  rights  of  the 
Palestinian  people  and  enable  the  Palestinians  to  participate  in  the 
determination  of  their  own  future.  11162 
On  August  6  and  7,  Secretary  Vance  went  to  Jerusalem  and  Alexandria  to 
deliver  the  handwritten  letters  from  Carter  to  Begin  and  Sadat  inviting 
them  to  meet  the  President  at  Camp  David,  beginning  on  September  5.  to 
negotiate  a  framework  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  The  two  leaders 
accepted  Carter's  invitation.  163 51 
THE  CAMP  DAVID  ACCORDS  AND  THR  RGYPTTAN-TqRARI.  T  PEACE  TREATY 
At  Camp  David,  the  delegations  took  some  two  weeks  of  intensive 
discussion  from  September  6  to  arrive  at  an  agreed  peace  formula  which 
was  mainly  based  on  the  Security  Council  Resolution  242.  These  talks 
resulted  in  the  signature  in  Washington  on  September  17  of  two  framework 
agreements,  one  on  an  overall  Middle  East  settlement  and  the  other 
specifically  on  the  conclusion  of  a  peace  treaty  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  within  three  months. 
The  first  of  the  Camp  David  Agreements  (or  Accords)  dealt  in  particular 
with  the  granting  of  what  was  termed  "full  autonomy"  to  the  Palestinian 
Arab  inhabitants  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  second  of  the  Camp 
David  Agreements  provided  for  agreed  principles  to  resolve  the  main 
issues  of  the  Egyptian-Israeli  conflict.  It  also  provided  that  Egypt  and 
Israel  would  seek  to  conclude,  within  three  months,  a  full  peace 
treaty.  164 
As-a-  mat-ter  of  fact,  the  target  date  for  an  Egyptian-Israeli  peace 
treaty  could  not  be  met  because  of  disputes  over  some  crucial  issues. 
However,  further  US  meditation  efforts  culminating  in  some  Middle  East. 
shuttle  diplomacy  by  President  Carter  an  March  8  to  13,  resulted  in  the 
signing  of  the  first  ever  Arab-Israeli  Peace  Treaty  in  Washington  on 
March  26,1979.16s 
The  Peace  Treaty  and  its  associated  documents  had  been  approved  by  the 
Knesset  an  March  22  by  95  to  11  (with  two  absentionst  three  not 
participating  in  the  vote,  and  two  absent).  1665  In  Egypt,  the  People's 
Assembly  approved  it  on  April  10  by  328  votes  to  15  (with  one  absention 
and  16  absent).  Also,  it  was  approved  by  the'electorate  as  a  whole  in 
a  national  referendum  on  April  19,1979.  IS7 52 
The  main  provisions  of  the  Camp  David  Accords  and  the  1979  Treaty  will 
be  extensively  analysed  in  the  following  chapters.  Suffice  it  at  this 
stage  to  say  that,  while  the  Accords  and  the  Treaty  have  satisfactorily 
resolved  the  main  issues  of  the  conflict  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  they 
failed,  however,  to  resolve  the  issues  of  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the 
West  Bank  and  Gazal  Palestinian  self-  determination  and  the  future  of 
East-Jerusalem. 
Undoubtedly,  the  failure  to  resolve  the  main  issues  of  the  Palestinian 
problem  was  the  principal  reason  for  Arab  condemnation  of  the  Camp. 
David  Agreements.  Even  Arab  moderate  states,  such  as  Saudi  Arabia  and 
Jordan,  were  disappointed  by  the  Agreements.  "To  the  Saudis  and  other 
moderate  Arabs,  the  general  framework  document  that  emerged  from  the 
summit  deliberations  was  at  best  a  repackaged  version  of  Begin's  limited 
autonomy  plan,  with  no  promise  of  any  fair  expression  of 
self-determination  for  the  inhabitants  of  the  conquered  territories. 
Begin  confirmed  their  suspicions  in  a  speech  in  New  York  City 
immediately  after  Camp  David  that  seemed  to  rule  out  any  meaningful 
exercise  of  self-determination  at  the  end  of  the  agreed  upon  five-year 
transition  period  between  the  establishment  of  autonomy  and  the 
negotiation  of  a  permanent  status  for  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  04169 
In  response  to  the  Camp  David  Accords,  the  Arab  heads  of  state  held  a 
summit  meeting  in  Baghdad  (1978)  to  consider  the  results  of  the  Accords. 
They  announced  that  they  rejected  the  Egyptian-  Israeli  plans  for  peace 
because  they  provided  only  for  a  partial  settlement  and  not  a 
comprehensive  settlement.  During  this  meeting  the  principles  of  the 53 
League's  policy  towards  the  conflict,  for  nearly  a  decade,  were 
restated.  169 
Among  the  resolutions  of  the  Baghdad  Summit,  it  had  been  agreed  to  warn 
Egypt  not  to  sign  a  peace  treaty  with  Israel.  If  it  did  so,  it'  would 
be  isolated  in  the  Arab  world,  and  several  Arab  sanctions  would  be 
imposed  on  it.  However,  on  March  19,1979  Egypt  ignored  this  warningl 
and  signed  a  Peace  Treaty  with  Israel.  Consequently,  the  League's 
Council  held  another  emergency  meeting  on  March  31,1979  in  Baghdad 
where  it  adopted  resolutions  which  included  a  commitment  to  cut  off  all 
forms  of  economic  and  military  assistance,  both  multilateral  and 
bilateral.  They  also  included  diplomatic  and  political  sanctions  an 
Egypt-160 
Among  the  political  and  diplomatic  sanctions  were:  to  withdraw  Arab 
ambassadors  from  Egypt  immediately  and  severe  diplomatic  ties  within 
one  month;  to  regard  Egypt's  membership  in  the  League  as  suspended  to 
suspend  Egypt's  membership  in  all  other  Arab  specialist  organizations; 
to  transfer  the  League's  seat  from  Cairo  to  Tunis  ;  and  to  work  towards 
suspending  Egypt's  membership  in  the  Islamic  Conference  Organization  and 
in  the  Non-Aligned  Countries  Conference.  161 
Among  the  economic  sanctions  were  to  halt  the  granting  of  any  loanst 
banking  facilities  or  any  kind  of  aid  by  Arab  governments  or  their 
institutions  to  Egypt;  to  prohibit  the  granting  of  economic  aid  from  all 
Arab  institutions  operating  within  the  framework  of  the  League;  to 
impose  an  Arab  oil  embargo  on  Egypt  ;  and  to  apply  the  regulations  Of 
the  boycott  office  in  respect  of  any  Egyptian  firm  or  company  dealing 
directly  or  indirectly  with  Israel.  162  Further,  the  resolutions  called 
on  the  Arab  governments  to  apply  more  economic  measures  against  Egypt 54 
since  the  measures  resolved  were  regarded  as  "the  minimum  actions 
required  for  the  confrontation  of  the  Treaty.  "  With  regard  to 
military  measures,  the  Arabs  ended  their  financing  of  Egypt's  military 
purchases.  Moreover,  the  military  cooperation  between  Egypt  and  the 
Arab  states  was  stopped  since  it  was  no  longer  in  the  Arab  Defence 
Council  and  the  Arab  League.  Furthermore,  the  Arab  Organization  for 
Industralization  (which  was  important  to  Egypt's  military  industry)  was 
dissolved  as  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  United  Arab  Emirate  withdrew  from 
it.  163 
These  measures  were  carried  out  by  all  the  Arab  states  with  the 
exception  of  three,  Sudan,  Oman  and  Somalia.  Also,  some  Arab  states  had 
taken  additional  measures  against  Egypt  which  were  not  ordered  by  the 
League.  164 
A  great  deal  of  controversy  has  surrounded  the  question  of  the  legality 
of  the  sanctions  imposed  by  the  League  an  Egypt.  The  Egyptian  position 
has  been  that  these  sanctions  are  illegal.  This  viewpoint  rests  mainly 
upon  the  basis  that  the  sanctions  are  inconsistent  with  the  Pact  of  the 
Arab  League.  No  mention  whatsoever  was  made  in  the  Pact  of  the  League's 
right  to  impose  sanctions  of  this  nature,  nor  it  could  it  be  interpreted 
as  allowing  such  sanctions  by  inference.  On  the  other  hand,  it  seems 
that  the  League's  decision  to  impose  sanctions  on  Egypt  was  based  on  the 
assumption  that  regional  organizations  are  authorized  under  Article  53 
of  the  Charter  to  impose  sanctions,  and  that  such  a  right  was  execised 
by  international  organizations  an  several  occasions.  A  detailed 
examination  of  the  legality  of  the  sanctions,  and  whether  resolution 
on  the  sanctions  was  ultrq 
-virpc; 
in  the  light  of  the  League  Pact  and 
general  principles  of  international  law,  is  outside  the  scope  of  this 55 
work.  Yet,  a  brief  mention  of  arguments  for  and  against  the  legality  of 
the  sanctions  could  be  useful  and  relevant. 
In  favour  of  the  legality  of  this  type  of  measurest  it  may  be  argued 
that  Article  53  of  the  United  Nations  Charter  stipulates  that  "no 
enforcement  action  shall  be  taken  under  regional  arrangements  or  by 
regional  agencies  without  the  authorisation  of  the  Security  Council.  ""' 
The  interpretation  given  to  the  term  "enforcement  action,  "  and  whether 
it  includes  measures  of  a  non-military  nature,  has  mainly  been  dealt 
with  before  the  UK  in  connection  with  the  issue  of  imposition  of 
sanctions  by  the  OAS.  166 
The  question  was  f  irst  raised  in  1960  in  the  Dominican 
Case. 
Following  a  resolution  by  the  OAS  to  apply  diplomatic  and  economic 
sanctions  against  the  Dominican  Republic  for  its  acts  of  intervention 
against  Venezuela,  the  USSR  requested  a  meeting  of  the  Security  Council 
to  consider  the  question  of  authorising  these  measures  taken  by  the  OAS 
under  Article  53.  Its  representative  before  the  Council  took  the  view 
that  the  Security  Council  was  "the  only  organ  empowered  to  authorise  the 
application  of  enforcement  action  by  regional  organisation  against  any 
state.  11167  The  US  representative,  however,  argued  that  the  Security 
Councill's  authorisation  was  only  required  for  the  imposition  of  forcible 
measures,  not  for  those  of  a  mere  diplomatic  and  economic  nature.  Since 
this  latter  kind  of  action  could  legitmately  be  taken  by  any  state  in 
exercise  of  its  sovereignty,  therefore  Article  53  could  be  regarded  as 
permitting  the  right  of  regional  organisations  to  apply  such 
measures.  169  Eventually,  the  Council  seems  to  have  accepted  the  US 
interpretation  when  it  adopted  a  resolution  whereby  it  "took  note"  that 
the  sanctions  were  being  employed  an  a  regional  basis.  161 56 
Again,  in  the  Cuban  Case  of  19620  the  question  of  the  right  of 
regional  arganisation  to  apply  economic  sanctions  was  debated  before  the 
Security  Council.  The  OAS  had  expelled  the  Cuban  Goverment  from  the 
regional  system  and  imposed  economic  sanctions  on  it.  Cuba  thereupon 
requested  the  Council  to  seek  advisory  opinion  from  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  on  whether  these  sanctions  were  subject 
to  Council  approval.  170  In  the  debate,  most  of  the  members  supported 
the  opinion,  based  an  the  resolution  on  the  Dominican 
Case, 
that  non- 
military  sanctions  were  permitted  without  authorisation  of  the 
Security  Council.  Eventually,  the  Council  voted  against  submitting  the 
question  to  the  ICJ.  171 
The  Dominican  and  Cuban  cases  suggest  that  the  Arab  League  sanctions 
imposed  against  Egypt  were  permissible,  and  find  a  basis  under  the 
Charter  provisions  relating  to  regional  arrangements  as  construed  by 
the  Security  Council. 
It  nay  also  be  argued  that  the  imposition  of  economic  sanctions  is  not 
a  new  phenomenon  in  international  relations.  Apart  from  resorting  to 
economic  warfare  in  time  of  war,  which  has  been  widespread,  it  had  been 
resorted  to  by  states  on  various  occasions  since  the  beginning  of  this 
century,  even  in  peacetime  conditions.  In  1909  Turkey  imposed  economic 
sanctions  against  the  Greek  Goverment  by  organizing  a  boycott  of  Greek 
goods.  In  China,  the  practice  of  economic  boycott  has  almost  been  a 
national  institution.  In  1925,  for  example,  as  a  result  of  disturbances 
in  Shanghai  in  which  a  number  of  Chinese  were  killed,  a  boycott  of 
British  goods  was  initiated  in  China.  172.  In  the  Netherlan4!;  ý  the 
embargo  of  strategic  goods  to  such  destinations  as  the  sino-Soviet  was 
executed  under  an  export  prohibition  law  issued  in  1935.173  The  practice 57 
of  states  in  this  respect  reflected  a  customary  rule  under  which  the 
institution  of  such  measures  has  been  accepted  in  international 
relations. 
In  contemporary  inter-state,  '  relations  the  mosr,  obvious  examples  of 
regional  sanctions,  beside's  the  sanctions  authorized  by  the  OAS  which  we 
mentioned  above,  arr  ,  '.  1ose  carried  out  by  the  OAU  against  South  Africa, 
Portugal,  Rhodesila-,  and  Israel.  For  instance,  at  the  1963  Addis  Ababa 
Summit  Conference  the  Organization  of  African  Unity  member  states 
decided  on  the  boycott  of  trade  with  Portugal  and  South  Africa,  the 
closure  of  African  ports  and  airports  to  their  shipping  and  aircraft, 
and  the  prohibition  of  the  right  of  their  aircraft  to  overfly  the 
territories  of  African  states.  174 
On  the  other  hando  the  viewpoint  of  the  Egyptians  was  that  the 
sanctions  constituted  an  illegal  act  for  a  number  of  considerations.  In 
the  first  place,  it  is  well  established  that  the  League  is  a  loose 
confederation  in  which  the  sovereignty  of  each  state  would  be  retained 
and  no  encroachment  on  the  sovereignty  of  the  members  permitted  176. 
A  review  of  the  travaux  preparatoires  reveals  that  the  question  of  the 
degree  of  sovereignty  the  states  were  prepared  to  surrender  was  among 
the  main  questions  discussed  by  the  Preparatory  Committee.  While  only 
one  state,  Syria,  was  prepared  to  surrender  its  sovereignty,  most 
Arab  States  preferred  a  formula  whereby  the  complete  sovereignty  of  each 
state  would  be  retained.  Eventually,  the  form  of  organization  an  which 
consensus  could  be  reached  was  in  the  nature  of  a  loose  confederation 
that  would  not  affect  the  sovereignty  and  independence  of  the  member 
states.  17G  Thus,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  provisions  Of  the 
League's  Pact  included  no  explicit  or  implicit  reference  restricting 58 
the  conduct  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  members.  Moreover,  under 
Article  8  of  the  Pact,  the  members  undertook  to  respect  the  system  and 
policy  of  other  governments  and  "pledge  to  abstain  from  any  action 
calculated  to  change  established  systems  of  government.  "  Article  9  of 
the  Pact  provides  for  the  right  of  the  members  to  conclude  treaties  with 
other  states  without  any  restriction.  177 
Finally,  it  may  be  argued  that  the  question  of  the  legality  of  the 
sanctions  in  the  light  of  the  principles  of  international  law  and  the 
provisions  of  the  UN  Charter  is  controversial.  According  to  one  trend 
of  opinion,  "unless  carried  out  as  a  sanction  either  imposed  by  the 
world  organization  or  by  the  state  itself  as  a  reprisal  against  a  prior 
illegal  act,  a  boycott  initiated  by  the  state  constitutes  a  weapon 
designed  to  damage  the  trade  of  another  state  for  which  the  latter  as 
subject  to  that  damage  may  seek  redress  for  legal  injury.  14170 
Apart  from  the  problem  of  the  legality  of  these  sanctionso  which  is  no 
longer  of  particular  importance  after  Egypt's  readmission  to  the  Arab 
League  in  May  1988,  it  may  be  observed  that  perhaps  the  failure  of  Egypt 
to  implement  the  "autonomy  plan"  or  at  least  to  gain  concessions  for  the 
Palestinians  during  the  autonomy  negotiations  with  Israel  could  be 
mainly  attributed  to  the  weakness  of  Egypt's  bargaining  position  after 
being  banned  in  the  Arab  Varld. 
In  April  25,1982  Israel's  withdrawal  from  all  ,  Egypt's  occupied 
territories  was  completed  in  accordance  with  the  1979  Treaty.  Israel 
returned  the  remainder  of  the  Sinai  Peninsula,  including  the  oil  fields 
and  air  bases,  and  dismantled  its  settlements.  The  year  of  1982  marks  a 59 
turning  point  in  the  history  of  the  Egyptian-Israeli  conflict,  not  only 
because  of  Egypt's  recovery  of  its  territory,  but  because  such 
withdrawal  confirms  Israel's  intention  as  having  no  ambitions  to  remain 
or  to  annex  Egypt's  territory. 
Moreover,  the  way  in  which  the  Taba  dispute  had  been  resolved  is 
another  clear  example  showing  how  Egypt  and  Israel  implemented  the 
Treaty  in  good  faith.  Taba  is  a  small  area  in  the  boundaries  which 
Israel  refused  to  return  to  Egypt  on  the  ground  that  it  is  not  Egyptian 
land.  Having  failed  to  resolve  the  dispute  by  negotiation,  Egypt 
notified  the  government  of  Israel  of  its  request  for  international 
arbitration,  and  Israel  agreed.  Later,  on  September  29,1988,  the  Award 
of  the  Egypt-Israel  Arbitral  tribunal  declared  its  acceptance  of  Egypt's 
claim  to  the  area.  Consequently,  the  disputed  area  was  returned  to 
Egypt  on  March  15,1989.179 
On  February  15,1989  an  11  Agreement  Regarding  the  Permanent  Boundaries 
between  Egypt  and  Israel"  was  signed.  lrý40  The  value  of  this  Agreement 
cannot  be  underestimated.  For  the  first  time  in  Israel's  history  it  has 
a  defined  and  permanent  international  boundary  with  an  Arab  state. 
Moreover,  by  the  conclusion  of  this  agreement,  the  final  territorial 
dispute  between  Egypt  and  Israel  was  satisfactorily  resolved,  Thus,  one 
may  be  entitled  to  suppose  that  no  more  war  is  likely  to  occur  between 
the  two  states,  at  least  over  territorial  issues. 
As  to  the  Palestinian-  Israeli  -conflict  during  this  period,  several 
writers  believed  that  the  1979  Treaty  changed  the  character  of  the 
conflict  as  well  as  the  course  of  events  in  the  area.  According  to 
kp" 
William  Quandt,  "Whatý  one  may  think  of  the  Camp  David  Accords  and  the 
Egyptian  Israeli  Peace  Treaty,  few  would  deny  that  they  changed  the 60 
course  of  events  in  the  Middle  East.  With  Israel  and  the  largest  and 
most  powerful  Arab  country  at  peace,  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  and  the 
Palestinian  issue  took  on  a  fundamentally  different  character.  "", 
During  this  period,  as  President  Carter  observed,  the  Arabs,  without 
Egypt,  have  been  and  are  unlikely  to  initiate  either  "an  effective  peace 
or  war  with  Israel.  10192 
Turning  to  the  important  events  during  this  period,  one  can  cite,.  for 
example,  the  bombardment  of  an  Iraqi  nuclear  reactor  in*June  1981;  the 
application  of  Israeli  law  to  the  Golan  Heights  in  December  1981;  the 
Israeli  invasion  of  Lebanon  in  June  1982  and  the  expulsion  of  the  PLO 
from  Lebanon  during  the  invasion;  the  uprising  of  the  Palestinian  people 
in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  since  1987(Intef'ada);  the  Declaration  of  the 
Palestinian  state  in  November  1988  which  was  accompanied  by  the  PLO's- 
acceptance  of  Resolution  242;  the  return  of  Egypt  to  the  Arab  League  in 
May  1989;  and  recently  the  Iraqi  missiles  attack  on  Israeli  cities 
during  the  Gulf  War  of  1991. 
By  and  large,  these  events  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study. 
However,  a  brief  mention  must  be  made  of  three  events  that  bear  upon  the 
Camp  David  process.  The  first  of  these  is  the  expulsion  of  the  PLO  from 
Lebanon.  In  June  6,1982,  less  than  two  months  after  its  final 
withdrawal  from  Sinai,  Israeli  ground  forces  invaded  Lebanon.  It  is 
widely  recognized  that  the  Israeli  invasion  had  two  main  purposes,  to 
destroy  the  PLO  bases,  and  to  establish  a  friendly  regime  in  Lebanon. 
Within  a  few  days  Beirut  was  surrounded  and,  in  the  ten-week  siege  and 
bombardment,  thousands  were  reported  dead.  Israel  demanded  the 
evacuation  of  the  PLO  forces.  Because  of  the  huge  civilian  losses,  and 
the  scale  of  destuction  by  Israeli  forces  surrounding  Beirut#  the  PLO 61 
agreed  with  the  Lebanese  government  to  pull  out  of  Beirut  subject  to 
agreement  on  the  conditions  of  withdrawal.  Accordingly,  after  the 
arrival  of  the  multinational  force,  the  PLO  withdrew  its  combatants  to 
various  Arab  countries  between  August  21  and  September  1,1982. 
Eventually,  Israel  withdrew  most  of  its  armed  forces  from  Lebanon  on 
June  6,1985,  but  retained  what  it  described  as  a  security  zone  all 
along  its  northern  border  which  was  twelve  miles  deep.  161  Before  its 
withdrawal  Israel  concluded  a  Peace  Agreement  with  Lebanon  an  May  171 
1983.  However,  in  March  1984,  the  President  of  Lebanon  announced  the 
revocation  of  the  Agreement.  "'The  main  outcome  of  the  war  was  that  by 
forcing  the  PLO  forces  out  of  Lebanon  Palestinian  military  options  had 
been  significantly  reduced,  thus  paving  the  way  for  the  1988 
Declaration. 
On  November  12  to  15,1988,  in  its  l9th  meeting  in  Algeria,  the 
Palestinian  National  Council,  acting  as  a  parliament  in  exile  for  the 
Palestinians,  proclaimed  at  the  Council's  final  session  on  November  15 
"  the  establishment  of  the  State  of  Palestine  on  our  Palestinian 
land.  181"  Arafat's  unilateral  declaration  of  statehood  followed  a  vote 
by  the  PKC  for  a  new  moderate  political  programme,  endorsing,  for  the 
f  irst  time,  , UK  Security  Resolution  242  as  a  basis  for  a  Middle  East 
peace  settlement.  By  December  1989  some  117  countries  had  recognized 
the  new  Palestinian  State.  'Gr-  The  Israeli  government  rejected  the 
declaration  of  statehood  claiming  that  the  P10  continued  to  be  committed 
to  the  destruction  of  Israel.  From  a  legal  perspective,  the  PLO's 
acceptance  of  Resolution  242  had  removed  the  main  obstacle  preventing  it 
from  taking  part  in  the  Camp  David  peace  process  which  is  based  on 
Resolution  242,  particularly  in  the  light  of  the  fact  that  the  new 62 
political  programme  fulfilled  the  American  conditions  stipulated  for 
holding  talks  with  the  PLO.  187 
It  was  not  surprising  that  by  1989  most  Arab  states,  for  reasons 
related  to  the  chain  of  events  discussed  earlier,  as  well  as  strategic 
and  historic  ones,  had  become  convinced  that  the  isolation  of  Egypt  in 
the  Arab  World  must  be  brought  to  an  end.  In  fact,  the  process  of 
Egypt's  return  to  the  Arab  nation  began  early  in  1984  when  Jordan 
decided  to  resume  full  diplomatic  ties  with  Egypt  regardless  of  the 
Baghdad  resolutions  of  1977.18a  On  November  12,1987,  the  Arab  League 
summit  conference,  held  in  Amman,  passed  a  resolution  whereby  Arab 
League  states  were  allowed  to  resume  diplomatic  relations  with  Egypt.  "' 
This  gradual  process  of  return  was  completed  in  1989  when  Egypt  was 
formally  invited  to  attend  the  Arab  League  Summit  Conference  held  in 
Morocco  in  May  1989.190  In  this  meeting  President  Mubarak  reaffirmed 
Egypt's  commitment  to  its  peace  strategy  and  obligations,  thus  leaving 
the  impression  that  Egypt's  readmission  would  not  be  at  the  expense  of 
its  relations  with  Israel.  No  specific  or  formal  procedures  were  adopted 
to  readmit  Egypt  which  resumed  its  membership  by  a  simple  invitation 
from  King  Hassan  to  attend  the  Arab  League  heads  of  state  summit 
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well  as  the  Camp  David  Accords.  The  contents  of  both  show  that  the  Peace 
Treaty  was  not  intended  to  replace  the  Camp  David  Framework,  but  to  supplement 
it.  9 81 
General 
On  June  5,1967  Israel,  claiming  the  right  to  exercise  self-defence  under 
Article  51  of  the  Charterl  launched  an  offensive  against  Egyptian  positions  in 
the  Gaza  Strip  and  Sinai  Peninsula  using  its  air  and  ground  forces.  Within  six 
days  Israel  had  occupied  the  whole  of  the  Sinai  as  well  as  Gaza  Strip.,  * 
Ever  since  the  War  of  1967,  several  peace  efforts  had  been  made  to  secure  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Israeli  forces,  including  attempts  to  implement  Security 
Council  Resolution  242  which  calls  for  that  withdrawal.  Nevertheless,  apart 
from  partial  withdrawal  from  a  small  area  under  the  1975  Separation-  of-Forces 
Agreemento  such  efforts  failed  and  most  of  Sinai.  remained  under  occupation  until 
the  conclusion  of  the  1979  Treaty. 
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The  object  of  this  chapter  is  to  examine  how  the  1979  Treaty  approached 
the  problem  of  the  military  withdrawal  of  the  Israeli  forces  from  Sinai.  This 
problem  has  been  chiefly  dealt  under  the  Treaty  in  paragraph  2  of  Article  1 
which  reads  as  follows:  "  Israel  will  withdraw  all  its  armed  forces  and  civilians 
from  the  Sinai  behind  the  international  boundary  between  Egypt  and  mandated 
Palestine,  as  provided  in  the  annexed  protocol  (Annex  1),  and  Egypt  will  resume 
the  exercise  of  its  full  soverignty  over  the  Sinai"" 
Xore  provisions  dealing  with  the  details  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal  can  be 
found  in  other  parts  of  the  Treaty.  They  will  be  referred  to  and  examined 
later.  Suffice  it  to  say  at  this  stage  that  the  provisions  on  the  withdrawal  as 
provided  by  the  Treaty  are  of  special  importance  because  they  provide  a 
satisfactory  resolution  of  the  most  notable  issue  of  the  Egyptian-  Israeli 
conflictt  viz.  the  complete  Israeli  withdrawal  from  Sinai  because  they  provide 
explicitly  for  a  clear  application  of  the  ambigious  language  of  Resolution 
242  regarding  the  extent  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  Arab  territories 
occupied  in  1967.  Such  an  application  of  Resolution  242  constitutes  a  legal 
precedent  for  a  total  Israeli  withdrawal  which  is  of  great  importance  to  any 
future  comprehensive  settlement  in  the  Middle  East.  To  understand  these 
provisions  fully  it  is  necessary  to  place  them  within  the  context  of  both  the 
1979  Treaty  and  the  Framework  Treaty  as  a  whole.  Vith  the  assistance  of  a 
brief  enquiry  into  the  history  of  the  diverse  positions  adopted  by  the  parties 
and  the  UK  resolutions  dealing  with  Israel's  occupation  of  Egypt's  territory 
since  1967t  an  examination  and  evaluation  of  the  relevant  provisions  will  be 
offered. 83 
A  Review  Qf  Tht-  SAttlPinpnt  Positlans  Of  Egypt,  srPaj  and  TbP  UN 
Regarding  The  Vithdrawal  Issue  Between  1967-1978 
In  1967  one  writer  observed  that  "the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  is  a  tragedy  in 
the  classic  sense;  that  is,  it  involves  a  struggle  of  right  against  right"'. 
This  phrase  is  illustrative  of  the  atmosphere  pervading  the  discussion  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  1967  war  an  the  question  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal. 
For  example,  while  Israel  invoked  its  right  to  exercise  self-defence  under 
Article  51  of  the  Charter  to  Justify  its  attack  on  Egypt  and  the  right  to  live 
in  peace  with  its  neighbours  in  order  to  remain  in  the  territories  it  occupied 
until  concluding  that  peace  13.  Egypt,  on  the  other  hand,  rejected  Israel's 
"aggression"  and  occupation  an  the  ground  that  it  violated  the  principles  of 
international  lawt  in  particular,  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  territorial 
integrity  of  states,  and  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by 
war". 
It  would  be  difficult  in  this  review  to  give  a  comprehesive  account  of  all  the 
relevant  positions  taken  and  the  views  adopted  by  the  parties,  and  to  provide 
an  account  of  all  the  UK  resolutions  dealing  with  the  question  during  the 
above-mentioned  period.  Therefore,  our  review  of  the  positions  concerned  will 
be  on  selective  rather  than  a  comprehensive  basis. 
The  starting  point  for  review  of  post-Six  Day  War  settlements  is  Security 
Council  Resolution  242  of  November  22,1967.  However,  before  doing  so,  a 
mention  of  the  positions  taken  by  Egypt  and  Israel  in  the  wake  of  the  Six  Day 
War  ought  to  be  made. 84 
__The- 
Positinnn  Tn  :  [hi-  Aftermath  Of  The  SIr  Day  Vnr 
After  its  decisive  military  victory  in  the  June-War,  Israel  offered  to  withdraw 
from  Sinai  provided  that  certain  conditions  were  fulfilled.  In  the  first  place# 
it  declared  that  it  would  not  withdraw  from  Egypt's  territory  unless  the  latter 
terminated  any  claim  to  right  of  belligerency,  recognized  the  state  of  Israel 
and  signed  a  peace  treaty  with  it.  16  Israel  also  held  that  "The  June  War 
ceasef  ire  lines  -will  not  change  except  for  secure  borders  and  peace  treaties 
which  would  terminate  war  with  the  Arab  countries".  "- 
In  this  connection,  Israel  revealed  its  intention  to  hold  certain  parts  of 
Egypt's  territory  as  part  of  its  proposed  secure  boundary;  for  examplep 
according  to  the  "Allon  Plan"  announced  in  July  1967,  Israel  demanded  to  remain 
in  occupation  of  the  Sharm  El-Sheikh  area  and  certain  other  parts  of  Sinai  for 
security  reasons.  17 
Israel  insisted  that  its  withdrawal  was  conditional  on  Egypt's  acceptance  of 
direct  negotiations  with  the  Israelis.  In  the  words  of  Abba  Eban,  then 
Israeli  foreign  minister,  "it  is  unrealistic  to  believe  that  the  withdrawal  is 
possible  without  negotiation.  "'  19 
The  above  position  adopted  by  Israel  in  the  wake  of  the  June  War  had  been 
based  on  a  number  of  considerations  which  can  be  summarized  as  follows: 
Israel,  it  is  submitted,  obtained  Egypt's  land  in  a  defensive  war  permitted 
under  Article  51  of  the  Charter.  It  follows  therefore  that  it  is  legally 
permitted  under  international  law  to  remain  in  the  territories  until  the 
conclusion  of  a  peace  treaty.  Professor  Higgins,  a  holder  of  this  view, 
explained  the  legality  of  Israel's  right  to  remain  in  Sinai  in  the  following 
words: 85 
11 
There  is  nothing  in  either  the  Charter  or  general  international  law  which 
leads  one  to  suppose  that  military  occupation,  pending  a  peace  treaty  is 
illegal.  The  Allies,  it  will  be  recalled,  did  not  claim  title  to  Berlin  in  1945; 
but  neither  did  they.  withdraw  immediately  they  had  entered  it.  The  law  of 
military  occupation,  with  its  complicated  web  of  rights  and  duties,  remains 
entirely  relevantg  and  until  such  time  as  the  Arab  nations  agree  to  negotiate  a 
peace  treaty,  Israel  is  in  legal  terms  entitled  to  remain  in  the  territories  she 
now  holds. 
To  justify  its  right  to  launch  a  defensive  war,  Israel  advanced  three  main 
reasons:  the  deployment  of  a  large  Egyptian  forces  along  the  Israeli  borders;  : 20 
the  evacuation  of  UNEF  forces  from  Sinai  at  the  request  of  Egypt;  -:;  ý'  and  Egypt's 
blockade  of  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  and  the  Straits  of  Tiran  in  Xay  1967,  which  was 
regarded  as  a  castiq  hPIIJ22.  This  blockade  was  illegal,  it  is  submittede 
because  it  violated  Article  16  (4)  of  the  Geneva  Convention  of  195823  and 
because  Egypt  failed  to  observe  the  conditions  which  it  had  agreed  to  in 
connection  with  Israel's  withdrawal  from  Sharm  al-Shaykh  in  195721.  Moreover, 
it  was  argued,  if  one  applies  both  the  Soviet  draft  definition  of  aggression 
formulated  in  1956,  and  the  General  Assembly  Resolution  on  the  Definition  of 
Aggression,  formulated  in  1974,  Egypt's  blockade  qualified  as  an  act  of 
aggression  f2G.  Further,  it  had  been  argued  that  the  blockade  prevented  Israel 
from  receiving  about  80%  of  its  normal  oil  and  other  vital  imports.  " 
In  additionj  Israel's  demand  for  secure  boundaries  is  based  on  the  contention 
that  the  1949  Armistice  Agreement  determining  the  pre-June  1967  boundary  was 
invalid  because  of  Egypt's  violation  of  the  provisions  of  that  Agreement.  it 
follows,  therefore,  that  under  the  rules  of  international  law  governing  the 86 
suspension  and  termination  of  treaties,  Israel  was  no  longer  bound  by  its 
obligation,  including  the  1949  demarcation  lines.  27 
Alsot  it  was  argued  that  even  if  the  1949  Agreement  between  Egypt  and  Israel 
was  effective,  Article  V  of  that  Agreement  stipulated  that  the  line  defined  " 
shall  be  designated  as  the  Armistice  demarcation  line"  ;  it  "is  not  to  be 
construed  in  any  sense  as  a  political  or  territorial  boundary,  and  is  delineated 
without  prejudice  to  rights$  claims  and  positions  of  either  party  to  the 
Armistice  as  regards  ultimate  settlement  of  the  Palestine  question"21. 
Moreover  Article  XII  specified  that  the  Armistice  was  established  in  order  to 
facilitate  the  transition  from  the  present  truce  to  permanent  peace  in 
Palestine29-  Thust  Israel  has  the  right  to  negotiate  secure  and  final 
boundaries.  At  this  point,  it  may  be  worth  recalling  that  the  US  adopted  a 
line  in  support  of  Israel's  demand  for  secure  and  recognized  boundaries,  e.  g., 
President  Johnston's  statement  an  June  19,1967  in  which  he  stated  that  "  the 
nations  of  the  (Middle  East)  region  have  had  only  fragile  and  violated  truce 
lines  for  twenty  years.  what  they  now  need  are  recognized  boundaries.  "" 
A  further  justification  for  Israel's  demand  for  secure  and  recognized 
boundaries  was  the  argument  that  the  establishment  of  such  boundaries  would 
bring  peace  to  the  Middle  East. 
A  full  assessment  of  the  Israeli  position  is  not  our  concern  here.  Suffice  it 
to  emphasize  at  this  stage  that  such  position  had  lef  t  much  room  f  or  dispute 
since  Israel,  as  it  has  been  rightly  observedq  under  the  label  of  secure  ý- 
borders,  would  be  able  to  keep  any  territory  it  wished  under  the  pretext  of 
protecting  its  security3l.  Quite  clearly  this  would  constitute  a  violation  of 
several  international  norms,  in  particular  the  principles  of  territorial 87 
integrity  and  sovereignt",  ýj  of  states,  the  principle  of  inadmissibility  of 
acquisition  of  territory  by  f  orce  and  the  principle  of  self-determination. 
In  turning  to  Egypt's  position,  it  may  be  observed  at  the  outset  that,  since 
the  end  of  the  June  Var,  Egypt  stuck  to  the  position  that  Israel  must  withdraw 
from  all  the  occupied  territories  and  that  withdrawal  must  be  immediate  and 
unconditional32.  Also  Egypt  rejected  Israel's  notions  of  keeping  parts  of  Sinai 
in  the  final  settlement  for  security  reasons33.  Further,  it  also  rejected 
Israel's  argument  that  it  is  entitled  to  remain  in  Egypt's  territory  until  the 
conclusion  of  a  peace  treaty.  3,  * 
From  a  legal  standpoint,  Egypt's  position  was  based  upon  several  grounds. 
First,  Israel  was  obliged  by  the  rules  of  international  law  to  withdraw  from 
occupied  Egyptian  territory.  This  obligation  derived  in  particular  from  the 
following  fundamental  legal  principles: 
-  The  general  principle  of  non-use  of  force  prescribed  by  the  U.  N.  Charter  in 
Article  2(4)0  stipulating  that  all  members  shall  refrain  from  the  threat  or  use 
of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or  political  independence  of  any 
state,  an  obligation  which  under  paragraph  2  of  the  same  Article  should  be 
fulfilled  in  good  faith;  3r, 
-  The  principle  of  the  illegality  of  the  occupation  of  the  territory  of  another 
state  by  force.  Even  according  to  Article  51  of  the  UK  Charter,  force  may  only 
be  used  by  a  state  In  the  exercise  of  its  inherent  right  of  self-defence  "if  an 
armed  attack  occurs"  and  only  "until  the  Security  Council  has  taken  measures 
necessary  to  maintain  international  peace  and  security"36; 
-  The  principle  of  inadmissibility  of  acquisition  of  territory  by  force.  This 
principle  is  in  fact  well  established.  It  is  inherent  in  the  rules  Of  customary 88 
international  law  developed  by  state  practice  during  the  nineteenth  century.  It 
is  sanctioned  by  general  international  treaties  such  as  the  Covenent  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  the  Kellog-Briand  Pact  of  1928  and  the  UN  Charter,  under 
which  it  has  been  considered  a  necessary  implication  of  the  obligation  in 
Article  2,  to  refrain  from  the  use  of  force  against  any  state.  The  principle 
was  also  insisted  upon  in  the  Stimson  Doctrine,  whereby  the  U.  S.  refused  to 
recognize  any  Japanese  acquisition  resulting  from  Japan's  invasion  of  Manchuria 
in  1931.  It  was  also  accepted  in  the  form  "no  title  by  conquest"  as  a  principle 
of  American  international  IaW37.  Further,  it  was  explicitly  reaffirmed  in 
Article  17  of  the  1948  Bogata  Charter  which  states  that  no  territorial 
acquisition  or  special  advantage  obtained  by  f  orce  shall  be  recognized.  38 
The  second  ground  in  support  of  Egypt's  position  is  that  Israel  could  not 
invoke  Article  51  of  the  Charter  to  Justify  a  pre-emptive  strike.  While  the 
Charter  recognizes  the  right  of  self-defence  against  an  armed  attack,  it  does 
not  permit  a  pre-emptive  strike  in  advance  of  any  attack.  This  view  has  been 
adopted  by  the  majority  of  states  and  recognized  by  international  lawyers39. 
For  example,  Philip  Jessup  observed  that  Article  51  suggested  a  limitation  an 
the  right  of  self-defence  provided  by  customary  international  law,  and  that  "it 
may  be  exercised  only  if  an  armed  attack  occurs.  This  restriction  in  Article 
51  -  very  definitely  narrows  the  freedom  of  action  which  states  had  under 
traditional  law.  A  case  could  be  made  out  for  self-defence  under  the 
traditional  law  where  the  injury  was  threatened  but  no  attack  had  yet  taken 
place.  Under  the  Charter,  alarming  military  preparations  by  a  neighbouring 
state  would  Justify  a  resort  to  the  Security  Council,  but  would  not  Justify 
resort  to  anticipatory  force  by  the  state  which  believed  itself  threatened41140 89 
Along  the  same  line#  Georg  Schwarzenberger  argued  that  the  right  of 
self-defence  is  not  preventive  and  therefore  "it  does  not  cover  preventive 
measures  against  ýPnote  future  contingencies.  1141  f 
Another  ground  supporting  Egypt,  s  view  is  the  argument  submitted  by  the 
representative  of  Egypt  In  Security  Council  meeting  of  May,  29,1967: 
"The  Gulf  of  Aqaba  has  always  been  a  national  inland  waterway  subject  to 
absolute  Arab  sovereignty  ...  by  its  configuration  it  has  a  nature  of  a  mare 
r1mmum  which  does  not  belong  to  the  class  of  international  waterway  ...  there  is 
no  shade  of  a  doubt  as  to  the  continued  existence  of  the  state  of  war  between 
the  Israelis  and  the  Arabs  ...  My  Government  has  the  legitimate  right,  in 
accordance  with  international  law,  to  impose  restriction  on  navigation  in  the 
Strait  of  Tiran  with  respect  to  shipping  to  an  enemy,  1142 
Thus,  the  blockade  was  a  legal  exercise  by  Egypt  of  its  right  of  sovereignty 
over  its  internal  waters  and  an  assertion  of  a  right  of  belligerency  recognized 
Aý  I 
by  international  law.  On  one  hand,  the  Armistice  Agreement  between  Egypt  and  9 
Israel  did  not  terminate  the  state  of  war  legally  existing  between  them.  It 
followed  that  the  '  right  to  enf  orce  a  blockade  was  not  af  fected  by  the 
armistice43.  Further,  Article  II  of  the  Armistice  Agreement  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  provided  that  "no  element  of  f  orces  of  one  party  shall  enter  or  pass 
through  waters  within  three  miles  of  the  coast-line  of  the  other  party.  "44 
In  addition,  even  if  Israel  possessed  the  right  of  innocent  passage  in 
. 
the 
Straits  of  Tiran  under  Article  16  (4)  of  the  Convention  on  the  Territorial  Sea 
of  1958,  the  relevant  provision  was  not  binding  an  Egypt  because  Egypt  did  not 
ratify  that  Treaty  and  because  Article  16  (4),  as  rightly  observed  by  the  U.  S. 
representatives  j  established  a  new  rule  rather  than  codified  a  customary  one  .  46 90 
Before  leaving  this  point,  it  is  worthwhile  to  refer  to  the  position  adopted  by 
the  Arab  League  in  the  wake  of  the  Six  Day  War.  In  the  Arab  League  Summit 
Conference  held  in  Khartum  in  August  in  1967,  Arab  Leaders  agreed  to  seek  a 
peaceful  settlement  to  secure  the  withdrawal  of  the  Israeli  forces,  but  in  the 
framework  of  the  three  criteria:  no  peace  with  Israel,  no  recognition  of  Israel 
and  no  negotiation  with  Israel.  In  other  words,  the  Arab  leaders,  while 
agreeing  to  seek  a  peaceful  settlement,  rejected,  ,  -:  -;  L  ,  the  three  conditions 
stipulated  by  Israel  in  return  for  its  withdrawal,  i.  e.,  the  termination  of  the 
state  of  war,  the  recognition  of  Israel  and  direct  negotiations  with  Israel.  " 
RPARalutirm  949  And  The  Withdrawal  nf  Israp-11.  Forces  From  Egypt'R  Tprritnry 
With  all  its  defects  and  uncertainities,  Resolution  242  remains  the  only 
internationally-agreed  framework  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  It  nay  be  said 
that  it  is  one  of  the  exceptional  resolutions  in  which,  contrary  to  its  usual 
practices  of  not  going  beyond  calling  for  an  end  of  hostilities,  the  Security 
Council  recommanded  in  some  detail  a  long  term  solution  to  a  dispute. 
The  Resolution  is  of  general  importance  once  it  had  been  accepted  by  Most 
states  involved  in  the  peace  process  and  by  the  PL047  in  1988  as  constituting 
the  agreed  basis  for  any  future  comprehensive  settlement  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  Alsot  it  is  of  particular  importance  to  any  examination  of  the  texts 
of  the  1979  Treaty  and  the  Framework  Treaty  because  it  was  intended  to 
constitute  the  legal  basis  of  the  principles  included  in  both  of  them.  This  can 
be  inferred  from  the  first  preambular  paragraph  of  the  Framework  Treaty  which 
reads  in  part  as  follows: 91 
"The  agreed  basis  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  conflict  between  Israel  and 
its  neighbours  is  the  Security  Council  Resolution  242  in  all  its  parts.  11413 
Along  the  same  lines,  the  first  preambular  paragraph  of  the  1979  Treaty  states 
that  it  is  founded  on: 
*The  urgent  necessity  of  the  establishment  of  a  just,  comprehensive  and  lasting 
peace  in  the  Middle  East  in  accordance  with  Security  Council  Resolution  242  and 
33811.49 
After  this  brief  clarification  of  the  importance  of  Resolution  2429  we  turn  now 
to  consider  its  position  with  regard  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  Israeli  forces 
from  Egypt's  occupied  territory. 
Although  the  Resolution  provides  explicitly  for  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli 
forces,  it  either  overlooks  or  advances  uncertain  answers  to  some  important 
questions  raised  regarding  that  withdrawal.  The  conditions  of  that  withdrawal 
and  the  extent  of  the  withdrawal,  as  well  as  the  binding  nature  of  the 
Resolutiong  are  among  these  questions. 
In  relation  to  the  conditions  of  the  withdrawal,  we  may  recall  at  the  outset 
that  the  Resolution  was  a  package  deal  based  on  certain  basic  principles.  While 
it  called  for  the  withdrawal  of  Israel  from  Egypt's  territory,  it  provided  that 
this  withdrawal  was  conditional  on  the  application  of  the  other  principlesr-0. 
That  is  to  say,  Egypt  was  obliged,  in  return  for  that  Israeli  withdrawall  to 
terminate  the  state  of  belligerency  with  Israelr-1,  to  recognize  the  state  Of 
Israel  and  its  right  to  live  within  secure  and  recognized  boundaries  62,  to 
respect  the  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  Israe1r.  3  and  finally  to 
establish  peace  with  Israel.  " 92 
In  considering  the  above  conditions  in  the  Resolution,  in  the  light  of  the 
positions  taken  by  both  Egypt  and  Israel  in  the  wake  of  the  June  War,  we  may 
state  the  following: 
Quite  clearly,  Egypt's  demand  for  unconditional  Israeli  withdrawal  from  its 
territory  had  been  rejectedr-r,.  On  the  other  hand,  Israel's  conditions  for  the 
a L 
withdrawal  were  largely  supported  by  the  Resolution.  The  Resoluton  accepted  the 
(N 
Israeli  conditions  regarding  the  termination  of  the  state  of  war,  the  right  to 
be  recognized  by  Egypt,  the  right  to  have  secure  boundaries  and  the  right  to 
establish  peace  with  Egypt.  However,  Israel's  demand  for  direct  negotiations 
seems  to  have  been  rejected.  r-r- 
As  to  the  question  of  timing,  it  is  clear  that  the  Resolutior  totally 
overlooked  it.  For  example,  no  mention  was  made  of  the  period  during  which  the 
withdrawal  was  to  be  completed,  nor  the  date  of  its  beginning.  Further, 
assuming  that  Israel  agreed  to  withdraw,  there  still  remained  an  intractable 
problem  :  which  should  come  f  irst  in  time,  Israeli  withdrawal  f  rom  the 
territories  which  she  was  holding,  or  Egypt's  acceptance  of  peace  and 
recognition  of  Israel.  According  to  the  Arab  interpretation,  Egypt  would  only 
terminate  the  state  of  war  with  Israel  once  Israel  had  first  withdrawn  its 
forces  from  Sinai.  This  was  based  on  the  premise  that  the  term  "withdrawal" 
was  placed  physically  first  in  the  body  of  Resolution  242.69 
Also,  Egypt  would  be  put  at  a  disadvantage  in  negotiations  by  virtue  of 
Israel's  continued  occupation  of  its  territoriesr-9.  Further,  it  was  argued  that 
there  was  a  recognized  principle  of  international  law  that  a  treaty  secured  by 
force  or  under  the  pressure  of  military  occupation  was  null  and  void.  As 
Oppenheim  pointed  out,  a  peace  treaty  imposed  by  a  victorious  aggressor  has  no 93 
legal  validity6O.  In  support  of  this  argument,  it  referred  to  Lauterpacht's 
Report  of  1953  on  the  law  of  treaties  to  the  International  Law  Commission: 
"A  treaty  imposed  by  or  as  result  of  f  orce  or  threat  of  f  orce...  is  invalid  by 
virtue  of  the  operation  of  the  general  principle  of  law  which  postulates  f  reedom 
of  consent  as  an  essential  condition  of  the  validity  of  consensual 
undertaking.  "r" 
The  same  view  was  adopted  by  Brownlier-2  and  by  Quincy  Wright  who  condemned 
Israel's  claim  to  remain  in  occupation  of  Arab  territories  until  it  secured  a 
peace  treaty: 
"One  cannot  say  that  negotiations  over  territories  are  fair  where  one  or  the 
other  parties  occupies  most  of  it  ...  Modern  international  law  affirmed  by  the 
Stimson  Doctrine  holds  that  a  treaty  made  by  duress  against  the  state  is 
invalid.  "" 
On  the  other  hand,  Israel  held  the  view  that,  as  the  Resolution  was  a 
framework  for  an  agreement,  it  followed  therefore  that  the  withdrawal  should 
follow  rather  than  preceed  it,  If  Israel  were  to  withdraw  before  negotiations 
and  Arab  states  then  refused  to  terminate  belligerency,  Israel's  security  might 
be  seriously  impaired  with  no  way  of  rectifing  the  situation,  short  of  another 
WarG4.  Israel's  argument  was  supported  by  the  view  -  referred  to  earlier  - 
that  there  is  nothing  in  either  the  Charter  or  general  international  law  which 
leads  one  to  suppose  that  military  occupation  pending  a  peace  treaty  is 
illegal.  rar, 
Before  leaving  this  point,  it  may  be  worth  mentioning  that  the  US  adopted 
the  position  that  the  provisions  an  Israel's  withdrawal  from  the  occupied 
territories  were  contingent  upon  the  conclusion  of  peace  between  the  Arab 94 
states  and  Israel.  In  this  connection  Vlliam  Rogers,  US  Secretary  of  State, 
declared: 
"To  call  for  Israeli  withdrawal  as  envisaged  in  the  UK  Resolution  without 
achieving  agreement  on  peace  would  be  partisan  toward  the  Arabs.  To  call  an 
the  Arabs  to  accept  peace  without  Israeli  withdrawal  would  be  partisan  toward 
Israel.  Therefore,  our  policy  is  to  encourage  the  Arabs  to  accept  a  permanent 
peace  based  on  a  binding  agreement  and  to  urge  the  Israelis  to  withdraw  from 
occupied  territory  when  their  territorial  integrity  is  assured  as  envisaged  by 
the  Security  Council  Resolution".  r-6 
This  view  seems  to  be  the  one  adopted  by  the  1979  Treaty,  as  we  shall  see 
later. 
In  relation  to  the  legal  nature  and  the  binding  ef  fect  of  the  resolution,  it 
may  be  observed  that  the  Security  Council  did  not  specify  under  what  article  or 
chapter  of  the  Charter  it  acted  when  adopting  the  Resolution  of  November  22, 
1967  G7.  It  follows  that  the  legal  character  of  the  Resolution  is,  therefore#  a 
matter  for  Anterpretation.  In  this  respect,  we  can  find  two  conflicting 
views:  ` 
The  first  view  holds  that  the  Resolution  is  of  a  binding  nature  and  therefore 
it  should  be  implemented  in  all  its  parts.  This  view  has  been  expressed  by  the 
Soviet  Union.  In  presenting  this  view,  two  Soviet  jurists  state  the  following: 
"The  Security  Council  is  authorized,  under  the  United  Nations  Charter,  to  take 
all  necessary  stepst  including  the  use  of  armed  force,  against  a  state  refusing 
to  implement  its  resolution.  The  Security  Council  Resolution  of  November  22, 
1967  is  a-  juridical  deed  which  ought  to  be  executed  in  full  detail,  and 95 
particularily  as  regards  the  withdrawal  of  the  Israeli  f  orces  to  the  lines  prior 
to  June  5.1'11 
Quite  clearly  the  above  passage  implies  that  the  Resolution  was  adopted  by  the 
Security  Council  within  the  framework  of  Chapter  VII  which  deals  with  "Action 
with  respect  to  threats  to  the  peace,  breaches  of  the  peace,  and  acts  of 
aggression".  in  particularl  Article  39,  the  key  provision  in  this  chapter"01 
which  reads  as  follows: 
"The  Security  Council  shall  determine  the  existence  of  any  threat  to  the  peace, 
breach  of  the  peace,  or  act  of  aggression  and  shall  make  recommendations  or 
decide  what  measures  shall  be  taken  in  accordance  with  Articles  41  and  42,  to 
maintain  or  restore  international  peace_  and  security.  0671 
ý  .1-. 
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On  the  other  handt  the  view 
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the  resolution  is  in  the  nature  of  Mere,, 
4L 
recommendation  taken  by  the  Security  Council  under  Chapter  V172  which  provides 
that  the  Security  Council  may  recommend  procedures  or  methods  of  adjustment  in 
cases  of  dispute  or  similar  situationS73  or  may  itself  recommend  terms  of 
settlement  in  defined  circumstanceS71  .  The  grounds  advanced  in  support  of  this 
view  can  be  summarized  as  follows:  the  language  used  by  the  Resolution  did  not 
mention  the  terms  "threat  to  peace,  breach  of  peace,  or  act  of  aggression"  whose 
invocation  may  perhaps  prima  faniA  indicate  an  intention  to  take  enforcement 
action  upon  non-compliance.  Thus  confirming  that  it  was  not  taken  within  the 
framework  of  Article  V1176  ;  during  the  debate  in  the  Security  Councilt  several 
representatives  said  or  Implied  that  the  Security  Council  should  merely  make 
recommendations  on  the  Middle  East  under  the  peaceful  settlement  provisions  Of 
the  Charter  7G  and;  the  official  Security  Council  repertnire  deals  with  the 
British  draft  as  in  part  an  application  of  Chapter  VI  of  the  UK  Charter.  77 96 
Apart  from  the  dispute  over  its  binding  nature,  it  had  been  rightly  observed, 
that  Resolution  242  has  been  so  widely  accepted79  and  referred  to  that  one  may 
well  conclude  that  it  has  been  treated  as  having  a  mandatory  effect,  in 
particular  after  it  had.  been  emphasized  in  Security  Council  Resolution  338  on 
October  1973  adopted  towards  the  end  of  the  1973  October  Var  .  79 
It  remains  now  to  consider  the  most  significant  question  raised  with  regard  to 
the  withdrawal  issue  under  the  Resolution,  namely  the  extent  of  the  final  line 
of  Israeli  withdrawal.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  uncertainty  resulting 
from  the  vague  language  used  in  dealing  with  such  an  essential  issue  made  it  a 
complex  one.  Several  reasons  may  be  mentioned  as  having  accounted  for  such 
complexity. 
The  English  text  of  the  Resolution  deals  with  the  extent  of  the  Israeli 
withdrawal  in  vague  language:  Article  1  speaks  of  withdrawal  of  Israeli  f  orces 
"from  territories  occupied  in  the  recent  conflict",  and  not  "from  all  the 
territories"  occupied.  Accordingly,  the  absence  of  the  definite  article  "the" 
before  the  word  "territory"  has  left  the  door  open  to  the  argument  that  the 
Resolution  did  not  require  withdrawal  from  all  the  territories'O. 
Notwithstanding  the  absence  of  the  word  "the"  in  the  English  text,  the  French 
text  of  the  Resolution  speaks  about  withdrawal  from  the  territories  occupied:  it 
speaks  about  "retraft  des  foreps;  armees  Israeliennes  des  tPrritnIrPs  Occ 
Inrn  du  ranAntel.  The  text  of  the  Resolution  contains  no  reference  whatsoever 
of  the  pre-5  June  boundaries. 
The  Resolution  refers  to  the  right  of  every  state  in  the  area  to  live  "within 
secure  and  recognized  boundaries  free  from  threats  or  acts  of  force".  "  Thust 97 
according  to  a  reasonable  interpretation,  it  negates  the  necessity  of  a 
return  to  the  lines  existing  prior  to  the  hostilities  of  June  1967.83 
For  the  above  reasons,  a  great  deal  of  controversy  has  arisen  over  the 
extent  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal.  For  example,  Israel  and  its 
supporters  argued  that  the  extent  of  its  withdrawal  could  not  be  the  4 
June  lines  since  the  omission  of  the  word  "the"  was  deliberately  made. 
It  follows,  therefore,  that  Israel  was  entitled  to  negotiate  new 
boundaries  which  may  include  parts  of  Egypt's  territory.  On  the  other 
hand,  Egypt  and  its  supporters  insisted  an  an  opposing  view  that  the 
Resolution  undoubtedly  required  a  total  Israeli  withdrawal  from  all 
occupied  Egyptian  Territory. 
The  meaning  attributed  to  Resolution  242  in  the  argument  advanced  by 
Israel  and  its  supporters  is  that  it  did  not  require  withdrawal  of 
Israeli  forces  from  all  the  lands  occupied  in  the  Six-Day  Var,  but 
required  only  the  withdrawal  to  such  lines  as  would  constitute  "secure 
boundaries"  for  Israel. 
Article  1(1)  of  the  Resolution  speaks  of  territory  occupied  in  the 
recent  conflict  but  not  "all  the  territories".  Moreover,  that  paragraph 
on  withdrawal  does  not  say  to  where  the  Israeli  forces  are  to  withdraw, 
nor  does  it  say  what  is  to  be  withdrawn;  also  it  does  not  say  when  they 
are  to  withdraw.  According  to  the  argument,  this  is  not  accident  and 
such  omission  is  deliberate.  64 
Proof  of  this  is  the  fact  that  the  Security  Council  and  the  General 
Assembly  had  rejected  all  draft  resolutions  in  which  the  intent  was  to 98 
require  the  withdrawall  immediate  or  otherwise,  of  all  Israeli  forces 
back  to  the  lines  they  occupied  on  June  5,1967.  OG  Having  in  mind  the 
fact  that  every  word  in  the  adopted  clause  was  carefully  weighedo  they 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  language  used  by  that  paragraph  does 
not  require  a  total  withdrawal66. 
As  regards  the  French  text  of  the  Resolution  which  speaks  of  Israeli 
withdrawal  from  the  territories  "des  territntres",  and  not  from 
"territories",  the  Israelis  held  that  in  the  case  of  divergence  between 
two  equally  valid  versions  of  a  legal  text,  an  important  place, 
according  to  international  law,  is  accorded  to  the  language  in  which  the 
text  was  originally  draftedG7. 
Thus,  in  the  light  of  the  fact  that  the  British  proposal  (S/8247)  which 
became  Resolution  242  after  its  adoption  by  the  Security  Council, 
carried  the  notation  "Original  English"99,  it  would  be  unjustified  to 
disregard  the  English  text  in  favour  of  the  French  text. 
Also  Article  1(2)  of  the  Resolution  provides  for  the  right  of  every 
stateý  in  the  area  "to  live  in  peace  within  secure  and  recognized 
boundaries  free  from  threats  or  acts  of  force",  a  description  which 
could  not  be  applied  to  the  pre-June  5,1967  lines89 
Consideration  must  also  be  given  to  the  meaning  of  the  principle  of 
"inadmissibility  of  the  aquisition  of  territory  by  war"  referred  to  in 
the  second  paragraph  of  the  preamble  of  the  Resolution.  -  According  to 
Shabtai  Rosenne,  the  meaning  of  the  principle  is  nothing  more  than  the 
established  rule  of  international  law  that  only  a  formal  agreementl  and 
more  particularly  after  a  war,  usually  a  treaty  of  peace,  is  competent 
to  transfer  territory  from  one  country  to  another.  To  justify  his 
opinion,  he  held  that  the  words  of  this  principle  are  formulated  in  the 99 
Spanish  expression  which  has  become  almost  epigrammatic  in  U.  N.  circles, 
namely  "LavictorIA  Tin  dA  derechos".  This  notion,  appears  in  a  number  of 
important  treaties  concerning  Latin  America,  and  it  lies  behind  the  so 
called  "Stimson  Doctrine.  "  The  expression  was  first  used,  he  continued, 
by  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Argentina  in  December  1869  in  his 
note  regarding  the  war  between  certain  Latin  American  states  in  which  he 
argued  that  military  victory  by  itself  did  not  give  rights  to  territory$ 
and  that  the  disposition  of  territory  could  only  follow  from  an 
international  agreement  between  the  parties  concerned9O. 
From  the  above  explanation,  Rosenne  draws  the  conclusion  that  the 
ti  iiadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  war  as  a  general 
proposition  cannot  be  accepted,  and  that  a  correct  understanding  of  this 
principle  suggests  that  there  should  be  an  agreement  between  the 
parties,  after  the  war,  to  establish  definitive  territorial  limits". 
Also,  he  added  if  this  pri  ncipleý  -read  S,  in  conjuction  with  the  final 
clause  an  territorial  arrangements  which  speaks  of  "secure  and 
recognized  boundaries",  the  meaning  he  attributes  to  that  principle  is 
couf  irmed.  92 
Additional  ground  in  support  of  this  view  is  the  argument  that  the  pre- 
June  5,1967  linesq  under  Article  IV(3)  of  the  Armistice  Agreement 
between  Egypt  and  Israelq  were  provisional  in  character  and  did  not 
prejudice  the  rights  of  the  parties  in  respect  of  the  final  boundaries. 
This  argument  has  been  discussed  earlier.  93 
Egypt  and  its  supporters  insist  that  the  Resolution  called  for  a  total 
Israeli  withdrawal  from  all  the  Arab  occupied  territories9l.  According 100 
to  them,  withdrawal  from  territories  occupied  in  the  recent  conflict  can 
only  mean  withdrawal  from  all  the  territories  occupied  in  June  1967. 
The  question  is  not  one  of  semantics,  but  is  a  question  of  law.  Under 
international  law  and  the  principles  of  the  Charter  as  well  as 
Resolution  242,  Israel  is  bound  to  withdraw  from  all  territories  it 
occupied,  since  the  Resolution  should  not  be  construed  in  a  manner  that 
implies  that  the  Security  Council  was  acting  against  the  Charter  and 
against  accepted  principles  of  law  by  allowing  Israel  to  retain  some  of 
the  territories  it  seized  in  the  war. 
This  view  is  supported  by  the  Arab  understanding  of  certain  paragraphs 
of  the  Resolution.  In  the  first  place,  the  reference  to  the  principle 
of  the  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  war  means,  as 
Lord  Caradon  indicated  to  the  Arab  Foreign  Ministers,  that  Israel  has  to 
withdraw  from  all  the  Occupied  territories96. 
Moreover,  the  Resolution  clearly  required  withdrawal  from  occupied 
territories  and  not  to  "secure  boundaries".  As  a  result,  withdrawal 
from  occupied  territories  should  not  at  any  ratý-  be  confused  with  the 
establishment  of  secure  boundaries.  96 
As  regards  the  absence  of  the  definite  article  before  the  word 
"territory"  in  Article  1(l)  in  the  English  text,  Shihata  points  Out  that 
while  the  Resolution  does  not  use  the  definite  article  in  the  withdrawal 
paragraph,  it  amply  describes  the  territories  f  rom  which  withdrawal  is 
required  as  being  "those  occupied  in  the  recent  conflict"  without  any 
exception.  Insistence  an  the  relevance  of  the  absence  of  the  definite 
article,  he  continues,  would  lead  to  the  absurd  conclusion  that  some 
Israeli  forces  could  be  maintained  in  any  territories  from  which 101 
withdrawal  is  accomplished,  as  the  Resolution  fails  also  to  provide  for 
withdrawal  of  all  the  Israeli  forces  from  such  territories.  97 
Furthermore,  the  above  argument  may  be  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  the 
text  of  the  Resolution  in  the  four  other  official  languages  (Frencho 
Spanish,  Russian  and  Chinese)  used  the  term  "the  territories"  and  not 
"territories"  in  the  paragraph  on  withdrawal.  For  example,  the  French 
text  refers  to  "Irletraft  des  fnrcps  arme-PP  TnrAP1JPnnPA_dPq  territoires 
nnnupps  lore  du  recent...  1199.  It  is  well  known  that  English  and  French 
enjoy  equal  status  as  official  and  working  languages  of  the  Security 
Council99. 
A  total  withdrawal  is  also  consistent  with  the  principles  referred  to 
in  the  operative  paragraph  'which  calls  for  "the  respect  for  and 
acknowledgement  of  the  sovereignty,  territorial  integrity  and  political 
independence  of  every  state  in  the  area";  and  it  further  affirms  the 
necessity  for  guaranteeing  "the  territorial  inviolability"  of  every 
state  in  the  area.  100 
Apart  from  reasons  based  an  the  text  of  the  Resolution,  additional 
reasons  in  support  of  a  total  Israeli  withdrawal  have  been  advanced. 
For  example,  in  the  course  of  the  138  2nd  Session  of  the  Council 
during  which  the  Resolution  was  adopted,  the  great  majority  of  the 
representatives  voting  for  the  Resolution  understood  that  it  means  total 
Israeli  withdrawal.  For  instance,  the  Indian  representative  stated: 
"It  is  our  understanding  that  the  draft  resolution,  if  approved  by  the 
Council,  will  commit  it  to  application  of  the  principle  of  total 
withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces  from'  all  the  territories-  I  repeat  all 
territories-  occupied  by  Israel  as  a  result  of  the  conflict".  101 102 
In  this  connection,  several  delegations,  including  India,  Mali,  ligert 
Bulgaria  and  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  expressed  the  view  that  L1--  -  riad  voted  f  or  the 
1ýt 
Resolution  precisely  as  India  interpreted  it.  102 
A  total  Israeli  withdrawal  is  also  consistent  with  the  subsequently- 
adopted  Resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly  on  the  Middle  East  situation 
at  its  25th,  26th,  and  27th  sessions.  103 
Along  the  same  lineeg  several  resolutions  adopted  by  international 
organizations  have  amply  stated  that  Resolution  242  requires  a  total 
Israeli  withdrawal  from  all  the  territories  occupied  in  1967.  For 
example,  the  African  Summit  Conference  held  in  Algeria  in  September  1968 
issued  a  resolution  calling  for  Israel's  withdrawal  to  the  4  June 
positions  in  accordance  with  Resolution  242104.  Also  35  members  of  the 
U.  N.  severed  their  relations  with  Israel  because  of  its  failure  to 
conform  to  that  understanding.  106 
Another  important  reason  in  support  of  a  total  Israeli  withdrawal  from 
Egypt's  territory  is  the  argument  that  the  1967  lines  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  were  not  provisional.  According  to  this  view,  the  1949  Armistice 
Agreement,  under  which  the  pre-June  boundary  was  established,  made  a 
distinction  between  two  types  of  linest  firstly  permanent  armistice 
lines  which  coincided  with  the  previously-established  international 
boundaries  between  mandated  Palestine  and  Egypt,  and  secondly  other 
demarcation  lines  which  separated  the  Gaza  Strip  from  the  Israeli-held 
territory.  The  latter  lines  were  intended  to  be  provisional  and 
therefore  could  be  changed  in  the  ultimate  settlement  according  to 
Article  IV  (3)  of  the  Agreement.  Thusl  Israel's  claim  that  its  pre-June 
boundaries  with  Egypt  are  provisional  is  groundless.  106 103 
The  f  inal  reasons  of  f  Wed  >3(ý  this  view  ta,  itased  an  the  assertion  that 
Israel's  continuous  occupation  is  in  conflict  with  the  principles  of 
international  law  and  the  U.  N.  Charter'07.  It  follows,  therefore,  that 
it  is  obliged  to  withdraw  from  Egypt's  territory.  The  argument  regarding 
the  illegality  of  Israel's  occupation  has  been  pointed  out  earlier. 
In  considering  these  two  conflicting  interpretations,  we  ire  forced  to 
agree  with  the  view  that  the  Resolution  requires  a  total  Israeli 
withdrawal  from  all  the  Arab  territories  seized  in  1967.  We  cannot 
accept  Israel's  view  that  it  does  not  recognize  documents  of  the 
Security  Council  unless  they  are  written  in  English,  thus,  removing  at 
stroke  four  of  the  five  official  languages  of  the  UN.  109 
Also,  we  cannot  accept  Israel's  insistence,  against  the  consensus  of 
the  international  community,  on  tying  the  destiny  of  sovereign  states# 
their  history  and  geography,  to  the  absence  of  a  definite  article  which 
is  not  even  needed  grammatically  to  convey  the  required  comprehensive 
meaning"'. 
In  any  event,  the  ambiguity  surrounding  the  extent  of  the  Israeli 
withdrawal  as  provided  by  Resolution  242  seems  to  be  resolvedo  as  we 
shall  see,  by  the  Peace  Treaty  which  clearly  interprets  it  as  requiring 
total  Israeli  withdrawal  and  consequently  applied  such  interpretation  to 
Egypt's  territary.  110 
Thg  Positlnn  nn  th!  o  Vithdrawal  Nring  Sadat'r.  Visit  tn  JpruralPZ_Jlr'  1977 
It  must  be  conceded  that  the  starting  point  of  the  peace  process  which 
resulted  in  the  1979  Treaty  was  undoubtedly  the  historic  and  unexpected 
visit  of  President  Sadat  to  Jerusalem.  Adjýý  Y9 
latters 
took  a  new 
turn  an  20th  of  November,  1977  when  Sadat  delivered  his  statement  before 104 
the  Israeli 
'Knesset 
declaring,  for  the  first  time  during  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict,  Egypt's  readiness  to  accept  the  existence  of,  and  to 
conclude  peace  with,  the  state  of  Israel.  "' 
Sadat's  visit-is  of  particular  importance,  not  only  because  without  it) 
as  is  widely  recognized,  there  would  have  been  no  peace  treatyO  but  also 
because  it  represented  a  historic  turning  point  in  Egypt's  settlement 
postion  after  which  several  dramatic  changes  regarding  some  important 
issues  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  accurred":  2.  It  is  relevant  and 
important  therefore  to  examine  Egypt's  position  on  the  question  (If 
withdrawal  during  that  period. 
In  relation  to  the  conditions  of  the  withdrawal,  it  may  be  stated  that 
Sadat's  statement  included  certain  changes  in  Egypt's  previous  position. 
In  the  first  place,  no  mention  of  an  immediate  and  unconditional 
withdrawal  was  made  in  the  statement.  This  left  the  door  open  for  the 
argument  that  Egypt  had  implicitly  acknowledged  the  legal  argument 
advanced  by  Israel  thatj  once  a  state  has  entered  the  territory  of 
another  in  a  legally  justified  use  of  force  in  self-defencelit  is 
entitled  to  remain  there  until  the  conclusion  of  a  peace  treaty  .  Such  a 
view,  however,  is  not  widely  accepted"3. 
Also,  it  could  mean  that  Egypt  was  no  longer  insisting  on  its 
interpretation  that  Resolution  242  required  Israel's  withdrawal  before 
the  establishment  of  peace  with  it. 
Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  Egypt's  agreement  to  negotiate  for  peace  while 
Israel  occupied  its  lands  was  rather  a  political  decision  dictated  by 
certain  political  circumstances  andt  therefore,  no  legal  conclusion 
should  be  drawn  from  it.  In  any  event,  whatever  the  legal  consequences 
which  may  be  drawn  from  such  a  position,  Egypt's  agreement  to  give  up 105 
its  firm  demand  for  unconditional  and  in  diate  withdrawal  was  a 
concession  in  favour  of  Israel. 
In  assessing  this  change  in  Egypt's  position,  several  comments  require 
to  be  made.  The  change  is  consistent  with  the  reasonable  understanding 
of  Resolution  242  which  in  fact  does  not  require  immediate  and 
unconditional  withdrawal.  Moreover,  the  legal  basis  of  this  view  can  be 
found  in  the  argument  referred  to  earlier  that  Israel  was  legally 
permitted  to  wait  until  the  conclusion  of  peace'  14. 
In  addition,  this  change  is  inconsistent  with  the  legal  view  that 
Israel's  continuous  military  occupation  of  Egypt's  territory  was 
violating  the  rules  of  international  law  and  the  principles  of  the 
Charter  which  we  discussed  earlier. 
In  turning  to  the  position  of  the  statement  vis  a  vie  the  conditions 
stipulated  by  Israel  in  return  of  its  withdrawal,  Sadat  declared  Egypt's 
full  acceptance  of  all  the  peace  guarantees  required  by  Israel.  In  his 
words: 
U  we  declare  that  we  accept  all  the  international  guarantees  you 
envisage  and  accept.  We  declare  that  we  accept  all  the  guarantees  you 
want  from  the  two  superpowers  or  from  either  of  them,  or  from  the  Big 
Five,  or  some  of  them.  111'r- 
A  detailed  examination  of  the  peace  guarantees  is  not  our  concern  here. 
Suffice  it  to  recall  ektthis  stage  that  Sadat's  acceptance  of  peace 
guarantees  is  also  consistent  with  Resolution  242,  namely#  Article 
2(c).  116 
As  to  the  direct  negotiations  stipulated  by  Israel,  Sadat  implied  in 
his  statement  that  peace  will  be  concluded  within  an  international 
conference  in  Geneva'  17.  This  was  an*implicit  rejection  of  the  Israeli f 
106 
demand  for  direct  negotiations.  Again  it  may  be  recalled  that 
Resolution  242  did  not  require  direct  negotiations.  118 
With  regard  to  the  second  issue,  namely  the  timing  of  the  Israeli 
withdrawal,  no  mention  whatsoever  is  made  of  such  issue.  For  example# 
the  questions  of  when  Israel  is  to  begin  its  withdrawal  or  the  period 
during  which  this  withdrawal  is  to  be  completed,  were  not  addressed.  It 
is  clear  that  these  questions  had  been  deliberately  left  to  be  decided 
during  the  peace  negotiations. 
With  regard  to  the  third  issue,  namely  the  extent  of  the  Israeli 
withdrawal  from  Egypt's  territory,  Sadat  adhered  to  the  principle  of  a 
total  Israeli  withdrawal  not  only  from  Egypt's  territory,  but  also  from 
all  the  Arab  occupied  territories.  His  demand  for  a  total  Israeli 
withdrawal  was  pointed  out  explicitly  and  implicitly  in  several  parts  of 
the  statement.  In  his  words: 
11  There  are  Arab  territories  which  Israel  has  occupied  by  armed  forces- 
we  insist  an  complete  withdrawal  from  these  territories.  "  119 
Also  he  stated  in  other  part: 
"To  us,  the  national  sail  is  equal  to  the  holy  valley...  none  of  us  can, 
or  accept,  to  cede  one  inch  of  it  or  accept  the  principle  of  debating  or 
bargaining  over  it.  11120 
QuIbZlclearlyt  Egypt's  insistence  On  complete  Israeli  withdrawal  is 
consistent  with  the  Arab  interpretation  of  Resolution  242  and  the 
understanding  expressed  on  many  occasions  by'  various  states  and 
international  organizations  that  Israel  should  withdraw  from  all  the 
occupied  territaries.  121 
Turning  to  the  final  issue,  namely  Israel's  understanding  of  the  term 
usecure  and  recognized  boundaries"t  referred  to  in  Article  1(ii)  Of 107 
Resolution  2420  we  may  observe  that  Sadat  adopted  the  view  that  this 
term  should  not  be  understood  as  providing  an  excuse  for  geographical 
expansion;  instead  it  should  mean  proper  security  arrangements  and  more 
peace  guarantees  for  Israel.  In  presenting  his  view  on  the  meaning  of 
the  term  "secure  boundaries",  he  stated: 
"It  means  that  Israel  lives  within  her  borders,  secure  against  any 
aggression...  It  means  that  Israel  obtains  all  kinds  of  guarantees  that 
ensure  those  two  factors.  "122 
Egypt's  position  in  this  respect  meant  that  it  rejected  Israel's  demands 
proposed  by  several  Israeli  officials,  that  it  must  have  a  permanent 
presence  at  Sharm-el-Shelkh123.  From  a  legal  standpoints  Egypt's 
understanding  of  the  term  "secure  boundaries"  was  based  on  several 
international  law  principles,  such  as  the  principle  of  inadmissibility 
of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  force,  the  principle  of  respect  of 
territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty  of  states,  and  the  principle  of 
self-determination,  as  developed  under  the  U.  N.  124 
Moreover,  this  understanding  can  be  supported  by  the  fact  that  the 
term  "secure  and  recognized  boundaries"  in  the  British  draft  (which 
became  Resolution  242)  was  taken  from  the  earlier  US  draft  submitted  to 
the  Security  Council  an  November  7,1967.  Secure  boundaries  were 
envisaged  by  the  sponsors  of  the  latter  draft  as  a  condition  in  the 
arrangements  to  be  adopted  and  not  in  the  geographic  location"'- 
Before  leaving  this  point,  it  may  be  worthwhile  to  point  out  that  no 
change  in  the  Israeli  position  during  this  period  can  be  traced.  In  his 
statement  followed  Sadat's  speech,  Begin  indicated  that  the  Israelis 
"have  a  different  position...  with  regard  to  the  permanent  borders". 
Nevertheless,  he  confirmed  that  the  approach  of  the  Israeli  government 108 
was  that  it  was  ready  to  negotiate  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  Security 
Council  Resolutions  242  and  338,  without  any  prior  condition.  127 
T-  The  Drafting  History  nf  thp  Vithdralffil  Mause 
It  is  necessary  at  the  outset  to  indicate  that  it  is  not  our  intention 
here  to  analyze  the  proposals  and  the  drafts  submitted  by  the  parties 
6 
duringCamp  David  negotiations  as  they  will  be  examined  later  in  our 
analysis  of  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Peace  Treaty.  The  following 
discussion,  therefore,  will  be  confined  to  a  brief  exposition  of  these 
drafts  as  submitted  during  the  negotiations. 
The  Camp  David  talks  opened  on  September  5,1978  (and  lasted  for 
thirteen  days)'20.  On  the  next  day,  on  September  6t  Sadat  submitted  a 
plan  which  called,  inter  all&,  for  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces  from 
all  the  Arab  occupied  territories.  The  question  of  the  Israeli 
withdrawal  was  chiefly  dealt  in  Article  2  of  the  text  of  the  Egyptian 
proposal.  It  reads  as  follows: 
"The  parties  agree  that  the  establishment  of  a  just  and  lasting  peace 
among  them  requires  the  fulfillment  of  the  following:  first,  withdrawal 
of  Israel  from  the  occupied  territories  in  accordance  with  the  principle, 
of  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  war.  In  Sinai  and 
the  Golan,  withdrawal  shall  take  place  to  the  international  boundaries 
between  mandated  Palestine  and  Egypt  and  Syria  respectively"'.  " 
The  Egyptian  draft  was  quite  unacceptable  to  the  Israeli  negotiators 
for  several  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  the  language  on  the 
inadmissibility  of  acquisition  of  territory  by  war  was  rejected  by  Begin 
on  the  ground  that  Israel  had  occupied  the  Arab  lands  in  a  "defensive 
act"  rather  than  by  a  war.  130 109 
Moreover,  Israel's  initial  position  was  that  it  would  not  give  up  the 
Israeli  military  airfields  in  Sinai'21.  Also,  Dayan  suggested  an 
adjustment  in  the  international  boundaries  between  Egypt  and  Israel  in 
return  of  the.  latter's  agreement  to  remove  its  settlements  in  Sinai'31. 
Further,  if  Egypt's  draft  was  to  be  accepted,  then  the  scope  of  the 
Israeli  withdrawal,  which  would  be  based  on  the  principle  of  the 
inadmissibility  of  acquisition  of  territory  by  war,  would  extend  in 
legal  terms  to  all  the  Arab  occupied  territories.  133 
In  an  attempt  to  bridge  the  gap  between  Egypt's  position  and  the 
Israeli  reaction,  the  US  submitted  on  September  10  its  first  draft.  134 
The  relevant  portion  dealing  with  the  question  of  the  withdrawal  reads 
as  follows: 
"Israel  has  agreed  to  the  restoration  of  the  exercise  of  full  Egyptian 
sovereignty  in  the  Sinai  up  to  the  internationally  recognized  border 
between  Egypt  and  Israel,  and  Egypt  has  agreed  to  establish  full  peace 
and  normal  relations  with  Israel.  "136 
A  quick  look  at  the  Egyptian  and  American  draf  t  reveals  two  main 
differences.  First,  while  the  legal  basis  of  Egypt's  draft  was  the 
principle  of  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  wars  the 
American  draft  instead  referred  to  the  principle  of  respect  of  state 
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity.  Also,  the  US  draft  contained  no 
mention  of  other  Arab  occupied  territoriest  while  Egypt's  draft  provided 
explicitly  for  Israeli  withdrawal  from  all  the  Arab  territories. 
Moreover,  contrary  to  Egypt's  draft$  the  Americans  used  a  language  which 
referred  implicitly  rather  than  explicitly  to  the  Israeli  withdrawal 
from  Egypt's  territory. 110 
As  to  the  reaction  of  Egyptq  it  seems  that  the  Egyptians  found  it 
acceptable  provided  that  it  was  amended  to  refer  explicitly  to  the 
1  Israeli  withdrawal 
In  response  to  Egypt's  view,  the  US  amended  its  draft  an  the  withdrawal 
to  provide  explicitly  for  the  Israeli  withdrawal.  On  September  12,  the 
second  American  draft  was  submitted'  : 37  The  relevant  portion  on  the 
withdrawal  ran  as  follows: 
"Egypt  and  Israel  agreed  to  negotiate  on: 
a)The  full  exercise  of  Egyptian  sovereignty  up  to  the  international 
recognized  borders  between  Egypt  and  mandated  Palestine, 
b)  ...  withdrawal  of  Israeli  personnel  from  Sinai.  11139 
This  version  suggests  that  the  expression  "withdrawal  of  Israeli 
personnel  from  Sinai"  was  inserted  to  meet  the  Egyptian  demand  for 
clearer  language.  The  term  "Israeli  personnel"  is  somewhat  unclear  and 
can  be  taken  as  a  reference 
perhaps  also  to  the  settlers. 
both  to  Israeli  military  forces  and 
At  this  time,  it  may  be  observed,  the 
Israelis  had  not  been  yet  agreed  an  the  withdrawal  of  the  settlers. 
Also,  the  above  version  refers  to  the  final  line  of  the  withdraewal  in 
terms  of  the  international  borders  between  Egypt  and  mandated  Palestine, 
instead  of  the  expression  "internationally  recognized  border  between 
Egypt  and  Israel"  used  in  the  first  draft.  The  former  expression  which 
was  taken  from  the  Egyptian  draft  is  more  accurate  as  we  shall  indicate 
later. 
In  turning  now  to  the  Israeli  position,  a  distinction  ought  to  be  imade 
between  its  initial  position  taken  in  the  first  days  of  the  negotiations 
and  the  final  position.  In  the  first  stage  Israel  declared  that  it  was 
ready  to  withdraw  its  military  forces  from  Sinai  provided  that  it  could ill 
keep  control  over  the  airfields  in  Sinai'".  These  airfields  were  built 
by  Israel  during  its  military  occupation  of  Sinai.  Of  course,  such  a 
demand  was  rejected  by  Egypt,  since  it  would  involve  violation  of 
Egypt's  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity.  140 
Alternatively,  the  Israelis  proposed  that  the  airfield  near  Sharm  el- 
Sheikh  could  be  turned  over  to  the  UK  peace-keeping  forces,  the  one  near 
El-Arish  to  the  Americans,  and  the  one  near  Etzion  retained  by  the 
Israelis  for  some  time.  Again,  Egypt  rejected  these  proposals-141 
Eventually,  after  the  Americans  accepted  a  proposal  that  the  US 
government  would  pay  the  costs  of,  and  help  in,  building  three  airfields 
in  Israel  in  return  for  Israel's  abandonment  of  the  Sinai's  airfieldst 
Israel  agreed  to  give  up  the  three  airfieldsg  providing  that  Egypt  would 
use  only  them  for  civilian  purposes142 
Thus,  the  relevant  paragraph  of  the  Camp  David  Accords  dealing  with  the 
airfields  problem  provides  for: 
11  ...  the  use  of  airfields  left  by  the  Israelis  near  El-Arishl  Rafahl  Ras- 
en-Naqbl  and  Sharm  el  ,  Sheikh  for  civilian  purposes  only,  including 
possible  coin  rcial  use  by  all  nations.  "143 
Another  relevant  problem  which  arose  during-  the  negotiation  was  the 
timing  of  the  Israeli  withdrwal  from  Egypt's  territory.  Under  Articles  2 
and  6  of  the  Egyptian  draft,  the  Israeli  withdrawal  was  to  be  completed" 
within  three  months"  from  the  signing  of  the  the  framework  treaty.  144" 
This  period  was  rejected  by  the  Israelis,  yet,  by  the  end  of  the 
negotiations  it  had  been  agreed  that  Israel  would  evacuate  a 
substantial  area  within  nine  months  from  the  signing  of  the  peace  treaty 
;  thereafter  its  withdrawal  would  be  completed  within  three  years. 112 
Israeli  security  reasons  were  behind  extending  the  period  from  three 
months  to  three  years  146 
On  summing  up  the  postion  of  the  three  participants,  we  may  conclude 
that  the  extent,  the  timing,  and  the  conditions  of  the  Israeli 
withdrawal  from  Egypt's  territory  did  not  constitute  a  serious  problem 
during  the  negotiations.  However,  while  the  US  and  Egypt  demanded 
complete  withdrawal,  Israelq  under  the  pretext  of  the  right  to  secure 
boundaries,  insisted  on  its  demand  to  remain  in  occupation  of  the 
airfield.  It  did  not  give  up  this  demand  until  the  final  hours  of  the 
negotiation. 
While  Egypt  demanded  that  the  scope  of  the  withdrawal  must  include  all 
the  territories  seized  in  1967l  Israel  and  the  US  preferred  a  language 
calling  for  withdrawal  from  Egypyt1s  territory  only. 
The  text  of  the  Camp  David  Agreements  referred  to  the  Question  of  -the 
Israeli  withdrawal  in  the  second  part  of  the  Agreement  entitled 
"Framework  For  The  Conclusion  Of  A  Peace  Treaty  Between  Egypt  and 
Israel".  In  this  connection  two  main  provisions  dealing  with  the 
withdrawal  can  be  found: 
"a.  The  full  exercise  of  Egyptian  sovereignty  up  to  the  internationally 
recognized  border  between  Egypt  and  mandated  Palestine; 
b.  The  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces  from  the-Sinai. 
Another  paragraph  dealing  with  the  period  during  which  the  Israeli 
withdrawal  was  to  be  completed  was  the  final  paragraph  entitled  Interim 
Withdrawal: 
"Between  three  -months  and  nine  months  after  the  signing  of  the  Peace 
Treaty,  all  Israeli  forces  will  withdraw  east  of  a  line  extending  from  a 113 
point  east  of  ElArish  to  RasMuhammed,  the  exact  location  of  this  line  to 
be  determined  by  mutual  agreement.  11147 
As  regards  the  conditions  stipulated  by  Israel  in  return  for  its 
withdrawal,  such  as  the  peace  guarantees,  the  stationing  of  U.  N.  forces 
and  Israel's  freedom  of  passage  through  the  Straits  of  Tiran,  several 
provisions  can  be  found.  Yet,  these  conditions  are  not  our  concern  at 
this  stage  since  they  will  be  examined  at  length  in  other  parts. 
We  proceed  now  to  examine  the  relevant  parts  of  the  Camp  David  Accords 
and  the  1979  Pace  Treaty. 
I 
The  main  provisions  'dealing  with  Israel's  withdrawal  are  included  in 
Article  1(2)  of  the  Treaty.  For  the  purposes  of  the  present  analysis,  it 
will  be  quoted  again: 
"Israel  will  withdraw  all  its  armed  forces  and  civilians  from  the  Sinai 
behind  the  international  boundary  between  Egypt  and  mandated  Palestine 
as  provided  in  the  annexed  protocol  (Annex  1),  and  Egypt  will  resume  the 
exercise  of  its  full  sovereignty  over  Sinai".  A  textual  interpretation 
of  the,  above  paragraph  suggests  several  observations.  The  term  "armed 
forces"  is  derived  from  the  language  of  Resolution  242,  in  Article  l(l). 
This  could  be  interpreted  as  being  basedl  in  the  first  places  on 
Israel's  acceptance  of  and  obligations  under  the  Resolution. 
The  term  "the  Sinaill  refers  obviously  to  all  Egypt's  occupied 
territories.  In  referring  to  Sinail'the  framers  clearly  avoided  the  use 
of  the  term  "occupied  territories"  which  was  used  in,  Resolution  242. 
Having  in  -mind  the  fact  that  all  Arab  occupied  territories  are  within 114 
the  scope  of  the  withdrawal  required  by  Resolution  242,  it  seems  that 
the  Israeli  lawyers  insisted  on  the  use  of  the  term  "Sinai"  instead  of 
the  term  "Egyptian  occupied  territories",  as  proposed  in  the  Egyptian 
draft.  They  believed  that  such  a  language  would  exclude  the  possibility 
of  the  application  of  the  provisions  to  other  Arab  occupied 
territories.  149 
Moreover,  the  phrase  "International  boundary  between  Egypt  and  mandated 
Palestine"  is  similar  to  the  language  used  in  Article  VIII  (2)  of  the 
Egyptian-  Israeli  Armistice  Agreement  of  1949,  which  determined  the  pre- 
June  armistice  lines.  This  could  mean  that  the  authors  of  the  Treaty  are 
in  line  with  Egypt's  view  that  its  pre-June  Armistice  lines  149,  with  the 
exception  of  Gaza,  was  in  accordance  with  the  international  permanent 
boundary.  Thus,  if  this  is  true,  it  means  that  the  authors  denounced 
the  Israeli  claim  to  adjust  its  boundary  with  Egypt  based  on  the  premise 
that  the  pre-June  line  was  provisional. 
The  phrase  "international  boundary"  appears  for  the  first  time  in  the 
Egyptian  draft  submitted  at  Camp  David.  Later  it  was  used  by  the 
Americans  in  -  their  second  draft  instead  of  the  phrase  "the 
internationally  recognized  border  between  Egypt  and  Israel.  "  Clearlyp 
the  former  phrase  is  more  accurate  than  the  latter.  In  fact,  while  there 
was  an  international,  permanent  and  recognized  boundary  between  Egypt 
and  mandated  Palestines  there  had  never  been  a  recognized  boundary 
between  Egypt  and  Israel  until  the  conclusion  of  the  1979  Treaty.  "' 
Also,  the  use  of  this  phrase,  in  particular  the  term  "mandated 
Palestine"  to  refer  to  the  final  line  of  the  withdrawal  could  mean  that 
Egypt  implicitly  recognizes  the  state  of  Israel  as  encompassing  the 
territory  of  mandated  Palestine  with  the  exception  of  Gaza  and  the  West 115 
Bank.  In  other  words,  it  could  mean  that  Egypt  had  accepted  Israel's 
acquisition  of  that  substantial  part  of  the  territory-  allocated  to  the 
Palestinian  State  in  the  U.  N.  partition  Resolution-  and  which  it  seized 
in  1948  and  1949.161 
The  word  "resume"  used  in  the  sentence,  "Egypt  will  resume  the  exercise 
of  its  full  sovereignty  over  the  Sinai"  suggests  that  this  phrase  is 
declaratory  in  character  as  it  confirmed  Egypt's  previous  sovereignty 
over  Sinai,  thus  rejecting  Israeli  claims  questioning  Egypt's 
sovereignty  over  Sinai.  162 
The  expression  "exercise  its  full  sovereignty"  refers  clearly  to  the 
principle  of  respect  for  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of 
states.  This  is  one  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  Law  of  Nations 
by  which  a  sovereign  state  is  supreme  within  its  territorial  domain.  ` 
This  right  imposes  the  duty  on  every  state  to  refrain  and  to  prevent 
its  agents  and  subjects  from  committing  any  act  which  constitute  a 
violation  of  another  state's  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity.  It 
is  also  one  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  U.  N.  Charter  as 
enshrined  in  Article  2(4)  of  the  U.  N.  Charter'  64  .  The  principle  was  also 
Included  in  the  constitution  of  several  international  organizationst 
e.  g.,  Article  3(3)  of  the  Charter  of  the  OAU.  'r-6 
A  glance  at  Article  1(2)  suggests  that,  in  practicel  the  injection  of 
that  principle  into  the  last  sentence  of  the  paragraph  adds  nothing  to 
its  general  meaning,  that  is  to  say,  assuming  that  such  a  referrence  to 
the  principle  was  omitted,  Israel  would  have  to  withdraw  from  all 
Egypt's  territory  under  the  clear  meaning  of  the  rest  of  the  paragraph. 
Thus,  we  may  askj  -what  are  the  reasons  for  the  reference  to  that 
principle  7 116 
A  careful  reading  of  the  paragraph  suggests  that  the  reference  to  that 
principle  could  be  construed  as  follows: 
-  From  the  Israeli  perspective  such  reference  may  be  understood  to  mean 
that  Israel's  withdrawal  from  Egypt's  territory  was  legally  based  on  the 
principle  of  respect  of  Egypt's  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity, 
rather  on  the  principle  of  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of 
'  . -I ýearlier, 
territory  by  war  proposed  by  the  Egyptian  draft.  As  referred 
the  reference  to  the  latter  principle  might  be  understood  as  broadening 
the  scope  of  the  paragraph  to  embrace  the  rest  of  the  Arab  occupied 
territories.  In  other  words,  the  target  of  this  phrase  was  the  occupied 
territory  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  which  do  not  belong  to  any 
sovereign  statet  and  consequently,  Israeli  presence  there  is  not  in 
violation  of  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  states. 
In  sum,  we  may  conclude  that  by  the  inclusion  of  that  expressiont 
Israel  not  only  avoided  the  reference  to  the  principle  of 
inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  wart  but  also 
excluded  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  from  the  scope  of  the  withdrawal  clause. 
On  the  other  hand,  -from  the  Egyptian  perspective,  the  objective  of  the 
reference  to  the  principle  is  two-fold.  First,  the  ref  erence  that 
Egypt  will  resume  the  exercise  of  its  full  sovereignty  over  Sinai  could 
be  interpreted  to  mean  that  Israel  denounces  its  previous  claims  that 
Egypt  possesses  no  title  over  Sinai.  To  understand  the  importance  of 
this  point,  we  may  refer  in  brief  to  the  legal  argument  against  Egypt's 
sovereignty  over  Sinai  (one  third  of  Egypt's  territory).  In  this 
connection  Stone  wrote: 
0  As  to  Sinai,  this  remained  under  the  sovereignty  of  Turkey  right 
until  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne,  19239  Article  150  by  which  Turkey 117 
renounced  all  titles  thereto  without  however  disposing  of  the 
sovereignty  in  favor  of  Egypt  or  any  other  particular  State.  What  lay 
in  Egypt  after  that  time  would  appear  to  have  been  merely  what  was  first 
accorded  to  the  Khedivate  of  Egypt  in  1892,  and  continued  under  the 
British  protectorate  until  after  Vorld  Var  1,  namely,  a  grant  of 
"administration".  After  1923,  and  even  after  Egypt  became  independents 
no  other  disposition,  nor  any  new  act  of  annexation  by  Egypt,  is  to  be 
found.  The  only  possible  grounds  for  suggesting  that  Egypt  had 
sovereignty  over  Sinai  in  1967  would  therefore  have  to  be  that  her 
subsequent  activities  there  sufficid  for  acquisitive  prescription 
whether  they  sufficed  to  enlarge  her  "administration"  into  sovereignty$ 
and  whether  indeed  they  were  not  all  sufficiently  explained  in  terms  of 
"administration"  remained  a  debatable  question  in  1967.1111-6 
Secondly,  the  reference  to  the  principle  of  sovereignty  and  territorial 
integrity  of  states  would  affirm  the  necessity  of  a  complete  Israeli 
withdrawal  from  Sinai  and  would  close  the  door  to  any  unexpected  Israeli 
claim  or  interpretation  under  which  it  may  not  complete  its  total 
withdrawal.  An  example  of  such  unexpected  claim,  or  interpretation  is 
the  Israeli  claiiw  with  regard  to  Taba.  An  examination  of  the  Taba  Award 
will  be  made  later.  167 
(2)  A  Contextual  Analysis 
The  first  issue  which  needs  to  be  examined  in  relation  to  the  Israeli 
withdrawal  as  provided  by  the  1979  Treaty  was  the  timing  of  the  Israeli 
withdrawal. 118 
Article  1(D  of  Annex  one  to  the  Treaty,  indicated  that  "Israel  will 
complete  withdrawal  of  all  its  armed  forces...  from  the  Sinai  not  later 
than  three  years...  "169 
Also,  withdrawal  during  this  period  would  be  accomplished  in  two 
phases,  interim  and  final  withdrawal.  The  interim  withdrawal,  under 
Article  1(3)  of  Annex  one,  was  to  be  completed  within  9  months  from  the 
date.  of  exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification.  The  line  of  this 
interim  withdrawal  will  be  "behind  the  line  from  east  of  El-Arish  to  Ras 
Muhammed  as  delinated  on  Map  2.11169 
The  final  withdrawal  from  the  rest  of  Sinai  to  the  international 
boundaries  was  to  be  completed  "not  later  than  three  years.  "  More 
details  about  the  subphases  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal  are  provided  in 
Article  II  of  Appendix  2  Annex  1.160 
The  stipulation  of  three  years  to  complete  the  Israeli  withdrawal  is  a 
long  period  compared  to  the  three  months  period  envisaged  by  the 
Egyptian  draf  t.  The  U.  S.  draft  submitted  on  10  September  did  not 
suggest  any  period  and  stated  that  "the  timing  of  the  withdrawal  of  all 
Israeli  forces  from  Sinai...  will  be  defined  in  the  Peace  Treaty.  ""' 
In  comparing  this  period  to  many  international  peace  treaties,  the 
three  years  period  was  a  long  one.  For  example,  Article  20  of  the  Peace 
Treaty  between  the  Allied  Forces  on  one  hand  and  Bulgaria  on  the  other 
hand  in  1947  provided  for  the  withdrawal  of  Allied  Forces  from  Bulgarian 
territory  within  a  period  of  90  days  after  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
Treaty'  62.  A  similar  period  can  be  found  in  the  Treaty  between  the 
Allie,  6  and  Italy  which  provided  in  Articles  14  and  73  for  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Allied  forces  from  the  territory  of  Italy  within  90 
days.  163 119 
In  any  event,  the  stipulation  of  this  long  period  for  the  Israeli 
withdrawal  had  been  affected  by  the  view  that  Israel  must  have  time  to 
prepare  itself  for  the  withdrawal,  particularly,  complete  its  security 
arrangements  inside  its  final  borders'". 
Moreover,  as  Saunders  observes,  the  process  of  achieving  peace  in  the 
Middle  East  needs  time  to  allow  the  political  conditions  for  peace  to 
grow  as  they  "cannot  be  decreed"166.  In  other  words,  such  time  would 
create  a  political  environment  that  would  encourage  and  ensure  a 
permanent  peace.  166 
Vith  regard  to  the  time  as  f  rom  which  Israel  was  to  begin  its 
withdrawal  ,  Article  1  (1)  indicated  that  the  withdrawal  would  begin  as 
"from  the  date  of  exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification  of  this 
Treaty". 
The  framers  at  this  point  are  in  line  with  Article  2  of  the  Egyptian 
Proposal  at  Camp  David  that  "Israeli  withdrawal  shall  commence 
immediately  after  the  signing  of  the  peace  treaties"  C.  7.  However,  the 
Treaty  indicates  that  the  withdrawal  begins  "from  the  date  of  the 
exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification""  and  not  from  the  signing  of 
the  Treaty,  as  Egypt  proposed.  At  this  point,  we  may  recall  that  the 
Camp  David  Accords  provided  that  the  Israeli  withdrawal  was  to  begin  as 
from  the  signing,  and  not  from  the  ratification,  of  the  Peace  Treaty.  "'-' 
Notwithstanding  this,  the  timing  of  the  withdrawal  as  defined  by  the 
Treaty  settled  the  dilemma  raised  with  regard  to  the  implementation  Of 
Resolution  242,  namely  what  must  come  first  in  time,  Israeli  withdrawal 
or  Egypt's  acceptance  of  peace  and  recognition  of  Israel.  It  is  clear 
that  the  Treaty  adopted  the  view  that  peace  with,  and  recognition  Oft 120 
Israel  must  precede  withdrawal.  Thur.,  it  goes  beyond  what  had  been 
envisaged  by  the  Resolution. 
At  this  point,  it  may  be  well  to  recall  that  the  paragraph  on  the 
establishment  of  peace  was  placed,  physically,  in  the  Peace  Treaty 
before  the  paragraph  on  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces  from  Sinai. 
This  may  be  compared  with  Resolution  242,  where  the  paragraph  on  the 
withdrawal  precedes  the  establishment  of  peace;  and  therefore  the  Arabs 
called  for  the  Israeli  withdrawal  before  concluding  peace  with  Israel. 
As  to  the  implementation  of  the  provisions  on  the  timing  of  the 
withdrawal,  Israel,  with  the  exception  of  Taba,  had  completed  its 
withdrawal  in  the  time  defined,  i.  e.,  by  April  1982.1"Jaba  is  the  site 
of  a  hotel  that  the  Israelis  built  near  Eilat  an  land  that,  according  to 
Egypt,  belonged  on  the  Egyptian  side  of  the  boundary  after  Israel's 
final  withdrawal  from  the  Sinai  under  the  terms  of  the  Peace  Treaty. 
Israel  asserted  its  claim  to  remain  there.  The  dispute  over  this  area 
was  referred  to  international  arbitration.  In  1989,  abiding  by  the 
award,  Israel  withdrew  finally  from  the  disputed  area.  171  A  more 
detailed  analysis  of  the  problem  appears  later  in  this  chapter. 
The  second  issue  arising  in  connection  with  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli 
forces  under  the  Treaty  is  the  extent  of  that  withdrawal.  Article  1(2) 
made  it  clear  that  Israel  would  withdraw  to  the  international  boundaries 
between  Egypt  and  mandated  Palestine.  For  a  better  understanding  of 
the  final  line  of  the  withdrawal  defined  by  the  Treaty,  it  may  be  useful 
to  refer  to  the  three  other  possible  lines  of  withdrawal  which  might 
have  been  chosen. 
The  first  possibility  is  the  pre-June  line.  This  line  was  established 
under  the  1949  Armistice  Agreement  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  and  was  of 121 
two  types.  One  is  the  permanent  line  marking  the  international 
recognized  boundaries  between  Egypt  and  mandated  Palestine  which 
referred  to  in  the  Armistice  Agreement  as  "the  Egypt-Palestine 
frontiers";  and  the  temporary  line  separating  "the  Gaza  Strip  from  the 
Israeli-held  territories".  172 
From  a  legal  standpoint,  the  pre-June  line  is  consistent  with  the 
extent  of  the  withdrawal  clause  of  the  Security  Council  Resolution. 
Further,  it  is  consistent  with  the  overwhelming  view  that  the  Israeli 
occupation  of  the  Arab  territories  seized  in  1967  is  illegal  under 
fundamental  Charter  principles  and  U.  N.  resolutions.  173  The  Egyptian 
draft  envisaged  an  Israeli  withdrawal  to  the  pre-June  line. 
The  second  possible  line  is  the  one  determining  the  Jewish  state  as 
proposed  by  and  defined  in  Resolution  181(11)  adopted  by  the  General 
Assembly  an  29  November  1947.171  This  is  the  line  according  to  which 
Israel  was  accepted  and  recognized.  176  In  a  letter  addressed  on  14  May 
1948  by  Eliahu  Epstein,  Agent  of  the  Provisional  Government  of  Israel, 
to  President  Truman  requesting  recognition  of  Israel,  the  President  was 
informed  that:  "The  State  of  Israel  has  been  proclaimed  as  an 
independent  republic  within  frontier  approved  by  the  General  Assembly  of 
the  United  Nations...  11  17C.  In  support  of  this  line,  we  may  recall  that 
the  Israeli  government  also  accepted  in  the  Protocol  of  Lausanne  of  12 
May  12  1949,  the  use  of  a  map  of  Palestine  identical  to  the  UN  partition 
plan  as  a  basis  for  discussion  of  the  ultimate  settlement.  177 
An  advocate  of  this  view  could  also  argue  that  Israel's  annexation  of 
the  territories  it  occupied  in  1949  in  excess  of  the  partition 
resolution  was  illegal  under  the  principle  of  inadmissibilitY  Of  the 122 
acquisition  of  territory  by  force  and  the  principle  of  self 
deterimination. 
Notwithstanding  the  above,  this  line  was  not  proposed  during  the 
negotiations.  This  was  due  to  the  fact  that  both  Egypt  and  Israel  agreed 
before  the  negotiation  that  the  principles  included  in  Resolution  242 
should  be  the  basis  of  the  settlement.  As  is  well  known#  the 
resolution  overlooked  the  problem  of  the  territories  siezed  by  Israel  in 
1948  and  1949.  In  the  words  of  Quincy  Wright,  "  The  resolution  of 
November  22  nd  is  advantegeous  to  Israel  in  requiring  withdrawal  only 
from  territories  occupied  in  1967.  The  territories  occupied  by  Israel 
under  the  1949  Armistice  beyond  the  UN  partition  line  of  the  1947  might 
have  been  added.  96179 
The  third  possible  line  is  the  international  recognized  boundary 
between  Egypt  and  mandated  Palestine.  For  a  better  understanding  of  this 
line,  we  have  to  go  back  to  1906  when  Turkey  was  the  ruler  of  Palestine 
and  the  nominal  ruler  of  Egypt.  During  that  time,  the  boundary  between 
the  two  countries  was  uncertain.  In  1906,  it  was  agreed  between  Britain, 
then  the  actual  ruler  of  Egypt,  and  Turkey  that  the  boundary  of  the  two 
territories  should  be  definitively  established.  17  Thus,  on  October 
1st,  1906  an  agreement  was  concluded  between  the  Turkish  Sultante  and  the 
Egyptian  Khediviate.  IGO  Under  this  agreement  the  boundary  between  Egypt 
and  Palestine  was  laid  down  and  boundary  pillars  were  erected  along  the 
separating  line.  181 
This  was  the  line  suggested  by  the  first  US  draft  to  be  the  final  line 
of  the  Israeli  withdrawal.  It  was,  however,  referred  to  in  terms  of  the 
"internationally  recognized  border"  between  Egypt  and  Israel.  Then 
later,  in  the  second  draft,  it  was  referred  to  in  terms  of  the 123 
internationally  recognized  boundary  between  Egypt  and  mandated 
Palestine.  Of  course,  thi6-was  the  line  adopted  by  the  Camp  David 
Accords  and  the  1979  Treaty. 
We  have  mentioned  earlier,  in  dealing  with  the  meaning  attributed  to 
the  term  "mandated  Palestine",  that  the  language  of  the  final  line  of 
the  withdrawal  suggests  that  Egypt  recognized  Israel  as  a  sovereign 
state,  not  only  over  the  territories  alloted  to  the  Jewish  state,  but 
also  over  that  substantial  part  of  the  territory  alloted  to  the  Arab 
state  in  the  Partition  Plan  and  seized  by  Israel  in  1948  and  1949. 
While  there  has  never  been  a  consensus  of  opinion  as  to  the  question 
whether  or  not  Resolution  242  required  unconditional  Israeli 
withdrawall  it  is  clear  that  the  framers  of  the  1979  Treaty  envisaged  a 
conditional  withdrawal.  The  Treaty,  like  Resolution  242j  was  a  package- 
deal  based  on  certain  basic  principles:  Israel,  an  one  hand,  agreed  to 
withdraw  from  all  the  Sinai,  to  dismantle  its  settlements,  and  to  give 
up  all  the  oil  fields.  Egypt  agreed,  in  return,  to  conclude  full  peace 
with  Israel  which  entailed  full  recognition,  the  termination  of  the 
state  of  belligerency,  free  passage  for  Israeli  shipping  through  Egypt's 
waterways,  the  establishment  of  full  diplomatic  relations  and  the  end  of 
the  boycott  of  Israel.  192  Also,  Egypt  agreed  on  several  peace 
guarantees  required  for  the  security  of  Israel. 
Apart  from  these  general  conditions,  review  of  the  provisions  dealing 
specifically  with  military  withdrawal  show  that  the  phases  of  the 
withdrawal  should  be  accompanied  by  certain  conditions,  These  can  be 
classified  into  two  types:  conditions  regarding  security  and  peace 124 
guarantees,  and  conditions  regarding  the  normalization  of,  and  future 
relations  between,  Egypt  and  Israel. 
The  security  arrangements,  military  measures,  and  the  peace  guarantees 
under  the  Treaty  will  be  examined  in  detail  in  another  part  of  this 
work.  103  Suffice  it  to  emphasize  at  this  stage  that  Israel  had  obtained 
sufficient  and  effective  guarantees.  For  example,  Article  2  of  Annex  1 
indicated  that  the  withdrawal  was  to  be  accompanied  by  the  establishment 
of  demilitarized  zones  and  some  military  measures.  Also,  Article  3  of 
the  Appendix  to  Annex  1  provided  for  the  stationing  of  U.  N.  forces  to 
supervise  the  implementation  of  certain  terns  of  the  Treaty.  In 
addition,  Article  V  of  that  Appendix  provided  for  interim  buffer  zones 
in  Egypt  where  no  military  forces  were  to  be  permitted.  Finally, 
Article  II  of  the  same  Appendix  provided  for  certain  limitatior6L4ý 
Egypt's  military  forces  and  equipment. 
With  regard  to  the  second  type  of  conditions,  namely  those  relating  to 
the  normalization  of  relations  between  the  parties,  Article  1  of  the 
Treaty  provided  for  a  linkage  between  the  Israeli  withdrawal  on  one  hand 
and  the  normalization  of  relations  and  the  termination  of  the  economic 
boycott  on  the  other  hand.  It  reads  as  follows: 
"  upon  completion  of  the  interim  withdrawal  provided  for  in  Annex  lo 
the  Parties  will  establish  normal  and  friendly  relations  in  accordance 
with  Article  111(3). 
11194 
Fortunatelyl  the  Treaty  provided  an  additional  paragraph  to  explain  the 
meaning  of  the  term  "normal  and  friendly  relations".  It  is  clear  that 
the  framers  favoured  a  broad  meaning  for  this  term.  Article  3(3) 
indicated  that  "The  normal  relationship  will  include  full  recognition 
of  Israel;  Diplomatic  relations;  Economic  and  cultural  relations; 125 
Termination  of  boycotts  and  discriminatory  barriers  to  the  free  movement 
of  people  and  goods  and;  The  mutual  enjoyment  by  citizens  of  the  due 
process  of  law".  1" 
In  comparing  the  above  paragraph  with  other  meanings  attributed  to  the 
same  termSduring  the  peace  negotiations,  the  following  observations 
require  to  be  made. 
This  paragraph  was  originally  taken  from  the  first  American  draft 
submitted  at  Camp  David,  which  referred  to  the  normal  relations  in  the 
following  terms: 
"Signatories  shall  proceed  to  establish  among  themselves  relationships 
normal  to  states  at  peace  with  one  another.  To  this  end,  they  should 
undertake  to  abide  by  all  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations.  Steps  to  be  taken  in  this  respect  include:  a)  full  recognition, 
including  diplomatic,  economic  and  cultural  relations;  b)  abolishing 
economic  boycotts  and  barriers  to  the  free  movement  of  goods  and  people; 
c)  guaranteeing  that  under  their  jurisdiction  the  citizens  of  the  other 
parties  shall  enjoy  the  protection  of  the  due  process  of  law".  19r, 
This  quotation  was  finally  approved  and  became  paragraph  2  of  Section  C 
of  the  Camp  David  Accords. 
However,  the  above  broad  meaning  of  the  term  "normal  relations"  runs 
contrary  to  the  narrow  meaning  suggested  in  the  Egyptian  draft  of 
September  6,1978.  Article  2(7)  of  this  draft  understood  the  normal 
relations  in  terms  of  "full  recognition  and  abolishing  the  economic 
boycott". 
197 
This  wide  meaning  went  beyond  what  had  been  suggested  in  Resolution 
242.  The  Resolution  referred  to  the  termination  of  all  states  of 
belligerency  and  respect  for  the  sovereignty,  territorial  integrity  and 126 
political  independence  of  every  state  in  the  area.  Obviously,  neither 
diplomatic  relations  nor  economic  ties  had  been  envisaged. 
In  conjunction  with  the  establishment  of  normal  relations  as  a 
condition  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal,  the  Treaty  provided  also  for  two 
additional  conditions  which  should  be  fulfilled  after  the  first  phase  of 
the  Israeli  withdrawal.  The  first  was  the  exchange  of  ambassadors. 
Under  Article  1  of  Annex  3,11  the  Parties  agree  to  establish  diplomatic 
and  consular  relations  and  to  exchange  ambassadors  upon  completion  of 
the  interim  withdrawal"  190.  Obviously,  the  term  "diplomatic  relations" 
seems  also  to  have  a  specific  meaning  under  this  Article.  Generally,  the 
establishment  of  diplolmatic  relations  is  not  an  international 
obligation  under  the  rules  of  international  law"'.  Article  2  of  the 
Vienna  Convention  an  Diplomatic  Relations  1961  provides  that  the 
establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  between  states,  and  of  permanent 
diplomatic  missions,  takes  place  by  mutual  consent.  11190 
Thus,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  establishment  of  diplomatic 
relations  is  not  an  international  obligation,  and  the  fact  that  even  if 
such  relations  exist,  it  does  not  necessarily  entail  the  exchange  of 
ambassadors,  Egypto  however,  agreed  to  exchange  ambassadors  with  Israel 
while  the  latter  was  occupying  its  territory. 
Another  condition  in  return  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal  was  that  Egypt 
was  obliged,  under  Annex  III  of  the  Agreed  Minutes  of  the  Treaty,  to 
fulfill  Israeli  oil  needs  from  its  oil  exports.  The  relevant  provision 
reads  in  part  as  follows: 
11  ...  [Sluch  relations  will  include  normal  commercial  sales  of  oil  by 
Egypt  to  Israel,  and  that  Israel  shall  be  fully  entitled  to  make  bids 
for  Egyptian-origin  oil  not  needed  for  Egyptian  domestic  011 127 
consumption,  and  Egypt  and  its  oil  concessionaires  will  entertain  bids 
made  by  Israel  an  the  same  basis  and  terms  as  apply  to  other  bidders  for 
such  oil.  "191 
This  com  rcial  clause  was  beyond  what  was  envisaged  at  Camp  David. 
Yet,  according  to  Israeli  sources,  the  objective  of  this  clause  was  to 
confirm  the  termination  of  the  economic  boycott,  to  allow  Israel  to  buy 
oil  directly  from  Egypt  and  transport  it  in  Israeli  tankers  through  the 
Gulf  of  Aqaba,  thus  confirming  the  end  of  the  boycott  and  the  existence 
of  normal  relations.  Another  objective  was,  of  course,  to  secure 
Israeli  oil  needs  in  case  of  any  world  oil  crisis.  "-12 
Another  inportant  condition  stipulated  in  return  for  the  Israeli 
withdrawal  was  that  Egypt  was  obliged  under  Article  VI  of  the  Treaty  to 
abandon  its  obligations  under  the  Arab  Joint-Defence  Pact  of  1951  and 
other  mutual  defence  treaties  with  Arab  states'93,  if  such  obligations 
were  in  conflict  with  Egypt's  obligation  under  the  1979  Treaty.  This 
condition  was  mainly  included  in  Article  VI(5)  which  reads  as  follows: 
"Subject  to  Article  103  of  the  Uited  Nations  Charter,  in  the  event  of  a 
conflict  between  the  obligation  of  the  parties  under  the  present  Treaty 
and  any  of  their  other  obligations,  the  obligations  under  this  Treaty 
will  be  binding  and  implemented".  194 
Any  review  of  the  trauvaux  preparatoire  of  the  Treaty  reveals  clearly 
that  the  principal  target  of  this  Article  is  the  Joint  Defence  and 
Economic  Co-operation  Treaty  of  1951  between  the  States  of  the  Arab 
League  (known  as  the  Arab  Defence  Pact).  19G  This  means  that  in  the  event 
of  a  conflict  between  Egypt's  military  obligations  under  the  Arab 
Defense  Pact  on  the  one  hand,  and  its  obligations  to  keep  peaceful 128 
relationý  with  Israel  under  the  Peace  Treaty  on  the  other,  Egypt's 
obligation  under  the  Peace  Treaty  must  prevailed.  1`16 
So  far  as  this  condition  is  concerned,  there  has  never  been  a  consensus 
of  opinion  between  Egypt  and  Israel  as  to  the  exact  meaning  of  the  above 
article.  From  an  Israeli  perspective,  this  article  means  that  Egypto 
under  any  circumstances,  because  of  its  obligations  under  the  Arab 
Defence  Pact  or  any  mutual  defense  treaty,  is  not  legally  permitted  to 
take  part  in  Arab  military  action  against  Israel,  even  if  the  latter  was 
attacking  an  Arab  League  state.  197 
On  the  other  hand,  Egypt  held  that  its  obligation  under  the  Arab 
Defense  Pact  is  part  of  its  obligation  as  a  UN  member.  Consequently, 
Article  VI  does  not  prevent  Egypt  from  coming  to  the  aid  of  a  country 
with  which  it  has  a  mutual  defense  treaty  or  a  collective  security 
agreement  if  such  a  country  should  come  under  armed  attack  by  Israel. 
Reasons  in  support  of  these  two  conflicting  views  need  to  be 
clarified-199 
Before  embarking  on  the  argument  for  and  against  the  effect  of  Article 
VI  on  Egypt's  Arab  obligation,  it  is  useful  to  offer  a  brief  account  of 
the  legislative  history  of  this  Article. 
It  is  sound  to  assume  that  the  Article  on  conflict  of  obligations  had 
never  been  raised  or  discussed  at  Camp  David.  Nor  was  a  reference  made 
to  such  problem  in  the  text  of  the  Camp  David  Accords.  199 
The  first  text  of  this  Article  can  be  found  in  the  first  draft  Of  the 
Peace  Treaty  which  was  nearly  accepted  by  Egyptian  and  Israeli 
delegations  in  Washington  in  November  1978.  Article  6  of  the  draft 
treaty  was  similar  to  that  one  which  finally  appears  as  Article  VI  of 
the  1979  Treaty.  200 129 
By  the  end  of  November,  1978,  despite  the  fact  that  the  draft  article 
was  approved  by  the  Egyptian  delegation  in  Washington,  President  Sadat 
was  reported  to  have  been  angry  at  the  article  "since  that  made  it  seem 
as  if  his  obligations  to  Israel  took  precedence  over  his  obligations  to 
his  Arab  allies".  : 201 
on  November  30,  Carter  received  a  letter  from  Sadat  whereby  he  stated 
that  this  article  was  impossible  to  accept  and,  therefore,  needed  to  be 
revised-"' 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Israeli  reaction  to  the  draft  article  was 
different.  On  November  21,1978,  it  was  declared  that  the  Israeli 
cabinet  had  voted  to  accept  the  draft  treaty,  including  the  article  on 
the  priority  of  obligationS.  203 
The  Americans  held  that  the  text  of  the  treaty  agreed  an  11  November 
1978  should  be  considered  closed,  including  article  6.  Carter  objected 
to  the  idea  of  revising  the  treaty,  but  did  suggest  that  interpretative 
notes  could  be  appended  to  it.  204 
Carter's  proposal  was  accepted  by  Egypt,  as  Sadat  agreed  that  Article  6 
could  remain  essentially  unchanged,  provided  an  interpretative  note 
could  be  added  making  clear  that  this  treaty  did  not  prevail  over  other 
treaties  to  which  Egypt  was  a  party.  Thus,  a  US  interpretative  legal 
opinion  was  agreed  and  submitted  to  Egypt  and  Israel.  This  legal 
opinion  stated  that  Article  6  "did  not  prevent  Egypt  from  coming  to  the 
aid  of  a  country  with  which  she  had  a  mutual  defence  treaty  or  a 
collective  security  agreement  if  such  a  country  should  come  under  armed 
attack"  . 
205 
As  expected,  this  legal  opinion  was  not  accepted  by  Israel.  The 
Israeli  cabinet  announced  its  rejection  in  the  following  terms: 130 
"The  Cabinet  takes  note  of  the  letter  of  the  Foreign  Minister  of  28 
December  1978  to  the  Secretary  of  the  State  of  the  United  Statest  which 
rejects  completely  the  American  interpretation  of  Article  6  (on  conflict 
of  obligatgions).  Israel  will  approach  the  United  States  Government  with 
a  view  to  ensuring  a  single  and  unequivocal  meaning  to  this  Article  of 
the  peace  treaty"  . 
206 
This  angry  Israeli  reaction  resulted  in  a  halt  in  the  peace  talks.  In 
an  attempt  to  revive  the  talks,  the  Americans  agreed  with  the  Israelis 
that  a  new  interpretation  to  their  original  interpretation  was  to  be 
added.  This  new  interpretation  was  to  be  in  the  form  of  an  agreed 
letter  which  Secertary  Vance  would  send  to  the  Israelis.  On  the  contents 
of  this  letter,  Dayan  wrote: 
"It  was  agreed  that  Vance's  letter  to  us  should  state  that  the  Israel- 
Arab  conflict  was  to  be  resolved  through  peaceful  means,  and  the  United 
States  held  that  neither  side  had  the  right  to  use,  or  threaten  to  use, 
military  means  to  do  so,  In  accordance  with  this  principlet  Egypt  would 
be  neither  obliged  nor  entitled  to  extend  help  to  her  allies  if  they 
used  military  force  against  Israel  because  of  Israel's  presence  in  the 
territories  captured  in  1967.  The  determining  sentence  on  this  Subject 
would  state  that  Israel's  presence  in  these  territories  did  not 
constitute  a  military  attack  or  an  act  of  aggression  which  justified 
military  action  against  her. 
On  reprisal  operations,  the  letter  was  to  state  that  military  action 
taken  by  Israel  for  self-defence  including  actions  such  as  those  against 
terrorist  attacks  could  not  Justify  military  help  against  Israel.  """ 131 
Of  course,  the  Egyptians  rejected  this  proposed  letter  on  the  ground 
that,  by  such  an  interpretation,  the  Americans  were  granting  legitimacy 
to  Israel's  occupation  of  conquered  territory.  2" 
By  early  1979,  the  Americans  decided  to  drop  the  legal  interpretation 
they  had  offered  to  both  Israel  and  Egypt  on  the  meaning  of  priority  of 
obligations  in  Article  6.  Instead,  they  proposed  some  slight  revisions 
of  Article  6  which  were  finally  accepted  by  the  parties.  "' 
Tbj-  vlax  tbat  Artlc'Lý  V1  Of  tb"'  TreatY  PrevejktELIýUpt  from  Darticipating 
In  any  Arab  systen  for  collective  self-dpfpUce  against  Tsrnpl, 
Taking  as  a  point  of  departure  the  assumption  that  the  tzazeala 
preparatnirpq  of  the  1951  Arab  Defence  Pact  shows  that  the  Arab 
collective  defence  system  was  created  and  developed  in  order  to  be 
directed  against  Israel,  the  Israeli  view  was  essentially  based  on  the 
argument  that,  as  the  Treaty  is  the  basis  for  peace  and  the  Defence  Pact 
is  the  basis  for  war,  Egypt  cannot  have  its  cake  and  eat  it,  but  rather 
must  decide  whether  it  is  really  committed  to  peace,  and  if  so  renounce 
the  hR111coqA  Defense  Pact.  This  view  is  based  an  a  number  of 
considerations. 
In  the  first  place,  there  is  a  possible  contradiction  between  the  Arab 
Defence  Pact  and  the  1979  Treaty.  This  is  caused  by  the  f  act  that 
Egypt  and  Israel  have  adopted  different  interpretations  of  Article  51  of 
the  UN  Charter.  While  Israel  has  been  a  traditional  supporter  of  the 
anticipatory  self-defence  concept  which  allows  a  state  to  act  in  self- 
defence  before  the  aggressor  if  it  faced  an  imminant  danger,  Egypt, 
however,  has  been  a  supporter  of  a  srict  interpretation  of  the  right  of 
self-defence  and  has  rejected  the  anticipatory  self  defense  theory-210 132 
This  difference  will  clearly  cause  difficulties  if  Israel  launches  a 
preemptive  strike  against  an  Arab  State.  In  this  event  Egypt,  may  be 
obliged  to  take  part  against  Israel  for  three  reasons.  Egypt  considers 
that  the  aggressor  is  the  first  state  to  employ  force.  211 
Also,  Article  2  of  the  Arab  Defence  Pact  stipulates  that  armed 
aggression  against  any  one  or  more  members  would  be  considered  as  an 
attack  against  all,  and  that  all  members  undertake  without  delay  to 
employ  the  appropriate  measures,  including  the  use  of  armed  forces-211 
And  the  UK  Declaration  on  the  Definition  of  Aggression  of  1974  gives 
priority,  in  general,  to  a  restrictive  interpretation  of  the  right  to 
self-defence  .  213 
The  Israelis  argued  that  Egypt  must  renounce  the  bellinnse  Defence  Pact 
to  avoid  such  a  contradiction.  214 
Moreover,  the  optional  nature  of  the  1951  Arab  Defence  Pact  makes  it 
possible  for  Egypt  to  withdrawa  from  this  Pact  as  to  avoid  such  a 
contradiction.  216  Article  12  of  the  Pact  referred  to  the  possibility  of 
withdrawal  in  the  following  terms: 
11  Af  ter  a  lapse  of  10  years  from  the  date  of  ratification  of  this 
Treaty,  any  one  from  the  contracting  states  may  withdraw  from  it, 
providing  12  months'  notice  is  previously  given  to  the  Secretary-General 
of  the  Arab  League,  the  Secretary-General  of  the  League  shall  inform  the 
other  contracting  states  of  such  notice.  " 
Thus,  the  Israelis  argued  that  by  virtue  of  this  Article  EgyPto  whose 
membership  in  the  Treatyli-la  more  than  10  years,  can  legally  withdraw 
from  the  Defense  Pact  to  maintain  its  peace  with  Israel.  21,  -- 
Another  reason  in  support  of  this  interpretation  is  the  Israeli 
argument  that  they  made  it  clear,  during  the  preparatory  work  of  what 133 
became  Article  VI  of  the  Treaty,  that  the  target  of  this  Article  is  the 
Arab  Defence  Pact,  as  well  as  the  fifteen  mutual  defence  treaties 
concluded  between  Egypt  and  other  Arab  states.  217  Prime  Kinister  Begin 
told  President  Carter  that  Artice  VI  was  designed  to  prevent  Egypt  from 
taking  part  in  any  Arab  joint  action  against  Israel  because  of  an  Arab 
contractual  obligation,  and  is  the  heart  of  the  Peace  Treaty;  and 
without  it  Israel  would  not  sign  the  Treaty.  21a  Dayan  expressed  the  view 
that, 
"To  find  a  golden  mean  whereby  Egypt  could  both  remain  in  the  Arab  anti- 
Israel  camp  and  yet  sign  a  peace  treaty  with  us  seemed  as  impossible  as 
trying  to  square  the  circle.  11219 
In  the  course  of  the  negotiations,  Dayan  asked  Egypt's  Prime  Minister 
Khalil,  during  a  meeting  in  Brussels  in  December  1978,  what  would  be 
Egypt's  obligation  if  Syria  attacked  the  Golan  Heights  and  "claimed 
that  this  was  a  defensive  war  to  liberate  the  holy  soil?  "  Khalil 
replied  that  Egypt  would  side  with  Syria  but  would  take  no  part  in  the 
war.  220  Also,  according  to  Dayan,  when  Khalil  was  asked  what  would  be 
the  situation  "if  Israel  had  no  alternative  but  to  attack  the  PLO 
terrorist  bases  in  Lebanon  by  invading  the  latter?  "  The  Egyptian 
Premier  repeated  that  his  government  would  join  those  who  condemn 
Israel  but  would  not  go  to  war,  and  that  Egypt  would  be  active  with 
other  Arab  states  in  a  diplomatic  but  not  in  a  military  compaign.  2:  21 
The  Israelis  therefore  held  that  the  Egyptian  had  agreed  during  the 
negotiations  to  Israel's  understanding  of  Article  VI. 
Moreover,  a  review  of  the  traveaux  p1:  eparatoir,  -.  c;  reveals  that  Israel 
strongly  rejected  an  American  interpretation  of  Article  VI  to  be 
attached  to  the  Treaty  as  an  interpretative  "legal  opinion"  of  the 134 
Government  of  the  U.  S.  22'2  "According  to  Israeli  sources,  the  rejection 
of  this  note  sprang  from  the  difficulty  of  determining  when  and  whether 
a  country  was  the  attacker  or  the  attacked.  22ýý- 
In  support  of  their  interpretation  of  Article  VI,  the  Israelis  also 
argued  that  Egypt1s  right  to  participate  in  the  Arab  defence  system  was 
authorized  under  Article  52  of  the  U.  N.  Charter  which  dealt  with 
regional  arrangements.  Article  52  of  the  Charter,  they  argued,  permits 
but  does  not  impose  regional  arrangements,  Therefore,  such  obligation 
is  jus  dispositlyum  and  cannot  be  regarded  as  jus  cogens.  In  this 
connection  Schwelb  states,  "The  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  does  not 
say  that  all  of  its  provisions  are  rules  of  jus  cogena.  It  contains  a 
few  provisions  which  are  clearly  jus  dispositivum  and  from  which 
derogations  are  permitted.  Examples  are;  ....  Article  52  which  permits  but 
does  not  impose  regional  arrangements".  224 
Hence,  there  is  no  jus  cogena  rule  in  contemporary  international  law 
which  prevents  Egypt  and  Israel  from  concluding  an  agreement  conflicting 
with  Egypt's  obligations  under  the  Arab  League  self-defence  system. 
The  ViekL  that  Article  VI  of  the  Treaty  does  ]Int  11reyent  139""Mn 
jultl1ling  its  abligatinj)n  under  the  Arab  Dp  t 
Contrary  to  the  Israeli  understanding  of  Article  VI,  Egypt  expressed 
the  view  that  the  Peace  Treaty,  which  established  a  "Just,  comprehensive 
and  lasting  peace"  between  itself  and  Israel.  in  no  way 
contradicted  the  Defence  Pact  as  long  as  Israel  did  not  intend  to 
launch  aggressions  on  Arab  States.  22s  Egypt  insisted  that  its 
obligations  under  the  Arab  Defence  Pact  could  not  be  renouncedo  and, 135 
consequently,  it  would  particapate  in  any  military  action  if  Israel 
attacked  any  member  of  the  Arab  League.  226 
Egypt  argued  that  its  obligation  to  take  part  in  regional  collective 
security  arrangements,  such  as  the  Arab  Def  ence  Pact,  was  part  of  its 
obligations  under  the  UN  Charter,  This  obligation  is  supported  by 
Article  103  of  the  Charter  which  reads  as  follows: 
"In  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  the  obligations  of  the  members  of 
the  United  Nations  under  the  present  Charter  and  their  obligations  under 
any  other  international  agreement,  their  obligations  under  the  present 
Charter  shall  prevail"  .  227 
It  has  been  agreed  that  among  the  situations  envisaged  by  Article  103 
was  the  situation  where  there  is  a  conflict  between  the  obligation  of  a 
member  under  the  Charter  and  the  obligation  of  that  member  under  an 
agreement  with  another  member  contracted  after  entry  into  force  by  the 
Charter.  "' 
Thus,  by  extension,  Article  103  of  the  Charter  maintained  Egypt's 
obligation  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  the  Arab  Defence  Pact 
and  its  obligations  under  the  Peace  Treaty. 
To  prove  that  Egypt's  obligations  under  the  Arab  Defence  Pact  Was  part 
of  its  obligations  under  the  U.  N.  Charter,  it  was  argued  that  the  Arab 
League  system  for  collective  self-defence,  established  under  the  1951 
Arab  Defence  Pact,  was  part  of  the  UK  system  for  collective  security. 
It  has  been  said  that  the  emphasis  given  by  the  U.  N.  Charter  to  regional 
defence  arrangements  was  among  the  main  reasons  which  led  to  the 
creation  of  the  Arab  Defence  Pact 
.  229 
As  a  consequence,  this  Pact  i5w  regarded  as  part  of  an  international 
system  established  by  the  Charter  in  order  to  maintain  international 136 
peace  and  security.  The  invitation  extended  by  the  UK  to  the  Arab  League 
and  to  the  OAS  to  attend  as  observers  at  the  UN  may  be  mentioned  as 
supportive  of  the  view  that  regional  arrangement  are  part  of  the  UN 
system.:  230 
Secondly,  it  was  argued  that  Egypt's  obligations  under  the  Arab  Defence 
Pact  and  its  mutual  defence  treaties  with  other  Arab  states  are  part  of 
its  obligation  under  Article  51  of  the  Charter,  which  provides  for  the 
states'  "inherent  right  of  individual  or  collective  self-defencew.  As 
is  well  known,  Article  51  was  taken  from  customary  international  law 
and,  is  df  a  jus  cogens  nature  .  231 
Thus,  the  Egyptians  argued  that,  not  only  does  Article  52  of  the 
Charter  legitimate  the  Defense  Pact,  but  Article  51  is  also  regarded 
as  the  very  basis  of  the  Arab  Defence  Pact. 
In  the  course  of  the  debate  in  the  six  session  of  the  General  Assembly, 
the  view  that  collective  defence  pacts  are  based  on  Article  51  was  held 
by  western  states.  When  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  was  criticised  by 
the  Soviet  Union  because  it  included  states  without  geographical 
connections,  and  without  a  common  language,  culture  and  history  and  no 
regional  action  under  Article  52  was  therefore  involved,  other 
representatives  replied  that  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  is  based  on 
Article  51.232 
Thirdly,  in  support  of  their  interpretation  ,  the  Egyptians  also  argued 
that  the  Arab  Defence  Pact  was  not  directed  against  Israel,  which  was 
not  singled  out  in  the  Pact,  but  against  any  potential  aggression.  From 
Egypt  view,  it  was  directed  mainly  against  a  possible  Soviet 
lntervention2ý113. 137 
.  Consequently,  the  Pact  does  not  constitue  a  threat  to  Israel'  security 
so  long  as  it  does  not  commit  any  aggression  against  its  Arab  neighbors. 
Fourthly,  from  a  political  perspective,  the  adoption  of  the  Israeli 
interpretation  demanding  Egypt's  withdrawal  from  the  Arab  Defence  Pact 
would  not  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  comprehensive  peace  in  the 
area  which  is  the  main  purpose  of  the  Treaty.  This  is  because  such 
withdrawal  from  the  Arab  Defence  Pact  would  remove  Egypt's  considerable 
weight  from  the  military  equation  in  the  Kiddle  East,  thus  leaving 
Israel  as  a  major  power  in  the  area.  This  would  give  the  Israelis,  as 
actually  happened,  a  renewed  freedom  to  pursue  their  goals  of  fortifying 
and  settling  the  occcupied  territories  and  removing  perceived  threats  by 
preemptivelagainst  some  of  its  neighbours234 
Finally,  the  draft  of  the  US  interpretative  legal  opinion  on  Article 
VI  of  the  Treaty,  which  stated  that  nothing  would  prevent  Egypt  from 
honouring  its  commitments  under  other  treaties  in  the  event  of  armed 
attack  an  one  of  its  allies,  runs  counter  to  the  Israeli  interpretation 
and  may  be  mentioned  as  supportive  of  Egypt's  interpretation. 
In  considering  the  above  contradictory  views  advanced  by  Egypt  and 
Israel,  and  before  attempting  to  arrive  at  any  conclusion  concerning  the 
question  whether  Article  VI  affects  Egypt's  obligations  under  the  Arab 
Defence  Pact,  the  following  observations  required  to  be  made: 
-The  crux  of  the  matter  was  that  Egypt,  by  introducing  its 
interpretation,  wanted  peace  with  Israel  but  not  its  isolation  among  the 
Arabs.  Yhereas,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Israelis  wanted  Egypt  to  be 
isolated  since  that  would  help  Israel's  defence  strategy; 
-One  cannot  accept  the  Israeli  argument  that  Egypt  should  renounce  the 
Arab  Defence  Pact  to  avoid  any  possible  confusion  because  Israel  could 138 
still  exercise  anticipatory  self-defence  under  the  western  concept  of 
Article  51  of  the  Charter.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Egypt's  membership  of 
the  Defence  Pact  was  still  possible  provided  it  would  take  into  account 
the  Israeli  understanding  of  Article  51. 
-  However,  one  cannot  deny  the  fact  that,  even  if  Egypt  accepted 
Israel's  right  of  anticipatory  self-defence,  there  remains  a  case  in 
which  Egypt  might  have  to  choose  between  its  obligations  under  the 
Treaty  and  its  obligations  under  the  Defence  Pact.  Under  Article  6  of 
the  Defence  Pact,  the  Joint  Defence  Council  is  competent  to  decide 
whether  an  act  of  aggression  had  occured.  The  decisions  of  the  Joint 
VIA- 
Defence  Council,  in  this  respect,  are  to  be  taken  by  the  A  hird-maJority 
and  are  binding  an  all  parties  to  the  Pact.  2-,  ",  In  practice,  this  mean 
that  Egypt  may  find  itself  obliged  to  intervene  against  Israel,  even  if 
it  voted  that  Israel  was  not  aggressor.  At  this  point,  one  must  admit 
that  the  1979  Treaty  does  not  provide  a  satisfactory  solution  for  that 
problem. 
-However,  Egypt's  practice  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1979  Peace  Treaty 
suggests  that  it  accepted,  to  some  extent,  Israel's  right  to  exercise 
anticipatory  self-defence.  An  example  is  Egypt"s  reaction  to  the 
Israeli  invasion  of  Lebanon  in  1982.  There  is  no  evidence  that  Egypt 
took  any  kind  of  military  action  nor  extended  any  military  aid  to  help 
the  Arab  forces  fighting  Israel  during  this  war. 
From  all  of  what  hrrvý*  been  said,  one  can  conclude  that  Article  VI 
posed  rather  than  solved  the  question  under  consideration.  However,  a 
more  sensible  approach  would  seem  to  be  that  Egypt's  membership  in  the 
Arab  Defence  Pact,  for  the  sake  of  peace  and  stability  in  the  area,  must 
be  kept  and  its  obligations  under  other  mutual  defence  treaties  should 139 
be  honoured  providing  they  respect  and  take  into  account  Israel's  right 
to  exercise  anticipatory  self-defence  so  long  as  such  an  exercise  is 
within  the  limits  and  in  accordence  with  the  conditions  stipulated  and 
agreed  by  international  law. 
A  reading  at  the  provisions  dealing  with  the  withdrawal  issue  reveals 
that  they  cover  the  most  important  aspects  of  the  problem,  that  is  to 
say  the  total  Israeli  withdrawal  from  Egypt's  territory,  the  evacuation 
of  the  three  airfields  built  by  Israel  in  Sinai  and  the  time-table  of 
the  Israeli  withdrawal.  They  also  covered  the  peace  guarantees  and  other 
conditions  stipulated  in  return  for  the  withdrawal. 
However,  it  may  be  observed  that  some  issues  were  deliberately  excluded 
from  the  scope  of  the  withdrawal  clause.  In  the  first  place,  the  rest  of 
the  Arab  occupied  territories  were  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the 
provisions.  Further,  the  authors  of  the  Treaty  deliberately  excluded 
issues  relating  to  compensation  L  any  damage  resulting  from  the  Israeli 
military  occupation.  Similarly,  issues  relating  to  the  legality  of  the 
Israeli  occupation  were  excluded. 
From  a  comparison  between  the  scope  of  the  withdrawal  clause  under  the 
Treaty  and  the  scope  of  the  withdrawal  clause  under  Resolution  242, 
several  comments  may  be  made.  While  the  Resolution  covered  certain 
aspects  of  the  withdrawal  in  somewhat  vague  language,  perhaps 
deliberatelyle.  g.,  the  extent  and  the  timing  of  the  withdrawal  as  well  as 
the  peace  guarantees,  the  Peace  Treaty  covered  several  issues  in  clear 
language  leaving  no  room  for  dispute  over  its  meaning. 140 
However,  the  scope  of  the  Treaty's  provisions  is  deliberately  limited 
in  order  to  exclude  the  territories  of  the  Golan  Heights,  Gaza  and  the 
West  Bank.  This  undermine6  the  Treaty  in  the  light  of  the  fact  that 
its  main  purpose  was  to  establish  a  comprehensive  peace  in  the  area, 
rather  than,  a  separate  peace  between  Egypt  and  Israel. 
Before  proceeding  further,  it  may  be  asked,  whether  and  in  what 
circumstances  the  principle  of  a  total  Israeli  withdrawal  applied  to 
Sinai  under  the  Treaty's  provisions  can  be  applied  in  any  future 
settlement  concerning  the  rest  of  the  Arab  territories  seized  in  1967  7 
It  must  be  admitted  that  there  is  no  certain  or  satisfactory  answer  to 
that  question.  From  a  political  perspective,  Egypt  wanted  to  prove  that 
it  gains  something  for  the  Arab  cause,  thus  insisting  that  the  total 
withdrawal  applied  to  Sinai  should  be  applied  to  the  rest  of  the  Arab 
territories  seized  in  1967  in  any  future  settlement.  217  On  the  other 
hand,  because  of  its  territorial  claims  with  regard  to  Gaza  and  the  West 
Bank,  Israel  holds  that  what  had  been  applied  to  Sinai  under  the  Treaty 
is  not  applicable  to  the  rest  of  the  occupied  territories.  23`ý 
From  a  legal  standpoint,  the  uncertainty  surrounding  this  question 
presumably  stems  from  a  conflict  between  the  meaning  of  certain 
preambular  paragraphs  on  one  hand  and  the  scope  of  the  withdrawal  clause 
on  the  other. 
A  careful  reading  of  the  Treaty's  preamble  would  clearly  suggest  that 
all  principles  applied  to  the  conflict  between  Egypt  and  Israel  are 
intended  to  constitute  a  basis  for  peace  between  Israel  and  each  of  the 
other  "Arab  neighbours"  which  is  prepared  to  negotiate  peace.  "' 
However,  Article  1(2),  dealing  with  the  Israeli  withdrawal  from  Sinai, 
contained  no  explicit  or  implicit  mention  of  the  other  Arab  territories. 141 
One  must  admit  that  it  would  seem  difficult  to  find  in  that  Article  a 
satisfactory  basis  for  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  other  Arab 
territories. 
The  record  of  the  negotiations  reveals  that,  whilst  the  preambular 
paragraph  was  designed  to  encourage  the  Palestinians,  Jordan  and  Syria 
to  join  the  peace  process,  because  the  principles  of  the  withdrawal  of 
Israeli  forces  and  settlers  would  apply  to  their  territories,  the 
formulation  and  the  wording  of  Article  1(2)  was  deliberately  designed  to 
eliminate,  or  at  least  minimize,  the  effect  of  that  preambluar 
paragraph. 
One  possible  way  around  this  question  is  to  accept  the  Israeli  view 
that  what  had  been  applied  to  Sinai  cannot  be  applied  to  other  Arab 
territories  particularly  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  In  the  words  of  an 
Israeli  official  "if  someone  thinks  that  there  is  any  analogy  between 
what  had  been  agreed  for  Sinai  and  what  might  happen  in  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza,  he  would  be  making  a  basic  error  of  judgement.  11240 
In  the  course  of  the  negotiations,  the  Israeli  delegation  rejected  in 
clear  terms  any  langauge  which  may  be  understood  as  a  reference  to  a 
total  Israeli  withdrawal,  as,  for  example,  Israel's  rejection  of  the 
inclusion  of  'the  principle  inadmissibility  of  acquisation  of  territory 
by  war'  in  the  text  of  the  Treaty.  "'  Also,  Israel's  practice  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  1979  Treaty  does  not  support  any  interpretation  which 
might  require  total  withdrawal  from  all  Arab  occupied  territories. 
Rather,  it  could  mean  the  reverse,  namely,  an  Israeli  intention  to 
remain  in  the  occupied  territories  or  it  least  most  of  them.  Examples 
of  such  practice  are  Israel's  annexation  of  East-Jerusalemm  and  the 142 
Golan  Hight  after  the  Peace  Treaty,  as  well  as  its  settlement  policy  in 
these  territory  after  the  Treaty.  242 
Another  different  answer  to  that  question  is  that  advanced  by  Egypt. 
Based  an  the  assumption  that  the  problem  of  the  ambiguity  of  Resolution 
242  regarding  the  extent  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal  had  been  resolved  by 
the  1979  Treaty  which  provided  for  a  total  Israeli  withdrawal  from 
Egypt's  territory.  141,  it  follows  that,  by  implication,  Israel  is 
required  to  withdraw  from  all  the  territories  falling  under  the  scope  of 
Resolution  2420  viz,  all  the  other  Arab  lands  occupied  in  19U.  There 
is  no  better  quotation  in  this  respet  than  that  by  Foreign  minister, 
Ghali,  in  a  statement  before  the  People  Assembly  in  Egypt  following  the 
conclusion  of  the  Treaty: 
11  ... 
for  the  first  time  Israel  has  signed  an  interpretation  of  Resolution 
242,  according  to  which  it  has  to  withdraw  from  the  occupied 
territories.  Also,  Israel  agreed  to  withdraw  to  the  international 
boundary  between  Egypt  and  Mandated  Palestine.  This  was  included  in  the 
Treaty  so  as  the  other  Arab  states  could  benefit  from  such  precedent, 
thus  Syria,  for  instance,  could  ask  Israel  to  withdraw  from  all  the 
occupied  territory  and  settlements  because  this  was  applied  under  the 
Treaty"  244 
In  assessing  the  above  views,  it  would  be  difficult  to  subscribe  to  the 
view  expressed  by  Israel  that  because  its  intention  during  the 
negotiations  was  not  to  withdraw  from  the  other  Arab  territories,  the 
reference  in  the  preamble  to  the  applicability  of  such  withdrawal  from 
these  territories  must  be  overlooked. 
One  cannot  agree,  from  a  legal  standpoint,  that  Israel  was  obliged 
under  the  Peace  Treaty,  even  by  implication,  to  withdraw  from  the  Golan I 
143 
Heights  as  well  as 
ýhe  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  If  such  an  important 
obligation  was  intendod,  it  should  have  been  clearly  stated. 
However,  to  say  this  is  not  to  accept  the  view  that  Israel  is  not 
obliged  to  withdrqw  from  the  Syrian  and  Palestine  territories  occupied 
in  1967.  As  we,  prove(I  earlier,  the  Israelis  are  obliged  to  wihdraw  from 
all  these  territories  under  Resolution  242  which  is  binding  on  them. 
To  conclude,  one  can  state  that  the  1979  Treaty  can  be  used  by  other 
Arabs  as  a  precedent,  but  only  as  a  negotiating  position.  No  legal 
right  was  given  to  them  under  the  1979  Treaty  in  this  respect. 
However  Resolution  242  does  give  rights  to  Arab  states  in  relation  to 
their  territory. 144 
Before  leaving  this  section  an  the  Israeli  withdrawal,  a  final  point  needs  not 
to  be  overlooked,  namely,  the  dispute  between  Egypt  and  Israel  over  Taba.  As  is 
well  known,  by  April  1982,  Israel  completed  its  final  withdrawal  from  S(iiýa 
with  the  exception  of  a  strip  of  land  at  Taba  on  the  shore  of  the  Gulf  of 
Aqaba.  Taba  is  the  site  of  the  hotel  that  the  Israelis  built  near  Eliat  on  land 
that,  according  to  Egypt,  belonged  on  the  Egyptian  side  of  the  boundry.  Israel 
asserted  its  claim  to  remain  there. 
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So  far  as  the  Taba  problem  is  concerned,  it  may  be  important  at  the  outset  to 
point  out  that  the  problem  is  no  longer  of  practical  importance  as  it  was 
finally  settled  by  the  Taba  Award  of  29  September  1988.  -;:,  Ir,  However,  it  is 145 
still  of  particular  importance  because  it  was  concerned  with  the  interpretation, 
as  well  as  the  implementation,  of  the  1979  Treaty.  Mý-  a_aattar-4&;,  ý  fact, 
Israel  Is  obligation,  under  Article  1  (2)  of  the  Treaty,  to  withdraw  "behind  the 
international  boundary"--4G,  could  not  be  implemented  to  the  satisfaction  of 
both  parties  so  long  as  there  existed  a  disagreement  over  this  area. 
Among  the  main  reasons  behind  the  Taba  dfspute  was  the  language  used  by  the 
authors  in  Article  II  of  the  1979  Treaty  which  reads  in  part  as  follows: 
11  The  permanent  boundary  between  Egypt  and  Israel  is  the  recognized 
international  boundary  between  Egypt  and  the  former  mandated  territory  of 
Palestine,  as  shown  on  the  map  at  Annex  II,  without  prejudice  to  the  issue  of 
the.  status  of  the  Gaza  Strip.  The  Parties  recognize  this  boundary  as  inviolable. 
Each  will  respect  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  other,  including  their 
territorial  waters  and  airspacell.  247 
Clearly,  as  the  Taba  Tribunal  observed  "the  description  of  the  boundary  is  not 
very  clear  or  specific,  particularly  the  word  'recognized'  is  in  the  context 
ambiguous  . 
11248 
The  question  ra!  sed  in  this  respect  is:  what  was  exactly  the  border-line 
recognized  during  the  mandatory  period  ?  To  this  question,  Professor  Lapidoth, 
im 
the  Israeli  Judge  in  Taba  Tribunal,  "'  indicated  that  there  were  four  possible 
answers: 
Wthe  line  defined  in  the  1906  Agreement; 
(b)the  line  demarcated  by  the  telegraph  poles  in  October  1905; 
(c)the  line  formed  by  the  masonry  pillars  built  in  1906-1907  which  replaced 
the  telegraph  poles  and; 146 
Wthe  line  formed  by  any  pillars  which  existed  de  facto  on  the  ground  in  1923 
and  which  may  have  been  erected  after  1906-1907.  -ý:  r-O 
To  understand  the  meaning  and  the  differences  between  the  above  lines  as  well 
as  the  background  to  the  dispute,  it  is  useful  to  go  back  to  1906  in  order  to 
trace  its  origins.  In  that  year  Turkish  forces  occupied  the  coastal  settlement 
of  Taba,  but  were  subsequently  forced  to  withdraw  under  British  pressure. 
During  this  time  Turkey  was  the  actual  ruler  of  Palestine  and  the  nominal  ruler 
of  Egypt.  The  actual  ruler  of  Egypt  was  Britain.  The  boundary  between  Egypt  and 
Palestine  was  uncertain.  ý2r-' 
After  negotiations  between  Anglo-Egyptian  and  Turkish  representatives,  it  was 
agreed,  in  May  1906,  that  the  boundary  between  the  two  territories  should  be 
definitivelY  established.  In  implementation  of  this  agreement,  a  joint 
commission  was  appointed  by  Egypt  and  Turkey  to  negotiate  the  possible  line 
of  the  boundary.  The  area  adjacent  to  the  line  of  the  prospective  boundary  from 
Taba  in  the  south  to  Rafa  in  the  north  was  f  irst  surveyed  and  a  map  was 
prepared.;  2" 
On  October  11  1906,  an  Agreement  determining  the  international  boundary 
between  Egypt  and  Palestine  was  reached.  211  So  far  as  the  terminus  of  the  line 
at  Taba  is  concerned,  the  boundary  at  its  southern  terminus  was  described  in 
the  following  terms: 
"The  administrative  separating  line,  as  shown  an  the  map  attached  to  this 
Agreement,  begins  at  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  and  follows  along  the  eastern  ridge 
overlooking  Wadi  Taba  to  the  top  of  Jebel  Fort,  from  thence  the  separating  line 
extends  by  straight  lines  as  follows 
...  11.2r-4 147 
An  important  and  relevant  provision  can  be  found  in  Article  3  of  the  1906 
Agreement  which  reads  as  follows: 
"Boundary  pillars  will  be  erected,  in  the  presence  of  the  Joint  Commission,  at 
intervisible  points  along  the  separating  lines,  from  the  point  on  the 
Mediterranean  shore  to  the  point  on  the  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba".  "' 
The  term  "intervisible  points"  means  points  each  of  which  can  be  seen  from 
points  before  and  points  after,  and  from  each  of  which  one  can  see  the  point 
before  and  the  point  after.  The  considerable  significance  of  this  Article  will 
become  apparent  later.  2  c-  1,: 
Immediately  after  the  Agreement  was  signed,  temporary  markers,  in  the  shape  of 
a  series  of  telegraph  poles,  were  fixed  by  a  joint  CoMMiSSion.  2G  7  Subsequently# 
a  process  of  replacing  the  telegraph  poles  by  permanent  masonry  pillars  began. 
On  December  31,1906,  Colonel  Parker,  the  then  Governer  of  Sinai,.  2r-a  accompanied 
by  the  Turkish  Commisioners  who  had  negotiated  the  Agreement,  supervised  the 
construction  of  the  first  pillar  at  Taba  and  took  a  photograph  of  the  occasion. 
This  photograph  was  used  later  to  identify  with  precision  that  pillar  which 
no  longer  existed  as  the  cliff  an  which  the  original  parker  pilliar  had  stood, 
as  revealed  by  Israel  for  the  first  time  during  the  oral  pleading  of  Taba  Case$ 
had  in  fact  been  removed  by  blasting  when  Israel  constructed  a  new  coast  road 
between  Taba  and  Eliat  in  1970 
.2  C-9 
At  this  point,  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  no  authenic  copy  of  the  large-scale 
map  annexed  to  the  1906  Agreement  was  found  either  in  Egypt  or  in  Turkey. 
Likewise,  no  formal  maps  or  authenic  reports  describing  the  work  of  the 
Cmmmission, 
which  demarcated  the  boundary  in  accordance  with  the  1906 
Agreement,  had  been  left.  260 148 
The  Mandate  Agreement  gave  no  precise  definition  of  the  boundary  between  Egypt 
and  Palestine  and  no  map  defining  the  area  of  Palestine  was  attached  to  the 
Agreement.:  261  However,  in  1925,  the  British  Government  declared  in  the  House  of 
Commons  that  "  the  line  binding  the  territories  under  Egyptian  and  Turkish 
administration  respectively  was  defined  in  1906  and  has  not  since  been 
modif  ied.  "--1*2 
Again,  in  June  1926,  the  British  Government  assured  Egypt  that  the  frontier 
as  defined  in  the  year  1906  between  Egypt  and  Palestine  would  not  be  altered. 
During  the  mandate,  there  was  an  agreement  between  British  officials  in 
Palestine  and  the  Egyptians  that  the  boundary  was  the  same.  2r-:  3  This  line 
remained  up  to  the  establishment  of  the  state  of  Israel  in  Kay  1948. 
In  the  June  War  of  19670  Israel's  capture  of  the  Sinai  peninsula  from  Egypt 
brought  the  Taba  area  under  Israeli  control.  During  the  period  between  1967 
and  1982  Israel  made  some  changes 
* 
in  the  area,  e.  g.,  they  built  a  luxury  hotel 
and  a  new  road  as  well  as  '  remo  some  boundary  pillars  .  2G4 
In  1979,  under  Article  IV(3)  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  a  Joint  Commission  was 
established  "to  facilitate  the  implementation  of  the  Treaty.  "  Among  the 
functions  of  this  Commission,  as  indicated  by  Appendix  to  Annex  1,  Art.  IV. 
3(d),  was  to  "organize  the  demarcation  of  the  international  boundary  ".  2c's 
In  implementation  of  this  function,  the  Commission  regarded  its  task  as  being 
the  reconstruction  of  pillars  where  pillars  had  existed  but  were  damaged.  As 
regards  pillars  whose  locations  were  not  identified,  there  was  disagreement 
among  the  parties.  In  this  respect,  Egypt  took  the  position  that  the  task  Of 
the  Commission  was  to  identify  the  location  of  the  pillars  as  they  were, 149 
whereas  Israel  argued  that  the  task  of  the  Commission  was  to  implement  the 
1906  Agreement  regardless  of  the  previous  locations.  261- 
In  facto  this  remained  the  basic  difference  between  the  parties  which  led 
them  to  resort  to  arbitration  proceedings  after  their  failure  to  resolve  the 
matter  by  other  means.  Such  a  right  to  resort  to  arbitration  was  permissible, 
and  indeed  manadatory  under  Article  VII  of  the  1979  Treaty  which  provides  for 
the  following  : 
0  1.  Disputes  arising  out  of  the  application  or  interpretation  of  this  Treaty 
shall  be  resolved  by  negotiations.  2.  Any  such  disputes  which  cannot  be 
settled  by  negotiations  shall  be  resolved  by  conciliation  or  submitted  to 
arbitrat  ion"267 
Thus,  in  a  Compromis  signed  an  September  11,1986,  the  parties  agreed  on  the 
establishment  of  a  five-member  arbitration  tribunal,  of  whom  three  members 
would  have  to  be  mutually  acceptable  to  Egypt  and  Israel,  while  each  country 
would  have  the  exclusive  right  to  appoint  one  member.  269 
The  task  of  the  Tribunal  was  defined  as  follows: 
"The  Tribunal  is  requested  to  decide  the  location  of  the  boundary  pillars  of  the 
recognized  international  boundray  between  Egypt  and  the  former  mandated 
territory  of  Palestine  ...  112,39 
As  far  as  Israel  was  concerned,  the  only  agreement  defining  the  border-line 
between  Egypt  and  Israel  was  the  1906  Agreement  between  Turkey  and  Egypt.  It 
follows  that  any  de-faata  demarcation  of  the  boundary  which  was  inconsistent 
with  the  legal  boundary  as  defined  by  the  1906  Agreement  could  not  be 
recognized  as  the  international  boundary  between  Egypt  and  Israel. 150 
The  Israeli  argument  was  basicly  that  the  de  fnntn  demarcation  of  the  final 
boundary  pillar  at  Taba  did  not  satisfy  the  requirements  of  intervisibility 
stipulated  in  Article  3  of  1906  Agreement;  consequently,  the  Israelis  argued 
that  they  could  not  recognize  the  location  of  this  pillar  as  constituting  part 
of  their  international  boundary  with  Egypt.  Instead  of  the  illegal  location, 
the  Israeli  preferred  another  location  which,  according  to  them,  not  only  met 
the  requirement  of  intervisibility,  but  also  was  the  original  location  that  was 
ignored  incorrectly  in  the  later  &-  fanto  demarcation.  If  this  location  was 
accepted  then  Taba  would  be  part  of  Israel  .  270 
In  support  of  this  view,  other  reasons  were  mentioned: 
-  In  her  dissenting  opinion  in  the  Taba  Case,  Professor  Lapidoth  took  up  the 
thesis  of  the  two-stages  renvoi:  "the  1979  Treaty  contains  a  renvoi  to  the 
recognized  mandatory  boundary  and  the  latter  in  turn  refers  us  back  to  the  1906 
line  as  laid  down  by  the  Agreement  and  recognized  during  the  mandatory 
period  .  41271  It  follows  that  j  in  the  final  analysis,  according  to  her,  the  1979 
Treaty  should  be  understood  as  referring  to  the  line  defined  by  the  1906 
Agreement  which  was  demarcated  an  the  ground  by  the  telegraph  pole  .  272 
-Also,  according  to  the  Israeli  argument,  in  1909  Egypt  used  precise  coordinates 
to  identify  the  location  of  the  terminus  of  the  boundary  and  described  it  as 
ending  on  a  granite  knob  near  the  sea.  this  description  was  given  in  the 
Egyptian  Statistinal  Yparbook  of  1909t  an  official  Egyptian  Government 
puplication.  This  granite  knob  still  stood  and  was  the  hill  just  to  the  South 
of  the  Hotel  built  by  Israel  at  Taba.  If  this  hill  had  been  accepted,  the 
disputed  area  would  have  been  within  Israeli  territory  .  273 151 
In  the  course  of  the  hearing  in  the  Taba  Case,  Israel  produced  an  evidence 
from  Lt.  Col.  Rushworth,  who  was  at  one  time  the  head  of  the  map-naking  section 
of  the  British  Ministry  of  Defence,  to  the  effect  that  an  error  with  regard  to 
the  location  of  the  boundary  pillar  at  Taba  had  been  made  at  a  crucial  stage  in 
the  preparation  of  the  map.  The  1915  map  (known  as  Newcombe  map)  was  the 
parent  of  a  whole  family  of  British  and  Egyptian  maps  that  were  in  common  use 
throughout  the  period  of  the  mandate,:  274 
The  Israelis  argued  that,  because  of  the  fact  that  the  Newcomb  nap  was  not 
published  untill  after  the  outbreak  of  World  War  I,  Turkey,  as  the  sovereign 
over  Palestine,  never  had  an  opportunity  to  react  specifically  to  the  boundary 
indicated  in  that  map  .  27  r-  As  is  well-known,  Turkey  renounced,  in  the  Treaty  Of 
Lausanne,  1923,  all  right  or  title  to  a  vast  area  including  the  whole  of 
Palestine,  and  in  1922  Britain  was  granted  the  mandate  over  Palestine.  27a 
The  head  of  the  British  team  which  produced  the  survey  of  the  1915  map,  Col.  T. 
E.  Lawrence  ("Lawrence  of  Arabia"),  admitted  later  that,  acting  under 
instructions,  he  had  "invented"  certain  details  of  the  map.  This  resulted  in  an 
undefined  area  of  roughly  triangular  shape,  its  southern  edge  extending  about 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  eastwards  along  the  coast  from  Taba,  with  the 
remaining  two  sides  converging  at  a  point  about  a  mile  inland.  -2,71 
Turning  to  the  view  advanced  by  Egypto  it  was  argued  that  the  phrase  11  the 
recognized  international  boundary  between  Egypt  and  the  former  Mandated 
territory  of  Palestine"  used  in  Article  2  of  the  1979  Treaty  should  be 
understood  as  a  reference  to  the  line  linking  the  boundary  pillars  which 
existed  on  the  ground  between  1922  and  1948.  Consequently.  it  was  the  location 
on  the  ground  during  the  mandatory  period  which  was  intended.  It  f  ollowed, 152 
that,  since  the  location  of  the  boundary  pillar  at  Taba  between  1922  and  1948 
was  accepted  as  part  of  the  international  boundary  between  Egypt  and  Israeli 
then  the  disputed  area  in  Taba  would  be,  as  it  always  was,  within  Egypt's 
territory  .  279 
In  support  of  its  view  on  the  location  of  the  boundary  pillar  at  Tabal  Egypt 
produced  the  photograph  that  Col.  Parker  took  on  31  December  1906  of  the 
construction  of  the  first  masonary  pillar  at  Taba.  279 
Alsot  it  was  argued  that  the  Treaty  of  1906  contained  a  geographical 
description  of  -  the  final  section  of  the  boundary'at  Taba.  This  description 
meant  clearly  that  the  pillars  in  thes  area  would  not  be  intervisible. 
Consequentlyl  according  to  Bowett,  "the  supposed  divegence  between  the  1906 
Treaty  line  (the  so  called  legal  boundary)  and  the  demarcation  by  the  masonry 
pillars  did  not  in  fact  exit".  This,  it  was  argued,  invalidated  much  of  the 
Israeli  reasoning  in  the  case.  2130 
Moreover,  if  this  description  was  to  be  taken  Into  accounto  then  the  Egyptian 
location  of  the  boundary  pillar  would  conform  to  the  text  of  the  1906  Treaty 
and  the  Israeli  location  would  not.:  2G'  In  support  Of  its  view,  Egypt  referred 
to  the  principle  of  stability  of  international  boundaries,  insisting  that  the 
Israeli  claims  to  Taba  run  counter  to  that  important  principle.  In  this 
respect,  Egypt  invoked,  Inter  nlis,  the  need  11  to  bring  into  operation  the 
general  legal  principles  of  the  stability  and  finality  of  boundaries.  the 
succession  of  States  to  territory,  estoppel,  acquiescence,  and  de--1aQt2  agreement 
so  as  to  preclude  Israel's  claims  based  on  application  of  the  terms  Of  the  1906 
Agreement" 
.  212 153 
Egypt  demonstrated  that  the  post-1982  Israeli  maps  showed  the  boundary  to  be 
aligned  differently  from  the  pre-1982  Israeli  maps.  Raising  the  inference  that 
the  maps  had  been  altered  in  order  to  suit  the  Israeli  case,  .  Egypt  based  its 
allegation  regarding  the  maps  an  an  article  published  in  1987  in  "Hotam"q  an 
Israeli  newspaper,  which  accused  the  government  of  alterating  Israeli  maps-20*4 
There  were  also  allegations  against  Israel  of  having  destroyed  boundary 
pillars,  of  having  falsified  photographs  and  of  having  withheld  important 
evidence.  2-11 
On  29  September  1988,  the  Taba  Award  was  delivered  by  the  Arbitration 
Tribunal.  It  is  not  intended  here  to  analyze  or  evaluate  this  Award  in  great 
detail  as  it  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  work.  Few  writings  on  the  Award  in 
can  be  found  elsewhere  . 
29r. 
However,  it  seems  useful  and  relevant  to  end  the  discussion  with  some 
observations  on  the  arguments  advanced  by  Egypt  and  Israel  regarding  Taba  by 
reference  to  the  Award. 
So  far  as  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  "recognized  international  boundary  between 
Egypt  and  former  mandated  territory  of  Palestine  11  is  concerned,  the  Tribunal 
pointed  out  that  "the  description  of  the  boundary  is  not  very  clear  or  specific, 
particularly  the  word  recognized  is  in  the  context  ambiguous"  s2cýG  However,  the 
Tribunal  rejected  Israel's  interpretation  that  the  words  refer  only  to  the  line 
defined  by  the  1906  Agreement,  and  not  to  the  demarcation  line.  Quoting  from 
and  commenting  on  the  Tribunal's  view  regarding  this  pointo  Professor  Prosper 
Weil  wrote: 
11  The  Award  states  that  these  expressions  cannot  be  interpreted  as  referring  to 
the  description  of  the  line  rather  than  to  its  demarcation  (para.  170).  And  the 154 
final  reason  put  forward  by  the  Tribunal:  why  should  the  Treaty  of  Peace  be 
understood  as  referring  to  the  Agreement  of  1906  "if  reference  could  just  as 
well  have  been  made  directly  to  the  1906  Agreement  ?  01.207 
Then  he  goes  on  to  criticize  the  attitude  of  the  Tribunal: 
This  latter  argument  is,  to  say  the  least,  not  convincing.  It  couldo  likewiset 
be  asked  why  the  Peace  Treaty  should  be  understood  as  referring  to  the 
demarcation  in  existence  on  the  ground  during  the  Mandate,  if  reference  could 
just  as  well  have  been  made  directly  to  that  demarcation.  11200 
As  regards  the  Israeli  argument  that  the  statement  in  the  Egyptian, 
Statiqtlnal  Yearbook  of  1909  supports  its  claims,  the  Tribunal  dismissed  it 
saying  that  "  the  evidentiary  value  of  such  technical  publications  designed  to 
provide  general  information  is  low,  for  such  publications  are  not  designed  as 
authoritative  statements  about  boundaries'l.:  29-: 
This  position  of  the  Tribunal  was  criticized  by  E.  Lauterpacht  who  wrote: 
"This  entirely  disregards  the  fact  that  what  one  is  concerned  with  is  not  the 
general  status  of  the  publication  but  the  specific  quality  of  the  information  it 
contains.  And  one  could  not  be  more  specific  than  the  description  given  in  the 
Statistical  Yearboak.  And  why  should  the  evidence  in  the  yeal:  bDuk  be  less 
authoritative  than  a  map  especially  in  the  face  of  evidence  that  the  relevant 
sector  of  the  map  was  inaccurate?  ".:  29c, 
As  regards  the  argument  by  Israel  that  the  pillars  at  Taba  were  erected 
inconsistently  with  the  1906  Agreement  and  were  to  be  disregarded  as  being 
erected  in  error  and  that  the  locations  suggested  by  Israel  conformed  with  the 
1906  Agreement,  the  Tribunal  heldýthat  a  Joint  agreed  demaraction  should  prevail 
over  the  text: 155 
11  If  a  boundary  line  is  once  demaracated  Jointly  by  the  parties  concerned,  the 
demaracation  is  considered  as  an  authentic  interpretation  of  the  boundary 
agreement  even  if  deviations  may  have  occurred  or  if  there  are  some 
inconsistencies  with  the  maps".  291 
Then  the  Tribunal  stated  that  even  if  a  pillar  existing  during  the  Mandate  had 
been  placed  in  an  erroneous  location  in  terms  of  the  1906  line,  that  pillar  was 
nevertheless  to  be  regarded  as  a  pillar  of  the  recognized  international  boundary 
between  Egypt  and  the  former  mandated  territory  of  Palestine,  since  neither  the 
Mandatory  Power  nor  Egypt  had  protested  it,  and  they  had  rather,  by  their 
conduct,  accepted  and  recognized  it.  29;  2 
Finally,  it  seems  that  Egypt's  argument  that  Israeli  claims  are  inconsistent 
with  the  principle  of  the  stability  of  intenational  boundaries  was  accepted  by 
the  Tribunal.  A  reference  to  the  applicability  of  such  a  principle  to  the 
dispute  can  be  found  in  the  Award.  (para.  235) 
The  opinion  of  the  Tribunal  Via'S-  cri-tiLzed  by  some  writers  who  held  that  the 
principle  of  stability  of  boundaries  is  not  applicable  to  the  Taba  dispute  and 
that  the  Tribunal's  approach  on  this  point  was  "running  so  clearly  to  the 
mainstream  of  international  law  on  the  subject"293 
A  holder  of  this  view  is  expressed  by  Professor  Weil  who  argued  that  there 
was  a  classic  distinction  under  international  law  between  disputes  relating  to 
the  delimitation  of  a  boundary,  a  legal  and  political  operation  which  tends  to 
fix  the  territorial  limits  of  the  authority  of  the  state,  that  is,  to  define  the 
course  of  the  line  in  law;  and  disputes  of  attribution  or  demarcation,  a 
technical  operation  of  implementation  which  transfers  to  the  ground  the  terms 
of  an  established  delimitation. 156 
So  far  as  disputes  of  attribution  are  concerned,  he  continued,  effective 
control  prevails  over  legal  title.  Whereas  in  disputes  of  delimitations  legal 
title  prevails  over  effective  control,  namely  the  principle  of  uti  possidetir. 
jUria.  294  It  follows  that,  since  the  Taba  dispute,  from  a  legal  standpoint,  was 
one  of  delimitation  only  ,  then  the  Tribunal  could  have  granted  predominance  to 
legal  title  over  effective  controlt  namely,  to  give  priority  to  the  provision  of 
the  1906  Treaty  over  the  situation  on  the  ground  in  1923.  However,  the 
Tribunal  did  give  priority  to  the  situation  on  the  ground  in  1923  over  the 
legal  line  defined  by  the  1906  Agreement.  2ý1r,  He  then  concluded: 
"in  these  circumstances$  one  may  ýahder  about  the  reasons  which  induced  the 
Tribunal  to  adopt  an  approach  running  so  clearly  against  the  mainstream  of 
international  law  in  this  subject.  29r- 
As  is  well  known,  the  Taba  Award  was  implemented  in  a  good  faith.  Israel 
completed  its  final  withdrawal  from  Taba  and  the  area  was  returned  to  Egypt  On 
March  15,1989.  Several  days  earlier,  viz,  on  February  26,1989,  at  the  Tabals 
Sonesta  Hotel  which  Egypt  acquired  by  purchase,  an  Agreement  regarding  the 
permanent  boundary  between  Egypt  and  Israel  was  concluded.  297 
Certainly  the  importance  of  the  eventual  resolution  of  the  Taba  Disputel 
despite  sharp  differences  of  opinion  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  lies  in  what  it 
shows  about  the  role  of  arbitral  settlement  'of  International  disputes.  In  the 
w  ords  of  Lauterpacht,  "The  eventual  resolution  of  the  problem  by  arbitration 
represents  an  important  addition  to  the  list  of  successful  contributions  that 
the  process  of  impartial  legal  settlement  has  made  to  the  settlement  of 
international  disputes.  11.299 
S 157 
.  Indeed,  the  foregoing  analysis  of  the  Taba  case  and  the  way  in  which  the 
Award  was  implemented  would  lead  one  to  believe  that  litigation  could  be  among 
the  best  methods  of  settling  some  of  the  complicated  problems  of  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict,  in  particular,  that  disputes  relating  to  territory  or  boundary. 
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There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  issue  of  Israeli  settlements  in  the  Arab 
occupied  territories  is  one  of  the  most  important  and  complex  issues  in  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict.  The  settlement  policy  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  mind  and 
strategy  of  the  Israelis.  In  the  past  Israel  could  not  have  come  into  being 
without  the  radical  transformation  of  the  population  of  Palestine  resulting  from 
its  long  adopted  settlement  policy. 
At  present,  Israel's  national  security  is  based  on  its  strategy  to  increase  its 
population  -in  order  to  establish  itself  as  a  major  power  in  the  area.  This 
strategy  can  only  be  achieved  by  bringing  Jewish  immigrants  and  settling  then 
in  the  occupied  territories.  '  According  to  Arab  sourcesi  Israel  has  a  long- 
term  plan  to  bring  and  absorb  four  million  Russian  Jews  and  settle  them  in  Gaza 
and  the  West  Bank.  2 
Thus,  it  is  not  surprising  that  any  review  of  the  political  programmes  and 
platforms  of  Israel's  main  parties  would  reveal  that  there  exists  an 
overwhelming  consensus  among  them  on  the  necessity  of  adopting  such  a  policy-' 
Arab  states'  '-held  that  Israel's  settlement  policy  is  illegal  under 
international  law.  4  They  argue  that  the  continuation  and  persistence  of  Israel 
in  pursuing  this  policy  will  endanger  peace  and  security  in  the  area.  The  Arab 179 
League  Summit  Conference  held  in  May  1990  in  Baghdad  condemned  and  deplored 
this  policy  particularly  Israel's  recent  plan  to  bring  one  million  immigrants 
Russian  Jews  to  live  in  new  settlements  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  In  their 
resolution,  the  Arab  leaders  observed  that  such  policy  would  lead  to  another  war 
in  the  area.  r- 
In  the  meantime,  Israel's  settlement  policy  was  the  subject  of  several  United 
ffations'  inquiries  and  resolutionsr-  in  which  this  policy  has  been  condemned  on 
the  ground  that  it  constitutes  "a  flagrant  violation  of  the  Fourth  Geneva 
Convention  Relative  to  the  Protection  of  Civilian  Persons  in  Time  of  War  and 
also  constitute  a  serious  obstruction  to  achieving  a  comprehensiveýý  Just  and 
lasting  peace  in  the  Xiddle  East.  "7 
Israel's  agreement,  under  the  1979  Peace  Treaty,  to  evacuate  its  settlements  in 
Sinai  constitutes  the  first  case  in  its  history  where  it  agreed  to  abandon 
established  settlements.  Thus,  -the  significance  of  the  present  provisions  on 
the  settlements  is  that  they  demonstrate  the  handling  by  the  Treaty's  authors 
of  an  issue  not  addressed  in  Security  Council  Resolution  242  and  that  they 
provide  a  revealing  precedent  with  regard  to  the  resolution  of  the  settlement 
problemo  which  may  be  applicable  in  future  to  the  rest  of  the  Arab  occupied 
territories. 
The  problem  of  the  Israeli  settlements  in  Sinai  was  chief  ly  dealt  under  the 
Treaty  in  paragraph  2  of  Article  1  (2): 
"Israel  will  withdraw  all  its  armed  forces  and  civilians  from  the  Sinai 
behind  the  international  boundary  between  Egypt  and  mandated  Palestine,  as 
provided  in  the  annexed  protocol  (Annex  1)  ,  and  Egypt  will  resume  the  exercise 
of  its  f  ull  sovereignty  over  the  Sinai.  " 180 
To  understand  fully  the  above  provision  with  regard  to  the  settlements  it,  is 
necessary  to  place  it  within  the  context  of  the  Treaty  as  a  whole  and  examine 
it  in  the  light  of  its  drafting  history.  Vith  the  assistance  of  a  brief  inquiry 
into  the  legal  status  of  the  Israeli  settlement  policy  in  Sinai  under 
international  law,  an  examination  and  evaluation  of  the  Treaty's  position  will 
be  offered. 
The  View  that  Tgraells  SettlpynpintR  lin  -qj])nj  were  not  TIlegid.  - 
It  was  claimed  by  Israel,  and  the  few  writers  who  support  it,  that  its 
settlement  policy  in  Sinai  was  not  in  violation  of  the  rules  of  international 
law.  To  find  legal  bases  for  Israel's  political  claims  to  the  right  to 
establish  settlements  in  Sinait  four  main  arguments  have  been  advanced: 
(1)  Israel,  it  is  alleged,  was  not  legally  bound  to  apply  the  law  of  military 
occupation  to  SinaiO  though  it  observed  such  law  dp  facta.  0  This  is  based  on 
the  assumption  that  Israel  was  denying  the  sovereignty  of  Egypt  over  the  Sinai 
Peninsula.  It  follows  that,  since  the  law  of  belligerent  occupation  presupposes 
that  the  displaced  government  was  a  legitimate  one 
1> 
and  if  it  does  not  so 
qualifyo  the  occupant  is  not  bound  to  apply  the  law.  9 
With  regard  to  the  argument  disputing  the  Egyptian  title  over  Sinai.  we  have 
referred  to  it  earlier  and  there  is  no  need  to  repeat  it  here.  10 
In  support  of  the  claim  that  the  law  of  occupation  presupposes  the  legitimacy 
of  the  displaced  government,  several  views  interpreting  the  law  Of  occupation  in 
this  respect  were  advanced.  For  example  Blum  wrote: 
"the  traditional  rules  of  international  law  governing  belligerent 
occupation  are  based  on  a  twofold  assumption,  namely,  (a)  that  it  was  the 181 
legitimate  sovereign  which  was  ousted  from  the  territory  under  occupation; 
and  (b)  that  the  ousting  side  qualifies  as  a  belligerent  occupant  with 
respect  to  the  territory.  According  to  Glahn,  "belligerent  occupation  ...  as 
regulated  by  customary  and  conventional  international  law,  presupposes  a 
state  of  affairs  in  which  the  sovereign,  the  legitimate  government  of  the 
occupied  territory,  is  at  war  with  the  government  of  the  occupying  forces. 
This  assumption  of  the  concurrent  existence  in  respect  of  the  same 
territory  of  both  an  ousted  legitimate  sovereign  and  a  belligerent 
occupant  lies  at  the  root  of  all  those  rules  of  international  law,  which, 
while  recognizing  and  sanctioning  the  occupant's  rights  to  administer  the 
occupied  territory,  aim  at  the  same  time  to  safeguard  the  reversionary 
rights  of  the  ousted  sovereign.  It  would  seem  to  follow  that,  in  a  case 
like  the  present  where  the  ousted  state  never  was  the  legitimate  sovereign, 
those  rules  of  belligerent  occupation  directed  to  safeguarding  that 
sovereign's  reversionary  rights  have  no  application.  "' 
At  the  same  lrý  it  has  been  argued  that,  under  the  Hague  Conventionj 
"territory  is  considered  occupied  when  it  is  actually  placed  under  the  authority 
of  the  hostile  army.  "  12  The  word  "territory",  according  to  Israelp  should  be 
interpreted  very  narrowly,  and  should  encompass  only  those  territories  Over 
which  the  preceding  sovereign  had  something  likede  jure  sovereignty  and  the 
title  to  the  land  is  not  contested.  13 
A  similar  narrow  interpretation  should  be  accorded  to  the  meaning  of  the  word 
"territory"  used  in  Article  49  of  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention.  "  This  Article 
provides  that  the  Convention  will  apply  to  all  cases  of  partial  or  total 
occupation  of  the  "territory"  of  a  High  Contracting  Party.  'r- 182 
(2)  The  law  of  occupation  ceases  to  apply  when  active  hostility  ends.  The, 
second  argument  advanced  in  support  of  this  view  is  based  on  the  Israeli 
contention  that  the  law  of  military  occupation  prohibiting  Israeli  settlements 
ceases  to  apply  when  active  hostilities  end  or  when  an  occupation  continues  for 
a  long  time.  r- 
(3)  Israel's  settlement  policy  in  Sinai  is  not  in  contravention  of  the  law  of 
belligerent  occupation.  This  argument  is  based  on  the  contention  that  even  if 
the  law  of  military  occupation  is  applicable,  a  proper  and  correct  understanding 
of  its  relevant  provisions  will  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  Israel's 
settlements  in  Sinai  were  not  in  contravention  of  its  provisions  .  17 
Allan  Gerson,  a  holder  of  this  view,  states  that  while  the  Hague  Regulations  of 
1907  are  silent  on  the  issue  of  civilian  settlements,  a  careful  reading  and 
application  of  Article  49  of  the  Geneva  Convention  dealing  with  the  settlement 
issue  suggests  that  Israel's  settlement  policy  was  not  illegal.  According  to 
him,  Article  49  prohibits  only  settlements  that  involve  displacement  of  the 
existing  population.  19  In  support  of  this  understanding,  he  referred  to 
Oppenheim's  comment  on  Article  49  that  the  prohibition  regarding  the  transfer 
of  civilian  population  into  the  occupied  territories  was  "intended  to  cover 
cases  of  the  occupant  bringing  in  its  nationals  for  the  purposes  of  displacing 
the  population  of  the  occupied  territory.  "'  9 
An  application  of  this  to  Israel's  settlements  will  reveal,  according  to  Gerson, 
that  Israel  does  not  pursue  11  a  policy  aimed  at  the  systematic  conversion  of 
the  administered  territories  ...  Israeli  settlement  in  the  territories  has  been  in 
the  nature  of  ad  hoc  responses  to  incipient  trends  rather  than  established 
policy'.  This  may  be  enhanced,  according  to  him,  by  the  fact  that  areas  settled 183 
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in  the  Sinai  by  Israeli  nationals  accounted  f  or  roughly  a  little  more  than  one 
per  cent  of  the  Sinai's  total  land  mass.  20 
From  the  above,  Gerson  draws  the  conclusion  that  "Israeli  settlement  does  not 
directly  contravene  the  Geneva  Convention,  assuming  its  applicability""  - 
(4)  Precedents  from  state  practice  have  also  been  cited  in  support  of  Israel's 
position  and  practice.  For  example,  the  U.  S.  after  the  Second  World  War 
declared  that  it  was  not  legally  bound  to  apply  the  law  of  military  occupation 
with  respect  to  the  territories  of  the  defeated  Axis  Powers.  Another  example 
cited  was  the  rejection  of  France  to  apply  Articles  42  to  56  of  the  Hague  Rules 
of  1907  to  the  territory  of  Alsace-Lorraine  .  22 
in  considering  the  aforesaid  view  as  expressed  by  Israel  and  its  supporters, 
one  cannot*  however,  accept  it. 
First,  Israel's  argument  that  the  law  of  occupation  was  not  applicable  to  Sinai 
as  Egypt's  sovereignty  over  Sinai  was  disputed  cannot  be  taken  seriously  from 
an  international  law  standpoint.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  such  a 
questioning  of  Egypt's  sovereignty  over  Sinai  had  never  been  raised#  nor  had 
Israel  itself  claimed  sovereignty  over  it.  In  the  words  of  Clagetts  "I  have 
not  seen  a  more  frivolous  argument  for  questioning  Egyptian  sovereignty  in  the 
Sinai,  and  I  do  not  believe  that  any  exists.  1123 
Xoreover,  it  is  widely  recognized  that  an  occupier  should  not  be  allowed  to 
ignore  the  law  of  occupation  simply  by  questioning  the  title  of  its  opponent- 
That  law  must  be  applied  regardless  of  whether  the  sovereignty  of  the  displaced 
state  is  open  to  question.  In  the  words  of  one  writer  who  rejects  Israel's 
position  and  practice: 184 
"The  Israeli  position  has  not  been  accepted  by  any  other  government.  There 
was  a  specific  resolution  an  this  subject  matter  at  the  United  Nations  in  which 
Israel's  position  on  the  applicability  of  the  Geneva  Convention  was  unanimously 
rejected;  even  the  United  States  voted  against  the  Israeli  contention.  The 
Israeli  argument  that  the  law  does  not  apply  might,  however,  be  used  as  a 
precedent  by  other  countries  which  find  themselves  as  occupying  powers  over 
territory  whose  title  it  disputes.  If  this  view  succeeds,  the  law  of  occupation 
will  probably  be  a  dead  letter.  1124 
Further,  Israel's  narrow  interpretation  of  the  word  "territory"  used  by  Articles 
42  of  the  Hague  Regulation  and  49  of  the  Geneva  Convention  is  not  consistent 
with  the  prevailing  view  adopted  by  the  majority  of  states.  In  this  regard,  it 
has  been  observed  that  the  negotiating  record  of  the  Hague  and  Geneva 
Conventions  indicates  that  11  the  only  thing  stated  by  those  who  put  the  word 
"territory"  into  these  treaties  for  the  first  time  is  that  the  word  should  be 
read  broadly.  "  This  alone,  it  is  submitted,  makes  it  difficult  to  accept  a 
narrow  interpretation  of  what  the  word  should  mean.  -26 
Furthermore,  there  is  a  consensus  of  opinion  among  scholars  that  neither  the 
cessation  of  active  hostilities  nor  a  cease-fire  agreement  has  any  effect  on  the 
rights  or  obligations  of  belligerent  occupiers  unless  a  cease-fire  agreement 
provides  for  deviations  from  the  law  of  occupation.  It  is  clear  that  such  an 
agreement  does  not  exist.  26 
Likewise,  Israel's  argument  that  Article  49  of  the  Geneva  Convention  prohibits 
only  settlements  that  involve  displacement  of  the  existing  population  cannot  be 
accepted  since  there  is  nothing  in  that  Article  suggesting  such  an 
interpretation.  Cummings,  who  rejects  that  interpretationg  says,  "  the  intention 185 
to  prevent  displacement  emphasized  by  Oppenhein  should  not  be  regarded  as  the 
only  purpose  of  Article  49.  Particularly  since  it  is  not  substantiated  in  the' 
negotiating  record  of  the  treaty,  it  would  be  inappropriate  to  derogate  the  1ý 
express  language  of  the  Article  through  such  an  interpretation  . 
1027 
Finally,  the  claim  that  Israeli  settlement  policy  in  Sinai  was  more  rhetorical 
than  real  is  doubtful  for  several  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  inconsistent 
with  the  finding  of  the  U.  N.  Special  Committee  to  Investigate  Israeli  Practices 
Affecting  the  Human  Rights  of  the  Population  of  the  Occupied  Territories: 
11  The  evidence  that  the  Special  Committee  has  recieved  reflects  a  policy  on 
the  part  of  the  Government  of  Israel  designed  to  ef  f  ect  radical  changes  in  the 
physical  character  and  demographic  composition  of  several  areas  of  the 
territory  under  occupation  ...  Keasures  taken  under  this  policy  include  the 
establishment  of  settlements  for  Israeli  Jews  in,  for  example,  occupied 
Jerusalem,  Hebron,  certain  parts  of  the  Jordan'Valley,  the  Golan  Heights,  Gazal 
Northern  Sinai  and  Sharm  El-Sheikh.  1128 
Another  proof  that  Israel's  settlement  policy  was  real  is  the  existence,  in  the 
government  of  Israel,  of  a  Ministerial  Committee  for  Settlement  of  the 
Territories.  This  Committee  "by  its  very  existence"  showed,  according  to  the  U.  N. 
Committee,  beyond  doubt,  that  it  is  a  policy  of  the  Government  of  Israel  to 
settle  the  territories  occupied.  "29 
Also,  the  U.  N.  Committee  referred  to  numerous  announcements  on  the  settlement 
issue  made  by  Israeli  ministers  and  leaders,  and  found  that,  11  their  general 
tenor,  the  frequency  with  which  they  have  been  repeated  and  the  various 
measures  adopted  by  the  Government  of  Israel,  such  as  the  establishment  of 186 
settlements,  justify  in  the  Special  Committee's  opinion  the  conclusion  that  these 
statements  are  a  faithful  reflection  of  official  Israeli  policy.  "30 
Apart  from  the  finding  of  the  U.  N.  Special  Committee,  it  is  worthwhile  to 
refer  to  Israel's  previous  plan  to  build  the  city  of  Yamit,  in  the  north-eastern 
corner  of  Sinai  which  was  designed  to  absorb  thousands  of  Israeli  settlers.  " 
On  one  occasion  Sadat  said  that  one  of  the  main  reasons  for  the  October  War 
was  the  settlement  at  Yamit.  This  is  another  clear  example  indicating  the  real 
nature  of  Israel's  settlement  policy.  32 
II.  The  Vipw  that  Israel, 
The  opposing  point  of  view,  and  one  held  by  the  majority  of  states,  is  based 
on  the  premise  that  Israel's  status  in  the  Sinai  was  of  a  belligerent  occupant 
with  all  the  attendant  rights  and  obligations  under  international  law. 
Accordingly,  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention  of  1949  and  the  Hague  Convention  of 
1907  provide  the  applicable  standard  for  Judging  Israel's  conduct.  Taking  into 
account  the  fact  that  the  military  occupier  is  not  permitted  under  these  two 
conventions  to  establish  settlements  in  the  occupied  territoriest  it  follows 
that  Israel's  settlements  in  Sinai  were  not  permitted  under  the  law  of 
occupation.  Thus,  Israel's  settlement  policy  in  Sinai  was  illegal  .  33 
In  particular,  the  settlement  policy  was  explicitly  in  violation  of  Article  49 
of  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention  relative  to  the  Protection  of  Civilian  Persons 
in  Time  of  Var  of  12  August,  1949.  Article  49  of  this  Convention  prohibits  in 
absolute  terms  the  settlement  of  occupied  territories.  It  reads  in  part  as 
follows: 187 
11  The  Occupying  Power  shall  not  deport  or  transfer  parts  of  its  own  civilian 
population  into  the  territory  it  occupies.  1134 
The  official  commentary  prepared  by  the  International  Committee  of  the  Red 
Cross  (ICRC)  described  the  above  provision  as  being  11  intended  to  prevent  the 
practice  adopted  during  the  Second  World  War  by  certain  powers,  which 
transferred  portions  of  their  own  population  to  occupied  territory  for  political 
and  racial  reasons,  or  in  order,  as  they  claimed,  to  colonize  these 
territories  .  "3r, 
The  negotiati'06  record  of  the  above  provision  indicates  that  there  was  concern 
expressed  by  some  participating  states  in  relation  to  the  broadness  of  this 
provision;  however,  the  language,  as  it  was  adopted,  does  not  lend  itself  to  a 
narrow  interpretation.  36 
Israel's  settlements  also  violate  the  provisions  of  the  Hague  Convention  on  the 
Laws  and  Customs  of  War  on  Land  of  18  October  1907.  Although  this  Convention 
contains  no  direct  mention  of  the  settlement  issue,  Article  23  (g)  forbids  the 
occupier  from  seizing  the  enemy's  property  unless  such  "seizure  be  imperatively 
demanded  by  the  necessities  of  war.  '137  Taking  into  account  the  fact  that  the 
creation  of  settlements  involves  two  elements,  the  appropriation  of  land  and  the 
establishment  of  settlers  on  such  land,  it  follows  that  the  appropriation  of  the 
lands  in  Sinai  in  order  to  establish  Israeli  settlements  was  in  violation  of 
that  Article-39 
Further,  Israel  is  obliged  under  Article  55  to  "safeguard  the  capital"  of  the 
property  and  to  administer  it  in  accordance  with  the  "rules  of  usufruct".  39  It 
is  clear  that  the  seizure  of  Egypt'e  land  and  the  establishment  of  settlements 
on  such  land  is  inconsistent  with  the  rules  imposed  by  that  Article. 188 
In  sum,  Israells,  settlement  policy,  it  is  submitted,  violates  the  spirit  of  the 
Hague  Convention  since  the  basic  duty  under  it  is  to  preserve  the  existing 
situation.  "' 
Additional  reason  in  support  of  the  illegality  of  Israel's  settlements  is  the 
contention  that  Resolution  242,  in  its  operative  paragraph  1(I)  calls  for  the 
withdrawal  of  Israel's  armed  forces  from  territories  occupied  in  the  1979 
conf  lict.  It  follows  that  it  requires  Israel,  as  a  matter  of  legal  obligation, 
to  withdraw  from  the  occupied  lands.  -  Such  withdrawal  should  include  settlers 
as  well  as  military  forces  .  41 
Another  argument  in  support  of  the  illegitimacy  of  Israeli  settlements  is 
based  on  the  fact  that  this  policy  has  been  explicitly  deplored  or  condemned  in 
several  U.  N.  resolutions  adopted  by  both  the  General  Assembly  and  the  Security 
Council.  "  A  clear  example  indicating  the  U.  N.  position  vis  a  vis  the 
settlements  can  be  found  in  General  Assembly  Resolution  2443  of  December  1968 
calling  for  the  establishment  of  a  special  comnittee  to  investigate  Israeli 
practices  affecting  the  human  rights  of  the  population  of  the  occupied 
territories.  On  September  17,1971  the  Special  Committee  transmitted  its  full 
report  to  the  General  Assembly  in  which  it  confirmed  that  Israel  is  following  a 
settlement  policy  in  the  occupied  territories  in  a  manner  calculating  to  exclude 
all  possibility  of  restitution  to  lawful  ownership.  In  addition,  the  Committee 
Report  found  that: 
"Every  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Government  of  Israel  at  carrying  out  a 
policy  of  annexation  and  settlement  amounts  to  a  denial  of  the  fundamental 
human  rights  of  the  local  inhabitants.  in  particular  the  right  to  self- 189 
determination  and  the  right  to  retain  their  homeland,  and  a  repudiation  by  the 
Government  of  Israel  of  accepted  norms  of  international  law.  1143 
Another  U.  N.  resolution  indicates  its  position  vis  a  vis  Israel's  settlement 
policy  is  Security  Council  Resolution  465  of  1  March  1980.  It  not  only 
proclaimed  the  legal  invalidity  of  Israeli  settlements,  but  also  called  for  their 
dismantlement.  It  reads  in  part  as  follows: 
"  ...  all  measures  taken  by  Israel  to  change  the  physical  character,  demographic 
composition,  institutional  structure,  or  status  of  the  Palestinian  and  other  Arab 
territories  occupied  since  19679  including  Jerusalem,  or  any  part  thereof,  have 
no  legal  validity  and  that  Israel's  policy  and  practices  of  settling  parts  of 
its  population  and  new  immigrants  in  those  territories  constitute  a  flagrant 
violation  of  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention  Relative  to  the  Protection  of 
Civilian  Persons  in  Time  of  War-  and  also  constitute  a  serious  obstruction  to 
achieving  a  comprehensive,  just  and  lasting  peace  in  the  Middle  East  .  1114 
With  regard  to  the  above  view,  one  cannot  agree  with  the  argument  that 
Resolution  242  prohibits  the  establishment  of  Israeli  settlements  in  the 
occupied  territories.  That  is  not  to  sayt  however,  that  we  accept  Israel's 
understanding  that  the  term  "secure  boundaries"  as  used  in  Article  1(IID  of  the 
Resolution  permits  the  establishment  of  settlements  which  could  be  useds 
according  to  Begin,  as  buffer  zones  between  Egypt  and  Israel  .  4r,  The  Resolution 
neither  prohibits  nor  permits  the  establishment  of  such  settlements  for  the 
simple  reason  that  the  first  Israeli  settlement  in  the  occupied  territory  was 
established  in  1968,  a  year  after  the  Resolution  was  adopted  .  46 190 
One  is  f  orced  to  conclude  that  the  Israeli  settllement  policy  is  illegal  under 
the  rules  of  international  law,  in  particular  in  the  light  of  the  Security 
Council  Resolution  465  refered  to  earlier. 
Having  discussed  the  legality  of  Israel's  settlement  policy  in  Sinai  under 
international  law,  we  proceed  now  to  consider  the  position  of  the  parties  on 
the  settlement  issue  at  the  begining  of  the  peace  process,  namely,  during 
Sadat's  visit  to  Jerusalem  in  1977. 
Israel  expressed  the  view  that  it  was  ready  to  evacuate  its  settlements  in 
Sinai  except  those  in  the  north-eastern  and  south-eastern  Sinai  which  should 
remain  within  its  control  .  47  However,  this  was  not  a  final  position  since 
Israel,  as  indicated  earlier.  held  the  view  that  no  party  should  rule  out  any 
subject  on  the  claim  that  it  was  not  negotiable  .  49 
As  to  Egypt's  position,  although  the  text  of  Sadat's  statement  at  the  Knesset 
on  November  20,1977  contained  no  explicit  mention  of  the  settlement  issue,  it 
may  be  correct,  however,  to  say  that  it  implied  a  rejection  of  Israel's 
settlement  policy  in  Sinai,  in  particular  its  proposal  to  keep  some  of  these 
settlements  as  part  of  its  final  secure  boundaries. 
Certain  expressions  in  the  speech  refer  to  Israel's  legal  status  in  Sinai  as  a 
military  occupier:  11  There  is  an  Arab  land  which  Israel  occupied  by  military 
f  orce  ....  Conceive  with  me  ....  ending  the  Israeli  occupation  .  4'44-'  The  speech  demands 
a  total  Israeli  withdrawal  from  Egypt's  territory:  11  ...  we  insist  on  complete 
withdrawal  from  that  land.  116c,  Of  course,  such  complete  withdrawal  must 
include  the  military  forces  as  well  as  the  settlers. 
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To  reaffirm  Egypt's  strong  position  vie  a  vis  Israel's  demand  to  keep  some  of 
its  settlements  permanently  in  Sinai,  Sadat  declared:  "  ...  our  land  does  not  yield 
itself  to  bargaining.  It  is  not  even  open  to  argument,  To  us,  the  national  soil 
is  equal  to  the  holy  valley  ...  None  of  us  can,  or  accept  to  cede  one  inch  of  ito 
or  accept  the  principle  of  debating  or  bargaining  over  it.  1161 
Sadat's  description  of  Sinai  as  a  holy  place  was  taken  from  and  referring  to 
certain  versions  in  the  Nuran"  on  Sinai.  The  purpose  of  such  a  transportation 
of  a  religious  term  to  a  political  fieldr,  2  is  perhaps  to  point  out  that  Egypt's 
position  was  not  based  only  on  legal  and  political  condition,  but  also  an 
particular  religious  considerations.  This  clearly  reflects  Egypt's  strong  and 
firm  opposition  against  any  kind  of  Israeli  presence  in  Sinai. 
The  main  discussions  and  proposals  on  the  settlement  issue  can  be  found  in  the 
negotiations  taking  place  at  Camp  David  where  the  problem  was  finally  resolved. 
However,  the  text  of  the  Camp  David  Agreements  contains  no  provision  on  the 
settlement  issue.  The  reason  for  this  will  be  indicated  below.  Thus,  the  Camp 
David  negotiations,  in  this  respect,  are  of  special  value  and  importance. 
As  mentioned  earlier,  Egypt  submitted  its  proposal  for  a  "Framework  Agreement" 
on  September  61  1978.  The  second  part  of  Article  2  of  the  draft  deals  with  the 
problem  of  the  settlements.  It  calls  for  "Removal  of  the  Israeli  settlements  in 
the  occupied  territories  according  to  a  time-table  to  be  agreed  upon  within  the 
period  referred  to  in  Article  6.116-3 
Like  the  military  withdrawall  the  legal  basis  of  Israel's  evacuation  Of  its 
settlements  was  the  principle  of  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory 192 
by  war.  This  principle  is  referred  to  in  the  f  irst  part  of  Article  2  of  the 
draft  and  is  taken  from  the  preamble  to  Resolution  242. 
The  period  during  which  Israel  was  to  remove  its  settlements,  is  three  months 
"as  from  the  conclusion  of  the  "Framework  Treaty".  This  has  been  provided  in 
Article  6  of  the  draft.  r,,  *  In  other  words,  Egypt  suggested  a  total  withdrawal  Of 
the  settlers  before  signing  the  "Peace  Treaty". 
This  provision  an  the  settlements  was  severly  criticized  by  the  Israeli 
delegation  and  it  was  unacceptable  on  many  grounds.  The  language  on  the 
inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  force  has  always  been 
rejected  by  Israel.  The  reasons  behind  such  rejection  were  indicated  earlier.  '-S 
While  the  settlements  in  the  other  Arab  occupied  territories  fell  within  the 
scope  of  the  Egyptian  draft  on  the  settlements,  Israel,  however,  was  not  ready 
to  aboadon  its  settlements  in  the  Golan  Heights  or  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  for 
the  sake  of  a  separate  peace  with  Egypt. 
The  timing  suggested  for  the  evacuation  was  inconsistent  with  Israel's  view 
that  peace  should  precede,  not  only  the  military  withdrawal,  but  also  the 
evacuation  of  the  settlements. 
Article  2  of  the  Egyptian  draft  could  be  interpreted  to  mean  that  Israel  had 
to  pay  compensation  to  the  Egyptian  civilians  for  the  damage  which  resulted 
from  the  operations  in  establishing  settlements.  Israel  was  not  prepared  to 
pay  any  compensation  because,  according  to  Begin,  it  was  not  defeated  in  the 
war.  Only  defeated  nations,  in  his  view,  had  to  pay  compensation.  "  Egypt's 
right  to  compensation  from  Israel  is  not  our  concern  here. 193 
In  response  to  the  above  criticism,  Sadat  agreed  on  two  concessions:  to  omit 
the  language  on  the  inadmissibility  of  acquisition  of  territory  by  war;  and  to 
allow  the  Israeli  settlers  to  remain  in  Egypt  for  three  years. 
In  the  meantime,  the  U.  S.  delegation  opposed  Israel's  demand  to  keep  its 
settlements  in  Sinai,  and  took  the  position  that  the  settlements  were  illegal 
and  had  to  be  dismantled  or  removed.  Brzezinski  went  further  and  informed 
Begin  that  such  settlements  were  not  only  illegal,  but  also  a  form  of 
colonialism. 
Nevertheless$  the  Americans  worked  out  a  proposal  to  narrow  the  gap  between 
Egypt  and  Israel.  On  September  10,  the  U.  S.  submitted  its  first  proposal  at 
Camp  David.  The  relevant  provision  suggested  by  the  Americans  deals  both  with 
the  military  withdrawal  and  the  evacuation  of  the  settlers.  It  was  quoted 
earlier  in  dealing  with  the  withdrawal  clause,  and  it  may  be  quoted  again  for 
the  purpose  of  the  present  analysis: 
"Israel  has  agreed  to  the  restoration  of  the  exercise  of  full  Egyptian 
sovereignty  in  the  Sinai  up  to  the  internationally  recognized  border  between 
Egypt  and  Israel.  1167 
This  clause  contained  no  explicit  mention  of  the  Israeli  settlements.  Also, 
the  principle  of  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  war  was 
omitted.  Further,  the  geographical  scope  of  this  Article  is  limited  to  Sinai6a; 
thus,  the  settlements  in  the  rest  of  the  occupied  territories  fell  outside  its 
scope.  The  issue  of  compensation  was  also  deliberately  omitted  from  the  U.  S. 
draf  t. 
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Notwithstanding  the  above,  the  Americans  assumed  that  the  text  was  well 
balanced  and  covered  a  total  Israeli  withdrawal,  including  both  the  settlers  and 
the  forces. 
As  was  mentioned  earlier,  the  Egyptians  doubted  whether  it  was  advisable  to 
accept  a  text  which  referred  vaguely  to  a  very  important  issue,  namely,  the 
Israeli  withdrawal  and  the  settlements.  They  preferred  language  calling  for  a 
total  withdrawalt  including  the  Israeli  settlers.  1-9 
In  response,  the  Americans  amended  that  text  in  their  second  written  proposal 
submitted  at  Camp  David  on  12  September: 
"Israel  and  Egypt  agree  to  negotiate  (on) 
a.  the  -full  exercise  of  Egyptian  sovereignty  up  to  the  internationally 
recognized  border  between  Egypt  and  mandated  Falestinet 
b-  the  time  of  withdrawal  of  Israeli  personnel  from  the  Sinai.  "60 
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  phrase  "withdrawal  of  Israeli  personnel  from  the 
Sinai"  had  been  inserted  in  the  last  part  of  the  amended  text  to  meet  Egypt's 
demand  for  clearer  language  on  the  withdrawal.  The  word  "personnel"  is  used  as 
referring  both  to  the  forces  and  the  settlers.  Thus,  an  the  ground  that  this 
text  ensured  a  total  Israeli  withdrawal  from  Egypt's  territory,  it  was  accepted 
by  the  Egyptians.  61 
In  fact,  it  was  this  text  which,  after  a  minor  change,  was  finally  approved  and 
adopted  by  the  authors  of  the  1979  Peace  Treaty. 
With  regard  to  the  position  by  the  Israelis,  a  distinction  may  be  made  between 
the  initial  position  taken  by  them  during  the  first  ten  days  of  the  negotiations 
and  their  final  position.  From  September  6  to  161  Israel  turned  down  all  the 
aforementioned  proposals.  According  to  Dayan,  Israel  insisted  on  its  previous 195 
proposal  that  some  of  its  strategic  settlements  in  Sinai  should  remain  in  its 
control  in  the  final  resolution.  Of  course,  this  proposal  was  rejected  by  Egypt 
as  encroaching  on  its  sovereignty.  62  During  the  negotiations,  Sadat  mentioned 
that,  as  long  as  issues  relating  to  sovereignty  and  territory  are  concerned,  no 
concessions  could  be  made.  1-3  Hence,  Dayan  of  fered  to  let  the  title  to  the 
settlements  be  transferred  to  Egypt,  but  allow  the  Israelis  to  live  there  for  a 
limited  timel  i.  e.,  a  period  of  20  years.  Carter  tried  to  convince  Sadat  to 
accept  this  proposal  since  it  is  not  in  violation  of  Egypt's  sovereignty,  but 
Sadat  rejected  it.  64  At  the  same  time,  Begin  insisted  that  the  Israeli 
settlements  in  Sinai  were  legally  permitted  under  Resolution  242.1-1-  It  was 
important$  he  continued,  that  the  few  Israeli  settlers  in  the  Sinai  be  accepted 
by  the  Egyptian  people  as  no  threat  to  them  and  as  no  encroachment  on  their 
sovereignty.  '-'- 
Because  of  these  differences  of  opinion  concerning  the  settlement  issue,  Dayan 
proposed  that  the  issue  be  postponed  until  resolution  of  all  the  problems 
between  Egypt  and  Israel.  67 
By  September  16,  the  only  remaining  obstacle  to  a  Sinai  agreement  seemed  to  be 
the  settlements.  There  was  a  conflict  among  the  Israeli  delegation:  "Begin 
wanted  no  commitment  to  withdrawal;  Dayan  was  willing  to  promise  withdrawal 
after  an  extended  period  of  time  (20  years);  and  Weizman  believed  that  the 
settlers  should  leave  if  the  Knesset  would  agree.  1'r-13 
The  last  view  was  the  basis  of  the  f  inal  position  taken  by  Israel  in  which  it 
agreed  to  remove  all  its  settlements  provided  that  such  evacuation  was  to  be 
approved  by  the  Israeli  Knesset.  This  position  was  accepted  by  Egypt. 196 
Thus,  on  September  17,  Begin  wrote  a  letter  to  Carter  confirming  that  within 
two  weeks  after  his  return  to  Israel,  he  would  submit  a  motion  before  Israel's 
Knesset  to  decide  on  the  following  question: 
If  during  the  nedgotiations  to  conclude  a  peace  treaty  between  Israel  and 
Egypt  all  outstanding  issues  are  agreed  upon,  are  you  in  favour  of  the  removal 
of  the  Israeli  settlers  from  the  northern  and  southern  Sinai  areas  or  are  you 
in  favour  of  keeping  the  aforementioned  settlers  in  those  areas 
In  the  meantime,  Sadat  wrote  a  letter  to  Carter  in  which  he  reaffirmed  Egypt's 
position  with  respect  to  the  settlements: 
11  LAU  Israeli  settlers  must  be  withdrawn  from  Sinai  according  to  a 
timetable  within  the  period  specified  for  the  implementation  of  the  peace 
treaty. 
2.  Agreement  by  the  Israeli  Government  and  its  constitutional  institutions  to 
this  basic  principle  is  therefore  a  prerequsite  to  starting  negotiations  for 
concluding  a  peace  treaty. 
3.  If  Israel  fails  to  meet  this  commitment,  the  "Framework"  shall  be  void  and 
invalid  . 
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By  the  end  of  September  1979,  the  Israeli  Knesset  adopted  a  resolution  in 
which  it  authorized  the  government  to  evacuate  the  settlements  in  Sinai  in  the 
following  terms: 
"....  If  in  the  negotiations  between  Egypt  and  Israel  towards  the  signing  of  a 
peace  treaty,  agreement  ia  reached  ...  and  finds  expression  in  a  written  documentl 
the  Knesset  authorizes  the  Government  ...  to  evacuate  the  Israeli  settlers  from 
Sinai  and  resettle  them  anew.  1971 197 
In  the  course  of  the  subsequent  negotiations  which  followed  the  conclusion  of 
the  Camp  David  Agreements,  Israeli  settlements  in  Sinai  did  not  constitute  any 
obstacle.  The  parties  agreed  on  a  formula  essentinally  taken  from  the  second 
American  proposal. 
An  Analysis  of  the  1979  Treaty's  PravlRinns: 
In  spite  the  fact  that  the  settlement  issue  was,  and  is  stillj  one  of  the 
important  and  complicated  issues  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflicto  the  text  of  the 
Treaty  contains  no  sep-Vate  provision  to  deal  with  it.  Instead,  it  seems  that 
the  authors  of  the  Treaty  favoured  a  formula  in  which  the  settlement  issue 
would  be  incorporated  in  or/and  linked  to  the  provisions  dealing  with  the 
withdrawal  of  the  military  forces.  For  example,  Articlel(2)  of  the  Treaty 
speaks  of  withdrawal  of  all  the  Israeli  "armed  forces  and  civilians  from  Sinai.  " 
Again,  Article  1(D  of  Annex  1,  which  deals  with  the  period  during  which  Israel 
will  complete  its  withdrawal,  uses  the  expression  11  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed 
forces  and  civilians.  "  Along  the  same  lines,  Art.  1(1)  of  Appendix  to  Annex  1, 
which  deals  with  the  phases  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal,  uses  the  same 
expression  .  72 
Language  of  this  kind  is  somewhat  disturbing  since  it  gives  rise  to  the 
question  of  what  was  the  intention  of  the  framers  behind  the  linkage  between 
the  withdrawal  of  the  forces  and  settlers.  Taking  into  account  the  fact  that 
every  word  and  expression  of  the  Treaty  is  carefully  weighed  and  chOsent"  we 
proceed  to  examine  the  possible  answers  of  that  question. 
0a  one  hand,  one  may  argue  that  such  linkage  was  intended  to  express  the 
frameres'  view  that  the  evacuation  of  the  settlers  was  conditional  on  the 198 
withdrawal  of  the  military  f  arces.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  argued  that 
the  evacuation  of  the  settlers  was  not  conditional  on  the  military  withdrawal, 
but  both  of  them,  however,  are  subject  to  certain  principles  included  in  the 
withdrawal  clause,  viz.  the  extent,  the  period,  and  the  phases,  of  the 
withdrawal. 
The  argument  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  settlers  is  conditional  an  the  military 
withdrawal  has  some  support. 
Whenever  the  Treaty  referred  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  forces  and  settlers,  the 
term  "armed  forces"  was  physically  placed  before  the  word  "civilian".  This 
could  mean  that  the  military  withdrawal  must  precede  the  evacuation  of  the 
settlers. 
It  may  be  also  argued  that,  during  the  preparatory  work,  Israel  made  it  clear 
that  its  military  occupation,  for  security  reasons,  must  be  accompanied  by  the 
establishment  of  civilian  settlements.  Based  on  the  (incorrect)  assumption  that 
Israeli  settlement  policy  in  the  occupied  territory  was  not  illegal  under 
international  law,  it  can  be  argued  that  such  a  linkage  is  legally  permissible. 
If  this  interpretation  is  correct,  it  would  mean  that  the  Treaty  is  in  line 
with  Israel's  view  that  where  it  has  military  presence,  it  is  entitled  to 
establish  and  to  keep  civilian  settlements  .  74  Yet,  this  interpretation,  far  from 
being  legally  permitted,  could  undermine  the  Treaty  in  two  other  aspects.  it 
may  reflect  a  deviation  from  the  rules  of  international  law,  that  is  to  say, 
there  is  a  clear  distinction  under  international  law  between  "the  right  to 
remain  in  occupation  of  a  territory"  and  the  right  "to  establish  settlements  in 
such  a  territory.  "  While  the  former  may  be  legal  under  certain  circumstances,  " 
the  latter  is  absolutely  illegal  under  any  circumstances.  Nevertheless,  the 199 
1979  Peace  Treaty  seems  to  adopt  a  different  position,  since  the  notion  of  the 
withdrawal  of  the  illegal  Israeli  settlers,  under  its  provision,  has  become 
deliberately  blurred  with  the  end  of  the  military  occupation  (  which  might  be 
legal  and  subject  to  conditions  for  Its  withdrawal). 
The  linkage  between  the  withdrawal  of  the  forces  and  the  settlers  constituted,  ' 
a  legal  precedent  which,  if  applied  in  the  future,  could  lead  to  absurd 
consequences  in  relation  to  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza.  Taking  into  account  the 
fact  that  under  the  Preamble  of  both  the  Camp  David  Accords  and  the  Treaty, 
Israel  could  argue  that  this  legal  precedent  is  intended  to  constitute  a 
principle  applicable  to  the  would-be  settlement  between  her  and  the  Arabs 
concerning  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  If  a  similar  linkage  was  accepted,  then 
Israel,  whose  intention  is  to  have  a  permanent  military  presence  in  certain 
areas  there,  would  be  able  to  maintain  its  settlements  in  these  area.  It  may 
be  well  to  recall  here  that  Israel's  practice  after  the  Peace  Treaty  reveals  its 
intention  to  maintain  military  presence  as  well  as  settlements  in  certain  areas 
in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  76  Of  course,  this  is  inconsistent  with  the 
international  norms  prohibiting  such  settledments. 
Turning  to  the  second  possible  interpretation  i.  e.,  the  evacuation  of  the 
settlers  under  the  Treaty  is  not  conditional.  In  support  of  this  view,  it  could 
be  argued  that  a  careful  reading  of  the  relevant  provision  would  reveal  that 
there  is  no  linkage  between  the  two  kinds  of  withdrawal;  rather  it  employed  the 
expression  "withdrawal  of  military  forces  and  civilians"  only  when  dealing  with 
the  extent,  the  period  and  the  phases  of  the  withdrawal.  Such  partial  linkage 
could  not  be  interpreted  to  mean  that  the  evacuation  of  the  settlers  is  subject 
to  the  military  withdrawal.  Moreover,  recourse  to  the  preparatory  work  and  the 200 
circumstances  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  would  suggest  that  the  evacuation 
of  the  settlements  is  unconditional.  For  example,  Sadat,  in  Camp  David,  not 
only  rejected  any  conditions  with  regard  to  such  evacuation,  but  also  Made  it 
clear  in  his  letter  dated  September  17,1978,  that  the  evacuation  of  the  settler 
is  a  basic  principle  and  a  prerequisite  to  starting  peace  negotiations  .  77  Also 
in  the  Camp  David  negotiations,  the  Americans  expressed  the  view  that  the 
Israeli  settlements  were  not  only  illegal  but  also  constituted  af  arm  of 
colonalism  and  therefore  had  to  be  dismantled  or  removed.  79  In  addition,  an 
examination  of  the  decision  of  the  Israeli  Knesset,  referred  to  earlier,  which 
authorized  the  Israeli  Government  to  dismantle  the  settlements  in  Sinai,  would 
reveal  that  it  contained  no  conditions.  Finally,  a  conditional  withdrawal  of 
the  settlers  was  inconsistent  with  the  rules  of  international  law.  It  is  well 
established  that  whatever  the  correct  construction  of  a  treaty,  it  cannot  be 
interpreted  as  violating  international  law. 
Thus,  despite  the  language  used,  which  strongly  links  the  evacuation  of  the 
settlers  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  forces,  we  cannot  interpret,  such  linkage  to 
mean  that  the  former  is  conditional  on  the  latter. 
The  word  "civilians",  included  in  the  first  sentence  of  Articlel  (2)  and 
repeated  again  in  other  partS79,  was  used  as  a  reference  to  the  "settlers".  To 
understand  this  word,  we  may  refer  to  other  similar  words  that  might  have  been 
used.  In  this  connection,  the  authors  had  to  choose  between  three  possible 
words.  The  first  is  the  word  "personnel"  which  was  used  by  the  second  American 
draft  in  the  course  of  the  preparatory  work  of  the  Article  an  the  settlements. 
It  is  necessary  to  construe  the  word  "personnel",  as  used  in  the  relevant 
paragraph  In  the  U.  S.  draft,  as  referring  both  to  Israeli  military  forces  and  to 201 
the  settlers.  Perhaps  the  Egyptians  regarded  this  word  as  somewhat  vague  and 
therefore  they  prefered  clearer  language  an  this  important  issue. 
The  second  possible  word  is  "settlers".  The  relevant  provision  of  the 
Egyptian  draft  which  was  quoted  earlier  refers  directly  to  the  "removal  of  the 
Israeli  settlements".  Of  course,  any  language  referring  directly  to  the 
settlements  or  the  settlers  was  rejected  by  Israel  for  reasons  mentioned  above. 
The  third  word  is  "civilians".  Probably  this  word  is  derived  from  the  language 
of,  and  referred  to  Article  49  of  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention  of  1949,  in 
particular  paragraph  6  of  that  Article  which  reads  as  follows: 
"The  Occupying  Power  shall  not  deport  or  transfer  parts  of  its  own  civilian 
population  into  the  territory  it  occupies.  1191, 
Taking  into  account  the  wide  ly-recogn  ized  view  that  the  Israeli  settlements  were 
explicitly  prohibited  by  Article  49  which  reflected  customary  international 
law8l,  it  follows  that  such  reference  could  mean  that  the  evacuation  of  the 
settlers  was  based  on  the  rules  of  international  law  rather  a  bilateral 
agreement. 
From  the  Egyptian  perspective,  the  word  "civilians"  is  accepted  since  it  could 
be  taken  as  referring  to  the  illegality  of  Israeli  settlements  in  Sinai  and 
referred  to  Israel's  obligation  under  the  law  of  military  occupation. 
As  to  the  Israelis,  the  word  "civilians"  was  accepted  because  it  could  be  used 
instead  of  the  word  "settlers"  which  they  were  anxious  to  avoid,  and  because  it 
could  not  be  interpreted  as  referring  to  the  settlers  of  the  other  occupied 
territories. 
Thus,  for  these  reasons,  the  word  "civilians"  was  chosen  by  the  drafters* 202 
The  last  part  of  paragraph  2  provides  that  "Egypt  will  resume  the  exercise  of, 
its  full  sovereignty  over  the  Sinai".  The  legal  meaning  of  this  expression  in 
respect  of  the  withdrawal  issue  has  been  discussed  in  section  one  of  this 
chapter.  It  remains  now  to  consider  its  meaning  with  regard  to  the  withdrawal 
issue. 
We  have  oroved  earlier  that  the  word  "resume"  was  used  to  reaf  f  irn  Israel's 
recognition  of  Egypt's  long-established  title  over  Sinai.  This  could  mean  that 
the  authors  of  the  Treaty  denounced  the  previous  Israeli  argument  for  the 
legality  of  its  settlements  in  Sinai  which  was  based  an  the  premise  that  the 
law  of  military  occupation  did  not  apply  to  Sinai  as  it  does  not  belong  to 
Egypt  or  any  sovereign.  82 
The  expression  "exercise  its  full  sovereignty"  was  a  clear  reference  to  the 
principle  of  respect  for  sovereignty  and  territorial  Integrity  of  states.  The 
value  and  the  legal  meaning  of  that  principle  were  pointed  out  earlier.  Suffice 
it  to  say  here  that  the  purpose  of  such  reference  in  respect  of  the  settlements 
is  twofold: 
(1)  To  ensure  the  total  evacuation  of  the  Israeli  settlers  f  ram  Sinai.  No  one 
can  deny  that  the  mere  presence  of  the  settlers  in  Sinai  was  inconsistent  with 
the  meaning  attributed  to  that  principle  under  international  law; 
(2)  To  confirm  that  Israel's  evacuation  of  its  settlers  in  Sinai  was  based  on, 
and  in  accordance  with,  that  principle  rather  any  international  principle  , 
particularly  the  principle  of  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by 
force.  In  the  course  of  the  preparatory  work  of  that  Article,  the  Israeli 
negotiators  avoided  the  inclusion  of  language  that  could  be  interpreted  as 
commiting  Israel  to  evacuate  its  settlements  in  the  other  Arab  occupied 203 
territories.  Thus,  by  reference  to  this  principle,  no  similar  evacuation  can  be 
envisaged  in  Gaza  and  the  Vest  Bank  for  the  simple  reason  that,  so  far  as 
sovereignty  is  concerned,  no  state  has  a  valid  title  over  Gaza  and  the  West 
Bank  .  93 
Surely  the  settlers'  withdrawal  was  part  of  the  deal  under  the  1979  Treaty. 
Yet,  the  above  analysis  of  the  meaning  both  of  the  word  "civilians"  and  the 
expression  "exercise  of  its  full  sovereignty"  suggests  that  the  legal  bases  of 
Israel's  obligation  to  withdraw  its  settlers  from  Sinai  are  the  relevant  rules 
of  international  law  which  we  have  indicated  above,  rather  than  any  bilateral 
agreement. 
However,  the  question  which  may  be  raised  In  this  respect  is  whether  or  not 
Resolution  242  constituted  a  judical  basis  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  settlers 
from  Sinai.  The  answer  of  this  question  is  of  special  importance  as  it  would 
help  in  ascertaining  the  scope  of  the  settlement  clause. 
The  correct  answer  to  that  question  seems  to  be  in  the  negative.  In  fact  one 
finds  it  somewhat  difficult  to  assume  that  Resolution  242  constituted  a  legal 
basis  for  the  evacuation  for  the  Israeli  settlers  in  Sinai.  The  Resolution 
contained  no  explicit  or  implicit  mention  of  the  settlement  issue.  We  have 
rejected  earlier  the  view  that  it  implies  a  prohibition  of  such  settlements.  " 
In  the  course  of  the  preparatory  work,  any  proposed  term  or  expression  taken 
from  or  referred  to  the  Resolution  was  deliberately  omitted.  Consequently,  the 
provision  on  the  settlements  contains  any  reference  to  the  Resolution. 
In  relation  to  the  period  during  which  the  evacuation  of  the  settlements  is  to 
be  completed,  Article  1  (1)  of  Annex  1  provides: 204 
"Israel  will  complete  withdrawal  of  all  its  armed  forces  and  civilians  from  the 
Sinai  not  later  than  three  years  from  the  date  of  exchange  of  instruments  of 
ratification  of  this  Treaty.  "" 
More  details  on  the  period  and  the  timing  of  the  evacuation  of  the  settlers 
were  set  out  in  Article  1  (1)  of  Appendix  to  Annex  one  which  reads  in  part  as 
f  ollows: 
11  The  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces  and  civilians  from  the  Sinai  will  be 
accomplished  in  two  phases  as  described  in  Article  1  of  Annex  1.  The 
description  and  timing  of  the  withdrawal  are  included  in  this  Appendix.  "96 
A  study  of  the  provisions  dealing  with  the  settlement  issue  reveals  that  it 
covers  certain  important  aspects  of  the  problem  while  leaving  aside  other 
important  issues.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Treaty  provides  f  or  a  set  of  rules 
governing  the  most  significant  aspects  of  the  settlement  issue,  e.  g.,  the  total 
evacuation  of  the  settlers,  the  timing  and  the  period  during  which  such 
evacuation  is  to  be  completed,  the  judical  bases  and  the  final  line  of  the 
settlers  'withdrawal.  On  the  other  hand,  certain  issues  have  been  deliberately 
excluded  from  the  scope  of  the  provision.  In  the  first  place,  the  question  Of 
the  settlements  in  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank  and  the  Golan  Heights  was  excluded 
from  its  scope.  Thus,  its  geographical  scope  is  limited  only  to  Sinai. 
Moreover,  the  provision'  deliberately  does  not  seek  to  regulate  issues  relating 
to  compensation  for  the  damage  resulting  from  the  operations  against  the 
civilian  population  during  the  establishment  of  the  settlements  in  Sinai.  As  an 
example,  hundreds  of  Egyptian  farmers  in  Sinai  were  dismissed  from  their  lands 
and  homes  when  Israel  was  building  the  city  of  Yamit67  in  North  Sinai,  At  this 205 
point,  it  is  worth  while  to  refer  that  paragraph  eighth  of  Article  2  of  the 
Egyptian  draft  at  Camp  David  provides  the  following: 
11  Israel  undertakes  to  pay  full  and  prompt  compensation  for  the  damage  which 
resulted  from  the  operations  of  its  armed  forces  against  the  civilian  population 
and  installations  ...  11919 
Egypt's  demand  for  compensation  was  based  upon  Article  52  of  the  Hague 
Regulationsl  which  provides  thato  where  property  is  requisitioned*  payment  is  to 
be  made  at  once  or,  if  not  possible,  as  soon  as  the  occupier  is  so  able,,  "'- 
contributions  in  kind  shall  be  given  and  the  payment  of  the  amount  due  shall  be 
made  as  soon  as  possible.  9c, 
However,  the  Egyptian  draft  was  rejected  and--'the  rights  of  the  Egyptian 
civilians  were  illeizally,  overlooked, 
Before  leaving  this  section,  a  final  important  question  must  be  addressedo 
namely,  whether  and  in  what  circumstances  the  settlement  clause  under  the  Peace 
Treaty  is  applicable  to  the  settlements  in  the  other  Arab  occupied  territories  ? 
Before  answering  this  question,  some  relevant  and  important  considerations 
should  be  taken  into  account.  These  are: 
(1)  It  is  clear  that  the  settlement  clause  as  included  in  Articlel  (2)  contains 
no  explicit  or  implicit  mention  of  the  settlements  in  other  Arab  occupied 
territories.  One  must  admit  that  it  would  seem  difficult  to  find  in  that 
Article  a  satisfactory  basis  for  the  evacuation  of  the  settlements  in  the  other 
occupied  territories; 
(2)  However,  we  have,  proved  in  the  previous  section  on  the  military  withdrawal 
that,  under  the  preamble  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  any  Arab  party  which  Joins  the 206 
peace  process  will  be  legally  entitled  under  -j%r+nln  conditions  to  benefit  from 
the  principles  applied  in  settling  the  -dyptian-  Israeli  conflict. 
(3)  The  language  and  the  wording  of  the  provisions  an  the  settlements  give 
rise  to  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the  evacuation  of  the  settlers  is 
conditional  on  the  military  withdrawal.  We  have  indicated  earlier  that  such 
question  has  two  possible  answers,  one  in  the  affirmative  and  the  other  is  in 
the  negative. 
Thus,  one  possible  way  to  answer  the  question  of  the  applicability  of  the 
settlement  provisions  to  the  settlements  in  the  other  Arab  territories  is  to 
assume,  for  the  purposes  of  the  argument,  that  the  evacuation  of  the  settlers  is 
conditional  an  the  military  withdrawal  under-the  Ireaty.  It  follows  that  Arab 
states  which  Join  the  peace  process  will  be  entitled  to  benefit  from  the 
settlement  clause  and  consequently  demand  the  dismantling  of  the  settlements  in 
their  territory.  Yet,  an'  the  other  hand,  any  Arab  states  have  to  accept  that 
such  dismantling  should  be  part  of  and  conditional  an  the  military  withdrawal 
and  the  conditions  stipulated  in  return  of  that  withdrawal. 
In  practice,  this  interpretation  would  enable  Israel,  for  example,  to  maintain 
its  settlements  in  the  Golan  Heights  in  Syria  until  the  implementation  of  an 
agreement  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  forces.  Further,  Israel,  which  intends  to 
keep  a  permanent  military  presence  in  certain  strategic  areas  in  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza,  would  also  be  entitled  to  keep  its  settlements  in  these  occupied  areas 
for  indefinite  period.  . Of  course.  this  answer  is  inconsistent  with  the  rules  Of 
international  law  and  the  relevant  U.  N.  resolutions  calling  for  unconditional 
dismantling  of  the  settlements  in  the  occupied  territories. 2-o 
This  answer,  howevero  seems  to  affect  the  rights  of  third  states  and 
therefore  cannot  be  accepted.  In  the  words  of  Judge  Huber  in  the  Tefland  of 
NlinA-;  arbitration,  11  ...  whatever  may  be  the  right  construction  of  a  treaty,  it 
cannot  be  interpreted  as  disposing  of  the  rights  of  independent  third 
Powers.  1191 
The  correct  answer  of  the  question  under  consideration,  in  our  view,  is  that 
Israel  is  obliged  to  evacuate  its  settlements  in  the  Arab  occupied  territories 
because  such  an  obligation  stems  from  the  rules  of  international  law  and  the 
relevant  resolutions  of  the  U.  N.  A  careful  reading  of  the  Treaty's  position  in 
this  respect  would  lead  to  the  same  conclusion.  On  one  hand,  the  evacuation  of 
the  settlers  under  the  Treaty,  as  we,  Droved  'earlier,  was  not  conditional.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  language  on  th6  -eLetitlements  made  it  clear  that  such_ 
evacuation  was  based  on  Israel's  obligation  under  international  law  rather  - 
bilateral  agreement.  This  was  indicated  earlier  in  some  detail. 
Thus,  Israel's  evacuation  of  its  settlements  in  Sinai  should  be  looked  upon  as 
a  legal  precedent  applicable  without  prior  conditions  to  all  the  settlements  in 
the  Arab  occupied  territories. 208 
The  problem  of  the  legal  status  of  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  and  the  Straits  of 
Tiran  is  goverened  by  Article  V,  Paragraph  2  of  the  1979  Treaty  which 
declares  the  following: 
"the  parties  consider  the  straits  of  Tiran  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  to  be 
international  waterways  open  to  all  nations  for  unimpeded  and  non- 
suspendable  freedom  of  navigation  and  airflight"92 
There  is  no  doubt  that  this  Article  embarks  on  the  establishment, 
through  a  bilateral  treaty,  of  a  new  regime  to  govern  international 
navigation  iý-the  Gulf  including  Israeli  navgation  in  the  Gulf.  To  fully/ 
understand  Article  V(2),  it  is  necessary  to  place  it  within  the  context 
of  the  1979  Treaty  as  a  whole.  With  the  assistance  of  a  brief  inquiry 
into  the  legislative  history  of  the  law  applicable  to  the  Gulf  and  state 
practice  with  regard  to  the  passage  through  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  and  the 
straits  since  1949,  an  examination  and  evaluation  of  the  new  regime  will 
be  offered. 
In  order  to  understand  the  legal  aspects  of  the  problem  under 
consideration,  some  geographical  facts  about  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  must  be 
mentioned  at  the  outset. 
According  to  the 
! 
Secretariat  Study  of  Bays  and  Estuaries,  the  Coasts  of 
which  belong  to  different  Statesl  "The  Gulf  of  Aqaba  is  a  long  narrow 
gulf  on  the  the  eastern  side  of  the  Sinai  Peninsula.  The  western  share 
is  Egyptian,  the  eastern  shore  is  Saudi  Arabian  and  the  head  of  the  Gulf 
is  Israeli  and  Jordanian  territory.  The  islands  of  Tiran  and  Sanafir 
front  the  entrance"93 209 
The  Red  Sea  at  its  northern  extremity,  the  western  arm  is  the  Gulf  of 
Suez  which  leads  into  the  Suez  Canal.  The  Gulf  is  somewhat  over  one 
hundred  miles  in  length,  and  varies  in  width  between  three  miles  in  the 
narrow  bay  at  its  northen  end  to  seventeen  miles  at  its  width  point. 
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Map  8  THe  Gulf  of  Aqaba  and  the  Straits  of  Tiran 
The  islands  of  Tiran  and  Sanafir  have  been  under  Egyptian  occupatioa 
since  1950.  Saudi  Arabia,  howeverg  claimed  the  two  islands.  The 
entrance  of  the  Gulf  is  through  the  Sraits  of  Tiran.  There  are  two 
passages  in  the  Sraits;  Enterprise  passage  and  Graf  ton  passage.  The  " 
formert  which  lies  close  to  the  Sinai  Peninsula,  ig  the  principad' 
channel  into  the  Gulf  and  the  only  channel  which  can  be  navigated  safely 
by  vessels  of  substantial  S12e.  Grafton  passage,  separated  from 
Enterprise  passage  by  a  series  of  reefs,  lies  close  to  Tiran  islands. 210 
This  entrance  appears  seldom  to  be  used  as  the  reef  s  there 
f)n 
render 
navigation  difficult.  94 
For  legal  purposes  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  and  the  straits  of  Tiran  are 
considered  to  be  an  inland  sea  which  are  connected  with  the  high  seas 
by  means  of  a  strait  and  consequently  they  are  subject  to  the  regime  of 
inland  sea  in  international  law.  96 
Under  customary  international  law,  a  distinction  was  made  between 
straits  connecting  two  parts  of  the  high  seas,  and  those  connecting 
parts  of  the  high  seas  with  an  inland  sea.  While  the  former*were  subject 
to  the  right  of  innocent  passage,  the  legal  status  of  the  latter  had 
never  been  definitively  determined.  9G 
It  may  be  observed,  in  this  regard  that,  the  second  Sub-Committee  of 
the  Hague  Codification  Conference  did  not  formulate  rules  for  inland 
seas  surrounded  by  more  than  one  state.  97  Thus  the  legal  status  of  the 
Gulf  of  Aqaba  under  international  law  remained  uncertain. 
A  review  of  the  work  of  the  International  Law  Commission  reveals  that 
its  draft  article  did  not  contain  any  rules  with  respect  to  bays 
surrounded  by  more  than  one  coastal  state.  The  reason  given  for  not 
formulating  rules  applicable  to  such  bays  was  the  Commission's  lack  of 
"sufficient  data  at  its  disposal  concerning  the  number  of  cases 
involved".  96 
Further,  the  Special  Report  of  the  ILC,  in  1956,  expressed  the  view 
that  the  situation  of  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  is  "exceptional-possibly 
unique"". 
Nevertheless,  under  Article  16(4)  of  the  1958  Territorial  Sea 
Convention,  the  legal  regime  applicable  to  "straits  connecting  two  parts 211 
of  the  high  seas"  was  expanded  so  as  to  include  straits  at  the  entrance 
of  Inland  seas  surrounded  by  more  than  one  state. 
11  There  shall  be  no  suspension  of  the  innocent  passage  of  foreign  ships 
through  the  straits  which  are  used  for  international  navigation  between 
one  part  of  the  high  seas  and  another  part  of  the  high  seas  or  the 
territorial  seas  of  a  foreign  state"100 
This  means  that  passage  through  the  Gulf  was  subject  to  a  regime  of 
non-suspedable  innocent  passage.  However,  it  has  been  rightly  observed 
that  the  Convention  merely  regulates  access  to  the  strait  at  the 
entrance  of  the  Gulf,  while  remaining  completely  silent  as  to  the  Gulf 
itself.  101 
In  any  event  this  rule,  included  in  Article  16(4),  was  regarded  by  Arab 
states  as  not  part  of  customary  international  law  and  only  binding  on 
ratification.  102 
In  the  UK  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  of  19820  Article  45(l) 
provided  that  the  regime  of  innocent  passage  shall  apply  to  straits 
connect4,  &.  betweenhigh  seas  and.  territorial  seas.  This  Article  was 
regarded  as  applicable  to  the  straits  of  Tiran.  103  Again,  it  may  be 
observed  that  the  regime  applicable  to  the  wate  of  the  Gulf  itself  has 
remained  uncertain  under  the  Convention. 
Having  outlined  the  legal  status  of  the  Gulf  under  customary 
international  law  and  multilateral  treaties,  and  the  uncertainty 
surrounding  it,  we  now  turn  to  consider  state  practice  regarding  the 
problem  of  the  passage  through  the  Aqaba  Gulf. 
State  practice,  in  the  period  between  1948  and  19790  reveals  that 
states,  by  reasons  partly  of  their  attitude  towards  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict,  and  partly  of  the  fact  that  International  rules  governing  the 212 
status  of  the  Gulf  are  uncertain,  adopted  different  attitudes  towards 
the  problem.  However,  in  this  connection  three  main  attitudes  can  be 
traced: 
In  the  first  place  the  attitude  adopted  by  the  Western  states  and 
Israel  provides  that  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba,  by  reasons  partly  of  its  breadth 
U'b  &I/.  N 
and  partly  of  the  f  act  that  its  shores  border  ýa  If  our  dif  f  erent  states, 
constitutes  international  waters.  It  follows  that  freedom  of  navigation 
should  be  ensured  in  it.  In  other  words,  according  to  them,  the  Gulf  and 
the  straits  must  be  open  f  or  non-suspendable  freedom  of  navigation 
similar  to  navigation  in  the  high  seas.  104  There  is  no  better 
quotation  in  support  of  this  view  than  what  has  been  stated  by  the 
representative  of  the  Netherlandýat  the  General  Assembly: 
"Firstoinasnuch  as  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  is  bordered  by  four  different 
States  and  has  a  width  in  excess  of  the  three  miles  of  territorial 
waters  of  the  four  littoral  States  on  either  side,  it  is,  under  the 
rules  of  international  law,  to  be  regarded  as  part  of  the  open  sea. 
Secondly,.  the  Straits  of  Tiran  consequently  are,  in  the  legal  senseg 
straits  connecting  two  open  seas,  normally  used  for  international 
navigation.  Thirdly,  in  regard  to  such  straits,  there  is  a  right  of 
free  passage  even  if  the  straits  are  so  narrow  that  they  fall  entirely 
within  the  territorial  waters  of  one  or  more  states.  This  rule  was 
acknowledged  by  the  International  Court  of  Justice  in  the  case  of  the 
Corfu  Channel  (Judgrment  of  December  15,1949;  I.  C.  J.  Reparts  1949#p.  244) 
and  also  by  the  International  Law  Commission  in  its  report  f  or  1956 
(A/3159).  Fourthly,  if  a  strait  falls  entirely  within  the  territorial 
waters  of  one  or  more  of  the  littoral  States,  there  is  still  a  right  of 
innocent  passage,  but  then  the  littoral  States  have  the  rights  if 213 
necessary,  to  verify  the  innocent  character  of  the  passage.  Fif  thly, 
this  right  of  verification,  however,  does  not  exist  in  those  cases  where 
the  strait  connects  two  parts  of  the  open  sea.  It  must,  therefore,  be 
concluded  that  all  States  have  the  right  of  free  and  unhampered  passage 
for  their  vessels  through  the  Straits  of  Tiran".  106 
This  attitude  was  declared  by  Israel  'several  occasions.  "16  It  was 
also  supported  by  many  Vestern  states  (e.  g.,  the  US,  France  and  Italy) 
during  the  debate  an  the  problem  in  the  UK  General  Assembly  in  March 
1957.107 
Some  states  held  the  view  that  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  and  the  straits  must 
be  subject  to  the  regime  of  territorial  seas.  Foreign  ships,  theref  are, 
have  the  right  of  innocent  passage  in  its  waters.  In  his  report  to  the 
General  Assembly  in  19571  Secretary  General  Dag  Hammarskjold  took  the 
position  that  there  'was  a  right  of  innocent  passage  but  the  extent  of 
that  right  was  subject  to  legal  controversy.  109  This  view  was  adopted  by 
Egypt  on  certain  occasions:  in  1950,  following-its  occupation  of  the 
two  Saudi  Arabian  islands  at  the  entrance  of  the  Aqaba  Gulft  Egypt 
informed  the  US  that  it  would  guarantee  the  freedom  of  innocent  passage 
in  the  Gulf.  According  to  the  Aide  Memoire  sent  by  the  Egyptian 
Government  to  the  American  Embassy: 
"..  This  occupation  is  not  conceieved  in  a  spirit  to  hinder  in  whatever 
way  it  may  be  the  innocent  passage  across  the  maritime  space  separating 
these  two  islands  from  the  Egyptian  coast  of  Sinai.  It  goes  without 
saying  that  this  passage,  the  only  practicable,  will  remain  free  as  in 
the  past  being  in  comformity  with  the  international  practice  and  the 
recognized  principle  of  international  law.  0109 214 
Moreover,  Egypt  declared  in  the  1950  that  its  restriction  and 
procedures  against  Israel  in  the  Gulf  were  based  an  the  existence  of  war 
between  them.  I1  10 
Further,  the  internal  regulation  of  the  littoral  states  of  the  Gulf 
asserted  that  its  waters  are  territorial  seas.  We  may  refer  in  this 
respect  to  Article  5  of  The  Territorial  Waters  Decree  in  Saudi  Arabia 
and  Egypt  which  extended  the  territorial  sea  "for  a  distance  of  six 
nautical  miles.  ""'  Likewise  Israel's  Territorial  Water  Decree  of  1955 
has  a  similar  provision.  112 
In  19570  several  states  declared  in  the  UK  that  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba 
should  be  governed  by  the  rules  of  innocent  passage  though  there  was 
disagreement  on  the  question  of  what  constitutes  innocent  passage.  The 
Indian  Representative  stated  for  example  that: 
"this  right  of  innocent  passage,  so-called,  actually  means  that#  first 
of  all,  one  must  prove  innocence.  Innocence  depends  upon  the  character 
of  the  party  claiming  the  passage;  it  depends  upon  the  purpose  of  the 
passage,  and  also  upon  the  freight  that  is  carried.  "113 
The  delegate  of  Italy  challk6-hged  India's  opinion  and  stated  that: 
"This  interpretation  would  nullify  the  rule  of  innocent  passage,  since 
it  is  obvious  that,  if  it  were  valid,  the  littoral  States  would  no 
longer  have  the  duty  of  justifying  their  refusal  of  passage  to  a  vessel 
an  specific  occasions  and  for  specific  reasons;  rather,  it  would  rest 
with  the  vessel  to  prove  that  its  passage  was  innocent.  11114 
The  third  attitude  held  that  waters  of  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  posseses  the 
character  of  historic  waters.  In  a  Xemorandum  to  the  UK  registering 
the  position  of  Saudi  Arabia  on  the  problem  of  the  Straits  of  Tiran  and 
the  Gulf  of  Aqaba,  it  was  argued  that  the  Gulf  was  an  Arab  marp-CIAUMM 215 
for  over  thirteen  centuriest  and  that  Israel's  footholds  on  the  Aqaba 
Gulf  were  illegal.  As  a  result,  the  waters  of  the  Gulf  ,  under  the 
doctrine  of  historic  bays  should  be  treated  as  internal  waters.  116  This 
means  that  the  coastal  state  is  not  bound  to  admit  the  innocent  passage 
of  foreign  vessels  In  the  waters. 
The  legal  basis  of  this  view,  which  was  held  for  some  time,  by 
Egypt,  1  1-3  as  well  as  other  states,  is  based  on  the  following 
considerations. 
First,  Israel's  foothold  on  the  Aqaba  Gulf,  apart  from  its  illegal 
origin,  was  based  on  the  Armistice  Agreements  which  by  their  character 
and  express  provision  vest  no  sovereignty  whatsoever  and  leave  the 
territory,  including  the  Aqaba  Gulf,  subject  to  rights,  claims,  and 
reservations.  The  armistice  lines  were  purely  dictated  by  military 
considerations  and  have  no  political  significance.  117 
Secondly,  the  Gulf  has  been  an  exclusive  Arab  route  under  Arab 
sovereignty  since  the  establishment  of  the  Arab  Empire  in  700  A.  D.  Its 
regular  use  as  a  sea  route  to  Moslem  holy  places  ever  since  that  time 
cannot  be  denied.  110 
Thirdly,  in  the  Case  of  the  Gulf  nf  Fnnc%pcn,  the  Central  American  Court 
of  Justice,  in  its  decision  of  Xarch  1917,  found  that  the  origin  of  the 
status  of  the  jGulf  as  a  historic  water  dates  back  to  1522  when  it  was 
discovered.  119  The  Gulf  of  Aqaba  and  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca  are 
characterized  by  the  fact  that  some  of  the  coastal  states  are  not 
situated  in  their  entrance,  and  the  two  waters  areas  are  approximately 
of  similar  size  and  restricted  configuration.  120 
Fourthly,  a  careful  reading  of  some  international 
ponventions 
concluded 
before  1948  would  support  the  above  view  .  For  example  the  drafters  of 216 
the  1888  Constantinople  Convention  left  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  outside  the 
scope  of  the  passage  defined  for  the  Suez  Canal,  because  they  regarded 
the  Gulf  as  a  locked  Arab  water  without  any  international  character.  12, 
Another  example  is  the  omission  of  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  in  the 
international  Sanitary  Convention  of  1912;  122 
Fifthly,  Shukairy,  asserted  that  "not  a  single  international  authority 
makes  any  mention  of  the  Gulf  as  an  international  waterway"  123  For 
example,  the  AmPrIcan  Journal  of  infi-rnAtinnni  111w,  in  April  1929, 
described  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  as  internal  waters.  124 
To  sum  up,  we  may  conclude  that  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  legal 
status  of  the  Gulf  had  been  confirmed  by  state  practice.  However,  in  this 
respect,  this  writer  agrees  with  the  view  expressed  by  Secretary  of 
State  Dulles  that: 
"..  the  straits  of  Tiran  are  territorial  because  they  are  less  than  six 
miles  wide...  But  it  is  also  a  principle  of  international  law  that  even 
though  waters  are  territorial  if  they  give  access  to  a  body  of  waterf 
comprehends  international  waterwayj  there  is  a  right  of  free  and 
innocent  passage  ..  that  passage  should  be  open  unless  Ethere  is  a] 
contrary  decision  by  the  International  Court  of  Justice.  11126 
.1  Textual  and  Cnntu%3rtjja1  Anajyg3is  of  Artie.  V  (2)  W  Thf,  1979  T3rpjLt 
The  1979  Treaty9  according  to  its  preamblej  was  based  on  the  provision% 
of  the  Camp  David  Accords  and  the  Security  Council  Resolutions  242  and 
338.  Consequently,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Article  V(2)  did  not  refer 
to  any  of  these  documents,  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  was  based  on  them. 
In  dealing  with  the  problem  of  the  Aqaba  Gulf,  the  Camp  David  Agreement 
made  the  following  provision: 217 
"The  Straits  of  Tiran  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  are  international  waterways 
to  be  open  to  all  nations  for  unimpeded  and  non-suspendable  freedom  of 
navigation  and  overflight.  "126 
dleac.  Lyl,  this  provision  is  based  on  the  Security  Council  Resolutioý 
24z-,  -namely,  Paragraph  2(a)  of  which  referred  to  "the  necessity  ..  for 
guaranteeig  the  freedom  of  navigation  through,  international  waters  in 
the  area.  11127  Resolution  338  of  OctDiýL-,  22,1973,  called  upon  the 
parties  concerned  to  "start  in  diately  the  implementation  of  the 
Security  Council  Resolution  242  (1967)  in  all  its  parts. 
04120 
Hence  if  the  new  regime  is  based  on  Resolution  2420  then  a  correct 
interpretation  of  the  relevant  parts  of  the  resolution  needs  to  be 
explored. 
The  language  used  in  Resolution  242  suggests  the  following 
observations. 
First,  the  term  international  waterways  is  derived  from  the  language 
of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  in  the  Corfu  Channel  Casp#i2q  and 
it  could  be  underZtood  to  mean  waterways  used  for  international 
041- 
navigation,  rather  waters  used  exclusively  for  local  navigation  and 
leading  to  the  internal  waters  of  coastal  state;  130 
Secondly,  the  term  freedom  of  navigation  could  be  interpreted  as  a 
refernce  to  the  high  seas  freedom  of  navigation.  131  However,  some  believe 
that  it  should  be  understood  as  "a  reference  to  the  general  principles 
that  should  underline  the  regime  of  the  passage...  rather  than  as 
indication  of  the  applicability  of  the  high  seas  freedom  Of 
navigation.  "112 
Thirdlyq  the  use  of  the  word  "thrrdgu--  has  been  understood  as  a 
reference  to  the  issue  of  passage  through  the  Straits  of  Tiran  rather 218 
I  than  as  a  reference  to  the  regime  applicable  to  the  Suez  Canal'33.  The 
latter  is  governed  by  the  1888  Constantinople  Convention. 
Further  legal  analysis  of  Resolution  242  raised  the  following  question: 
which  article  of  the  UK  Charter  was  the  resolution  based  on  ?  In 
answering  this  question,  two  views  can  be  found. 
Some  observed  that  the  action  of  the  Security  Council  in  that  context 
was  based  an  consideration  of  expediency  rather  than  relying  on  legal 
grounds  or  specific  Charter  provision.  134  Others  thought  that  the 
Council  was  aiming  to  bring  to  an  end  the  situation  which  at  that  time 
,  constituted  a  potential  danger  to  the  world  peace  and  security.  I 
This  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  legal  regime  provided  by  the 
Security  Council  should  be  limited  to  those  states  that  have  accepted 
the  resolution. 
Nevertheless,  an  the  other  hand,  some  held  the  view  that  Resolutions 
242  and  338  are  binding  on  all  members  of  the  UK  and  that  the  Security 
Council  view  on  the  question  of  the  Gulf  and  the  Straits  overrides  both 
the  Territorial  Sea  Convention  of  1958  and  the  UK  Law  of  the  Sea 
Convention  of  1982.136 
At  any  rate,  the  prevailing  view  is  that  the  scope  of  Resolution  242 
with  regard  to  the  regime  of  the  Gulf  is  limited  to  Egypt  and  Israel 
because  they  have  accepted  it.  136 
Turning  to  the  legal  regime  of  the  Gulf  under  the  1979  Treatyp  we  may 
state  that  the  scope  of  the  new  regime  is  limited  to  Egypt  and  Israel. 
This  is  due  to  the  following  reasons:  the  new  regime  is  based  on  the 
legal  regime  of  the  Gulf  under  Resolution  242  whose  scope  is  confined# 
as  Indicated  earlier,  to  Egypt  and  Israel;  the  binding  nature  of  the 
new  regime  is  due  to  the  bilateral  agreement  between  Egypt  and  Israel 219 
rather  than  any  international  customary  and  multilateral  treaties  on 
the  law  of  the  sea.  137 
As  a  result  the  new  regime  is  not  binding  on  Saudi  Arabiý  and  Jordan 
which  both  declared  their  rejection  of  the  Treaty.  139 
The  first  sentence  of  the  Article  is  declaratory  in  character'  39:  "the 
parties  consider  the  straits  of  Tiran  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  to  be 
international  waterways".  "'  This  could  be  interpreted  to  mean  that  the 
new  regime  stems  from  the  rules  of  general  international  law  rather  than 
bilateral  agreement  between  the  two  states. 
The  word  "Strait"  of  Tiran,  which  used  instead  of  the  ward  "Straits"  of 
Tiran,  suggest  that  it  refers  to  the  western  and  principal  entrance  of 
the  Gulf  known  as  "Enterprise  passage"  which  falls  within  the 
territorial  sea  of  Egypt.  The  term  "Straits  of  Tiran*#  which  was  not 
mentioned,  is  always  used  to  refer  to  the  two  channels,  Enterprise 
Passage  and  Grafton  Passage.  141  The  latter  passage  falls  within  the 
territorial  sea  of  Saudi  Arabia.  This  could  be  interpreted  to  mean  that 
the  intention  of  the  parties  was  to  avoid  any  problem  likely  to  occur 
if  Saudi  Arabia  rejected  the  Treaty.  It  could  also  be  understood  as  a 
reference  to  the  nature  of'  the  regime  as  resting  upon  a  bilateral 
agreement. 
The  term  11  international  waterways"  is  taken  from  Resolution  242  and, 
as  mentioned  earlier,  is  derived  from  the  language  of  the  Ici  in  the 
rnrfu  Channel  case.  This  could  be  understood  as  a  reference  to  the  idea 
that  the  freedom  of  navigation  in  the  Gulf  and  the  Straits  should  be 
similar  to  the  freedom  of  navigation  applied  in  the  Corfu  Channel.  Such 
understanding  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Gulf  and  the  Straits 220 
should  be  subject  to  the  regime  of  navigation  in  the  high  seas.  This 
conclusion  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  no  hint  of  territorial 
competence  with  regard  to  the  passage  had  been  mentioned.  142  The  term 
freedom  of  navigation  is  usually  associated  with  the  regime  of  the  high 
seas.  143  It  was  used  by  Article  (2)  of  the  1958  Convention  an  the  legal 
status  of  the  High  sea.  Reisman  regarded  it  as  "a  term  comprehensive  in 
intention,  including  movemento  observation,  inspection,  maneuversq  tests 
and  so  forth  carried  out  above,  on  and  below  the  surface.  11144  Under 
freedom  of  navigation  warships  have  complete  immunity  from  any  state 
other  than  the  flag  state.  146 
However,  on  the  other  hand,  the  term  has  been  used  from  1973  by  the  UN 
Conference  on  The  law  of  the  Sea  (UNCLOSIID  in  relation  to  the  right  of 
"transit  passage".  The  concept  of  transit  passage  was  defined  as  the 
exercise...  of  freedom  of  navigation  and  overflight  solely  for  the 
purpose  of  continuous  and  expeditious  transit  of  strait.  01146 
To  sum  upt  we  may  state  that,  while  the  term  'freedom  of  navigation' 
has  been  normally  used  to  describe  the  regime  of  the  high  seas,  it  is 
also  used  since  1973  to  refer  to  the  new  concept  of  transit  passage  in 
territolal  seas.  147 
The  terms  "non-suspendable"  and  "unimpeded"  which  were  used  by  the  1979 
Treaty  before  the  term  freedom  of  navigation  is  similar  to  the  terms 
used  by  Article  16(4)  of  the  1958  Convention  which  states  that: 
11  There  shall  be  no  suspension  of  the  innocent  passage  of  foreign  ships 
through  straits  which  are  used  for  international  navigation  between  one 
part  of  the  high  seas  and  another  part  of  the  high  seas  or  the 
territorial  seas  of  foreign  state"149 221 
Further,  the  terms  were  also  used  by  Article  45  (2)  of  the  same 
Convention  to  describe  the  legal  system  applicable  to  straits  at  the 
entrance  to  an  inland  seas.  149  However,  the  same  term  has  usually  been 
used  to  describe  the  freedom  of  navigation  in  the  high  seas. 
The  question  of  the  nature  of  the  new  legal  regime  and  whether  it 
falls  under  the  regime  of  innocent  passage  or  under  the  high  seas, 
regime  is  raised  by  the  above  argument.  The  answer  of  this  question  is 
of  special  significance  for  two  main  reasons, 
First,  there-is  no  mention  of  any  duty  on  the  part  of  the  passing  ships 
and  aircraft  or  of  the  extent  of  the  coastal  state's  competence  and 
rights;  150 
Secondly,  the  Peace  Treaty  assigned  to  a  third  party  (i.  e.,  UN  forces  or 
its  alternative  multinational  force)  the  task  of  "  ensuring  the  freedom 
of  navigation  through  the  Straits  of  Tiran  in  accordance  with  Article  V 
of  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  "151 
In  answering  the  above  questiong  el-Baradei  argued  that  the  parties 
intended  to  establish  a  regime  that  goes  beyond  the  regime  of  innocent 
passage,  but  that  falls  short  of  the  freedom  of  navigation  and  overflight 
applicable  in  the  high  seas.  He  added  that  the  objective  of  the  parties 
intended  to  establish  a  regime  analogous  in  content  to  the  UNCLOS 
regime  of  transit  passagel  which  assures  the  rights  of  the  international 
community  while  preserving  coastal  states'  rights  of  protection  and 
self-preservation.  162 
In  support  of  his  viewo  el-Baradei  advanced  a  number  of  reasnons. 
First,  the  parties  continue  to  regard  the  Gulf  as  part  of  their 
territorial  seas.  The  reference  to  the  performance  of  normal  police 222 
functions  made  in  Annex  1  of  the  1979  Treaty  nay  be  recalled.  Secondlyt 
the  parties  agreed  that  their  permissible  military  activities  in  some 
parts  of  territoial  would  be  restricted.  "It  does  not  therefore  seem 
plauible  in  such  a  securitY-conscious  agreement  that  the  intention  was 
to  create  rights  for  third  states  exceeding  the  rights  of  the  parties 
themselves"  1  11.  Thirdly,  if  the  Gulf  was  subject  to  the  high  seas' 
regime,  the  states'  rights  of  protection  and  self-preservation  may  be 
affected  by  security  risking  activities,  e.  g.,  the  conduct  of  military 
maneuveý  or  carrying  out  of  research  activities.  Ir-4 
From  a  legal  prespective,  this  view  was  not  accepted  by  writers  for  the 
following  reasons:  166 
First,  no  direct  or  indirect  reference  has  been  made  to  the  right  of 
transit  passage  in  the  treaty.  Nor  did  the  preparatory  work  refer  to 
it.  Having  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  new  concept  of  transit  passage  was 
already  known  since  1973,  it  may  be  correct  to  suppose  that  it  Was 
delibrately  Ignored  by  the  drafters  of  the  Treaty. 
Also,  according  to  Israeli  sources,  the  Israeli  negotiators  rejected 
the  idea  of  applying  the  regime  of  transit  passage  to  the  Gulf.  161 
According  to  Reisman,  the  coastal  state  has  the  right  to  suspend 
transit  passage.  As  he  put  it:  "a  state  bordering  a  strait  might 
unilaterally  determine  that  a  particular  transit  in  given  circumstances 
violates...  Article  39(l)(b)  hence  is  not  transit  passage  in  the  meaning 
in  the  Convention  and  may  either  be  prohibited  entirely  or  permitted 
only  upon  the  fulfillment  of  conditions.  0167 
There  is  no  doubt.  that  such  right  to  suspend  the  navigation  is 
inconsistent  with  Article  V(2)  which  refered  to  non-suspension  and 
unimpeded  navigation. 223 
Ve  have  pointed  out  earlier  that  the  new  regime  is  based  on  the  regime 
provided  by  Paragraph  2(a)  of  resolution  242.  The  legal  regime 
applicable  to  the  Gulft  according  to  that  resolution,  is  similar  to  the 
regime  applicable  to  the  rnrfu  rbAnnpl,  i.  e.,  the  regime  of  the  high 
seas.  Further,  the  fact  that  the  concept  of  transit  passage  was  not 
known  when  Resolution  242  was  adopted  in  1967  may  be  referred  to  in 
support  of  this  argument. 
The  Peace  Treaty,  perhaps  deliberately,  did  not  mention  any  duty  on 
the  parts  of  the  passing  ships  for  the  simple  reasons  that  the  intention 
of  the  drafters  was  to  subject  their  new  regime  to  the  high  seas  norms. 
If  this  was  the  intention,  then  there  is  no  need  to  mention  duties, 
rights,  or  competence  because  the  high  seas  are  subject  to  international 
law  aloneq  and  national  authority  exercised  thereupon  must  conform  to 
international  custom  or  convention. 
Egypt's  practice  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1979  Treaty  shows  that  it  did 
not  take  any  procedures  or  declared  any  act  which  may  affect  any  kind  of 
navigation  in  the  Gulf  and  the  Straits.  Israel's  practice  is  along  in 
the  same  line.  An  example  is  the  Agreement  on  the  Creation  of  the 
Multinational  Forces  and  Observers  (MFO)  signed  by  Egypt  and  Israel  in 
1981,  whereby  no  mention  of  Egypt's  competence  or  national  authority 
regarding  foreign  ships  in  the  Gulf  and  the  Straits  of  Tiran  has  been 
made.  168 
From  the  above,  we  may  conclude  that  the  new  regime  established  by  the 
1979  Treaty  cannot  fall  under  the  transit  passage  regime  or  even  any 
similar  one. 224 
The  question  which  arises  now  is,  to  what  extent  can  the  new  regime  be 
considered  as  similar  or/and  subject  to  the  international  rules 
governing  the  high  seas? 
In  considering  the  regime  of  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  and  the  Straits  of  Tiran 
under  the  1979  Peace  Treaty,  Reisman  wrote: 
"..  With  that  sort  of  formula  tortured,  casu/stic  interpretation  is  not 
necessary...  the  waterways  are  chracterized  as  international  and  any  hint 
of  territorial  competence  with  regard  to  the  passage  repeatedly 
excluded;  there  is  no  right  of  transit  characteriable  by  the  coastal 
state,  but  instead  the  traditional  freedom  of  navigation...  interpreted 
logically  or  teleogically  Camp  David  produces  freedom  of  navigation-NI69 
As  is  well  known,  Article  V(2)  was  based  on  the  Camp  David  Agreeiants. 
The  Security  Council  has  dealt  specially  with  the  issue  of  the  Aqaba 
Gulf  and  the  Straits  of  Tiran  in  Resolutions  242  and  338.  These  two 
resolutions,  as  we  indicated  earlier,  have  considered  the  Gulf  as 
subject  to  the  rules  governing  the  high  seas.  Consequently,  the  new 
regime  established  by  the  parties  under  the  1979  Treaty  must  be  governed 
by  the  rules  of  the  high  seas  because  of  the  binding  nature  of  these 
resolutions. 
The  textual  interpretation  of  Article  V(2)  suggestes  that  the  intention 
of  the  drafters  was  to  subjct  the  Gulf  to  the  rules  of  the  high  seas. 
This  was  clear  by  using  terms  associated  to  the  high  seas  regime.  For 
example,  the  parties  consider  the  Gulf  and  the  Straits  as  "international 
waterways.  "  Another  example  is  the  phrase"  unimpeded  and  non- 
suspendable  freedom  of  navigation".  This  phrase,  as  we  explained 
ealier,  must  be  interpreted  as  a  reference  to  the  regime  applicable  to 
the  high  seas.  160 225 
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The  practice  of  Israel  and  the  US  after  the  Treaty  conf  irmed  that 
they  considered  the  Gulf  and  the  Straits  as  being  governed  by  the  rules 
of  the  high  seas.  To  ýrovk  this  we  may  refer  to  the  Memorandum  of 
Agreement  between  the  Governments  of  the  US  and  Israel  signed  in  1979 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty.  'r-I  According  to  Article  3  of  this 
Memorandum,  if  a  violation  of  the  Treaty  should  threaten  the  security  of 
Israell  including,  inter  alin  a  blockade  of  Israel's  use  of  international 
waterways,  the  US  will  be  prepared  to  consider  such  measures  as  "the 
exercise  of  maritime  rights  to  put  an  end  to  the  violation".  "' 
Clearly,  as  some  writers  observed,  the  expression  "international 
waterway"  could  refer  to  the  Gulf  and  the  Straits  of  Tiran  as  well  as 
other  relevant  passages.  163 
A  similar  position  can  be  found  in  the  statement  by  the  Chairman  of 
the  US  delegation  to  UNCLOS  III  made  on  January  29,1982: 
11  The  U.  S.  fully  supports  ,  the  continuing  applicability  and  force  of 
freedom  of  navigation  and  overflight  for  the  Straits  of  Tiran  and  the 
Gulf  of  Aqaba  as  set  out  in  the7freaty  ofýeace  is  fully  compatible  with 
the  LOS  convention  and  will  continue  to  prevail.  The  conclusion  of  the 
of  164  LOS  convention  will  not  affect  these  provisions  in  any  way  . 
Likewise,  after  its  signature  of  the  1979  Treaty,  Egypt  did  not  take  or 
declare  any  action  which  may  affect  international  navigation  in  the 
Gulf.  For  example,  Egypt's  declaration  upon  its  ratification  of  the  1982 
Convention,  while  it  refers  to  its  right  to  take  some  measures  relating 
to  its  right  of  self-preservation  in  the  Gulf,  did  not  refer  to  any 
competence  concerning  foreign  ships  in  the  Gulf.  'r-r-  Competence,  as 
rightly  observed,  is  the  key  difference  between  freedom  of  navigation 
and  innocent  passage.  In  the  former,  competence  about  the  character  of 226 
the  user  vests  in  the  flag  state;  in  the  latter  it  vests  in  the  coastal 
statel".  Egypt's  declaration,  therefore,  could  be  understood  as 
supportive  of  the  view  that  it  considers  the  Gulf  as  subject  to  the 
regime  of  the  high  seas. 
Finally,  the  interpretation  that  the  Gulf  is  subject  to  the  transit 
passage  regime  encounters  a  number  of  obstacles.  For  example,  there  is 
need  for  more  provisions  to  regulate  matters  such  as  submerged  passage, 
the  duties  on  the  part  of  passing  ships,  the  competence  of  the  coastal 
states  and  so  on.  Such  matters  are  still  controversial  and  were  not 
settled  by  the  rules  governing  the  transit  passage  regime. 
From  the  above  considerations,  one  can  conclude  that  the  new  regime  is 
subject  to  the  regime  applicable  to  high  seas. 
Having  reached  the  above  conclusion,  the  question  arises:  what  is  the 
position  of  other  coastal  states  In  the  Gulf,  namely,  Saudi  Arabia  and 
Jordan$  with  regard  to  the  application  of  the  new  regime  to  them? 
Having  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  new  regime  is  not  a  codification  of 
customary  international  law,  IG7  and  that  both  Saudi  Arabia  and  Jordan 
have  expressed  their  rejection  of  the  1979  Treaty,  including  the  new 
regime  of  the  Gulf  and  the  Straits  on  several  occasions,  lr-'9  one  can 
state  that  this  regime  is  not  binding  on  them. 
As  a  result,  that  part  of  the  Gulf  constituting  the  territorial  seas  of 
Egypt  and  Israel  should  be  subject  to  the  rules  governing  the  high  seas. 
The  other  parts  of  the  Gulf,  namely,  the  territorial  seas  of  Jordan  and 
Saudi  Arabia  would  be  subject  to  the  rules  of  international  law,  i.  e., 
the  regime  of  innocent  passage  with  its  broad  coastal  competence, 
passage  duties  and  overflight  limitation. 227 
In  practice,  however,  the  Straits  of  Tiran  will  not  be  affected  by  the 
application  of  a  diversity  of  legal  norms  since  it  falls  within  the 
territorial  seas  of  Egypt.  Moreover,  access  to  Israel  through  the 
Straits  of  Tiran  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  could  be  gained  through  or  over 
the  Egyptian  and  Israeli  territorial  seas.  This  would  be  the  case  even 
if  Saudi  Arabia  was  restored  to  the  islands  occupied  by  Egypt  at  the 
entrance  of  the  Straits. 
Thp  Attltudp  nf  The  Aralh  League  Towards  The  New  Regl= 
The  rejection  of  the  new  regime,  declared  by  Saudi  Arabia  and  Jordan  in 
the  af  termath  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  cannot  be  separated  from  the  Arab 
League's  complete  rejection  of  the  peace  process  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  including  the  two  Agreements.  The  Arab  League's  rejection#  which 
was  declared  at  the  Baghdad  Summit(1978)  and  the  Arab  League  Foreign 
Ministers  Conference  of  1979l  was  mainly  due  to  political  reasons  which 
we  pointed  out  in  other  parts  of  this  work.  169  However,  the  Arab  policy 
regarding  the  legal  status  of  the  Gulf  seemed  to  be  affected  by  two 
main  considerations:  first,  the  polititical  one  that  the  legal  status  of 
the  Gulf  should  be  part  of  a.  comprehensive  settlement  of  the  Arab 
Israeli  conflict;  secondly,  the  legal  and  practical  problem  stemmed  from 
the  factt  referred  to  earlier,  that  Israel's  frontier  in  the  Gulf  is  Of 
a  temporary  nature. 
Neverthelessi  the  question  that  needs  to  be  answered  is:  whether  the 
attitude  of  the  Arab  League  towards  the  new  regime  of  the  Gulf 
established  by  the  1979  Treaty  changed  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1982 
Summit  meeting  when  the  Arab  leaders  adopted  the  1982  peace  plan  (known 
as  Fez  Plan). 228 
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of  fact,  there  is  no  mention  of  the  question  of  the  Gulf  As  a-z 
either  in  the  text  of  the  plan  or  in  the  discussions  during  the 
meetings.  This  could  lead  to  the  interpretation  that  the  League's 
intention  was  to  subject  the  Gulf  to  the  norms  of  international 
customary  law  and  multilateral  treaties.  Yet,  a  careful  reading  of  the 
Fez  plan  refutes  this  interpretation. 
In  the  f  irst  place,  it  is  clear  that  the  problem  of  the  Israeli 
boundary  in  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  no  longer  exists  since  it  was  not  included 
in  the  Arab  territorial  claims.  The  Fez  plan  called  for  a  complete 
withdrawal  only  from  the  "..  Arab  territory  occupied  in  1967.0  170  By 
implication,  this  means  that  the  plan  considered  Israel's  boundaries  of 
the  pre-June  1967  war,  including  the  Gulf  frontier,  as  legal  and  final 
boundaries. 
Further,  the  plan  called  for  "the  United  Nations  Security  Council  to 
provide  guarantees  for  peace"  and  11  to  guarantee  implementation"  of  the 
Arab  plan.  "I  This  could  be  understood  as  an  implicit  approval  of 
Resolution  242.  Clearly,  if  the  UK  Security  Council  is  to  play  any  role 
to  settle  the  Arab  Israeli  conflict.  this  would  be  dominated  by  its 
Resolution  242  which  is  of  special  importance  and  binding  nature. 
Omission,  by  the  1982  Arab  Summit,  of  the  League's  former  rejection  of 
resolution  242  is  supportive  of  that  conclusion  . 
To  the  above,  it  may  be  added  that  apart  from  its  position  on  the 
Palestine  questions  the  principles  of  the  Fez  plan,  as  we  proved,  are  in 
line  with  the  principles  of  Resolution  242. 
Thus  we  can  conclude  that  the  Fez  plan  does  not,  from  a  legal  view, 
reject  the  new  legal  regime  of  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  provided  by  the  1979 
Treaty.  However,  in  the  meantime,  it  seems  that  the  Fez  plan  did  not 229 
envisage  any  final  determination  of  the  question  of  the  Aqaba  Gulf  to  be 
decided  separately,  since  the  League  does  not  allow  any  of  its  member 
states  to  conclude  bilateral  agreement  with  Israel.  172 
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This  chapter  is  concerned  with  the  attItude  of  the  Peace  Treaty  towards 
the  Palestinian  state  and  the  peoples,  right  to  self-determination. 
Here,  it  is  necessary  to  stress  that,  although  nQ-Igqntion  has  been  made 
of  such  right  in  the  Peace  Treatyjtselý,  all  the  issues  zilating  to  the 
Palestinians'  rights  were  dealt/  by  the  Camp  ýfavid  Accords  of  1978, 
particularly  in  the  document  entitled  "Framework  for  Peace  in  the  Middle 
East".  ' 
For  legal  purposes,  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Camp  David  Accords 
dealing  with  the  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  must  ba  regarded  as  an 
integral  part  of  the  Peace  Treaty.  This  can  easily  be  understood  from 
paragraph  2  of  the  preamble  to  the  Peace  Treaty  which  provides  that  the 
parties  reaffirm  their  adherence  to  the  "Framework  for  Peace  in  the 
Middle  East*  agreed  at  Camp  David,  dated  September  17,1978.2 
The  scheme  envisaged  by  the  Camp  David  Accords  can  be  described  briefly 
along  the  following  lines.  A  self-governing  authority  on  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza  is  to  be  set  up  for  a  transitional  period  (of  up  to  five 
years);  the  authority  is  to  be  elected  by  inhabitants  of  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza  (presumably,  only  present  inhabitants).  3  During  the 
transitional  period,  representatives  of  Egypt,  Israeli  Jordan  and  a 
self-governing  authority  will  constitute  a  continuing  committee  to 
decide  on  the  modalities  of  the  admission  of  persons  displaced  from  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  in  1967,  together  with  necessary  measures  to  prevent 
disruption  and  disorder.  4  Israel's  security  interests,  in  this  respect, 245 
are  to  be  taken  into  account  and  there  is  to  be  no  return  of  persons 
displaced  in  1948  from  territory  which  then  became  Israel.  6 
As  to  the  general  refugee  problem,  i.  e.  the  Arab  refugees  of  1948, 
Egypt  and  Israel  are  to  "work  with  each  other  and  with  other  interested 
parties  to  establish  agreed  procedures  for  a  prompt,  just  and  permanent 
implementation  of  the  resolution  of  the  refugee  problem.  "  Yet,  no  time 
period  is  set  for  the  general  resolution  of  the  refugee  problem;  nor  is 
there  any  indication  that  the  problem  must  be  resolved  by  means  of  a 
wholesale  "right  of  return".  Such  expedients  as  resettlement, 
compensation  and  other  alternatives  are  not  excluded  in  those  cases  even 
where  the  first  choice  of  the  refugees  concerned  is  repatriation-6 
After  this  clarification,  in  order  to  understand  and  evaluate  the 
aforementioned  scheme,  it  is  necessary  in  the  first  place  to  undertake  a 
brief  inquiry  into  the  right  of  the  Palestinian  people  under  the  rules 
of  international  law.  With  the  assistance  of  this  inquiry,  a  textual 
and  contextual  legal  interpretation  of  the  Accords  and  the  Peace  Treaty 
will  then  be  offered. 246 
Before  taking  up  the  matter  under  consideration,  it  might  be  convenient 
at  this  point  to  note  very  briefly  that  there  has  never  been  a  consensus 
of  opinion  as  to  the  issues  relating  to  the  Palestinians'  right  to 
self-determination.  For  instance,  the  Palestinian  people  as  a  whole, 
according  to  one  view,  are  entitled  to  self-determination.  It  follows 
therefore  that  they  have  the  right  to  return  and  establish  their  own 
state.  On  the  other  hand,  an  opposing  view  takes  up  a  position  that  the 
Palestinians  are  not  entitled  to  self-determination,  irrespective  of  the 
General  Assembly  resolutions  in  this  regard. 
These  two  contradictory  views  are  the  subject  of  the  following 
discucssion. 
The  Palentiminn  Pfanplux  are  Pntitlcmd  to  SAlf-DetprIgInatlon 
This  view  claims  that  the  Palestinians  are  a  people  whose  right  of 
self-determination  has  been  violated  by  the  State  of  Israel.  What 
claimed  is  not  a  right  of  self-determination  arising  only  in  the 
present,  but  a  right  which  came  into  existence  before  1948,  and  which 
has  not  been  terminated  .7  The  main  tenet  of  this  position  is  that 
legitimate  rights,  such  as  self-determination,  are  not  extinguishable  by 
the  coercive  displacement  or  preventing  the  return  of  the  "people"  from 
the  "territory"  after  the  right  has  accrued  to  this  very  "people"  On 
that  very  "territory".  13  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  this  claim  may  raise 247 
a  number  of  complex  issues  related  to  the  doctrine  of  self-determination 
in  international  law.  This  complexity  arises  because  of  two  main 
considerations:  the  inevitable  contradiction  between  the  implementation 
of  the  Palestinians'  self-determination  on  one  hand,  and  the  principle 
of  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  state  of  Israel  on  the 
other,  9  and  the  lack  of  consensus  of  opinion  as  to  the  legal  character 
of  the  principle  of  self-determination.  10 
Notwithstanding,  this  discussion  will  be  devoted  to  three  main  issues: 
First,  the  legal  reasons  for  justifying  the  Palestinians'  right  to 
self-determination;  Secondlyl  the  problem  of  which  territory  whose  fate 
is  to  be  determined  by  the  Palestinians  and,  Thirdly,  the  problem  of 
timingl  namely,  at  what  point  does  the  population  of  Palestine  represent 
the  true  population  for  the  purpose  of  self-determination? 
Reasons  in  support  of  thR  PalestlnianSO  right  tn  Self-determination 
It  is  worth  remembering  that  the  legal  basis  for  such  a  claim  has  been 
the  subject  of  long  and  arduous  discussion.  Yet,  these  reasons  are  in 
general  based  upon  two  main  considerations:  that  the  Palestinians  have 
fulfilled  the  conditions  required  to  exercise  the  right  of 
self-determination  under  international  law"  and,  that  the  Arabs'  claim 
that  the  "so  called-Israel"  is  an  illegal  state  whose  establishment  was 
in  conflict  with  the  rules  of  international  law.  12 
This  view  asserts  that  the  right  of  self-determination  under 
contemporary  international  law  is  a  legally  operative  right  backed  by 
legal  obligation  and  not  merely  a  pious  hope  devoid  of  legal 
substance.  "  If  self-determination  is  a  mere  political  principle  which 
is  not  recognized  as  a  binding  rule  of  international  law,  the  argument 
of  this  view  will  be  far  from  ConVinCing.  14 248 
The  view  that  self-determination  has  developed  into  an  international 
legal  right  is  supported  by  several  writers  such  as  Higgins  who 
rejected  the  interpretation  that  self-determination  remains  a  mere 
"principle"  and  Article  2(7)  is  an  effective  defence  against  its 
implementation: 
"To  insist  upon  this  interpretation  is  to  fail  to  give  any  weight  either 
to  the  doctrine  of  bona  fides  or  to  the  practice  of  states  as  revealed 
by  unanimous  and  consistent  behaviour.  1116 
The  right  of  self-determination  presupposes  the  existence  of  two 
interrelated  factors  :  people  and  territory.  It  also  requires  the 
existence  of  a  genuine  link  between  the  people  and  the  territory  claimed 
by  them.  The  Palestinians,  as  it  is  rightly  observed,  have  fulfilled 
these  requirements.  They  are  descendants  of  Abraham,  Semites  by  race 
who  have  continuously  inhabited  the  area  known  as  Palestine  since  time 
immemorial.  The  territory  belonging  to  these  people  are  the  lands  known 
as  Palestine,  which  incorporates  Israel,  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank.  Their 
genuine  link  to  this  territory  is  well  known  and  cannot  be  denied-` 
The  existence  of  this  Palestinian  right  before  the  establishment  of 
Israel  would  lead  to  a  reasonable  conclusion  that,  once  such  a 
legitimate  right  had  come  into  existence,  it  cannot  be  terminated  by  the 
coercive  displacement  of  the  Palestinians.  Some  authors  believe  that 
the  Palestinians'  right  to  self-determination  was  established  under  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  in  1922.17  Under  this  view,  the  ideas 
of  President  Wilson  were  generally  accepted  and  incorporated  in  1919  in 
Article  22.  The  text  of  this  Article,  which  was  applied  to  communities 
detached  from  the  Ottoman  Empire,  including  Palestine,  pointed  out  that: 249 
11  ...  their  existence  as  independent  nations  can  be  provisionally 
recognized  subject  to  the  rendering  of  administrative  advice  and 
assistance  by  a  mandatory  until  such  times  as  they  were  able  to  stand 
alone".  18 
There  is  no  doubt,  according  to  this  view,  that  this  Article  referred 
to  the  right  of  self-determination  of  those  peoples  including  the 
Palestinians.  "3  At  this  point,  it  may  be  worth  mentioning  that  Article  6 
of  the  Palestinian  National  Covenant  is  based  on  the  above  opinion,  as 
we  shall  indicate  later.  20  Others  incline  to  the  opinion  that  the 
Palestinian  right  to  self-determination  came  into  existence  by  the  U.  N. 
Resolution  for  the  Partition  of  Palestine  adopted  in  1947,21  which  seems 
a  more  reasonable  view,  as  we  shall  see  later.  22 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  change  in  the  indigenous  Arab  character  of 
Palestine,  caused  by  the  Jewish  immigration,  was  the  legal  foundation  of 
the  1947  U.  N.  Resolution  for  the  Partition  of  Palestine  which  lead  to 
the  establishment  of  Israel. 
Before  considering  the  reasons  forwarded  to  Justify  the  illegality  of 
this  immigration,  the  census  figures  ought  to  be  mentioned  to  clarify 
the  extent  of  this  immigration: 
Throughout  the  mandate  period,  the  Jewish  population  increased  more 
than  tenfold,  from  56,000  in  1918,  the  number  of  Jews  in  Palestine 
increased  to  83t7g4l  according  to  the  census  of  1931$  and  to  608,230  in 
1946  out  of  a  total  population  of  1,972t560.  In  other  words,  while  the 
non-Jewish  population  was  go  per  cent  in  1918  when  the  British  forces 
entered  Palestine,  it  was  reduced  to  55  percent  in  1947  at  the  end  of 
the  mandate.  23 250 
According  to  this  view,  the  overwhelming  Jewish  immigration  was  in 
violation  of  international  law.  In  the  first  place,  it  was  against  the 
will  of  the  original  inhabitants.  Their  clear  opposition  was 
demonstrated  in  riots  and  civil  wars  against  Jewish  communities  in  order 
to  stop  the  immigration.  24  In  support  of  this  argument,  the  following 
quotation  of  ttD  K"(; 
->SCommission  may  be  cited: 
"It  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  non-Jewish  population  of  Palestine, 
nearly  nine-tenth  of  the  whole,  are  emphatically  against  the  Zionist 
Programme  -  112  6 
The  deliberate  overlooking  of  the  Palestinian  wishes  is  in  direct 
conflict  with  the  practice  of  the  League  of  Nations,  which  was  pointed 
out  by  Mr.  Yanaghita,  in  a  memorandum  to  the  Third  Session  of  the 
Permanent  Mandate  Commission.  He  stated: 
11  If  ...  it  happens  that  the  interests  of  two  classes  of  inhabitantss 
those  previously  living  in  a  mandate  area  and  those  arriving  later  prove 
irreconcilablej  the  mandatory  administration  will  naturally  give  first 
consideration  to  those  of  the  original  inhabitants.  112G 
It  has  been  estimated  that  one  half  of  the  Jewish  population  in  1947 
had  illegally  entered  Palestine,  did  not  obtain  Palestinian  nationality$ 
and  were  not  officially  recorded.  27  Further,  this  overwhelming 
immigration  was  contrary  to  the  formal  policy  of  the  British  Government, 
which  declared  in  1939  that  the  entire  population  ratio  was  to  be  kept 
at  the  level  It  had  reached  of  one  third  Jewish  and  two  thirds 
non-Jewish  Arabs.  29  Furthermore,  unlimited  immigration  was  against  the 
spirit  of  the  mandate,  as  well  as  against  certain  provisions  of  the 
legal  instrument  governing  the  mandate.  29  As  long  as  the  mandate  was 
regarded  as  "a  sacred  trust  of  civilization",  30  the  change  of  the 251 
demographic  structure  of  the  original  population  in  favour  of  a  Jewish 
minority  cannot  be  in  accordance  with  the  aim  and  spirit  of  the 
mandate  .  31 
This  inference  could  be  supported  by  a  number  of  instances  illustrating 
the  existence  of  conflicts  between  certain  provisions  govening  the 
mandate  on  the  one  hand,  and  unlimited  Jewish  immigration  on  the  other. 
It  is  in  conflict  with  Article  22  of  the  League  of  Nations  which 
provides  that  the  main  aim  of  the  mandate  system  is  the  well-being  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  mandate  territory.  It  is  clear  from  this  history 
of  Palestine  that  the  immigration  was  inimical  to  the  "well  being"  of 
the  Palestinians.  Another  illustration  is  the  conflict  between  the 
massive  immigration  and  certain  provisions  of  the  Balfour  Declaration, 
which  required  the  United  Kingdom  to  ensure  that: 
"Nothing  should  be  done  which  might  prejudice  the  civil  and  religious 
rights  of  existing  non-Jewish  communities  in  Palestine.  1132 
It  nay  be  worth  remembering  that  the  text  of  the  mandate  included  in  its 
preamble  the  text  of  the  Balfour  Declaration.  33 
Thus,  it  has  been  rightly  concluded  that  "the  mandate  system  and  its 
successor,  the  trusteeship  system  of  the  U.  N.,  did  not  envisage  or 
permit  a  trust  territory  to  be  so  administrated  as  to  allow  an  imposed 
or  forceful  demographic  transformation  designed  to  alter  the  indigenous 
character  of  that  territory  and  to  remove  its  original  inhabitants.  0134 
It  is  a  well-known  contention  by  Arab  states  that  Israel,  as  an  illegal 
state  is  not  protected  by  the  principle  of  the  sovereignty  and 
Sro 
terrirorial  integrity  of  states.  This  reason  has  been  forwarded  as  to 
#N 
avoid  the  inescapable  contradiction  between  the  implementation  of  the 
Palestinians'  right  to  self-determination  an  one  hand  and  the  principles 252 
of  international  law  which  protect  the  sovereignty  and  territorial 
integrity  of  Israel  on  the  other.  The  argument  forwarded  by  some 
authors  to  support  the  illegality  of  Israel  is  well  known.  3s  Howeverl  in 
recent  years,  it  may  be  observed  that  many  of  the  Arab  States  no  longer 
support  such  a  claim. 
The  U.  N.  General  Assembly's  resolutions  have  supported  and  recognized 
the  Palestinians'  right  to  self-determination.  It  is  argued  that  the 
General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  adopted  several  resolutions  in 
which  the  right  of  the  Palestinian  people  to  self-determination  has  been 
recognized.  36 
Resolution  2672  C,  passed  in  1970,  was  the  first  to  use  the  phrase 
"people  of  Palestine"  and  to  acknowlege  their  right  to 
"self-determination.  4137  Before  this  time,  the  Palestinian  problem  was 
regarded  by  the  U.  N.  as  a  refugee  problem.  90  In  1971  and  1972,  similar 
resolutions  were  adopted.  These  resolutions,  however,  refer  only 
vaguely  to  the  people  of  Palestine  without  specifying  what  was  meant  by 
Palestine.  " 
In  1974,  the  General  Assembly  adopted  the  most  complete  statement  to 
date  of  its  conceptions  of  Palestinian  rights.  40  In  its  relevant  part, 
Resolution  3236  of  1974  states  that: 
"The  General  Assembly, 
Recalling  its  relevant  resolutions  which  affirm  the  right  of  the 
Palestinian  people  to  self-determination 
(1)  Reaffirms  the  inalienable  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  in 
Palestine,  including 
a.  The  right  to  self-determination  without  external  interference, 
b.  The  right  to  national  independence  and  sovereignty. 253 
(2)  Reaffirms  also  the  inalienable  right  of  the  Palestinians  to  return 
to  their  homes  and  property  from  which  they  have  been  displaced  and 
uprooted,  and  call  for  their  return. 
1141 
The  Resolution  undoubtedly  confirmed  that  the  Palestinians  have  the 
right  to  return  within  the  overall  context  of  self-determination-" 
In  interpreting  the  meaning  envisaged  by  Resolution  3263  as  to 
Palestiniam  self-determination,  two  opinions  were  advanced.  Some  held 
that  it  would  appear  to  be  entirely  consistent  with  the  Palestinian 
Liberation  Organization's  idea  of  a  democratic  secular  Palestinian  state 
to  replace  Israel.  43  Other  authors  believe  that  the  resolution  suggests 
a  Palestinian  state  along  the  lines  proposed  in  the  plan  of  partition  of 
1947  .  44  This  latter  interpretation  seems  to  be  supported  by  the  "Report 
of  the  Committee  an  the  Exercise  of  the  Inalienable  Rights  of  the 
Palestinian  People"  .  49  which  included  repeated  references  to  the 
partition  plan,  Resolution  181(11)  as  well  as  an  acknowledglement  of 
Israel  itself  .  46 
Having  explained  the  grounds  for  the  legitimacy  of  the  right  of  the 
Palestinian  people  to  self-determination,  another  important  question 
remains,  namely,  the  question  of  the  territories  whose  fate  is  to  be 
determined  by  the  Palestinian  people.  From  the  outset,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  question  is  difficult  to  answer  satisfactorily. 
Howeverl  this  is  not  to  say  that  answers  have  not  been  advanced. 
Indeed,  three  types  of  answer  have  been  advanced: 
The  first  answer,  as  put  forward  by  the  Palestinian  National  Covenant 
and  some  authors,  provides  that  the  area  including  the  territories  of 
Israel  as  well  as  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank  is  the  territory  whose  fate 
must  be  determined  by  the  Palestinians.  47  This  answer,  as  a  matter  of 254 
reasonable  inference,  should  lead  to  the  dismantling  of  Israel  and  "the 
establishment  -  in  Palestine  -  of  a  secular,  democratic  and  progressive 
society  without  distinction  or  discrimination  as  between  Jews, 
Christians  and  Moslems.  1149 
One  must  admit  that  this  solution  would  realize  satifactorily  the 
rights  claimed  by  the  Palestinians.  However,  the  implementation  of  such 
a  solution  appears  to  be  in  conflict  with  rules  of  contemporary 
international  law. 
The  destruction  of  Israel,  as  envisaged  by  this  view,  is  against  the 
principle  of  sovereign  equality  of  States  upon  which,  according  to 
Article  2(1)  of  the  Charter,  the  United  Nations  is  based  .  49  It  is  in 
conflict  with  the  1960  Declaration  on  colonial  independence  (Resolution 
1514  (XV)  )  which  provides  that: 
"Any  attempt  aimed  at  the  partial  or  total  disruption  of  the  national 
unity  and  the  territorial  integrity  of  a  country  is  incompatible  with 
the  purposes  and  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations-60 
Along  the  same  linest  Secretary  General  U  Thant  affirmed  that: 
"When  a  state  joins  the  United  Nations,  there  is  an  implied  acceptance 
by  the  entire  membership  of  its  territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty 
the  United  Nations  has  never  accepted  and  does  not  accept  and  I  do 
not  believe  it  will  ever  accept  the  principle  of  secession  of  parts  of 
its  member  states.  1161 
The  destruction  of  Israel  is  in  conflict  with  Security  Council 
Resolution  242  which  is  based  an  the  principle  of  respect  for  the 
sovereignty  and  political  independence  of  every  state  in  the  Middle 
East.  " 255 
Israel's  rejection  of  this  solution  would  result  in  the  continuation  of 
a  war//syýýem  in  the  region,  which  constitutes  a  threat  to  international 
peace'41=ýý  dnd  such  a  situation  is  in  conflict  with  a  rule  governing  the 
exercise  of  self-determination,  namely  the  rule  based  on  the  opinion 
that  self-determination  is  only  possible  within  a  general  environment  of 
peace,  G4  which  means  that  it  is  sometimes  necessary  to  curb 
self-determination  for  the  sake  of  peace.  66  As  stated  by  Franklin 
Roosevelt,  "the  choice  freely  exercised  by  a  nation  must  not  threaten 
..  wit)-  disaster  of  war.  "  This  opinion  is  supported  by  state  practice, 
specially  the  iwo  Super  Powers.  66 
Along  the  same  lines,  at  San  Francisco,  it  has  been  aptly  observed  that 
"Self-determination...  was  regarded,  not  as  an  independent  value,  but 
only  as  secondary  to  the  goal  of  peace,  with  the  obvious  consequence 
that  it  might  and  indeed  should  be  set  aside  when  its  fulfillment  give 
rise  to  tension  and  conflict  among  states".  67 
Turning  to  the  second  answer,  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  area  whose 
fate  is  to  be  determined  by  self-determination  are  the  territories 
earmarked  to  the  Arab-Palestinian  state  in  the  1947  U.  N.  Partition 
Resolution.  69  This  view  rests  upon  the  U.  N.  General  Assembly  Resolution 
181  of  29  November  1947,  which  divided  the  territories  of  Palestine 
between  the  Arab  and  the  Jewish  inhabitants.  It  also  rests  upon 
Israel's  acceptance  of  the  Partition  Resolution  including  its  approval 
of  the  frontiers  provided  by  the  Partition  Plan.  c-O  Thus  the  Proclamation 
of  the  Independence  of  Israel  stated  "the  state  of  Israel  is  prepared  to 
co-operate  with  the  agencies  and  representatives  of  the  United  Nations 
in  implementing  the  Resolution  of  the  General  Assembly  of  the  29th 
November  1947".  61  In  a  letter  addressed  on  14  May  1948  by  Epestein, 256 
Agent  for  the  Provisional  Government  of  Israel,  to  President  Truman 
requesting  recognitionj  the  President  was  notified  that: 
"The  State  of  Israel  has  been  proclaimed  as  an  independent  republic 
within  frontiers  approved  by  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations 
in  its  resolution  of  November  29,1947,  and  that  a  provisional 
government  has  been  charged  to  assume  the  rights  and  duties  of 
government  for  preserving  law  and  order  within  the  boundaries  of 
Israel".  62 
From  the  above  passages,  there  is  no  ground  to  deny  that  the  frontiers 
of  the  Partition  Plan  were  accepted  by  Israel,  at  least  in  1948.  This 
view  is  consistent  with  the  solution  provided  by  the  General  Assembly 
Resolution  3236  of  1974  which  has  been  interpreted  as  envisaging  a 
Palestinian  state  within  the  territories  earmarked  to  them  by  the  1947 
Partition  Plan.  This  was  indicated  when  we  discussed  the  Resolution 
earlier.  G3 
One  must  admit  that,  from  a  political  perspective,  such  a  solution  may 
constitute  a  compromise  which  could  be  accepted  by  many  Palestinians  in 
the  light  of  the  view  that  something  is  better  than  nothing.  64  However, 
from  a  legal  perspective,  some  authors  raise  the  claim  that  the  U.  N. 
Partition  Resolution  of  1947  was  invalid.  66 
Consequently,  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  legal  basis  for  any  solution. 
The  arguments  against  the  legitimacy  Of  the  Partition  Plan  have  been 
thoroughly  examined  by  others,  and  kt 
_is 
irrelevant  to  be  repeated. 
However,  it  may  be  relevant  to  refer  to  the  opinions  Of  some 
international  authorities  who  recently  expressed  a  somewhat  similar 
view,  For  example,  Brownlie  has  said: 257 
"It  is  doubtful  if  the  United  Nations  has  a  capacity  to  convey  title, 
Inter  alia  because  the  Organization  cannot  assume  the  role  of 
territorial  sovereign  ...  Thus  the  resolution  of  1947  containing  a 
partition  plan  for  Palestine  was  probably  ultra  vires  [outside  the 
competence  of  the  United  Nations],  and  if  it  was  not,  was  not  binding  an 
member  states  in  any  casell.  rr- 
Along  the  same  lines,  Quincy  Wright  recently  expressed  the  view  that 
"the  legality  of  the  General  Assembly's  recommendations  for  the 
partition  of  Palestine  was  doubtful',  .  67 
The  third  answer  suggested  that  the  area  including  Gaza  and  the  West 
Bank,  which  has  been  occupied  by  Israel  since  1967,  is  the  territory 
whose  fate  could  be  determined  by  the  Palestinians.  " 
It  is  well  established  that  Israel  has  no  legal  right  under 
contemporary  international  law  to  occupy  and  annex  these  territories 
which  it  has  occupied  by  force  since  1967.  Israel,  therefore,  is 
obliged  to  terminate  its  military  occupation.  70  The  legal  obligation  of 
Israel  to  withdraw  from  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank  derives  specifically  from 
three  fundamental  legal  principles.  They  may  be  worth  mentioning  in 
brief: 
-  The  general  principle  of  non-use  of  force  prescribed  by  the  U.  N. 
Charter  in  Article  2(4)  stipulating  that  all  members  shall  refrain  from 
the  threat  or  the  use  of  force. 
-  The  principle  of  the  illegality  of  the  military  occupation  of  the 
territory  of  another  state  by  force.  Even  under  Article  51  of  the 
Charter,  force  may  only  be  used  by  a  state  in  the  exercise  of  its 
inherent  right  of  self-defence  "if  an  armed  attack  occurs"  and  only 
"until  the  Security  Council  has  taken  measures  necessary  to  maintain 258 
international  peace  and  security".  71  The  principle  of  illegality  is 
further  elaborated  in  the  1970  United  Nations  General  Assembly's 
Declaration  on  the  Principles  of  International  Law  concerning  Friendly 
7  'k- 
Relations  and  Co-operation  among  States, 
The  principle  of  inadmissibility  of  acquisition  of  territory  by  force. 
This  principle  is  stipulated  in  paragraph  1  of  the  General  Assembly 
Declaration  on  the  Principles  of  International  Law  concerning  Friendly 
Relations  and  Co-operation  among  States,  and  in  paragraph  5  of  the 
Declaration  on  the  Strengthening  of  International  Security.  71  They  both 
read: 
"the  territory  of  a  state  shall  not  be  the  object  of  acquisition  by 
another  state  resulting  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  ...  no 
territorial  acquisition  resulting  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  shall 
be  recognized  as  legal.  1074 
Further  it  has  been  rightly  observed  that  the  implementation  of  the 
Palestinian  right  to  self-determination  within  the  territories  of  Gaza 
and  the  West  Bank  will  not  give  rise  to  any  problem  related  to  the 
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  Israel.  It  may  also  minimize 
the  possibilities  of  war  in  the  area.  76 
In  the  light  of  the  foregoing,  it  can  be  submitted  that  this  last 
solution  on  the  one  hand  reflects  an  ignorance  of  the  right  of  the 
Palestinian  people  to  self-determination  and  reveals  the  weaknesses  of 
international  law  in  finding  a  workable  solution  based  on  justice  for 
the  Palestinian  people.  On  the  other  hand,  it  would  be  fair  to  say  that 
this  solution  may  be  legally  accepted  if  there  exists,  as  mentioned 
earlier,  a  norm  of  international  law  which  permits  self-determination  to 259 
be  put  aside  when  its  fulfillment  would  give  rise  to  tension  and 
conflict  among  states  .  76 
The  question  of  the  territory  whose  fate  should  be  determined  by  the 
Palestinians  gives  rise  to  another  legal  question,  namely,  the  difficult 
problem  of  the  critical  date  to  distinguish  between  the  indig*nous 
inhabitants  of  Palestine  and  other  illegal  Jewish  populationj  entering 
Palestine  during  the  mandate.  There  is  no  consensus  among  supporters  of 
the  Palestinian  people  as  to  the  choice  of  a  cut-off  date. 
Apart  from  a  rejected  view  that  1971  may  be  chosen  as  a  cut-off  date 
because  self-determination  has  been  recognized  as  a  legally  binding  rule 
for  Palestinians  since  that  year  77  we  need  to  distinguish  between  two 
main  opinions  accepted  by  the  Palestinians. 
The  first,  in  brief,  claimed  that  1923  must  be  chosen  as  the  critical 
year  because,  in  their  opinion,  it  is  the  commencement  of  the  Zionist 
invasion.  711  This  is  the  position  of  the  Palestinian  Liberation 
Organization  which  was  expressed  in  Article  6  of  the  1968  Palestine 
National  Covenant: 
"Jews  who  were  living  permanently  in  Palestine  until  the  beginning  of 
the  Zionist  invasion  will  be  considered  Palestinians.  '179  According  to 
this  argument,  the  population  of  Palestine  which  is  entitled  to  exercise 
self-determination  is  estimated  to  be  one  third  Jewish.  00 
The  legal  basis  of  this  choice  is  once  more  the  claim  that  the 
Palestinian  right  to  self-determination  came  into  existence  by  Article 
22  of  the  League  of  Nations  and,  since  that  time,  has  never  been 
terminated,  and  that  all  the  subsequent  evente  leading  to  the 
establishment  of  Israel  were  illegal  and  in  violation  of  the 
Palestinians'  right  to  self-determination. 260 
This  cut-off  date  is  debatable  since  Palestinian  Arab  representatives 
agreed  in  ensuing  years  to  an  immigration  quota  which  allowed  for  the 
lawful  entry  of  many  more  European  Jews.  81  This  cut-off  date  would  lead 
to  the  destruction  of  Israel.  We  have  15roved  ýearlier  that  such 
destruction  is  not  acceptable  under  international  law.  The  claim  upon 
which  this  solution  is  based  is  doubtful  because  there  is  a  lack  of 
consensus  as  to  whether  Article  22  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations  provided  for  self-determination  for  the  Palestinians.  The 
majority  of  international  writers,  at  that  time,  did  not  recognize  the 
existence  of  self-determination  as  a  legal  right.  02  That  date  seems  to 
be  in  conflict  with  the  attitude  of  the  U.  N,  towards  the  problem.  Any 
review  of  the  relevant  resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly  supporting 
the  Palestinian  right  would  reveal  that  it  was  never  envisaged. 
Moreover,  it  is  also  in  conflict  with  Resolution  242  of  the  Security 
Council,  which  provides  full  respect  for  Israel's  sovereignty  within  its 
frontiers  before  the  1967  war.  83 
For  the  foregoing  reasons,  this  cut-off  date  cannot  be  accepted. 
On  turning  to  the  second  attitude,  some  authors  hold  that  1947  should 
be  chosen  as  the  cut-off  year.  64  In  their  opinion,  the  right  of  the 
Palestinian  people  to  self-determination  came  into  existence  by  virtue 
of  the  Partition  Plan  of  1947,  and  it  was  accepted  by  Israel.  The 
Jewish  population  under  this  argument  is  estimated  to  be  45  per  cent  of 
the  whole  population,  and  they  would  be  obliged  to  accept,  and  to  live 
in,  the  area  earmarked  to  them  by  the  1947  Resolution.  1=1s 
There  is  no  doubt  that  self-determination  was  recognized  as  a  principle 
of  international  law  under  the  U.  N.  Charter.  Consequentlys  it  is 
correct  to  say  that  the  Palestinians'  self-determination  came  into 261 
existence  in,  or  immediately  before,  1947.96  The  choice  of  that  cut-off 
date  would  lead  to  a  final  settlement  of  the  problem  of  the  Palestinian 
refugees  of  1948.  It  would  give  a  right  to  these  refugees  to  return  to 
their  homes  and  property,  as  recognized  by  the  General  Assembly  in 
Resolution  194  (111)  of  11  December  1948,  and  since  that  time,  in  the 
years  1952  through  1975,  in  the  General  Assembly  annually  reaffirming 
Resolution  194-87 
The  question  which  arises  is  whether  or  not  Israel  is  in  fact  free 
under  international  law  to  refuse  such  a  solution.  Once  again  it  may  be 
stated  that  Israel  has  the  right  under  international  law,  for  reasons 
discussed  in  another  part,  99  to  refuse  any  partial  destruction  or 
secessation. 
Before  leaving  the  argument  which  supports  the  Palestinian  right  to 
self-determinationt  it  seems  relevant  to  refer  in  brief  to  some 
additional  legal  points. 
In  the  first  place,  whatever  the  methods  that  may  be  chosen  to 
ascertain  the  wishes  of  the  Palestinian  people,  the  view  of  the 
Palestinian  Liberation  Organization,  it  is  submitted,  must  not  be 
ignored.  The  importance  of  the  views  of  liberation  movements  has  been 
recognized  by  United  Nations  practice  in  several  cases.  ".  In  this 
regard,  Judge  Ammoun  in  his  separate  opinion  in  the  Western  Sahara  Case 
pointed  out  that  the  views  of  the  national  liberation  movements  are 
"more  decisive  than  a  referendum".  90 
The  Palestinian  Liberation  Organisation  is  widely  recognised,  by  the 
United  Nations,  the  Arab  League  and  the  majority  of  States  as  the  sole 
representative  of  the  Palestinian  people.  '250 262 
Moreover,  in  assertaining  the  wishes  of  the  Palestinian  people  in  Gaza 
and  the  West  Bank,  the  Jewish  settlers,  it  is  submitted,  have  no  right 
to  decide  the  fate  of  this  area.  The  legal  ground  of  this  opinion  rests 
upon  the  fact  that  Israel,  as  a  belligerent  occupant,  has  no  right  under 
international  law  to  establish  settlements  in  occupied  areas.  The 
argument  for  the  illegality  of  such  settlements  is  not  our  concern 
here.  92 
Furthermore,  the  right  of  the  Palestinian  people  to  self-determination 
includes  their  right  to  establish  an  independent  state.  The  words  of 
Resolution  3236  of  1974  accept  11  ...  the  inalienable  right  of  the 
Palestinian  people  in  Palestine  including  : 
(a)  The  right  to  self-determination  without  external  interference 
(b)  The  right  of  national  independence  and  sovereignty.  1193 
The  view  that  thp  PalpRtinlann  are  nut  Pntitlpd  to  exercise  the  right 
11f  Self-Dptprmination 
It  remains  to  consider  the  opposing  point  of  view,  as  forwarded  by 
international  authors  supporting  Israel.  This  view  rests  its  case  on 
the  denial  of  the  Palestinian  right  to  self-determination.  The  legal 
justification  of  this  view  rests  upon  three  main  claims  :  the  first  is 
that  the  principle  of  self-determination  was  not  recognised  as  a  binding 
rule  of  positive  international  law  when  Israel  came  into  existence; 
secondly,  it  is  claimed  that  the  Arab  Palestinian  state  has  been  already 
established  on  parts  of  the  mandate  territory  under  the  name  of  Jordan 
and,  thirdly,  it  is  claimed  that  the  Arab  Palestinians  living  in  Israel 
are  not  entitled  to  such  a  right  under  contemporary  international  law. 263 
It  is  asserted  that  self-determination  was  not  recognised  as  a  binding 
rule  of  positive  international  law  in  1948.  The  argument  here  is  based 
on  the  premise  that,  if  self-determination  was  not  a  principle  of 
international  law  in  1948  when  the  state  of  Israel  was  proclaimed,  the 
Palestinian  claim  to  self-determination  would  lack  any  legal 
foundation.  94  Some  writers  have  gone  as  far  as  to  deny  the  existence  of 
this  principle  under  contemporary  international  law,  ss  while  others  hold 
the  view  that  it  became  a  principle  of  international  law  in  1969  or 
1970.96  The  legal  argument  in  support  of  each  opinion  is  not  our  concern 
now.  At  any  event,  in  support  of  the  denial  of  the  existence  of 
self-determination  in  the  period  before  1948,  a  number  of  legal 
arguments  have  been  forwarded.  Any  review  to  the  standard  writings  of 
classical  international  law  would  reveal  no  reference  to 
self-determination,  or  to  anything  that  might  be  construed  as  its 
equivalent.  Further,  classical  international  law  has  conceded  that  a 
right  and  a  title  to  sovereignty  flow  from  conquest  or  usurpation.  97 
In  the  period  after  World  War  I,  President  vilson's  ideas  on 
self-determination  were  considered  in  the  light  of  the  adjustment  of 
colonial  claims  as  among  the  victors,  rather  than  of  independence,  3c,. 
The  history  of  United  States  practice  in  that  period  shows  that  all 
statements  regarding  self-determination,  unless  made  in  circumstances 
which  indicate  that  they  represent  undertakings  given  by  that  country  to 
another,  were  mere  declarations  of  policy,  lacking  any  legal 
significance.  99 
The  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  can  hardly  be  described  as 
including  a  recognition  of  any  right  to  self-determination.  The  only 
general  mention  of  a  principle  of  self-determination  occurred  in  Article 264 
5,  but  even  this  was  more  narrowly  confined  than  has  sometimes  been 
implied.  100  The  reference  in  Article  22,  that  in  so  far  as  former  enemy 
territories  were  being  placed  under  the  mandate  system  "the  wishes  of 
these  communities  must  be  a  pri  ncipfS  consideration  in  the  selection  of 
the  mandatory",  and  that  the  well-being  of  the  inhabitants  was  a 
paramount  concern,  cannot  be  accepted  as  a  recognition  of 
self-determination.  Ic"  It  nay  be  useful  to  recall  the  fact  that  the 
draft  of  Article  22  suggested  by  President  Wilson  was  rejected  by  the 
Alliance  because  the  term  "self-determination"  was  explicitly  used.  "' 
In  an  attempt  to  strengthen  the  argument,  reference  has  been  made  to 
the  report  of  the  Commisssion  of  Jurists  which  had  been  set  up  to  deal 
with  the  Aaland  I51ands  dispute.  The  report  stated: 
"Although  the  principle  of  self-determination  of  peoples  plays  an 
important  part  in  modern  political  thought,  especially  since  the  Great 
War,  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  there  is  no  mention  of  it  in  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.  The  recognition  of  this  principle  in 
a  certain  number  of  international  treaties  cannot  be  considered  as 
sufficient  to  put  it  upon  the  same  footing  as  a  positive  rule  of  the  Law 
of  Nations...  To  concede  to  minorities  of  either  of  language  or  religion, 
or  to  any  fraction  of  population,  the  right  to  withdraw  from  the 
community  to  which  they  belong  because  it  is  their  wish  or  their  good 
pleasure,  would  be  to  destroy  order  and  stability  within  states  and  to 
inaugurate  anarchy  in  international  life.  It  would  be  to  uphold  a 
theory  incompatible  with  the  very  idea  of  a  state  as  a  territorial  and 
political  unity,  "'(13 
State  practice  during  the  Second  World  War  shows  that 
self-determination  was  conceived  merely  as  a  political  principle  which 265 
imposed  no  legal  obligation,  For  example,  after  Roosevelt  persuaded 
Churchill  to  include  in  the  Atlantic  Charter  a  statenent  of  respect  for 
the  right  of  all  peoples  to  choose  the  form  of  government  under  which 
they  will  live,  Churchill  soon  made  it  clear  that  Britain  did  not  regard 
this  as  constituting  a  legal  obligation.  11114 
Another  reason  in  support 
self-determination  under  the  U.  N. 
of  denying  the  existence  of 
Charter  is  the  c)pinion  that  the 
Charter,  though  referring  twice  to  the  term,  said  so  little  of  a 
concrete  character  an  self-determination.  According  to  this  opinion, 
there  is  little  ground  for  arguing  that  the  delegates  at  San  Francisco 
were  really  concerned  with  what  is  now  known  as  the  right  of 
self-determination.  This  understanding,  it  is  argued,  has  been  inferred 
from  the  interpretation  of  Article  41  which  refers  to  relations  among 
states,  rather  than  groups.  Therefore,  the  word  "people"  in  the  term 
"self-determination  of  peoples"  means  only  sovereignty  of  stater..  This 
interpretation,  it  was  added,  is  rooted  in  the  preparatory  work  of  the 
U.  N.  Charter.  'Or- 
In  order  to  support  this  argument,  thev  ieferred  to  Kelsen's  opinion 
that  the  relevant  article  refers  to  relations  among  states  and: 
"therefore  the  term  "peoples"  too  -  in  connection  with  "equal  rights@$  - 
means  probably  states,  since  only  states  have  "equal  rights"  according 
to  general  international  law.  That  the  purpose  of  the  Organization  is 
to  develop  friendly  relations  among  states  based  on  respect  for  the 
principle  of  self-determination  of  "peoples"  does  not  mean  that  friendly 
relations  among  states  depend  an  democratic  forms  of  government  and  that 
the  purpose  of  the  Organization  is  to  favour  such  form  of  government. 
This  would  not  be  compatible  with  the  principle  of  "sovereign  equality" 266 
of  the  Members,  nor  with  the  principle  of  non-intervention  in  domestic 
affairs  established  in  Article  2,  paragraph  7.  If  the  term  "peoples"  in 
Article  1,  paragraph  2,  means  the  same  as  the  term  "nations"  in  the 
Preamble,  then  "self-determination  of  peoples"  in  Article  1  can  mean 
only  "sovereignty  of  the  states".  1110*5, 
Further,  no  reference  was  made  to  self-determination  in  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  adopted  in  the  early  years  of  the  U.  N. 
This  has  been  regarded  as  more  evidence  that  the  U.  N.  members  were  not 
concerned  with  such  a  right. 
The  final  reason  for  the  contention  that  the  practice  of  the  U.  N. 
towards  the  question  reveals  that  self-determination  was  not  recognized 
as  a  binding  rule  of  positive  international  law.  A  holder  of  this  view 
is  Leo  Gross,  who  illustrates  that,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  an 
impressiveý,  large  number  of  people  have  been  granted  or  conceded 
self-determination,  it  is  not  possible  to  supply  the  missing  element, 
namely,  that  practice  was  based  on  a  sense  of  legal  obligation: 
11  On  the  contrary,  the  practice  of  decolonization  is  a  perfect 
illustration  of  the  usage  dictated  by  political  expediency  or  necessity 
or  sheer  convenience.  And  moreover,  it  is  neither  constant  nor 
uniform!  '107 
Thus,  this  view  concluded  that  neither  the  Charter  nor  the  subsequent 
practice  supports  the  proposition  that  the  principle  of 
self-determination  is  to  be  interpreted  as  a  right  in  the  early  days  of 
the  U.  N. 
It  also  contended  that  the  Arab  Palestinian  state  had  been  established 
in  the  Palestine  mandate  under  the  name  of  Jordan.  101-1  According  to  this 
view,  the  Arab  Palestine  state  was  already  been  established  in  1922  on 267 
eighty  per  cent  of  the  whole  territory  of  the  Palestine  mandate  under 
the  name  of  Jordan.  Accordingly,  as  long  as  the  Palestinians  exercised 
self-determination  in  Jordan,  and  since  the  right  of  self-determination 
can  be  exercised  only  once,  109  the  Palestinians  are  not  allowed  to 
exercise  this  right  again.  It  is  added  that,  if  there  are  some 
Palestinians  living  outside  Palestine  and  wishing  to  exercise 
self-determination,  they  can  exercise  their  right  within  the  territory 
of  Jordan,  not  Israel.  110 
This  argument  rests  upon  the  contention  that  the  whole  territory  of 
Jordan  was  part  of  the  mandate  granted  by  the  League  of  Nations  to 
Britain  in  1922.  Transjordan  was  taken  out  of  the  mandate  provision  and 
allocated  to  the  creation  within  Palestine  of  the  Emirate  of 
Transjordan,  which  became  independent  in  1946.  The  Palestinians 
represent  more  than  60  per  cent  of  the  population  of  Jordan  where  they 
enjoy  the  suffirage  and  all  political  rights.  "'  Further,  those 
Palestinians  regard  Jordan  as  an  integral  part  of  Palestine.  112 
It  is  also  contended  that  Palestinian  Arabs  living  in  Israel  are  not 
entitled  to  self-determination  under  international  law  because  they  not 
only  enjoy  suffOrage  and  full  political  rights  as  Israeli  citizens#  but 
also  because  they  are  bound  by  the  principle  that  no  continuing  right  of 
self-determination  for  any  part  of  the  population  survives  once 
independent  statehood  has  been  achieved.  113 
The  legal  argument  to  Justify  this  view  is  based  mainly  on  the 
interpretation  of  paragraph  7  of  the  Declaration  of  Friendly  Relations 
of  1970,  which  indicates  that  the  exercise  of  self-determination  must 
not  affect  the  territorial  integrity  of  states  except  those  states  which 
are  not  "conducting  themselves  in  compliance  with  the  principle  of  equal 268 
rights  and  self-determination.  ""'  This  means  that  self-determination 
to  people  inside  the  political  boundaries  of  existing  sovereign  states 
will  be  applicable  only  in  situations  where  the  government  does  not 
represent  the  governed. 
In  the  words  of  the  International  Commission  of  Jurists  in  its  1972 
study  entitled  Fast  PAkIstnn  "...  the  conflicting  principles  of 
territorial  integrity  had  to  be  given  full  weight  when  considering  the 
principle  of  self-determination  ...  however  this  principle  is  subject 
to  the  requirement  that  the  government  does  comply  with  the  principle  of 
equal  rights  and  does  represent  the  whole  people  without  distinction. 
If  one  of  the  constituent  peoples  of  a  state  is  denied  equal  rights  and 
is  discriminated  against,  it  is  submitted  that  their  full  right  of 
self-determination  will  revive.  ""'- 
On  this  basis  the  Palestinian  Arabs  living  in  Israel  and  enjoying  full 
political  rights  cannot  be  entitled  to  self-determination. 
This  conclusion  is  also  supported  by  the  fact  that  any  inquiry  into  the 
legal  content  of  a  right  of  secessionist  self-determination  is  not 
supported  by  an  analysis  of  the  practice  of  states.  "r, 
Having  set  out  the  view  supporting  the  right  of  Palestinian  people  to 
self-determination,  followed  by  the  other  contradicte:  ý  view  that  the 
Palestinians  are  not  entitled  to  self-determination,  some  evaluation  of 
these  two  views  will  now  be  attempted. 
In  relation  to  the  first  view  which  supports  the  Palestinian  people's 
right  to  self-determination,  the  following  observations  ought  to  be 
made.  In  the  first  place,  we  cannot  accept  the  claim  that  the  right  of 
the  Palestinian  people  to  self-determination  came  into  existence  in 269 
Article  22  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.  The  substantial 
grounds  of  rejecting  this  claim  are  based  on  both  the  principles  of 
international  law  and  the  practice  of  states.  It  is  also  supported  by 
the  view  of  the  majority  of  international  writers  who  did  not  recognize, 
as  indicated  earlier,  the  existence  of  self-determination  as  a  rule  of 
international  law  prior  to  19451  17  This  leads  us  to  reject,  in  turn,  all 
relevant  consequences  which  are  mainly  based  on  this  article. 
Accordingly,  it  may  be  correct  to  regard  the  opinion  that  the  territory 
whose  fate  is  to  be  determined  by  the  Palestinians  must  include  Israel 
as  not  well  established. 
Also,  the  choice  of  1923  as  a  cut-off  date  cannot  be  accepted  for  the 
same  reason,  and  for  the  reasons  discussed  earlier. 
While  we  can  agree  with  the  viewpoint  that  the  right  of  the  Palestinian 
people  to  self-determination  was  established  by  the  U.  N.  Partition 
Plan,  we  have  to  admit  that  the  legal  consequences  of  this  opinion  is 
inconsistent  with  certain  rules  of  international  law.  For  example,  this 
opinion  would  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  Palestine  state  in  parts  of 
Israel  as  envisaged  by  the  Partition  Plan. 
In  these  circumstances,  it  would  seem  that  any  attempt  to  divide  the 
state  of  Israel  will  be  in  conflict  with  the  principle  of  the 
territorial  integrity  of  states  and  Article  1(2)  of  the  United  Nations 
Charter.  It  is  also  in  conflict  with  Resolution  242.  The  detailed 
reasons  were  indicated  earlier. 
Also,  for  the  same  reasons,  the  choice  of  1947,  as  a  cut-off  date, 
cannot  be  legally  accepted. 
However,  the  aforementioned  argument  is  not  to  say  that  we  are  against 
the  establishment  of  a  Palestine  State  according  to  the  1947  Partition 270 
Plan,  but  the  legal  and  practical  difficulties  surrounding  such  a 
solution  should  not  be  ignored. 
An  examination  of  the  second  view  which  denies  the  right  of  the 
Palestinian  people  to  self-determination  reveals  that  it  is  based,  to  a 
large  extent,  on  two  disputed  claims,  that  self-determination  was  not 
recognized  as  a  binding  rule  of  international  law  and,  that  the 
Palestinian  Arab  state  has  been  established  under  the  name  of  Jordan. 
We  cannot,  from  a  legal  view,  accept  the  opinion  that 
self-determination  is  not  recognized  as  a  legal  principle  of 
international  law,  or  perhaps  became  so  only  after  1969.  Certainly,  the 
right  of  self-determination  has  been  recognized  by  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations.  Article  1(2)  of  the  Charter,  which  sets  out  the 
Purposes  and  Principles  of  the  Organization,  declares  that  it  is  based 
an  "friendly  relations  among  nations  based  on  respect  for  the  principle 
of  equal  rights  and  self-determination  of  peoples  ...  ".  And  again, 
Article  55  considers  that  friendly  relations  between  nations  are  to  be 
based  "on  respect  for  the  principle  of  equal  rights  and 
self-determination  of  peoples",  while  in  Chapter  XI,  which  is  concerned 
with  non-self  governing  territories,  Article  73  notes  that  members 
assuming  responsibility  for  such  territories  are  "to  develop 
self-government,  to  take  due  account  of  the  political  aspirations  of  the 
peoples  and  to  assist  them  in  the  progressive  development  for  their  free 
political  institutions.  11"19 
Moreover,  the  legal  character  of  self-determination  as  an  operative 
legal  right  has  been  asserted  by  U.  N.  practice  as  reflected  in  the 
relevant  resolutions.  It  nay  be  well  to  recall  the  large  number  of 
cases  of  decolonization  in  which  the  U.  N.  has  invoked  self-determination 271 
,  e.  g.  the  overwhelming  acceptance  of  the  1960  Declaration  on  the  Granting 
of  Independence  to  Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples  of  1960  (Resolution 
1514  (XV)  )  and  its  1961  successor  (Resolution  1654  (XVI)  )  setting  up  a 
special  Committee  to  oversee  the  application  of  the  Declaration.  119 
The  majority  of  international  writers  accept  self-determination  as  a 
legally  binding  right.  Higgins,  for  instance,  after  examining  United 
Nations  practice  and  the  1960  Declaration,  pointed  out  that  "that 
Declaration,  taken  together  with  seventeen  years  of  evolving  practice  by 
the  United  Nations'  organs,  provides  ample  evidence  that  there  now  exists 
a  legal  right  of  self-determination.  11120 
Further  evidence  in  support  of  the  above  is  afforded  by  those  who  are 
inclined  to  accept  self-determination,  not  only  as  a  legal  right,  but 
also  as  a  norm  of  Jus  cogen,:;.  In  the  words  of  a  formal  report  submitted 
to  the  United  Nations  by  Gros  Espiell: 
"Todayl  no  one  can  challenge  the  fact  that,  in  the  light  of  contemporary 
international  realities,  the  principle  of  self-determination  necessarily 
possesses  the  character  of  jus  cogens.  " 
Along  the  same  lines,  Vedel  cogently  argued  on  behalf  of  Morcco  in  the 
Western 
-. 
';  Abnrq  Qw;  P  that,  if  there  is  jus  cog  ns  in  the  United  Nations 
in  matters  of  self-determination,  it  consists  of  decolonization  as  an 
122  end  result  rather  than  self-determination  as  a  technique.  " 
Finally,  any  review  of  the  opinions  of  the  International  Court  of 
Justice,  particularly  in  the  Western  S  hara  rAr--P,  would  reveal  that  the 
principle  of  self-determination  has  been  considered  as  an  important  rule 
of  contemporary  international  law.  123 272 
In  relation  to  the  second  claim,  we  cannot  accept  that  the  Arab  state 
of  Palestine  has  been  established  under  the  name  of  Jordan  as  part  of 
the  mandate  provision.  This  rejection  in  fact  is  based  on  historical 
fact  that  the  Territory  of  Jordan,  which  was  called  Transjordan,  had  not 
been  part  of  historical  Palestine.  In  Ottoman  times,  it  had  been 
administratively  part  of  the  Province  of  Syria  and  was  called  the 
district  of  Al  Balqa.  When  the  question  of  delimiting  the  British  and 
French  mandates  arose,  Britain  insisted  on  the  inclusion  of  the  district 
of  Al  Balqa  in  its  mandate  over  Palestine  because  it  wished  to  entrust 
its  administration  to  Amir  Abdullah,  son  of  King  Hussein  Ben  Ali,  the 
Sharif  of  Mecca,  to  reward  him  for  help  during  the  war  against  the 
Turks.  The  new  state  assumed  the  name  of  Transjordan  and  was  set  up  as 
an  Emirate.  It  remained  under  a  protective  treaty  relationship  with 
Britain  until  25  May  1946,  when  it  was  formally  detached  from  the 
Palestine  mandate,  and  Amir  Abdullah  was  recognized  as  King  of 
Transjordan.  In  1949  the  new  Kingdom  took  the  name  of  Hashemite  Kingdom 
of  Jordan.  124 
Before  leaving  this  evaluation,  it  seems  inescapable  to  raise  and 
attempt  to  answer  the  question  of  whether  or  not  it  is  permissible  under 
international  law  to  put  aside  international  rules  protecting  the 
territorial  integrity  of  Israel  for  the  sake  of  applying  the 
Palestinians'  self-determination. 
To  anewer  this  queetion,  we  need  to  consider  the  prevailing  view  on  the 
conflict  between  the  principles  of  territorial  integrity  and 
self-determination.  The  most  authoritative  statement  in  international 
law  relevant  to  this  question  is  paragraph  7  of  the  1970  Declaration  on 
Friendly  Relations.  As  noted,  this  paragraph  appears  to  give  prima 273 
I 
f-aciP,  ýPspect  to  the  territorial  integrity  of  states  and  to  protect 
centered  order.  However,  it  confirms  that  not  all  states  will  enjoy 
this  inviolability  of  their  territorial  integrity,  but  only  those  states 
"conducting  themselves  in  compliance  with  the  principle  of  equal  rights 
and  self-determination.  This  opinion  was  supported  by  the  International 
Commission  of  Jurists  in  its  1972  study  entitled  "Ila  Events  in  West 
Pakistan".  126 
In  applying  the  opinion  of  the  Commission  to  the  case  of  Palestinian 
Arabs  living  in  Israel,  it  may  be  correct  to  say  that  they  are  not 
entitled  to  self-determination  under  international  law  as  long  as  they 
enjoy  suffýrage  and  equal  political  rights  with  the  other  inhabitants  of 
Israel.  However,  an  the  other  hand,  Israel's  policy  of  preventing  the 
return  of  the  Arab  refugees  of  1948  may  be  regarded  as  a  denial  of  equal 
rights  and  discrimination  against  the  Palestinian  Arabs.  Consequently, 
this  denial  and  that  discrimination  could  give  rise  to  the  right  of  this 
people  to  self-determination.  12s 
From  the  above  evaluation,  it  seems  quite  correct  to  draw  the  following 
conclusions. 
1.  There  is  nc  doubt  that  the  Palestinian  people  are  entitled  to 
self-determination  under  international  law  since  that  right  came  into 
existence  at  the  latest  by  the  1947  Partition  Resolution. 
2.  As  noted  above,  the  difficulties  inherent  in  the  application  Of  such 
right  may  lead  to  confining  its  application  to  the  area  including  Gaza 
and  the  West  Bank  unless  Israel  agrees  to  give  up  the  area  allocated  to 
the  Palestinian  Arabs  by  the  Partition  Plan. 274 
3.  Whatever  the  methods  used  to  ascertain  the  wishes  of  the 
Palestinians,  the  views  of  the  Palestinian  Liberation  Organization  must 
not  be  ignored. 
4.  The  Palestinians'  right  to  self-determination  includes  the  right  of 
the  1948  refugees  to  return  to  their  homelands  in  Israel.  In  the  words 
of  Secretary  General  U  Thant,  in  his  Annual  Report  to  the  22nd  Session 
of  the  General  Assembly: 
"People  everywhere,  and  this  certainly  applies  to  the  Palestinian 
refugees,  have  a  natural  right  to  be  in  their  homeland  and  to  have  a 
future.  16127 .  It  is  necessary  at  the  outset  to  recall  that,  as  neither  the  Palestinians  nor 
their  representatives  have  signed  the  Camp  David  Accords  and  the  1979  Treaty, 
then,  strictly  speaking,  all  the  provisions  in  the  Accords  and  the  Treaty 
regarding  the  resolution  of  their  problems  may  not  be  invoked  against  them. 
It  is  generally  recognized,  as  a  principle  of  international  law,  that  treaties 
create  rights  and  duties  only  for  the  parties  to  them  (panta  tertlis  nec 
nonernnPn  prodesse  posstint).  1243 
In  the  Island  of  Palmas  Case  for  instance,  Judge  Huber  said: 
"It  appears  further  to  be  evident  that  treaties  concluded  by  Spain  with  third 
powers  recognizing  her  sovereignty  over  the  Philippines  could  not  be  binding 
upon  the  Netherlands.  "  Later  Judge  Huber  went  on  to  say  that: 
"The  inchoate  title  of  Netherlands  could  not  have  been  modified  by  a  treaty 
concluded  between  third  powers.  "  129 
Similarly,  in  the  case  of  the  Free  Zones  of  Upp!  jr  Savoy  and  the  District  of 
Gex,  the  P.  C.  I.  J.  held  that  Article.  435  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  not 
binding  upon  Switzerland  which  was  not  a  pa  rty  to  the  treaty,  "except  to  the 
extent  to  which  that  country  had  accepted  it".  130 
This  principle  has  also  gained  the  recognition  of  the  international  community 
and  is  codified  in  the  Vienna  Convention  of  1969  on  the  Law  of  Treaties.  131 276 
In  sum,  we  may  state  that  it  is  an  accepted  principle  of  international  law  that 
a  bilateral  treaty  or  a  particular  provision  in  such  a  treaty  could  have  an 
effect  upon  non-parties  only  if  they  accept  it  or  when  the  treaty  or  a 
provision  passed  into  customary  law.  132 
Certainly,  the  Camp  David  formula  was  rejected  'by  the  Palestinian  people.  In 
his  letter  to  the  U.  N.  Secretary  General  dated  March  24,1979,  P.  L.  O.  Chairman, 
Yasir  Arafat,  pointed  out  that  "the  Palestinian  people  have  unanimously  rejected 
this  agreement  and  everything  related  to  it,  especially  the  suspect  proposals 
for  self-government,  which  will  consolidate  the  occupation  and  submit  our  people 
to  a  new  form  of  slavery.  "'  33 
To  that  nay  be  added  that  the  fact  that  the  authors  of  the  Agreement 
possessed  no  competence  or  capacity  to  decide  the  Palestinian  question  or  the 
future  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza';  34  On  the  one  hand,  Israel  is  the  military 
occupier  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  status  of  a  military  occupier  is  well 
defined  under  international  law  an  occupier  does  not  acquire  sovereignty  and 
can  only  act  as  an  admistrator.  There  exists  no  rule  of  international  law  which 
confers  on  a  military  occupier  any  power  to  decide  the  political  and 
constitutional  future  of  the  inhabitants  or  the  status  of  the  occupied  territory. 
In  the  words  of  Henry  Cattan,  "By  assuming  in  the  Camp  David  Accords  a  right 
to  decide  these  matters  and  to  sit  as  arbiter  over  the  destinies  of  the 
Palestinian  people,  Israel  was  usurping  a  power  in  violation  of  the  law  Of 
nations.  ""' 
Similarly,  Egypt  possessed  no  right  or  power  to  decide  the  future  of  the 
Palestinians.  Sadat  "was  not  their  guardian,  nor  did  he  hold  a  mandate  to 
represent  them.  "1:  3r, 277 
As  to  the  Americans,  it  has  been  rightly  observed  that  there  existed  no  legal 
basis  upon  which  their  participation  in  deciding  the  future  of  the  Palestinian 
people  can  be  justified.  As  one  Palestinian  has  put  it,  "President  Carter  had  as 
much  a  right  to  decide  the  future  of  the  Palestinians  and  Palestinian  territory 
as  the  Palestinians  have  a  right  to  decide  the  future  of  U.  S.  citizens  or  of  U.  S. 
territory.  "  I 
a7 
To  argue  that  the  provisions  dealing  with  the  Palestinian  problem  are  not 
binding  on  the  Palestinians  is  not  to  deny  the  binding  force  of  these 
provisions  as  between  the  parties.  Undoubtedly  the  releva-t  T)rDvisions  of  the 
Camp  David  Accords  are  binding  an  Israel  regardless  "of  the  fact  that 
Palestinian  factions  have  rejected  the  Accords.  However  as  regards  the  1979 
Treaty,  due  to  the  fact  that  it  dealt  with  Palestinian  issues  in  a  separate 
instrument  appended  to  it,  doubts  have  been  raised  as  to  the  binding  nature  of 
that  instrument,  particularly  whether  or  not  it  constitutes  an  integral  part  of 
the  Treaty.  "' 
This  instrument  is  an  agreement  between  Egypt  and  Israel  concerning  how  and 
when  the  "autonomy  scheme"  provided  for  by  the  Camp  David  Accords  is  to  be 
implemented.  It  established  a  kind  of  link  between  the  implementation  of  the 
Peace  Treaty  and  the  Camp  David  Accords  in  order  to  indicate  that  the  parties 
are  aiming  at  achieving  a  comprehensive,  rather  than  separate,  peace.  "'  Yet, 
for  reasons  which  are  not  our  concern,  "O  the  authors  of  the  Treaty  decided  to 
put  it  in  the  form  of  a  joint  letter  from  Sadat  and  Begin  to  Carter  in  which 
they  informed  him  about  the  agreement.  This  letter,  it  may  be  observed,  was 
signed  on  the  same  day  as  the  Treaty.  141 278 
The  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  distinguishes  between  "Travaux 
preparatoires"  which  according  to  Article  32  are  merely  supplementary  means  of 
interpretation,  '  4:  2  and  agreements  or  instruments  related  to  the  Treaty  which 
according  to  Article  31  are  to  be  considered  as  part  of  the  context  for  the 
purpose  of  interpreting  a  Treaty.  The  meaning  and  scope  of  the  term  "context" 
are  defined  in  Article  31(2)  in  the  following  terms: 
"The  context  for  the  purpose  of  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty  shall  comprise, 
in  addition  to  the  text,  including  its  preable  and  annexes: 
(a)  any  agreement  relating  to  the  treaty  which  was  made  between  all  the 
parties  in  connexion  with  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty; 
(b)  any  instrument  which  was  made  by  one  or  more  parties  in  connexion  with 
the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  and  accepted  by  the  other  parties  as  an  instrument 
related  to  the  treaty.  191  A4 
Clearly,  for  a  document  to  be  regarded  as  forming  part  of  the  context  of  a 
treaty  for  the  purpose  of  its  interpretation,  it  must  be  the  result  of  an 
agreement  by  all  the-parties  to  the  treaty,  must  have  been  made  in  connection 
with  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  and  must  be  understood  as  such  by  all  of 
them.  '  4r, 
As  regards  the  criteria  for  determining  which  instrument  is  to  be  considered 
as  an  integral  part  of  the  Treaty  or  part  of  the  context  f  or  the  purpose  of 
interpretation,  Valdock  referred  to  two  cases  in  which  two  opposite  views  were 
taken  by  the  International  Court  of  Justice.  14r- 
In  the  Ambatlelns  Case,  one  of  the  main  contentions  of  the  United  Kingdom 
Government  against  Greece  was  that  the  Declaration,  which  was  signed  at  the 
same  time  as  the  Treaty  of  1926,  was  not  a  part  of  that  Treaty  and  the 279 
provisions  of  that  Declaration  were  not  provisions  of  that  Treaty.  One  of  the 
reasons  given  by  the  United  Kingdom  for  this  submission  was  that  the 
Declaration  was  signed  separately  from  the  Treaty  itself,  though  by  the  same 
signatories  and  an  the  same  day.  Another  of  the  stated  reasons  was  that  the 
Declaration  did  not  expressly  state  that  it  was  to  be  regarded  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  Treaty'  47  .  The  Court,  however,  after  referring  to  certain 
circumstances  relating  to  the  construction  of  the  Declaration  found  as  a  fact 
that  "the  intention  of  the  Declaration  was  to  prevent  the  Treaty  of  1926  from 
being  interpreted  as  coming  into  full  force  in  so  sweeping  a  manner  as  to 
prejudice  claims  based  on  the  older  Treaty  of  1866".  141  The  Court,  then 
concluded  :  "Thus  the  provisions  of  the  Declaration  are  in  the  nature  of  an 
interpretation  clause,  and  as  such,  should  be  regarded  as  an  integral  part  of 
the  Treaty,  even  if  this  was  not  stated  in  terms.  11149 
Here,  there  is  a  clear  expression  in  favour  of  regarding  as  an  integral  part  of 
the  Treaty  instruments  such  as  the  Sadat-Begin  Joint  letter  appended  to  the 
1979  Treaty.  In  fact,  this  is  the  view  expressed  by  Egypt.  'r-1 
However,  while  this  ruling  is  clear  it  should  be  remembered  that,  as  Waldock 
observed,  it  was  contrary  to  the  views  expressed  in  the  Advisory  opinion  on 
Adm1gs1nn  to  the  United  Nations.  In  the  Admissions  Case,  the  Court  had  defined 
everything  as  travaux  preparations  which  was  not  part  of  the  actual  text  of  the 
Treaty  and  could  only  bew  used  as  a  supplementary  method  of  interpretation.,  6, 
Having  in  his  mind  the  above  cases,  Valdock  in  his  report  to  the  International 
Law  Commission  an  the  provision,  which  became  Article  31(2)  of  the  Vienna 
Convention,  pointed  out  the  criteria  for  deciding  whether  an  instrument  is  to  be 
considered  as  an  integral  part  of  a  treaty. 280 
*The  fact  that  these  documents  are  recognized  in  para.  2  as  forming  part  of  the 
"context"  does  not  mean  that  they  are  necessarily  to  be  considered  as  an 
integral  part  of  the  treaty.  Whether  they  are  an  actual  part  of  the  treaty 
depends  on  the  intention  of  the  parties  in  each  case.  1116:  2 
From  the  above,  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  with  regard  to  the  legal  status  of 
the  Sadat-Begin  joint  letter  is  that  at  least  it  should  be  recognized  as  part  of 
the  context  of  the  1979  Treaty  within  the  meaning  of  Article  31(2)  of  the 
Vienna  Convention. 
In  asserting  the  scope  of  the  Camp  David  scheme,  we  may  note  at  the  outset 
that  it  covers  mainly  the  problem  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  section  of  the 
Agreement  dealing  with  the  Palestinians  is  entitled  the  "West  Bank  and  Gaza". 
The  first  important  question  arises  as  to  whether  the  scope  of  the  provisions 
covers  all  the  Palestinian  people.  The  answer  to  that  question  is  undoubtedly  in 
the  negative.  Such  answer  may  be  inferred  from  a  careful  reading  of  paragraph 
A.  Certainly,  the  wording  of  this  paragraph  covers  three  groups  of  the 
Palestinian  people.  The  first  group  includes  the  Palestinians  living  in  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  whose  problem  was  addressed  by  paragraph  A.  1(a)  and  (b).  The 
second  group  includes  the  Palestinians  who  were  displaced  from  the  'West  Bank 
and  Gaza  by  the  Israeli  military  authorities  after  the  June  1967  War.  The 
problem  of  this  group  was  dealt  by  paragraph  A.  3.1  11  The  third  group  includes 
the  Palestinian  refugess  of  1948  whose  problem  was  tackled  by  paragraph  A.  4. 
It  follows  that  other  Palestinian  groups  have  been  left  outside  the  scope  of 
the  Camp  David  formula.  Suygh  pointed  out  three  Palestinian  groups  falling 
outside  the  scope  of  the  scheme  :  the  Palestinians  who  left  Gaza  and  the  West 281 
Bank  by  their  own  will  after  the  Israeli  occupation  of  1967;  those  who  left 
their  homes  in  Palestine  in  1948,  either  by  their  own  free  will  or  by  force  but 
not  officially  registered  as  refugees  by  the  U.  N.  R.  W.  A.;  and  the  Arab 
Palestinians  living  in  Israel.  lr*A 
From  the  foregoing,  it  is  clear  that  the  scope  of  the  scheme  covers  some 
important  groups  of  the  Palestinian  people.  The  scope,  looked  at  from  this 
angle,  reflects  the  intention  of  Israel,  perhaps  for  the  first  time  in  its 
history,  to  give  particular  solutions  to  the  Palestinian  problem.  "' 
Quite  apart  from  the  above  advantage,  the  scheme  is  inadequate  since  it  leaves 
some  groups  of  Palestinians  outside  its  scope.  Additionally,  the  extent  of  the 
scope  differs  from  group  to  group  and  from  place  to  place.  For  example,  while 
it  covers  all  the  Palestinians  living  in  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank,  it  covers  only 
part  of  the  Palestinians  displaced  from  these  areas  after  1967,  but  it  does  not 
cover  any  of  the  Palestinians  living  in  Israel. 
Furthermorep  the  scope  as  defined  at  Camp  David,  lacks  the  necessary  precision 
and  gives  rise  to  disputes  as  well  as  uncertainty,  such  as  in  the  case  of  East 
Jerusalem  and  the  Israeli  settlers  in  the  area. 
While  the  gaegraphical  scope  of  Resolution  242  covers  the  Palestinian 
territories  occupied  in  1967,  including  undoubtedly  East  Jerusalem,  6,  ý`  the  scope 
of  the  Camp  David  Accords  does  not  cover  East  Jerusalem.  In  his  reply  to 
Jordanian  questions  concerning  the  meaning  of  the  Camp  David  Accords,  President 
Carter  indicated  that  a  distinction  must  be  made  between  Jerusalem  and  the  rest 
of  the  West  Bank  because  of  the  City'B  special  status  and  circumstances.  '  57 
According  to  him: 282 
"The  issue  of  the  status  of  Jerusalem  was  not  resolved  at  Camp  David  and  must 
be  dealt  with  in  subsequent  negotiations.  The  questions  of  how  the  Arab 
inhabitants  of  East  Jerusalem  relate  to  the  self-governing  authority  remains  to 
be  determined  in  the  negotiations  on  the  transitional  arrangements.  ""' 
The  delimitation  of  the  provisions  to  exclude  the  territory  of  East  Jerusalem 
represents  a  deviation  from  the  position  adopted  by  Resolution  242.  This  must 
undermine  the  Accords  as  it  Is  legally  based  on  Resolution.  242. 
A  further  worthwhile  question  in  this  respect  is  whether  or  not  the  Israeli 
settlers  living  in  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank  fall  under  the  scope  of  the 
provisions.  This  question  will  be  examined  later.  Suffice  to  point  out  at  this 
stage  that  the  wording  of  paragraph  Al  which  used  the  word  "inhabitants" 
instead  of  the  words  "Palestinian  inhabitants"  suggests  that  the  intention  was 
to  refer  to  all  the  inhabitants  in  the  area,  including  the  Arabs  as  well  as  the 
Israeli  settlers. 
The  refugee  problem  was  dealt  with  in  paragraph  A4  of  the  Agreement  which 
reads  as  follows: 
"Egypt  and  Israel  will  work  with  each  other.  and  with  other  interested  parties 
to  establish  agreed  procedures  for  a  prompt,  just  and  permanent  implementation 
of  the  resolution  of  the  refugee  problem.  "Iss 
Clearly,  the  language  of  the  above  text  is  taken  from,  and  refers  to,  para.  2(b) 
of  Security  Council  Resolution  242  which  calls  for  "a  just  solution  for  the 
refugee  problem.  "Ic,  "  Like  Resolution  242,  the  above  text  used  the  word  "refugee" 
as  a  reference  to  the  Palestinian  as  well  as  Jewish  refugees.  r-'  It  is  not 
intended  here  to  examine  in  detail  the  position  of  the  Camp  David  Accords 
towards  the  refugee  problem,  because  of  to  the  simple  fact  that  it  referred  to 283 
and  adopted  the  position  of  Resolution  242.  The  position  of  the  latter  on 
refugees  has  been  examined  by  several  writers  elsewhere  and  it  seem  unnecessary 
to  repeat  what  had  been  said  in  this  respect  suffice  it  here  to  refer  very 
briefly  to  the  position. 
Para  2(b)  of  Resolution  242  affirms  "the  necessity  for  achieving  a  just 
settlement  of  the  refugee  problem".  A  careful  reading  of  this  wording  suggests  a 
number  of  observations. 
The  use  of  the  term  "refugee"  instead  of  the  term  "Palestinian  refugee"  has 
been  understood  as  a  reference,  not  only  to  the  1948  Arab  refugees  but  also  to 
the  Jewish  refugees  who  fled  to  Israel  from  Arab  states  during  the  Arab-Israeli 
wars.  This  interpretation  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  intention  of  this 
paragraph  is  to  link  a  solution  for  the  Palestinian  refugees  with  a  solution  for 
the  Jewish  refugees.  Israel  has  suggested  that  Arab  states  must  absorb  the 
refugees  of  1948  in  return  for  Israel's  absorption  of  a  similar  number  of 
Jewish  refugees  who  have  fled  from  Arab  states.  1r,:  2 
Certainly,  this  paragraph  overlooked  the  right  of  the  1948  refugees  to  return 
to  their  homeland  in  Israel.  There  is  no  express  provision,  nor  explicit  or 
implicit  mention  of  the  General  Assembly  Resolution  194  of  1949  which  called 
for  their  return.  Even  if  we  accept,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  the  term 
"Just  settlement"  includes  the  right  of  those  refugees  to  return,  such  return 
cannot  be  within  a  context  of  self-determination.  It  is  well  established  that 
the  recognition  of  Israel's  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  as  stipulated 
by  Resolution  242  means  the  abrogation  of  the  Partition  resolution  of  1947  and 
the  approval  of  Israel's  sovereignty  over  most  of  the  territories  earmarked  to 
the  Arab  Palestinians  by  the  Partition  resolution.  '  r--11  Also,  the  wording  of  this 284 
article  suggests  that  its  intention  was  to  provide  the  goneral  principle  which 
výould  constitute  the  basis  for  settling  the  problem  of  the  Palestinian  refugees 
(i.  e.  by  linking  it  to  the  Jewish  refugees)  rather  than  to  prescribp  the  specific 
terms  of  a  settlement. 
Finally,  this  paragraph  is,  in  effect,  an  agreement  to  q(-Pk  fut.  her  agreement. 
Thus,  according  to  Tac  na-  Arica-Arb-itLa  t  lull  (1925),  it  created  an  obligation  In 
international  law  to  negotiate  in  good  faith.  Iii  other  words,  this  paragraph  is 
a  recommendation  to  negotiate  the  refugee  problem  in  good  faith.  "I 
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The  Vest  Rqlnk  aind  Gaza 
The  first  Camp  David  Agreement  provides  for  a  three-stage  scheme  to  resolve 
the  problem  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  In  af  irst  stage,  Egypt,  Israel  and 
Jordan  would  negotiate  and  agree  on  the  modalities  for  establishing  a 
self-governing  authority  for  these  areas  and  would  define  its  powers  and 
responsibilites.  'r-r-  After  the  completion  of  the  negotiations,  free  elections 
would  be  held  to  elect  a  self-governing  authority.  "-r- 
In  a  second  stage,  transitional  arrangements  would  be  set  up  for  a  period  not 
exceeding  five  years.  During  this  period  the  inhabitants  would  be  granted  full 
autonomy.  IG7-  The  Israeli  military  government  and  its  civilian  administration 
would  be  withdrawn,  "'  to  be  replaced  by  the  elected  self-governing 
authority.  "-'.  Upon  the  establishment  of  this  local  government  most  Israeli 
military  forces  would  be  withdrawn  and  those  remaining  would  be  redeployed  into 
specified  security  locations.  170 
In  a  third  and  final  stage,  the  Palestinians  would  be  able  to  determine  the 
future  of  the  area  before  the  end  of  the  transitional  period.  According  to  the 
Agreement,  by  the  end  of  the  third  year  after  the  beginning  of  the  transitional 
period,  negotiations  would  take  place  to  determine  the  final  status  of  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  and  its  relationship  with  its  neighbours.  171 
It  must  be  acknowledged  that  the  provisions  on  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
abounded  with  so  much  ambiguity  that  it  was  obvious  that  several  phrases  and 
expressions  were  carefully  designed  to  "fuzz  over  the  issue  rather  than  resolve 
it.  11  172  As  John  Murphy  observes: 286 
"The  provisions  on  Palestinian  self-government  are  largely  hortatory, 
deliberately  ambiguous  and  envisage  that  agreement  on  the  more  difficult  issues 
arising  out  of  the  situation  will  be  reached  in  future  negotiations.  ""' 
One  must  admit  that  the  differing  interpretations  of  the  Agreement  on  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  adopted  by  each  party  tend  to  give  the  impression  that  it  is  not 
one  single  agreement,  but  two  separate  stances  which  happen,  somehow,  to  be 
included  in  the  same  document.  This  is  evident  in  two  respects.  First,  the 
inability  of  the  two  states  (i.  e.  Egypt  and  Israel)  to  reach  a  Consensus  as  to 
the  main  provisions;  second,  the  dispute  over  the  exact  meaning  of  several 
expressions  which  were  deliberately  inserted  and  which  need  to  be  "defined"  and 
"refined".  174 
This  being  the  case,  it  is  necessary  to  begin  the  present  analysis  by  some 
observations  an  certain  terms  and  expressions  whose  exact  meaning  gives  rise 
to  dispute  among  the  parties. 
"Full  autonomy"  is  the  first  term  which  needs  to  be  considered.  Para.  A.  I.  (a)  of 
the  first  Camp  David  Agreement  provides  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza  will  be  granted  "full  autonomy-"  1715  It  is  widely  recognised  that 
autonomy  is  a  very  broad  term  which  has  no  precise  meaning.  Carter  recorded 
that  he  spent  several  hours  at  Camp  David  with  Begin  "seeking  a  common 
understanding  of  what  autonomy  meant  -  unsuccessful  ly.  01  17  r-"While  the  term 
autonomy  is  not  a  term  of  art  under  international  law"  observe  Parry  and  Grant 
"it  is  widely  used  in  the  literature  of  international  law  .  11177 
A  typical  definition  of  the  term  can  be  found  in  Crawford: 
"Autonomous  areas  are  regions  of  a  State,  usually  possessing  some  ethnic  or 
cultural  distictiveness  which  have  been  granted  separate  powers  of  internal 287 
administration,  to  whatever  degree$  without  being  detached  from  the  State  of 
which  they  are  part.  For  such  status  to  be  of  present  interest,  it  must  be  in 
some  way  internationally  binding  upon  the  central  authorities.  Given  such 
guarantees,  the  local  entity  may  have  a  certain  status,  although  since  that  does 
not  normally  involve  any  foreign  relations  capacity,  it  is  necessarily  limited. 
Until  a  very  advanced  stage  is  reached  in  the  progess  towards  self-government, 
such  areas  are  not  states.  11178 
In  their  recent  survey  of  twenty  two  autonomous  areas,  Hannon  and  Lillich, 
after  referring  to  "the  extreme  diversity  of  the  entities  surveyed  and  the  wide 
variation  exhibited  in  the  degree  of  autonomy  or  international  self-government 
each  one  enjoys,  "  reached  the  conclusion  that  "autonomy  remains  a  useful,  if 
imprecise,  concept  within  which  flexible  and  unique  political  structures  may  be 
developed.  11  179 
The  use  of  the  term  "autonomy"  in  the  Agreement  gives  rise  to  the  question  of 
the  difference  between  autonomy  and  self-determination. 
According  to  one  view,  autonomy  may  be  regarded  as  internal 
self-determination.  Pomerance  observed  that,  in  the  Wilsonian  view, 
self-determination  was  a  composite  concept  involving  chiefly  the  right  Of 
people  to  choose  sovereignty  (i.  e.  external  self-determination)  and  the  right  of 
people  to  select  its  own  form  of  government  (i.  e.  internal 
self-determination).  '  80  Independence  he  believed,  need  not  be  one  of  the 
options  offered  to  the  population  when  it  is  determining  its  future  status-,  " 
In  the  Western  Sahara  Case.  the  Court  emphasized  the  free  and  genuine  expression 
of  the  will  of  the  people  of  the  territory  as  to  their  future  and  studiously 
avoided  any  reference  to  the  necessity  of  including  the  independence  option.  "32 288 
This  argument  cant  however,  be  criticized.  It  is  not  consistent  with  U.  N. 
practice,  which  suggests  that  self-determination  and  independence  are 
synonymous  in  most  cases.  193  It  is  also  not  in  line  with  the  substantial 
majority  of  jurists  who  support  the  view  that  the  principle  of  self- 
determination  must  include,  but  not  necessarily  require,  the  right  to 
independence.  '  *'A  An  opposite  view  as  to  the  difference  between  autonomy  and 
self-determination  was  advanced  by  Talal  who  wrote: 
"In  legal  and  political  terms  autonomy  and  self-determination  are  not  identical 
and  may  embody  conflicting  ideas.  They  differ  in  a  number  of  respects.  The 
right  of  self-determination  derives  from  the  general  principle  that  the  people 
determine  the  destiny  of  the  territory.  Autonomy  derives  from  the  converse 
proposition  that  the  territory  determines  the  destiny  of  the  people  in  it. 
Autonomy  in  the  modern  sense  is  a  question  of  degree,  ranging  from  a  grant  of 
limited  municipal  or  local  government  conferring  authority  in  such  matters  as 
street  lighting  and  children's  play-grounds,  to  extensive  regional,  governmental 
powers  in  a  federal  association  or  union.  The  right  of  self-determination  of 
peoples  arises  independently  of  grant  and  confers  upon  them  the  international 
law  right  to  determine  their  political  destiny  without  subjection  to  the  control 
of  any  state.  ""' 
It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  a  distinction  may  be  made  between 
transitional  and  permanent  autonomous  regimes.  In  practice,  the  former  have  been 
granted  a  much  more  limited  degree  of  autonomy  to  the  local  community  during 
the  transitional  periodo  de  facto  government  has  often  been  in  the  hands  of  an 
administering  authority  of  local  inhabitants.  '  8r- 289 
The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  with  regard  to  the  meaning  of  the  term  "full 
autonomy"  in  the  Camp  David  Agreement  is  that,  although  the  term  autonomy  has 
no  precise  meaning,  it  has  been  used  by  the  authors  of  the  Agreement  as  a 
reference  to  a  wide  and  extensive  degree  of  self-governing  authority  amounting 
to  the  powers  and  competence  of  a  de  facto  government.  Yet,  it  appears  that  the 
term  was  acceptable  to  the  Egyptians  and  the  Israelis  for  different  reasons. 
From  an  Israeli  perspective,  the  word  "autonomy"  was  chosen  in  preference  to 
the  word  "sovereignty.  "  Israel  was  not  ready  to  give  up  its  sovereignty  over  the 
Vest  Bank  and  Gaza-'  S7  Also  the  term  "autonomy"  would  not  place  Israel  under 
any  precise  obligation  since  the  term  has  no  strict  legal  meaning,  and  covers 
different  degrees  of  self-government  ranging  from  a  grant  of  limited  local 
government  to  extensive  regional  governmental  power  in  a  federal  union. 
From  Egypt's  perspective,  although  the  Egyptians  did  not  favour  the  use  of  the 
term  because  it  enabled  Israel  to  keep  sovereignty  over  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
during  the  transitional  period,  the  term,  however,  was  accepted  for  two  reasons. 
First,  the  Israelis  agreed  on  Egypt's  demand  to  insert  the  word  "full"  before 
the  word  "autonomy".  Clearly  the  term  "full  autonomy"  must  be  interpreted  as  a 
reference  to  an  extensive  rather  than  a  limited  degree  of  autonomy,  thus  the 
Israelis  could  not  claim  in  the  future  that  they  intended  only  a  limited  degree 
of  autonomy.  Secondly,  the  term  "full  autonomy"  is  to  be  understood  as  a 
reference  to  a  de  far-to  Palestinian  government  which  eventually  would  be  a 
state.  It  seems  that  such  meaning  was  in  the  mind  of  the  Israeli  opposition 
leader  when  he  criticised  the  Agreement  at  the  Israeli  Knesset  because  "the 
autonomy  plan"  would  lead  to  the  establishment  of  an  independent  Palestinian 
state.  113  8 290 
The  phrase  "the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people"  needs  to  be 
clarified.  Paragraph  A(c)  of  the  Camp  David  Accords  provides  that  "the 
resolution  from  the  negotiations  must  also  recognize  the  legitimate  rights  of 
the  Palestinian  people.  """  This  expression  is  inaccurate  and  liable  to  cause 
confusion.  In  some  cases,  it  was  apparently  a  synonym  for  the  right  to 
self-determination,  as  in  some  Arab  literature;  190  elsewhere,  it  has  a  different 
meaning  which  does  not  include  the  right  to  self-determination,  as,  for 
instance,  in  paragraph  B9  (a)  of  the  first  American  draft  at  Camp  David-` 
Unfortunately,  there  is  no  satisfactory  answer  to  the  question  of  whether  or  not 
the  right  to  self-determination  was  intended  by  the  phrase.  A  review  of  the 
preparatory  work  of  the  Camp  David  Agreement  reveals  that  this  expression 
appeared  in  the  first  American  draft  which  read  11  ...  The  solution  must  recognize 
the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people".  192  This  term  was  proposed  as 
an  alternative  to  the  language  an  the  Palestinian's  self-determination  proposed 
in  the  Egyptian  draft,  19:  3  but  rejected  totally  by  the  Israelis.  In  the  view  of 
the  Americans,  this  term  is  appropriate  and  well-balanced  as  it  satisfies  both 
the  Egyptians  and  the  Israelis. 
Arab  critics  who  oppose  the  Camp  David  Accords  believe  that  the  words 
"legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people"  are  deliberately  designed  to 
frustrate  the  Palestinian  rights  to  self-determination  by  implying  that  some 
Palestinian  rights  -  most  particularly  the  right  to  an  independent  state  Of 
Palestine  -  cannot  be  pursued.  '  94  The  Israelis,  of  course,  do  not  recognize  that 
the  words  "legitimate  rights"  are  intended  to  cover  self-determination.  At  Camp 
David  the  Israelis  rejected  any  language  on  such  a  right.  Further,  they  carefully 
avoided  any  implicit  reference  to  self-determination.  For  instance,  in  a  letter 291 
appended  to  the  Camp  David  Accords,  Carter  f  elt  constrained  to  point  out  to 
Begin  that  he  was  informed  by  him  that  "in  each  paragraph  of  the  Agreed 
Framework  Document  the  expressions  "Palestinians"  or  "Palestinian  People"  are 
being  and  will  be  construed  and  understood  by  you  as  "Palestinian  Arabs".  "" 
Clearly,  the  aim  of  this  letter  was  to  avoid  any  argument  that  Israel 
recognized  the  Palestinians  as  a  people  and,  therefore,  that  they  are  entitled 
under  the  U.  N.  Charter  to  self-determination.  '  'If- 
From  the  Egyptian  perspective  the  term  "legitimate  rights"  included  the  right 
to  self-determination  According  to  the  Egyptians,  the  term  was  clarified  by  the 
General  Assembly  Resolution  3236  (XXIX)  adopted  on  November  22,1974,  which 
reaffirmed: 
"The  inalienable  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  in  Palestine,  including: 
A)  The  right  to  self-determination  without  external  interference, 
B)  The  right  to  national  independence  and  sovereignty.  "'  97 
The  position  of  the  U.  S.  in  respect  to  the  issue  under  consideration  is  still 
not  clear.  After  the  conclusion  of  the  Camp  David  Accords,  in  a  letter  to  the 
U.  S.  Government,  King  Hussein  of  Jordan  raised  the  question  as  to  whether  the 
inhabitants  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  can  exercise  in  freedom  the  right  of 
self-determination  in  order  to  decide  their  political  future'99  A  careful 
reading  of  Carter's  reply  suggests  that  the  U.  S.  government  preferred  not  to  Put 
a  direct  or  explicit  answer  to  that  question.  In  fact,  the  reply  implied  that 
the  issue  might  be  decided  by  the  parties  concerned  in  the  negotiations  on  the 
final  status  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza,  and  that,  whatever  the  final  agreement, 
the  Palestinians  would  be  entitled  to  reJect  or  accept  it.  199  In  his  words: 292 
"The  Framework  provides  for  the  elected  representatives  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  to  participate  fully  in  the  negotiations  that  will 
determine  the  final  status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  and,  in  addition,  for  their 
elected  representatives  to  ratify  or  reject  the  agreement  reached  in  those 
negotiations.  ""'11 
What  does  the  Camp  David  Agreement  mean  when  it  refers  to  the  representatives 
of  the  Palestinian  people?  201  Again,  no  clear  answer  to  that  question  can  be 
found,  nor  is  any  comprehensive  definition  attempted. 
Before  proceeding  to  explore  the  different  interpretations  advanced  in  respect 
of  this  phrase,  it  is  important  to  indicate  that  such  a  phrase  could  be 
understood  as  referring  to  one  or  more  of  the  following  Palestinian  groups: 
1)  The  inhabitants  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza; 
2)  The  Arab  Palestinians  living  in  Israel  as  Israeli  citizens; 
3)  The  Palestinians  living  outside  the  territory  of  the  former  mandated 
Palestine  as  refugees;  and 
4)  The  Palestinian  Liberation  Organization  (PLO). 
The  U.  S.  government,  i.  e.  the  Carter  administration,  declared  its  position  in 
the  following  words: 
"The  United  States  interprets  the  phrase  "the  representatives  of  the  Palestinian 
people"  not  in  terms  of  any  single  group  or  organization  as  representing  the 
Palestinian  people,  but  as  encompassing  those  elected  or  chosen  for 
participation  in  negotiations.  It  is  expected  that  they  will  accept  the  purposes 
of  the  negotiations  as  defined  in  United  Nations  Security  Council  Resolution 
242,  and  in  the  framework  to  live  in  peace  and  good  neighbourly  relations  with 
Israel  . 
212 293 
This  quotation  is  taken  from  Carter's  reply  to  Jordan  in  answer  to  the  U.  S. 
interpretation  of  certain  provisions  of  the  Camp  David  Accords.  The  U.  S. 
suggested  a  distinction  be  made  between  two  groups  of  Palestinians,  those  who 
accept  Resolution  242  and  recognize  Israel's  right  to  live  in  peace,  and  those 
who  reject  both.  The  former  group  could  take  part  in  the  negotiations,  while  the 
latter  could  not.  Clearly,  the  aim  of  such  a  distinction  was  to  prevent  the 
P.  L.  O.  and  its  supporters  from  participating  in  the  negotiations.  As  is  well 
known,  the  PLO,  until  November  1988,2113  rejected  Security  Council  Resolution 
242.  Under  the  Palestine  National  Charter  of  1964  and  1968,  particularly 
Articles  23  and  26  respectively,  the  PLO  claims  to  be  responsible  for  the 
liberation  of  Palestine  .  2114 
Another  aim  of  the  American  interpretation  was  to  encourage  moderate  elements 
in  the  PLO  to  accept  Resolution  242  and  so  take  part  in  the  proposed 
negotiations.  Under  the  Nixon-Kissinger  administration,  Israel  reached  an 
agreement  with  the  U.  S.  that  the  Americans  would  not  hold  any  negotiation  with 
the  PLO  unless  it  recognized  Resolution  242.  This  agreement  was  still  binding 
on  the  U.  S.  in  1978/79.2"5  Vhatever  the  intention  behind  this  interpretation,  it 
would  be  unreasonable  now,  due  to  the  P.  L.  O's  recognition  of  Resolution  242,  to 
argue  for  the  expulsion  of  the  PLO  from  the  negotiations.  As  is  well  known,  the 
Palestinian  National  Council,  meeting  in  Algeria  on  November  15,1988, 
proclaimed  a  new  moderate  political  programme  endorsing,  for  the  first  time, 
U.  N.  Security  Council  Resolution  21r- 
As  to  the  Israelils,  they  maintained  that  the  phrase  "representative  of  the 
Palestinian  people"  does  not  cover  the  PLO,  Israel's  view  is  that,  while  the 
negotiations  with  the  Palestinians  would  be  based,  according  to  the  Camp  David 294 
Accordsl  on  Resolution  242,  the  PLO  did  not  recognize  that  Resolution.  And  the 
words  "as  mutually  agreed"  were  deliberatly  inserted,  after  the  term  "other 
Palestinians"  in  paragraph  A.  2(b).  207  Vhile  such  a  term  may  cover  the  PLO,  as 
well  as  other  Palestinians,  the  purpose  of  the  term  "as  mutually  agreed.  "  was  to 
permit  Israel  to  reject  the  PLO  In  fact,  this  policy  of  "no  recognition"  is 
deeply  rooted  in  IsraelU  thinking  and  strategy,  as  is  confirmed  in  the 
programmes  of  its  main  political  parties.  20LI  For  example,  in  the  Likud  party 
platform  of  1981,  it  is  stated  that  "...  the  Terrorist  organization  which  calls 
itself  "P.  L.  O.  "  seeks  to  destroy  the  state  of  Israel.  There  will  be  no 
negotiations  with  this  murderous  organization.  112119 
Nothwithstanding,  the  acceptance  of  Resolution  242  in  the  Algeria  Declaration 
of  1988,  the  Israeli  government  has  rejected  the  Declaration  and  the  new 
political  programme,  and  has  claimed  that  the  PLO  continues  to  be  committed  to 
the  destruction  of  Israel.  210 
To  the  foregoing,  we  may  add  that  in  recent  peace  talks.  the  Israeli  government 
has  rejected  an  American  proposal  according  to  which  the  PLO  may  be  consulted 
in  respect  of  forming  the  delegation  of  the  Palestinian  representatives.  2" 
Egypt,  an  the  other  hand,  held  the  view  that  in  the  Camp  David  Agreement  no 
mention  whatsoever  is  made  of  such  exclusion  of  the  PLO  or  it  supporters  .  212 
. 4oreover,  after  the  PLO  recognition  of  Resolution  242  there  is  no  legal  basis 
upon  which  such  exclusion  could  be  based.  In  fact,  during  the  autonomy 
negotiations  in  1980,  Israel  agreed  that  any  Palestinian  living  in  the  Idest  Bank 
and  Gaza  could  be  elected  to  represent  the  Palestinians  regardless  of  his 
political  attitudes.  213 295 
"The  legitimate  security  concerns  of  the  Parties"  is  another  ambiguous 
expression  which  raises  rather  than  resolves  problems.  Paragraph  A.  1.  (a)  of  the 
Accords  provides  that  the  arrangements  for  the  full  autonomy  "should  give  due 
consideration  both  to  the  principle  of  self  -government  by  the  inhabitants  of 
these  territories  and  to  the  legitimate  security  concerns  of  the  parties 
involved.  "-'  14  The  use  of  the  word  "legitimate"  before  the  term  "security 
concerns"  suggests  that  some  security  concerns  of  the  parties  are 
illegitimate  .  21  r,  The  authors,  however,  neither  identify  these  security  concerns 
nor  propose  any  test  for  determining  whether  or  not  a  security  demand  advanced 
could  be  regarded  as  legitimate.  The  difficulty  stems  from  the  fact  that  each  of 
the  parties  had  its  own  understanding  of  the  term.  Egypt,  for  example,  suggested 
that  Israel's  security  concerns  could  be  satisfied  by  stationing  U.  N.  Forces  in 
certain  strategic  areas  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  following  Israel's  complete 
withdrawal  to  the  4  June  1967  lines.  2-Ir-  In  Egypt's  view,  Israel  had  to  accept 
these  arrangements  as  they  are  in  accordance  with  Resolution  242,  which 
constituted  the  basis  of  the  negotiations.  2  17  Israel,  an  the  other  hand,  held 
that  its  security  concerns  could  only  be  achieved  by  maintaining  a  military 
presence,  as  well  as  Jewish  settlements,  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  2111  From  an 
Israeli  view  these  arrangements  are  consistent  with  Resolution  242,  particularly 
paragraph  2(c)  which  affirms  the  necessity  for  guaranteeing  the  territorial 
inviolability  and  political  independence  of  every  state  in  the  area  through 
security  measures.  119  In  fact,  the  question  remains  unresolved. 
The  term  "self-governing  authority"  was  repeated  in  several  paragraphs  in  the 
Agreement.  The  authors,  however,  did  not  specify  the  intended  meaning.  There  are 
three  possible  answers.  The  term  could  be  a  reference  to  an  administrative 296 
council  which  would  be  entitled  to  exercise  exclusive  authority.:  220  The  term 
could  also  be  intended  to  refer  to  an  assembly,  namely,  a  legislative  body  which 
would  exercise  powers  and  functions  an  the  lines  of  the  British  parliamentary 
model.  221  The  term  could  be  intended  to  refer  to  a  full,  local  government, 
which  would  be  entitled  to  exercise  legislative,  executive  and  Judicial 
authorities. 
From  an  Israeli  perspective,  the  term  referred  to  an  adminstrative  council 
which  would  be  directly  elected  by  the  inhabitants.  This  council  would  be 
entitled  to  exercise  executive  authority  as  well  as  a  very  limited  degree  of 
legislative  and  Judicial  authority.  222 
On  the  other  hand,  Egypt  understood  the  term  as  a  reference  to  an  assembly 
composed  of  a  large  number  of  f  reely-elected  members.  This  assembly  would,  in 
turn,  elect  the  administrative  council  from  among  its  members  and  would 
exercise  powerst  functions  and  competences  as  in  the  British  parliamentary 
model  .  223 
Notwithstanding  the  above  views,  one  must  admit  that  what  is  particularly 
disturbing  to  a  lawyer  is  the  way  in  wich  the  term  "self-governing  authority" 
has  been  used  in  the  Camp  David  Accords:  that  is  to  say,  the  meaning  of  the 
term  "self-governing"  in  one  paragraph  differed  from  its  meaning  in  other 
paragraphs.  For  example,  while  the  words  "administrative  council"  were  inserted 
after  the  term  1'se  lf-  governing  authority"  in  para.  A.  1(c)  to  emphasize  the 
meaning  intended,  a  reasonable  understanding  of  the  term  in  para.  A.  1(a)  (where 
the  words  "administrative  council"  were  not  included)  suggests  that  it  is  used 
as  a  reference  to  a  legislative  body  (an  Assembly).  In  the  meantime,  in  other 297 
parts  of  the  agreement  the  term  "self-governing  authority"  can  be  understood  as 
a  reference  to  the  local  government  as  a  whole224 
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  Accords  provided  for  a  three-stage  resolution  of  the 
problem  of  the  Palestinians;  thus,  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  (1)  provisions 
on  the  arrangements  leading  to  the  establishment  of  autonomy;  (2)  provisions  on 
the  autonomy;  and  (3)  provisions  on  the  final  status. 
(1)  In  relation  to  the  first  point,  the  Camp  David  Accords  provide  for  two  main 
arrangements  which  were  to  be  accomplished  in  the  period  prior  to  the 
establishment  of  the  self-governing  authority.  These  are  negotiations  on  the 
powers  and  responsibilities  of  the  self-governing  authority,  and  free  elections 
among  the  inhabitants  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  to  choose  the  self-governing 
authority. 
As  far  as  the  negotiations  are  concerned,  three  main  questions  need  to  be 
explored.  Who  are  going  to  negotiate?  What  is  to  be  discussed?  When  are  the 
negotiations  to  begin  and  end? 
The  first  Camp  David  Agreement  referred  to  the  parties  who  were  to  participate 
in  the  negotiations  in  the  following  terms: 
"Egypt,  Israel  and  Jordan  will  agree  on  the  modalities  for  establishing  the 
elected  self-governing  authority  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  delegations  of 
Egypt  and  Jordan  may  include  Palestinians  from  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  or  other 
Palestinians  as  mutually  agreed.  11226 
This  wording  indicates  clearly  that  there  was  no  intention  to  accept  the 
participation  of  a  separate  Palestinian  delegation,  nor  to  allow  any 
Palestinians  living  outside  the  Occupied  Territories  to  take  part  in  the 
negotiations  unless  approved  by  Israel. 298 
From  an  Israeli  perspective,  an  agreement  to  hold  negotiations  with  a  separate 
Palestinian  delegation  would  mean  a  deviation  from  Israel's  long  and  firm 
position  that  it  cannot  deal  with  the  Palestinians  as  a  separate  entity  because 
it  does  not  recognize  them  as  a  people  in  the  legal  meaning  of  that  term  .  226 
If  the  wording  of  the  above  text  were  to  be  expanded  to  include  a  separate 
Palestinian  delegation,  it  could  be  construed  as  an  implicit  recognition  of  the 
Palestinians  as  a  people.  Also,  from  a  political  view,  Israel  believed  that  any 
Palestinian  delegation  would  be  under  the  influence  of  the  PLO  whose  aim, 
according  to  Israel,  was  the  destruction  of  the  state  of  Israel.  The  drafting 
history  of  this  text  reveals  that  the  idea  of  not  permitting  the  Palestinians  to 
have  a  separate  delegation  appeared  in  the  first  American  draft  submitted  at 
Camp  David.  Its  relevant  portion  reads: 
"Egypt,  Israel  and  Jordan  will  determine  the  modalities  for  establishing  the 
elected  self-governing  authority  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  delegates  may 
include  Palestinians  from  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  .  10227 
A  study  of  this  American  draft  suggests  that,  as  well  as  not  permitting  the 
Palestinians  to  have  a  separate  delegation,  it  also  excluded  from  the  scope  of 
the  draft  any  Palistinians  living  outside  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  only 
group  of  Palestinians  allowed  to  take  part  in  the  negotiations  are  "Palestinians 
from  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza". 
This  language,  which  contained  no  reference  to  Palestinians  from  outside  Gaza 
and  the  Vest  Bank  was  not  accepted  by  Egypt.  It  demanded,  therefore,  that  this 
draft  should  be  amended  in  order  to  permit  other  Palestinians  to  take  part  in 
the  negotiations  .  2211, 299 
Egypt,  it  may  be  recalled,  had  been  obliged  under  the  Resolution  of  the  Arab 
League  Summit  Conference  of  1974  to  regard  the  PLO  as  the  sale  and  legitimate 
representative  of  the  Palestinian  people.  229  Had  Egypt  accepted  the  American 
draft  in  this  respect,  it  would  have  violated  its  obligation  as  an  Arab  League 
member.  Israel,  an  the  other  hand,  was  not  ready  to  negotiate  with  the  other 
Palestinians  because  they  were  mainly  either  members  or  supporters  of  the 
PL02:  30  In  order  to  bridge  the  gap  between  the  two  views,  the  Americans 
proposed  to  add  the  expression  "other  Palestinians  as  mutually  agreed.  "  This  was 
regarded  as  a  well-balanced  expression.  The  term  "Palestinians  from  outside" 
satisfied  the  Egyptians,  while  the  term  "as  mutually  agreed"  satisfied  the 
Israeli's  who  would  be  allowed  to  reject  or  accept  any  Palestinians  from  outside 
the  Occupied  Territories. 
The  question  of  whether  or  not  the  PLO  was  permitted  to  take  part  in  the 
negotiations  has  been  referred  to  earlier.  It  is  sufficient  at  this  stage  to  note 
that  it  remains  unsettled  . 
231 
Having  defined  the  parties  who  would  negotiate,  an  important  question  arises 
as  to  the  situation  if  the  Palestinians  or  Jordanians  refused  to  join  the 
negotiations.  Would  this  undermine  or  delay  the  implementation  of  the  agreed 
provisions  on  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza?  A  somewhat  vague  answer  to  that 
question  can  be  found  in  a  letter  from  Sadat  to  Carter  appended  to  the  Camp 
David  Accords.  This  letter,  dated  September  22,1978,  pointed  out 
"To  ensure  the  implementation  of  the  provisions  relating  to  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  and  in  order  to  safeguard  the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  peoplep 
Egypt  will  be  prepared  to  assume  the  Arab  role  emanating  from  these  provisionst 300 
following  consultations  with  Jordan  and  the  representatives  of  the  Palestinian 
people.  1123;  2 
The  wording  of  the  above  letter  indicates  that  it  was  designed  to  cover  a 
possible  situation  in  which  the  Palestinians  and  Jordanians  reJected 
negotiations  with  Israel,  but  were  willing  to  consult  with  Egypt  in  order  to 
represent  them  in  the  negotiations.  There  is  no  indication  of  what  was  meant  by 
the  word  "consultation".  Moreover,  this  letter  does  not  cover  a  possible 
situation  in  which  the  Palestinians  and/or  the  Jordanians  refused  even  to 
consult  with  Egypt.  Later,  in  another  letter  appended  to  the  1979  Treaty,  Sadat 
and  Begin  agreed  that: 
"In  the  event  Jordan  decides  not  to  take  part  in  the  negotiations,  the 
negotiations  will  be  held  by  Egypt  and  Israel.  "-233 
Clearly,  the  language  used  in  the  above  letter  indicates  that  there  was  no 
intention  to  exlude  the  Palestinians  from  the  negotiations,  although  Jordan  may 
be  excluded  at  its  own  instance. 
Having  indicated  the  parties  who  will  participate  in  the  negotiations,  it 
remains  to  consider  the  topics  which  will  be  discussed.  In  this  respect 
paragraph  Al  (b)  of  the  Camp  David  Accords  provided: 
"The  parties  will  negotiate  an  agreement  which  will  def  ine  the  powers  and 
responsibilities  of  the  self-governing  authority  to  be  exercised  in  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza.  A  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces  will  take  place  and  there 
will  be  a  redeployment  of  the  remaining  Israeli  forces  into  specified  security 
locations.  The  agreement  will  also  include  arrangements  for  assuring  internal 
and  external  security  and  public  order.  11.234 301 
This  text  specified  in  clear  language  the  issues  which  will  be  negotiated, 
namelyt  the  power  and  responsibilites  of  the  self-governing  authority  and 
arrangments  for  assuring  security  and  public  order. 
There  is  no  reference  whatsoever  in  the  whole  text  of  the  Treaty  that  other 
issues  outside  the  scope  of  this  Article  could  be  discussed;  that  is  to  say,  in 
legal  terms,  the  parties  to  the  negotiations  could  not  raise  or  suggest  topics 
outside  the  scope  of  this  Article  for  discussion.  The  objective  here  is  the 
election  issue.  While  it  was  reasonable  to  put  the  elections  among  the  topics 
off  the  agenda,  by  leaving  it  outside  the  scope  of  the  discussion,  the  result 
was  to  leave  all  the  important  and  crucial  matters  to  be  decided  exclusively  by 
Israel.  This  is  a  concession  made  by  the  authors  to  Israel,  perhaps  to  encourage 
it  to  enter  peace  with  Egypt. 
The  language  used  inaccurate  terms  and  expressions  that  need  to  be  defined. 
Unfortunately,  no  definition  of  such  words  can  be  found  either  in  the  provisions 
or  in  the  travaux  preparatnires.  For  example,  the  expression  "arrangements  for 
assuring  internal  and  external  security  and  public  order"  was  not  defined.  In 
considering  this  expression,  no  one  can  underestimate  the  practical  difficulties 
that  might  arise.  There  was  no  consensus  among  the  parties  as  to  what  such 
arrangements  may  entail.  While  the  Israelis  could  interpret  this  term  in  its 
broad  meaning  in  order  to  limit  the  degree  of  autonomy  granted  to  the  Arabs, 
the  Arab  delegations,  seeking  to  enhance  the  powers  and  authorities  of  the  local 
government  vis-a-vis  Israel,  could  interpret  the  term  in  a  narrow  way. 
Again,  the  use  of  ambiguous  language  is  not  surprising.  Quandt,  a  member  of  the 
American  team  at  Camp  David,  admitted  that,  by  the  end  of  the  negotiations, 
when  the  authors  realized  that  the  crucial  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  issue  could  not 302 
be  fully  resolved,  they  approved  an  Israeli  proposal  to  employ  ambiguous 
language  and  a  vague  formula  for  such  unresolved  issues.  2as 
As  regards  the  question  of  the  timing  of  the  negotiations,  the  Camp  David 
Accords  contained  no  reference  to  this  issue.  However,  reference  can  be  found  in 
a  joint  letter  from  Sadat  and  Begin  to  Carter  appended  to  the  Peace  Treaty. 
According  to  this  letter  dated  March  1979,  Egypt  and  Israel  "agreed  to  start 
negotiations  withý  a  month  after  the  f  irst  exchange  of  instruments  of 
ratification  of  the  Peace  Treaty.  "116  The  letter  affirmed  also  that: 
"Egypt  and  Israel  set  for  themselves  the  goal  of  completing  the  negotiations 
within  one  year.  "  In  another  part,  the  letter  provided  that: 
"The  two  governments  agree  ...  to  conclude  these  negotiations  at  the  earliest 
possible  date 
.  012:  37 
2bservations  on  the  attitude  of  the  Camp  David  Accords  and  the  Peace 
Treaty  towards  the  question  of  timing  require  to  be  made.  The  reference  to  the 
timing  of  the  negotiations  in  a  letter  appended  to  the  Treaty,  but  not  included 
in  its  text,  suggests  that  the  agreement  an  timing  was  not  part  of  the  legal 
obligations  of  the  parties  under  the  Treaty.  Also,  the  language  used  suggests 
that  the  intention  was  to  propose  imprecise  and  non-binding  dates.  The  term 
"earliest  possible  date",  for  example,  suggests  such  an  understanding.  Also,  the 
word  "goal"  refers  to  something  which  may  or  may  not  be  achieved.  The 
stipulation  that  the  autonomy  negotiations  will  begin  after  one  month  from  the 
ratification  of  the  Peace  Treaty  suggests  the  existence  of  a  link  between  the 
West  Bank  formula  agreed  at  Camp  David  and  the  Peace  Treaty.  According  to  the 
Egyptians,  such  linkage  is  legally  binding  because  the  Sadat-Begin  joint  letter 
appended  to  the  1979  Peace  Treaty  is  an  integral  part  of  the  Peace  Treaty-230 303 
From  a  political  and  legal  perspective,  the  Egyptians  wanted  to  prove  to  the 
Arab  world  that  they  did  not  sign  a  separate  peace  with  Israel.  Further,  Egypt 
was  obliged  by  Arab  League  resolutions  to  seek  a  comprehensive,  rather  a 
separate,  peace  with  Israel.:  233 
On  the  other  hand,  Israel  held  the  view  that  the  Sadat  -  Begin  letter  did  not 
create  a  binding  obligation.  Rather,  it  could  be  regarded  as  a  political  and 
"non-binding  obligation  .  11.240  The  binding  nature  of  that  letter  was  discussed 
earlier.  Suffice  it  at  this  stage  to  note  that  the  prevailing  view  during  the 
process  of  the  negotiations  was  that  : 
"The  treaty  must  be  legally  independent  of  whatever  happened  on  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza,  even  though  some  degree  of  political  linkage  might  exist  .  "2  41 
In  fact,  the  authors  thought  that  the  West  Bank  formula  might  fail  because  of 
the  actions  or  inactions  of  the  Jordanians  or  Palestinians. 
The  second  step  to  be  taken  af  ter  the  completion  of  the  negotiations  on 
autonomy  was  to  hold  free  elections.  Paragraph  A.  1  (a)  of  the  Camp  David  Accords 
provided  that 
"The  Israeli  military  government  and  its  civilian  administration  will  be 
withdrawn  as  soon  as  self-governing  authority  has  been  f  reely  elected  by  the 
inhabitant  of  these  areas.  ".  242 
Another  reference  to  the  election  issue  can  be  found  in  the  Sadat-Begin  letter: 
"Elections  will  be  held  as  expeditiously  as  possible  after  agreement  has  been 
reached  between  the  parties  .  14243 
Clearly,  there  is  a  general  agreement  in  principle  that  the  proposed  elections 
should  be  freely  held,  but  there  is  no  clarification  whatsoever  of  how  to  deal 
in  practice  with  several  problems  expected  to  be  raised  in  respect  of  the  "free 304 
elections.  "  For  example,  are  the  Israeli  settlers  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
going  to  participate  in  the  elections?  Who  is  going  to  supervise  these 
elections?  How  will  the  number  of  constituencies  be  determined?  Has  Israel  the 
right  to  prevent  some  Palestinians  from  taking  part  in  the  elections  under 
claims  of  national  security?  In  the  light  of  the  fact  that  many  Palestinian 
leaders  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  were  either  in  Israeli  prisons  or  displaced 
outside  the  area,  what  is  their  position  in  the  election  process? 
It  is  interesting  to  observe  that,  so  far  there  is  no  consensus  among  the 
parties  concerned  in  respect  of  these  questions. 
The  language  on  the  elections  could  be  understood  to  mean  that  the  intention 
17 
was  to  hold  the  elections  under  the  supervision  and  the  instruction'  of  the 
Israeli  military  government  in  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank.  In  this  respect,  the 
exclusion  of  the  election  issue  from  the  scope  of  the  paragraph  an  the 
negotiations,  as  well  as  the  absence  of  any  detailed  provision  on  the  elections, 
should  be  considered  with  the  text  of  paragraph  A.  1.  (a)  which  provides  that  the 
military  government  has  to  be  withdrawn  after  (but  not  before)  the  elections.  It 
follows  that  a  reasonable  understanding  of  this  formulation  suggests  that  the 
intention  was  to  hold  the  elections  under  the  military  government. 
The  drafting  history  of  the  paragraph  on  the  elections  reveals  that  the 
American  draft  submitted  at  Camp  David  on  September  10,1978,  adopted  the  same 
line.  Its  relevant  paragraph  on  the  elections  reads: 
"The  Israeli  military  government  and  administration  will  be  abolished  and 
withdrawn  as  soon  as  a  self-governing  authority  can  be  freely  elected  by  the 
inhabitants  of  these  areas  .  11244 305 
Undoubtedly,  this  draft  implied  that  the  elections  were  to  be  held  in  the 
presence  of  the  military  government.  The  rest  of  the  American  draft  contained 
no  mention  of  the  election  issue.  It  appears  that  the  intention  was  to  avoid 
addressing  the  complex  issues  arising  in  respect  of  the  elections.  One  must 
admit  that,  regardless  of  the  intention  behind  such  language,  it  would  be 
paradoxical  to  provide  for  free  elections  under,  or  in  the  presence  of,  a 
military  government  representing  the  occupying  power. 
Before  proceeding  further,  a  brief  mention  of  how  Egypt  and  Israel  interpreted 
and  understood  the  term  "free  election"  ought  to  be  made. 
In  respect  of  the  necessity  of  guaranteeing  the  impartiality  of  the  elections, 
Egypt  proposed  a  number  of  points:  international  supervision  of  the  elections 
processf  the  withdrawal  of  the  Israeli  forces  from  the  paces  in  which  the 
voting  will  take  place;  a  joint  Palestinian-  Israeli  Gommission  to  be  formed  to 
prepare  for  the  elections;  the  Palestinian  voters  should  have  immunity  against 
any  procedure  which  may  be  taken  by  the  Israeli's  against  them;  and  Israeli 
personnel  to  be  prevented  from  entering  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank  on  election 
day.:  24r-  According  to  Egyptian  sources,  the  Israeli's  agreed  during  the  autonomy 
negotiations  to  hold  the  elections  under  international  supervision.  The 
remaining  points  have  not  been  settled.  246 
Israel,  on  the  other  hand,  maintained  that,  due  to  considerations  of  national 
security,  it  should  have  the  right  to  object  to,  and  prevent,  any  candidate  from 
being  elected,  in  particular  the  supporters  of  the  PLOj47 
Before  leaving  this  point,  a  final  and  relevant  question  must  not  be 
overlooked,  namelyt  whether  the  Israeli  settlers  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  were 
to  be  entitled  to  participate  in  the  elections.  Again,  the  Accords  and  the  Peace 306 
Treaty  provided  no  answer.  A  review  of  the  preparatory  work  reveals  that  each 
party  had  its  own,  and  different,  answer  to  the  question. 
From  an  Israeli  perspective,  based  on  the  assumption  that  its  settlement 
policy  was  legal  and  therefore  that  the  settlers  would  remain  permanently  in 
the  area,  the  settlers  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  had  the  right  to  participate  in 
the  elections  as  candidates  and  voters.  This  view  was  reflected  in  the  original 
autonomy  plan  submitted  in  1977,  Articles  4  and  5  providing  respectively  for 
the  following: 
114.  Any  resident,  18  years  old  and  above,  without  distinction  of  citizenship,  or 
if  stateless,  will  be  entitled  to  vote  in  the  elections  to  the  Administrative 
Council. 
5.  Any  resident  whose  name  is  included  in  the  list  of  candidates  for  the 
Administrative  Council  and  who,  on  the  day  the  list  is  submitted,  is  25  years 
old  or  above,  will  be  entitled  to  be  elected  in  the  Council.  "'211 
Clearly,  the  word  "resident"  in  the  above  text  refers  to  the  Palestinians  as 
well  as  Jewish  settlers  in  the  area.  Further,  the  words  "without  distinction  of 
citizenship"  were  added  to  emphasize  the  meaning  intended  by  the  word 
"resident.  "  Thust  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Israeli  settlers  under  the  above 
text  have  the  right  to  vote  and  to  be  elected.  However,  it  is  interesting  to 
note  that  the  Israeli  autonomy  plan  of  1982  contained  no  mention  of  the  Israeli 
settlers  in  the  area.  Rather,  it  spoke  in  Article.  1  of  a  self-governing 
authority  that  would  comprise  one  body  representing  only  the  Arab  inhabitants, 
thus  excluding  any  role  for  the  Jewish  settlers  in  the  elections.  211 
]Iotwithstanding  these  two  contradicting  views,  the  American  officials  believed 
that  the  Camp  David  Accords  did  not  deal  with  the  status  of  the  Israeli 307 
settlements  in  the  area,  and  therefore,  their  relationship  with  the 
self-governing  authority  would  have  to  be  dealt  within  the  course  of  the 
negotiations.  "" 
Having  examined  the  procedures  leading  to  the  establishment  of  the 
self-governing  authority  we  proceed  now  to  consider  the  provisions  on  the 
self-governing  authority. 
The  main  provisions  relating  to  the  self-governing  authority  in  the  Camp  David 
Accords  read  as  follows: 
"In  order  to  provide  full  autonomy  to  the  inhabitants,  under  these  arrangements 
the  Israeli  military  government  and  its  civilian  administration  will  be 
withdrawn  as  soon  as  a  self-governing  authority  has  been  f  reely  elected  by  the 
inhabitants  of  these  areas  to  replace  the  existing  military  government. 
The  parties  will  negotiate  an  agreement  which  will  define  the  powers  and 
responsibilities  of  the  self-governing  authority. 
The  agreement  will  also  include  arrangements  for  assuring  internal  and 
external  security  and  public  order.  A  strong  local  police  force  will  be 
establishedt  which  may  include  Jordanian  citizens.  In  addition,  Israeli  and 
Jordanian  forces  will  participate  in  Joint  patrols  and  in  the  manning  of  control 
posts  to  assure  the  security  of  the  borders. 
When  the  self-governing  authority  (Administrative  Council)  in  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza  is  established  and  inaugurated,  the  transitional  period  of  five  years 
will  begin.  "261 
Another  mention  of  the  self-governing  authority  can  be  found  in  the  Sadat- 
Begin  joint  letter  appended  to  the  Peace  Treaty: 308 
11  ... 
The  establishment  of  the  self-governing  authority  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
in  order  to  provide  full  autonomy  to  the  inhabitants.  The  self-governing 
authority  will  be  established  and  inaugurated  within  one  month  after  it  has 
been  elected,  at  which  time  the  transitional  period  of  five  years  will  begin. 
The  Israeli  military  government  and  its  civilian  administration  will  be 
withdrawn  to  be  replaced  by  the  self-governing  authority  as  specified  in  the 
'Framework  for  Peace  in  the  Middle  East'll.  2r-2 
The  wording  of  these  provisions  clearly  indicates  that,  while  the  intention  of 
the  authors  was  to  leave  the  whole  matter  of  the  self-governing  authority  to  be 
resolved  in  the  negotiations,  certain  issues  had  been  settled  at  Camp  David,  e.  g. 
the  agreement  that  the  self-governing  authority  would  establish  a  strong  local 
police  force. 
Generally  speaking,  the  structure  of  a  "local  government"  or  "an  autonomous 
entity"  may  be  examined  by  reference  to  three  main  points:  the  legislative 
authority;  the  executive  authority;  and  the  Judicial  authority;  as  well  as  other 
particular  issues  such  as  control  over  foreign  relations,  defence  and  natural 
resources.  For  the  sake  of  clarity,  it  would  help  if  we  examined  the  relevant 
provisions  relating  to  autonomy  aloniz  these  points. 
So  far  as  a  legislative  authority  is  concerned,  it  is  interesting  to  observe 
that  neither  the  Camp  David  Accords  nor  the  Joint-letter  appended  to  the  1979 
Treaty  contained  any  mention  of  the  legislature.  The  question  of  whether  or  not 
tuey,  are  legally  permitted  to  establish  a  legislative  authority  is,  therefore,  a 
matter  of  interpretation,  and  two  conflicting  views  have  been  advanced. 
According  to  one  view,  the  provisions  must  be  understood  as  implying  a 
legislative  body  possessing  the  power  to  enact  laws  and  regulations.  2F-3  The 309 
second  view  holds  that  the  intention  was  to  give  the  administrative  council 
power  to  promulgate  regulations  .  2654 
The  first  view  is  based  on  the  argument  that  a  reasonable  understanding  of  the 
whole  text  and  language  used  suggests  that  the  self-governing  authority  should 
be  entitled  to  exercise  an  extensive  degree  of  legislative  competence,  which 
would  necessarily  include  the  enactment  of  laws  as  well  as  regulations.  2",  In 
support  of  this  view,  the  following  reasons  can  be  mentioned: 
=  The  term  "full  autonomy"  has  been  used,  as  mentioned  earlier,  to  refer  to  a 
wide  and  extensive  degree  of  autonomy.  Understood  in  conjunction  with  the  term 
"transitional  period"  the  term  "full  autonomy"  must  be  construed  as  a  reference 
to  a  de  facto  government  which  includes  a  legislative  body. 
=  The  statement  in  paragraph  A.  1  that  the  self-governing  authority  would 
"replace"  the  military  government,  as  mentioned  earlier,  implies  that  the 
self-governing  authority,  should  exercise  all  the  powers  exercised  by  the 
military  government,  including  the  enactment  of  laws  and  regulations.  211 
=  Turning  back  to  the  records  of  the  negotiations,  it  appears  that  the  first 
American  draft  at  Camp  David  was  in  line  with  the  Egyptian  view,  According  to 
this  draft,  the  self-governing  authority  would  replace  the  military  government 
which  would  be  "abolished  .  41267  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  word  "replace"  has  to 
be  considered  in  conjunction  with  the  word  "abolished".  It  follows  that  the 
self-governing  authority  should  exercise  all  the  powers  and  competence  of  the 
abolished  government.  As  is  well-known  the  Israeli  military  government  is 
empowered  to  enact  laws.:  2r-9 
=  It  may  be  also  argued  that  an  extensive  review  of  international  practice 
reveals  that  the  great  majority  of  autonomous  entities  have  a  locally-elected 310 
legislative  body  as  the  fundamental  source  of  local  government  power.  2G9 
According  to  Hannum  and  Lillich,  "while  the  extent  of  legislative  competence 
varies  considerablyt  as  do  the  designations  both  for  the  body  itself 
(legislature,  council,  parliament)  and  for  the  instruments  enacted  (laws, 
decrees,  regulations),  the  existence  of  an  elected  legislative  body  is  nearly 
universal.  11260 
In  sum,  the  Egyptians  maintained  that  the  term  "self-governing  authority" 
refers  to  "an  authority  which  governs  itself  by  itself...  no  outside  source  vests 
it  with  its  autharity.  ";  2r,  '.  The  intention  was  to  establish  a  de  facto  democratic 
structure  of  government  by  and  for  the  people  that  would  be  able,  after  the 
transitional  period,  to  form  a  de  Jure  government. 
In  practicel  the  Egyptians  envisaged  an  elected  body  (asssembly)  whose  members 
would  fulfill  the  legislative  functions  as  well  as  exercise  the  powers  that  an 
elected  representative  body  usually  does.  This  view  can  be  f  ound  in  Egypt's 
"Proposed  Model  of  Full  Autonomy  f  or  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip.  ',.  2r-2 
According  to  this  proposal,  the  self-governing  authority  would  be  composed  of 
two  main  organs,  a  council  and  "An  assembly  composed  of  all  freely-elected 
representatives  f  rom  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  ...  The  Assembly  will  take  over  and 
replace  the  authority  of  the  military  government  in  enacting  laws  and 
regulations,  formulating  and  supervising  policies,  adapting  the  budget,  levying 
taxes,  etc.  Its  internal  organization  of  chairmen  with  one  or  more 
vice-chairman,  its  rules  of  procedure  and  the  number  and  composition  of  its 
committees  will  be  determined  by  the  Assembly  itself.  "2r-3 
In  another  part  of  that  proposal,  the  Egyptians  suggested  that: 311 
"The  S.  G.  A.  (self-governing  authority)  will  be  composed  of  80-100  members  freely 
elected  f  rom  the  Palestinian  people  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  "21" 
9  The  second  view,  advanced  by  Israel,  held  that  the  intention  was  not  to 
establish  a  legislative  body.  Rather,  it  was  to  give  the  self-governing 
authority,  which  would  take  the  form  of  an  administrative  council,  the  authority 
to  promulgate  regulations  in  respect  of  matters  operated  by  it.  In  support  of 
this  view,  the  following  reasons  can  be  mentioned. 
In  the  first  place,  the  term  "self-governing  authority",  according  to  Israel, 
had  only  one  meaning,  i.  e.  administrative  council.  The  wording  of  paragraph  A.  1.  c 
supported  this  as  the  words  "administrative  council"  were  inserted  after  the 
term  "self-governing  authority"  to  emphasise  the  meaning  intended-"' 
Moreover,  the  Israelis  did  not  accept  Egypt's  view  that  the  self-governing 
authority  should  have  all  the  powers  exercised  by  the  military  government  after 
its  withdrawal.  According  to  Begin,  what  the  word  "withdrawal"  meant,  very 
simply,  was  that  the  Israeli  military  presence  would  be  physically  withdrawn, 
but  not  abolished.:  2r,  6  The  powers  of  the  administrative  council  would  devolve 
from  this  military  government  which  would  continue  to  exercise  functions, 
including  the  enactment  of  laws  .  2G7  Along  the  same  lines,  Ruth  Lapidoth  argued: 
"The  Camp  David  Accords  did  not  provide  for  the  automatic  transfer  of  all  the 
powers  of  the  military  government  and  its  civilian  administration  to  the 
self-governing  authority.  If  such  a  complete  transfer  of  authority  had  been 
aimed  at,  it  would  not  have  been  necessary  to  state,  as  the  Camp  David 
framework  did,  that  "the  Parties  will  negotiate  an  agreement  which  will  define 
the  powers  and  responsibilities  of  the  self-governing  authority".  112c-1 312 
The  drafting  history  of  the  paragraph  on  the  transfer  of  power  to  the 
self-governing  authority  reveals  that  the  word  "abolished"  as  used  in  the 
proposed  text  was  deleted  in  the  final  draft.  That  is  to  say,  while  the  U.  S. 
draft  used  the  expression  "the  Israeli  military  government  and  administration 
will  be  abolished  and  withdrawn,  112c-ý-,  the  word  "abolished"  did  not  appear  in  the 
final  text  which  became  paragraph  A  1(a)  of  the  Camp  David  Accords. 
Also,  it  can  be  argued  that,  despite  the  fact  that  a  large  number  of  autonomous 
entities  have  legislative  bodies,  there  exist  several  governed  only  by  an 
administrative  council,  as,  for  example,  in  the  transitional  League  of  Nations 
administration  for  the  Saar,  which  was  governed  by  an  administrative  council 
without  any  legislative  body  .  270  Similarly,  the  Landowners'  Council  in  Shanghai 
and  the  systems  of  cultural  autonomy  within  the  Belgian  linquistic  communites 
and  under  the  Ottoman  millet  systems  are  examples  of  autonomous  entities  which 
lack  a  separate  legislative  body  .  271 
In  support  of  this  view,  the  Israelis  argued  that  they  made  it  clear  before  and 
after  the  Camp  David  Accords  that  no  separate  legislative  body  was  envisaged. 
The  original  Israeli  autonomy  plan  submitted  by  Begin  on  December  28,1977, 
refers  to  this  limited  function.  Paragraph  10  of  that  plan  provided  that  the 
administrative  council  shall: 
"Promulgate  regulations  relating  to  the  operation  of  these  departments  (which  it 
will  operate)272 
Alsot  paragraph  19  of  the  same  proposal  provided  that  a  committee  will  be 
established  to  determine: 
"What  will  be  the  competence  of  the  administrative  council  to  promulgate 
regulations 
. 
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Again,  the  Israelis  adhered  to  the  same  line  during  the  autonomy  negotiations 
which  followed  the  conclusion  of  the  1979  Treaty.  In  their  proposal  submitted 
in  January  1982  the  Israelis  suggested  that  the  proposed  council  "will, 
moreover,  have  a  wide  range  of  powers  to  promulgate  regulations  as  required  by 
a  body  of  this  kind  .  11274 
Notwithstanding  the  above,  it  is  clear  that  Israel's  rejection  of  the  existence 
of  a  legislative  body,  and  the  very  limited  power  which  was  proposed  by  the 
Israelis  to  be  granted  to  the  administrative  council,  should  be  understood  in 
the  light  of  its  view  that  the  Palestinians  should  permanently  remain  under  its 
sovereignty  after  the  end  of  the  transitional  period  .  275 
So  far  as  Judicial  authority  is  concerned,  it  may  be  useful  at  the  outset  to 
indicate  that  it  was  firmly  recognized  that  a  free  and  independent  Judiciary 
formed  part  of  any  politically  autonomous  entity  .  276  However,  this  independence 
does  not  necessarily  imply  total  separation  from  the  central  or  sovereign 
judicial  authority  as  it  is  common  for  appeals  from  local  courts  to  be  heard  in 
higher  courts  in  the  central  government.  277 
Generally  speaking  two  areas  can  be  regarded  as  criteria  for  determining  the 
degree  of  local  Judical  autonomy;  the  manner  of  selection  of  local  judges, 
particularly  the  judges  of  the  highest  local  court,  and  whether  or  not  local 
matters  may  be  appealed  to  a  higher  tribunal  outside  the  autonomous  entity's 
jurisdiction  .  278 
It  has  been  observed  that  entities  with  high  or  even  moderate  degrees  of 
autonomy  have  total  control  over  the  appointment  of  local  judges,  e.  g.,  the 
proposed  Turkish  "Federal  State  of  Cyprus,  Eritrea,  Catalonia,  the  Emirates  and 
the  Swiss  cantons  .  279 314 
Yet,  even  where  local  courts  are  otherwise  independent  and  selected  by  local 
authoritiest  most  autonomous  entities  are  subject  to  the  ultimate  control  of  the 
highest  court  of  the  national  Judiciary.  It  was  also  observed  that  such  appeals 
are  appropriate  only  to  consider  the  cons  ititutionality  of  local  enactments  or 
challenges  that  local  actions  are  contrary  to,  or  beyond  the  powers  of,  the 
basic  constituent  documents  defining  the  relationship  between  the  autonomous 
and  principal  entities.  290 
Turning  to  the  Camp  David  Accords  and  the  Peace  Treaty,  no  explicit  or 
implicit  mention  of  the  judical  authority  can  be  found.  Moreover,  a  review  of 
the  Camp  David  talks  and  the  travaux  preparatoires  of  the  Peace  Treaty  suggests 
that  the  issue  of  the  judicial  authority,  as  part  of  the  would-be  self-governing 
authority$  was  never  discussed. 
From  the  above,  it  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  intention  was  to  leave 
such  questions  to  be  decided  in  the  negotiations. 
Notwithstanding,  it  is  not  irrelevant  before  leaving  this  point  to  refer  in 
brief  to  the  views  expressed  by  Egypt  and  Israel  in  respect  of  the  local 
judicial  authority  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 
Prior  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Camp  David  Accords  and  the  Peace  Treaty,  the 
only  reference  to  the  Judicial  authority  can  be  found  in  Begin's  Autonomy  Plan 
announced  on  December  28,1977.  It  pointed  out  that  the  "administration  of 
justice"  was  among  the  departments  which  would  be  operated  by  the 
administrative  council.  2191 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  a  similar  text  can  be  found  in  the 
Israeli  Autonomy  Plan  submitted  in  January  1982: 315 
"The  powers  to  be  granted  to  the  authorityO  under  these  proposals,  are  in  the 
f  ollowing  domains: 
1.  Administration  of  Justice,  Supervision  of  the  administrative  system  of  the 
courts  in  the  areas  dealing  with  matters  connected  with  the  prosecution 
system  and  with  the  registration  of  companies,  partnerships,  patents, 
trademarks,  etc.  ";  261:  2 
It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  this  text  overlooked  several  important  issues 
in  respect  of  the  Judicial  authority,  e.  g.  the  relations  between  the  local  courts 
and  the  Israeli  courts  and  the  appointment  of  Judges.  Also,  no  mention  of  a 
supreme  court  or  appeal  courts  was  made. 
Turning  to  Egypt's  view,  we  may  note  that  it  employed  clear  language  calling 
for  an  efficient  and  independent  judiciary.  The  Egyptian  proposed  model  for  full 
autonomy  refers  to  that  issue  in  paragraph  IV.  4(e): 
"The  judicial  authority  will  be  manifested  in  a  system  of  courts  of  law,  courts 
of  appeal  and  supreme  court  enjoying  full  guarantees  for  independence  and 
efficiency  in  their  administration  of  Justice.  "-2133 
Although  the  examination  of  the  above  text  is  outside  the  realm  of  this  work,  it 
is  interesting  to  observe  that  the  Egyptian  proposal  implied  a  total  separation 
of  the  local  courts  from  the  Israeli  courts. 
Two  observations  in  connection  with  the  views  of  both  Egypt  and  Israel  appear 
necessary.  While  Egypt  envisaged  a  complete  and  independent  judiclarys  the 
Israelis  proposed  a  moderate  degree  of  local  judical  autonomy,  but  not 
completely  independence.  Israel's  view  in  this  respect  was  in  line  with  the 
general  trend  of  international  practice  in  this  respect.  204  Several  important 
issues  relating  to  the  judicial  authority  have  been  overlooked,  e.  g.  the  relation 
I 316 
between  the  local  courts  and  the  sovereign  state,  the  appointment  of  Judges  and, 
finally  and  most  significantly,  the  legal  staus  of  the  Israeli  settlers  in  the 
area  vis  a  vis  the  Arab  local  courts  there.  The  absence  of  clear  provisions  on 
such  issues  will  open  the  door  to  differences  and  difficulties. 
Vhile  the  preceding  analysis  shows,  for  example,  that  an  autonomous  entity  nay 
or  may  not  have  a  legislative  bodyq  there  is  no  doubt  that  any  autonomous 
entity  must  have  an  identifiable  executive  branch  of  government  headed  by  a 
chief  executivel  be  that  a  governor,  president,  prime  minister  or  an  executive  or 
administrative  council  296 
Generally  speaking,  an  executive  council  is  gianted  power  to  administer  all  the 
affairs  of  the  local  inhabitants,  with  the  exception  only  of  foreign  affairs  and 
defence.  Autonomy  is  not  sovereignty  and  these  two  attributes  of  a  sovereign 
state  could  not  be  conferred  on  an  autonomous  unit  .  28G 
In  examining  the  executive  authority  under  the  Camp  David  autonomy  plan, 
discussion  will  be  confined  to  two  main  points:  the  political  character  of  the 
administrative  councilt  particularly  the  question  of  whether  it  represents  the 
central  or  local  governmento  how  and  by  whom  it  is  selected;  and  the  extent  of 
the  powers  of  the  local  government,  particularly  its  power  over  foreign 
relations,  external  and  internal  security,  and  natural  resources. 
In  respect  of  the  question  of  selecting  the  administrative  council,  the  wording 
of  the  Camp  David  Plan  clearly  indicated  that  the  self-governing  authority 
would  be  elected  by  the  local  inhabitants.:  297  At  this  point,  a  distinction 
should  be  made  between  the  Israeli  and.  Egyptian  interpretations.  Based  on  its 
interpretation  that  the  term  "self-governing  authority"  refers  to  an 317 
administrative  council,  Israel  held  that  the  executive  authority  would  be 
selected  directly  by  the  local  population  and,  thus,  it  would  be  responsible  to 
them,  rather  than  to  the  Israeli  government.  2911  The  origins  of  this  view  can  be 
found  in  the  first  autonomy  plan  submitted  by  Israel  in  1977,  Article  3  of 
which  reads: 
"The  residents  of  Judea,  Syiaria  and  the  Gaza  district  will  elect  an 
Administrative  Council  composed  of  eleven  members.  The  Administrative  Council 
will  operate  in  accordance  with  the  principles  laid  down  in  this  paper.  1126"-" 
A  similar  approach  was  adopted  by  the  Israeli  Autonomy  Plan  submitted  in 
January  1982  which  referred  to  "an  elected  representative  body  ...  that  will  be 
able  to  carry  out  the  functions  assigned  to  it  as  an  administrative  council.  "-29c' 
On  the  other  hand,  Egypt's  view  was  based  an  the  assumption,  mentioned  earlier, 
that  the  Accords  provided  for  the  election  of  an  assembly  which  will  exercise 
powers  and  competences  on  the  British  parliamentary  model.  It  followed  that  the 
executive  authority  should  be  selected  by,  and  from  among,  the  members  of  the 
assembly.  In  this  connection,  we  may  recall  that  Egypt  adhered  to  this  view  in 
the  autonomy  negotiations  following  the  conclusion  of  the  1979  Treaty.:  291  Its 
Proposal  Model  for  Full  Autonomy  submitted  on  January  28,1980  provide  for  "A 
council  composed  of  ten  to  fifteen  members  to  be  elected  from  among  the 
membership  of  the  assembly  . 
11292 
As  to  the  question  of  whether  the  administrative  council  would  administer  the 
laws  and  enactments  of  the  Israeli  governmentt  and  whether  the  latter  would 
retain  separate  powers  to  enforce  national  laws,  two  answers  can  be  found. 
On  the  one  hand,  Egypt  held  that  the  council  should  administer  the  laws 
enacted  by  itself  and  that  the  Israeli  government  did  not  retain  any  power  to 318 
enf  orce  Israeli  laws.:  293  Yet,  the  weakness  of  this  argument  is  that,  whatever 
interpretation  one  may  extract  from  the  provisions,  there  is  no  doubt  that,  if 
the  Camp  David  agreement  is  implemented,  the  administrative  council  will 
administer  Israeli  laws  relating  to  external  defence  and  foreign  affairs.  Also, 
the  Israeli  government  in  legal  terms  would  be  entitled  to  enforce  law 
concerning  these  two  areas. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  we  accept  Israel's  view  that  the  "council"  would  not  be 
entitled  to  enact  laws,  then  the  answer  will  be  clear.  The  council  would 
administer  Israel's  laws  and  enactments,  and  its  government  would  retain  power 
to  enforce  laws  against  the  Palestinian  council. 
As  to  the  question  of  who  will  supervise  the  administrative  council,  it  may  be 
noted  that  no  clear  answer  can  be  f  ound.  Any  answer  must  be  a  matter  of 
negotiation  as  well  as  interpretation.  Let  us  consider  the  views  expressed  an 
that  issue  in  the  preparatory  work  and  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1979  Treaty. 
While,  as  a  matter  of  reasonable  inference,  the  council  elected  solely  by  the 
local  people  should  be  exclusively  responsible  to  them,  the  Israelis  maintained 
that  the  administrative  council  should  be  responsible  to,  and  supervised  by,  the 
military  government.  Brzezinski  recorded  that  he  was  informed  by  Begin  that  the 
authority  of  the  local  government  in  the  West  Bank  should  be  devolved  from  the 
Israeli  military  governor  and  hence  could  be  revoked  by  him  .  294 
In  the  proposal  submitted  by  Egypt  at  Camp  David  on  September  6,1978,  the 
Egyptians  suggested  that  a  distinction  be  made  between  the  local  government  in 
Gaza  and  the  local  government  in  the  West  Bank.  The  former  was  to  be  supervised 
by  Egypto  while  the  latter  to  be  supervised  by  Jordan.  -"'-Is  In  this  respecto  the 
relevant  text  reads: 319 
"There  shall  be  a  transitional  period  not  to  exceed  f  ive  years  from  the  date  of 
the  signing  of  the  "Framework"  during  which  Jordan  shall  supervise  the 
administration  of  the  West  Bank  and  Egypt  shall  supervise  the  administration  of 
the  Gaza  Strip.  "-2915 
It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  at  a  later  stage  Egypt's  proposal  that  she 
and  Jordan  should  supervise  the  local  government  changed.  In  the  autonomy 
negotiations  that  followed  the  conclusion  of  the  1979  Treatyi  Egypt  expressed 
the  view  that  an  elected  Palestinian  assembly  must  supervise  the  administrative 
council. 
As  to  the  American  position,  it  is  clear  that  they  favoured  leaving  the 
question  of  who  would  supervise  the  self-governing  authority  to  be  decided  in 
the  future.  In  this  respect,  the  American  draft  provided  that  the  parties  would 
negotiate  an  agreement  which  would  define  "the  ...  responsibilities  of  the 
self-governing  authority.  00297  Clearly,  the  negotiations  ofi  the  responsibilities 
must  settle  the  question  of  supervision.  The  wording  of  the  American  draft  was 
adopted  by  the  authors  and  appeared  in  paragraph  A-l(b). 
Its 
Ve  turn  now  to  consider  the  extent  of  powers  of  the  authority  over  local  and 
national  matters.  At  the  outset,  we  may  note  that  the  Camp  David  Accordso  as 
well  as  the  joint  letter  appended  to  the  1979  Treaty,  contained  no  mention  of 
these  mattersl  with  the  exception  of  a  reference  to  local  police  forces  and 
joint  Jordanian-Israeli  patrols  to  secure  the  borders. 
Generally  speaking,  the  term  "autonomy  11  refers  to  the  authority  of  the  l0cal 
government  over  the  affairs  of  the  inhabitants,  with  the  exception  of  foreign 
relations  and  defence  which  are  matters  that  should  be  reserved  to  the  central 
or  national  government.  299 320 
We  can  therefore  conclude  that  the  Treaty  should  be  construed  as  granting  the 
Palestinian  local  government  authority  and  powers  over  all  matters,  except 
foreign  relations  and  defence. 
Fortunately,  a  careful  examination  of  the  proposal  submitted  during  and  after 
the  Camp  David  Accords  suggests  an  agreement  among  the  parties  in  this  respect. 
Thus,  both  the  Egyptian  and  Israeli  proposals  suggest  that  the  self-governing 
authority  will  be  granted  the  power  over  agriculture,  finance$  education,  housing 
etc.  -  all  clearly  internal  matters  .  299 
Howeverg  despite  the  agreement  among  the  parties  on  these  matters,  a  dispute 
arose  among  the  parties  in  respect  of  land  and  natural  resources  in  the  area. 
Israell  an  the  one  hand,  held  the  view  that,  at  Camp  David,  it  agreed  to  grant 
full  autonomy  for  the  inhabitants,  but  not  over  the  territory  of  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza. 
Paragraph  A.  1  (a)  used  the  expression  "in  order  to  provide  full  autonomy  to  the 
inhabitants.  "  If  the  territory  was  to  be  included,  the  word  "inhabitants"  should 
have  been  deleted  and  replaced  by  other  words  referring  explicitly  or  implicitly 
to  the  territory.  According  to  the  Israelis  it  follows  that  all  matters  relating 
to  land  were  reserved  to  the  Israeli  government.  3011  The  aim  of  this  Israeli 
interpretation  was  twofold.  First,  Israel  wanted  to  maintain  its  right  to 
establish  new  settlements  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza.  If  the  Palestinian  local 
government  was  to  have  control  over  land,  the  Israelis  might  not  be  able  to 
establish  new  settlements.  As  we  mentioned  earlier,  the  Israeli  government,  as 
well  as  the  opposition  parties  in  Israel,  believe  that  "such  settlement  is  a 
Jewish  inalienable  right  and  an  integral  part  of  our  national  security.  11301 321 
Secondlyo  Israel  wanted  to  keep  tight  control  over  the  water  resources  of  the 
West  Bank.  These  water  resources  are  the  main  sources  of  water  for  the  Israeli 
coastal  plain.  30:  2  Alsol  Israel  wanted  to  guarantee  the  supply  of  water  to  the 
settlers  and  their  farms  in  the  Vest  Bank,  which  had  been  subject  to  Israeli 
control  previously.  Order  192  promulgated  by  the  "Officer  Commanding  -  Israel 
Defence  Forces  in  Judea  and  Samaria"  provided  that  Israeli  officials  are 
responsible  for  all  the  matters  relating  to  the  water  resources  and  their  use 
by  the  inhabitants  .  303 
For  these  reasons,  the  Israeli  Commission  to  study  the  autonomy  plan 
recommended  that  the  water  resources  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  remain  under 
Israeli  contral.  114  This  Israeli  view  was  rejected  by  Egypt  on  the  ground  that 
the  term  "full  autonomy"  implied  the  transfer  of  authority  over  the  land  and 
natural  resources  to  the  self-governing  authority.  306 
As  regards  the  establishment  of  local  police  forcesp  the  Camp  David  Accords 
have  the  following  provision: 
*To  assist  in  providing  such  security,  a  strong  local  police  force  will  be 
constituted  by  the  self-governing  authority.  It  will  be  composed  of  inhabitants 
of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  police  will  maintain  continuing  liaison  on 
internal  security  matters  with  the  designated  Israeli,  Jordanian  and  Egyptian 
officers.  "3116 
The  warding  of  this  paragraph  indicates  clearly  that  once  the  transitional 
period  has  begun  security  would  no  longer  remain,  as  it  is  now,  an  exclusive 
Israeli  responsibility.  In  the  words  of  a  former  Israeli  official,  "Whichever  way 
one  turns  this  textt  whatever  interpretations  one  may  extract  from  it,  what  is 322 
quite  clear  is  that,  if  the  Camp  David  agreement  is  implemented,  it  is  not 
Israel  that  will  control  the  internal  security  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  .  013117 
The  establishment  of  a  local  police  force  is  in  line  with  the  general  trend 
that  local  police  forces  are  seen  as  a  normal  component  of  the  governmental 
power  of  any  autonomous  entity.  31113  Hannum  and  Lillich  observe  that  with  the 
exception  of  cases  such  as  the  Ottoman  millet  which  depended  on  Turkish  civil 
authorities  for  execution  of  their  decisions  within  the  religious  and  cultural 
spheres,  most  autonomous  entities  have  a  local  police  force  to  enforce  local 
legislation  in  the  delegated  areas,  e.  g.  taxation,  trade,  social  welfare  and 
protection  of  the  environment  30<--:  0 
The  warding  used  on  the  Palestinian  police  force  is  taken  from  the  original 
autonomy  plan  submitted  by  Begin  in  1977.  Under  Article  10  of  this  proposall 
"the  supervision  of  local  police  forces"  was  included  within  the  specific  powers 
delegated  to  the  self-governing  authority.  31c,  At  Camp  David  the  first  American 
proposal  submitted  on  September  10,1978  referred  to  the  local  force  in  the 
following  terms: 
"It  will  also  include  arrangementý  for  assuring  internal  and  external  security 
and  public  orderp  including  the  respective  roles  of  Israeli  armed  forces  and 
local  police.  1131  I 
As  to  external  security  and  defence,  there  is  an'  overwhelming  consensus  that 
responsibility  for,  and  authority  over,  national  defence  matters  rest  with  the 
central  or  sovereign  government.  312  The  only  exception  to  this  general 
principle  is  the  proposed  Turkish  Federated  State  of  Cyprus  which  assigned  to 
its  President,  under  Articles  80  and  135  of  the  Turkish  Cypriot  Constitutiono 323 
the  responsibility  for  preserving  the  integrity  of  the  state  and  the  right  to 
receive  any  aid  from  foreign  states,  including  military  aid.:  21:  2 
Turning  back  to  the  Camp  David  Accords,  we  can  find  two  relevant  provisions. 
The  first  suggests  that  this  matter  will  be  defined  in  the  negotiations.  It 
reads  as  follows:  "The  agreement  will  also  include  arrangements  for  assuring 
internal  and  external  security  and  public  order.  11314 
The  second  provision  suggests  that  Jordan  will  take  part  in  respect  of  the 
external  security  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  It  reads  as  follows: 
"In  addition,  Israeli  and  Jordanian  forces  will  participate  in  joint  patrols  and 
in  the  manning  of  control  posts  to  assure  the  security  of  the  borders.  1131r, 
The  wording  of  these  paragraphs  clearly  indicates  that  the  intention  was  to 
make  a  distinction  between  external  security  and  the  security  of  the  borders. 
While  there  were  a  number  of  options  in  respect  of  the  former,  the  Camp  David 
Agreement  specified  one  option  in  respect  of  the  latter,  namely,  joint 
Jordanian-  Israeli  forces  to  safeguard  the  borders.  In  respect  of  this  pointo 
some  comments  require  to  be  made. 
The  Camp  David  Agreement  did  not  provide  an  answer  to  the  question  as  to  what 
exactly  were  to  be  the  borders  which  need  to  be  safeguarded.  The  borders  could 
mean  the  borderline  between  Jordan  and  the  West  Bank,  i.  e.  the  River  Jordan.  A 
senior  Arab  diplomat  held  that  this  was  the  line  intended:  316 
"the  borders  here,  from  the  context,  have  only  one  meaning-,  the  River  Jordan, 
which  meant  that  the  Framework  had  fallen  into  a  serious  trap;  the  recognition 
of  the  River  Jordan  as  the  borderline  between  Israel  and  Jordan.  `:  -,  17 
Alternatively,  it  could  mean  the  pre-1967  border  between  Israel  and  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza.  One  must  admit  that  no  authoritative  answer  can  be  advanced. 324 
The  language  on  the  joint  Jordanian-Israeli  patrols  to  safeguard  the  borders  is 
somewhat  disturbing.  In  practice#  as  well  as  in  military  terms,  the  Israelis  do 
not  need  Jordanian  forces  to  secure  their  "borders",  If  this  is  to  be  true  in 
the  future,  the  question  arises  as  to  the  intention  of  the  authors  behind  such  a 
reference  to  including  Jordan. 
From  an  Israeli  perspective,  this  reference  implied  that  Jordan  would  assume  a 
role  in  deciding  the  final  status  of  the  area,  thereby  rejecting  implicitly  a 
possible  independent  Palestinian  state.  As  we  shall  see  later,  the  American  and 
some  Israeli  parties  favoured  the  view  that  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  should  be 
finally  linked  to  Jordan.  319 
Also,  this  reference  would  encourage  Jordan  to  join  the  peace  process.  Perhaps 
the  reference  to  a  Jordanian  role  in  the  local  police  force319  as  well  as  in  the 
security  of  the  "borders"  could  be  construed  as  an  implicit  recognition  by  the 
authors  of  Jordan's  claim  to  cYr/and  role  in  the  future  of  the  area.:  31211 
It  is  clear  that  one  of  the  most  controversial  problems  arising  from  the  Camp 
David  Accords  is  that  of  the  f  inal  status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  It  is 
relevant  to  recall  that  the  purpose  of  Camp  David  had  not  been  to  establish  the 
final  status  at  that  time.  The  participants,  Egypt,  Israel  and  the  U.  S.  A.,  agreed 
to  the  view  that  the  situation  required  an  interim  solution  for  a  specified 
period.  321 
From  the  perspective  of  the  Camp  David  Accords,  it  was  not  legitimate  to 
decide  the  future  of  the  Palestinians  who  were  not  represented  there  .  322 
Moreover,  if  an  immediate  solution  to  the  problem  was  forced 
-) 
the  parties  would 
have  been  unable  to  produce  any  agreement  an  this  particular  issue.  -1:  23  In  fact, 
the  basic  idea  was  the  importance  of  the  time  factor.  As  Blum  observes: 325 
"The  timing  was  extremely  important.  If  a  cooling-off  period  could  be  secured, 
if  an  atmosphere  of  co-operation  could  be  established,  if  the  barriers  of  mutual 
suspicion  that  had  been  built  over  a  period  of  50  years  could  be  broken  down, 
then  in  three  to  five  years  many  of  the  day's  seemingly  insurmountable  problems 
might  become  soluble.  "-24 
The  only  mention  of  the  final  status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  can  be  found  in 
paragraph  Al  (c): 
"As  soon  as  possible,  but  not  later  than  the  third  year  after  the  beginning  of 
the  transitional  period,  negotiations  will  take  place  to  determine  the  final 
status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  and  its  relation  with  its  neighbours.  1132r, 
Although  the  wording  of  this  text  clearly  indicates  that  the  intention  was  to 
leave  the  question  of  the  f  inal  status  of  the  area  to  be  decided  in  the 
negotiations  which  would  begin  within  three  years  of  the  transitional  period, 
both  the  parties  claimed  that  the  Accords  implied  certain  options  in  respect  of 
the  future  of  the  area.  On  the  one  hand,  Israel  claimed  that  certain  paragraphs 
of  the  Accords  excluded  the  possibility  of  an  independent  Palestinian  state.  The 
other  view,  which  was.  of  courseadvanced  by  Egypt,  held  that  the  Accords  did 
imply  reference  to  the  Palestinian  right  to  self-determination,  including  the 
right  to  establish  an  independent  state. 
The  view  that  the  Camp  David  Accords  exclude  the  option  of  an  independent 
Palestinian  state  are  based  on  the  assumption  that,  while  there  were  a  number 
of  conceivable  options  with  respect  to  the  final  status  of  the  area  concerned, 
certain  options  were  deliberately  excluded  by  the  participants.  Among  them  was 
the  establishment  of  an  independent  Palestinian  state.  326 326 
In  the  first  place,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  Camp  David  Accords  provided 
that  the  boundaries  between  Jordan  and  Israel  would  be  determined  within  the 
framework  of  the  Peace  Treaty  to  be  negotiated  directly  between  Jordan  and 
Israel.  It  follows  that,  since  there  would  be  a  boundary  between  Jordan  and 
Israel,  the  Camp  David  Accords  did  not  envisage  the  possibility  of  a  third 
state  on  the  territory  of  the  former  Palestine  Mandate.  327 
One  must  admit.  that  there  is  an  objection  to  this  view  articulated  by  Blum. 
There  is  no  clear  and  precise  language  in  the  Accords  providing  f  or  the 
establishment  of  boundary  between  Jordan  and  Israel.  The  relevant  portion  which 
was  in  Blum's  mind  is  worth  quoting: 
11  ...  to  negotiate  the  Peace  Treaty  between  Israel  and  Jordan,  taking  into  account 
the  agreement  reached  on  the  final  status  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza.  The 
negotiations  shall  be  based  on  all  the  provisions  and  principles  of  U.  N. 
Security  Council  Resolution  242.  The  negotiations  will  resolve,  among  other 
matters,  the  location  of  the  boundaries  and  the  nature  of  the  security 
arrangements.  "3211 
It  is  correct  that  the  words  "location  of  boundaries"  do  not  necessarily  mean 
the  Jordanian/  Israeli  boundary.  If  such  a  meaning  had  been  intended,  the  words 
"between  Jordan  and  Israel"  would  have  been  added  to  emphasize  that  important 
meaning. 
Further,  the  Accords  contain  no  mention  of  the  term  "self-determination". 
Having  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  term  "self-determination"  carried  with  it 
notions  of  independence  and  sovereignty,  it  follows  that  the  absence  of  this 
term  could  mean  that  the  intention  of  the  authors  was  not  to  establish  a  third 
state.  32'  According  to  this  view,  the  Accords  avoided  the  term 327 
"self-determination"  because  the  Palestinians  were  not  entitled  to  such  a  right. 
The  argument  against  the  Palestinian  self-determination  was  mentioned 
earlier.:  33c' 
The  word  "autonomy"  should  be  understood  as  a  clear  indication  that 
sovereignty  was  not  intended  to  be  granted  to  the  Palestinians.  In  the  words  of 
Blum: 
"The  autonomy  idea  proposed  that  the  Arab  residents  in  those  areas  run  their 
own  affairs,  including  agriculture,  trade  and  industry,  education,  justice, 
finance  and  practically  all  other  matters  with  the  exceptions  only  of  foreign 
affairs  and  defence.  Autonomy  was  not  sovereignty,  and  these  two  attributes  of 
a  sovereign  state  could  not  be  conferred  on  an  autonomous  unit  which  was  not, 
and  which  under  the  Camp  David  Accords  was  not  intended  to  become,  a  sovereign 
unit.  "3:  31 
Also,  it  was  argued  that  Security  Council  Resolution  242,  upon  which  the  Camp 
David  Accords  and  the  Peace  Treaty  were  based,  made  no  reference  whatsoever  to 
the  right  to  self-determination  of  the  Palestinian  people.  The  only  reference  to 
them  in  that  resolution  was  the  reference  to  the  just  solution'  of  the  refugee 
problem  and  the  reference  was  not  to  Arab  refugees  alone.  The  f  irst  U.  N. 
resolution  referring  to  the  Palestinian  right  to  self-determination  was  adopted 
in  1969,  two  years  after  the  adoption  of  Resolution  242.  Also,  it  does  not 
require  total  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  As  sucho  the 
resolution  under  any  circumstances  cannot  be  construed  as  implying  Palestinian 
self-determination. 
The  drafting  history  of  the  Accords  reveals  that  any  phrase,  term  or  word 
referring  explicitly  or  implicitly  to  a  Palestinian  state  or  to  the  Palestinian 328 
right  to  self-determination  had  been  deleted.  For  example,  Article  2  (5)  of  the 
Egyptian  Proposal  which  provides  that  "the  Palestinian  people  shall  exercise 
their  fundamental  right  to  self-determination  and  shall  be  enabled  to  establish 
their  national  entity":  332;  this  language  was  totally  rejected  by  the  Israelis.  3213 
Another  example  is  the  letter  from  Carter  to  Begin  dated  September  22  1978 
which  was  appended  to  the  Camp  David  Accords.  According  to  this  letter  Carter 
acknowledged  that  he  had  been  informed  by  the  Israelis  that  "In  each  paragraph 
of  the  Agreed  Framework  Document  the  expressions  "Palestinians"  or  "Palestinian 
People"  aie  being  and  will  be  construed  and  understood  by  you  as  "Palestinian 
Arabs"*  334  Clearly,  the  target  of  this  letter  is  the  term  "Palestinian  People" 
which  could  be  construed  as  referring  to 
%% 
people  within  the  legal  meaning 
intended  by  Article  1  of  the  U.  N.  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political 
Rights  which  provides  "All  people  have  the  right  of  self-determination...  " 
To  the  above,  it  may  be  added  that  in  the  course  of  the  negotiations,  as 
Brzezinski  records,  "the  Israelis  repeatedly  expressed  their  concern  that  the 
Palestinians  should  not  end  up  acquiring  an  independent  state.  "311 
Also,  in  drafting  the  paragraph  on  the  final  status  of  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank 
the  original  text  of  the  American  draft  pointed  out  that  the  final  status  of  the 
area  should  be  based  on  all  the  principles  of  Resolution  242: 
"the  negotiators  ...  will  settle  the  inal  status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  af  ter 
the  transitional  period-  and  its  relationship  with  its  neighbours  on  the  basis 
of  all  of  the  principles  of  the  U.  N.  Security  Council  Resolution  242,  including 
the  mutual  obligations  of  peace,  the  necessity  for  security  arrangements  for  all 
parties  concerned  following  the  transitional  period,  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli 
forces.  11331- 329 
This  languages  however,  was  not  accepted  by  Begin  since  it  would  imply  a  total 
Israeli  withdrawal  which  may  or  may  not  be  followed  by  an  independent 
Palestinian  state  .  337  The  paragraph  was  amended  to  read: 
11  ...  the  negotiations  (on  the  final  status)  shall  be  based  an  all  the  provisions 
and  principles  of  U.  N.  Security  Council  Resolution  242.11:  3:  39 
The  warding  of  the  above  text  clearly  indicates  that  the  negotiations  onlyt  but 
not  necessarily  the  final  status  would  be  based  on  Resolution  242.  In  Begin's 
view  this  meant  that  the  final  status  may  not  necessarily  be  in  accordance  with 
the  principle  of  the  Resolution.  *339  The  amended  text  appeared  in  paragraph 
A.  1(c)  of  the  Camp  David  Accords. 
Israel's  practice,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Camp  David  Accords,  suggests  that 
its  intention  was  not  to  agree  on  the  establishment  of  a  Palestinian  state  after 
the  transitional  period.  An  example  of  such  practice  is  Israel's  extention  of 
its  public  services,  like  electricity  and  transport,  to  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza.:  311  Such  practice  can  be  found  in  statements  declared  by  Israeli  officials 
on  several  occasions  against  the  establishment  of  the  Palestinian  state.  A 
striking  example  is  that  of  Prime  Minister  Begin  in  1981  declaring  his 
government  policy  concerning  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza: 
III,  Menachem,  son  of  Zelev  and  Hana  Begin,  do  solemly  swear  that  as  long  as  I 
serve  the  nation  as  Prime  Minister$  we  will  not  leave  any  part  of  Judea# 
Samaria,  the  Gaza  Strip  or  the  Golan  Heights.  11341 
This  statementl  as  Carter  observed,  contravenes  the  basic  terms  of  the  Camp 
David  Accords. 
In  support  of  the  interpretation  that  the  Camp  David  Accords  do  not  envisage 
an  independent  Palestinian  state,  reference  nay  be  made  to  the  Reagan  Peace 330 
Plan  of  September  1982  which  was  based  on  the  Camp  David  Accords  and 
Resolution  242.  The  relevant  part  of  this  plan  reads  as  follows: 
"Beyond  the  transition  period,  as  we  look  to  the  future  of  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza,  it  is  clear  to  me  that  peace  cannot  be  achieved  by  the  formation  of  an 
independent  Palestinian  state  in  those  territories  ...  But  it  is  the  f  irm  view  of 
the  United  States  that  self-government  by  the  Palestinians  of  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  in  association  with  Jordan  offers  the  best  chance  for  a  durable,  just  and 
lasting  peace.  11342 
Finally,  Israeli  claims  that  it  has  acquired  a  title  to  Gaza  and  the  West 
Bank  . 
343 
The  other  view  is  that  the  Camp  David  Accords  conceivekthe  formation  of  a 
Palestinian  state  in  i3aza  and  the  Vest  Bank  af  ter  the  transitional  period,  and 
was  strongly  supported  by  Egypt  on  a  number  of  grounds. 
The  reference  in  paragraph  A.  1(c)  to  the  idea  that  the  final  solution  "must 
recognise  the  legitimate  right"  of  the  Palestinian  people  should  be  considered 
in  conjunction  with  the  phrase  providing  that  the  negotiations  on  the  final 
status  shall  be  "based  on  all  the  provisions  and  principles  of  the  U.  K.  Security 
Council  Resolution  242.1'  It  f  ollows  that  the  exercise  of  the  right  to 
self-determination  would  be  the  only  logical  conclusion  which  could  reasonably 
be  derived  from  the  meaning  of  the  two  phrases.  As  Ambassador  Nabil  El  Arabyt 
former  Egyptian  representative  to  the  U.  N.,  put  it: 
Jk 
nit  is  inconceivable  to  entertain  the  tought  that  an  agreement  to  confirm  the 
tl- 
application  of  Resolution  2421  which  entails  withdrawal  from  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  and  the  recognition  of  the  legitimate  rights  of  -the  Palestinian  people, 
could  be  misconstrued  and  presented  as  limiting  the  exercise  of  the  most 331 
fundamental  and  sacred  of  these  rights.  The  exercise  of  the  right  to 
self-determination  is  inevitably  the  only  logical  conclusion  that  could 
reasonably  be  derived  from  the  binding  commitments  arrived  at  Camp  David.  11344 
To  construe  the  Accords  as  limiting  the  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  to 
self-determination  would  prejudice  them  as  against  other  groups  in  two  aspects. 
It  would  run  counter  to  the  various  resolutions  adopted  by  the  General  Assembly$ 
between  1969  and  1975  which  call  for  respect  for  and  the  implementation  of  the 
inalienable  rights  of  the  Palestinians  to  self-determination,  national 
independence  and  sovereignty.  In  particular,  resolution  3236  (XXIX)  on  November 
22,1974  which  reads  in  part  as  follows: 
11  ...  Recognizing  that  the  Palestinian  people  is  entitled  to  self-determination  in 
accordance  with  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations, 
...  Reaffirms  the  inalienable  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  in  Palestine, 
including: 
(a)  The  right  to  self-determination  without  external  interference; 
(b)  The  right  to  national  independence  and  sovereignty  ;  11=446 
Furtheri  the  Accords  should  not  be  construed  in  a  manner  that  implied  that  the 
authors  intention  was  to  violate  a  principle  of  the  highest  international  order. 
while  it  is  widely  accepted  that  self-determination  is  or  has  become  a 
recognized  principle  of  modern  international  law  34S  some  believed  that  it  is  a 
Jun  nngens  principle  under  the  General  Assembly  practice.  Professor  Vedell 
arguing  on  behalf  of  Morocco  in  the  Western  Sahara  CagP,  stated: 
AIf  'tthere  is  jus  cogens  in  the  United  Nations  in  matters  of  self-determination, 
it  consists  of  decolonization  as  an  end  result  rather  than  self-determination  as 
a  technique  or  method.  0347 332 
One  cannot  accept  completely,  from  a  textual  standpoint,  the  view  that  the 
Treaty  contains  some  provision  depriving  the  Palestinians  of  such  a  right.  Thus, 
there  is  no  need  to  resort  to  the  travaux  preparataires  in  order  to  investigate 
the  Israeli  intention,  whatever  it  was. 
Further,  the  American  rejection  of  the  formation  of  a  Palestinian  state  in  the 
Vest  Bank  and  Gaza,  as  in  the  Reagan  Plan  which  based  on  the  Camp  David 
formula,  should  not  be  regarded  as  a  legal  interpretation  of  the  Accords. 
Rather,  it  is  a  political  plan  which  was  based  on  strategic  and  ýolitical 
considerations  rather  than  on  legal  interpretation. 
1-cr  clonclua-p-.  -.  -ýne  must  "adzit  that  a  reasonable  understanding  of  the  relevant 
provisions  of  the  Accords  suggests  that  they  neither  exclude  the  possibility  of  , 
nor  provide  for,  the  formation  of  a  Palestinian  state.  The  whole  matter  was  left 
to  be  decided  in  the  future. 
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It  is  generally  recognized  that  in  any  peace  settlement  in  the  Middle 
East  the  solution  to  the  question  of  Jerusalem  and  its  Holy  Places  will 
play  a  significant  part.  To  a  large  extent  this  is  true  because 
Jerusalem  is  at  the  physical  centre  of  the  conflict  and  because  the 
tension  surrounding  it  is  symbolic  of  the  division  between  the  Arabs  and 
the  Israelis.  In  the  words  of  Sir  Alec  Douglas-Home: 
"There  is  one  special  problem,  which  in  some  ways  symbolizes  the 
Arab/Israel  problem  as  a  whole.  I  mean  the  problem  of  Jerusalem. 
The  complexity  of  this  problem  and  the  depth  of  feeling  about  the 
city  are  so  great  as  to  make  any  compromise  between  the  positions  of 
the  two  sides  hard  to  conceive.  Some  agreement  on  the  status  of  the 
city,  some  agreement  providing  for  freedom  of  access  to  the  Holy 
Places  and  for  their  protection  will  be  an  essential  part  of  a 
settlement.  But  this  may  have  to  be  almost  the  last  problem  to  be 
tackled.  "' 
Ifevertheless,  the  Camp  David  Agreements  contain  no  reference  to 
Jerusalemo  although  a  reference  was  included  in  the  exchange  of  three 
letters  appended  to  the  instruments  by  Presidents  Carter  and  Sadat  and 
Prime  Minister  Begin. 
The  Carter  letter  declared  that  the  U.  S.  Policy  on  Jerusalem  remained 
as  stated  by  Ambassadors  Goldberg  and  Yost  at  the  United  NationS2. 
The  Begin  letter  pointed  out  that  Israel's  position  was  based  on  the 
law  adopted  by  the  Knesset  an  June  28,1967  according  to  which  the 
Israeli  government  was  empowered  by  decree  to  apply  the  law,  the 357 
jurisdiction  and  the  administration  of  the  state  to  any  part  of  Ertez 
Israel.  Under  this  law,  the  Israeli  government  in  July  1967  decreed 
that  Jerusalem  was  one  city  indivisible  and  the  capital  of  the  state  of 
Israel.  -'-' 
The  Sadat  letter  declared  Egypt's  position  in  some  detail.  4  In  the 
first  place,  Arab  Jerusalem  was  an  integral  part  of  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  and,  therefore,  it  should  be  under  Arab  sovereignty.  Egypt 
considered  all  the  measures  taken  by  Israel  to  be  null  and  void.  it 
called  also  for  the  application  of  the  relevant  Security  Council 
resolutions  to  Jerusalem,  particularly  Resolutions  242  and  267. 
Further,  it  proposed  that  the  essential  functions  in  the  city  should  be 
undivided  and  a  Joint  municipal  council  composed  of  an  equal  number  of 
Arab  and  Israeli,  nembers  should  supervise  the  carrying  out  of  these 
functions.  As  regards  the  Holy  Places,  Sadat  indicated  that  all  people 
must  have  free  access  to  the  city  and  to  enjoy  free  exercise  of  worship. 
In  this  respect,  he  proposed  that  the  Holy  Places  of  each  faith  should 
be,  placed  under  the  adminstration  and  control  of  their  representatives'. 
Clearly,  these  letters  reflected  a  fundamental  difference  of  opinion 
among  the  participants.  Israel  wanted  to  have  permanent  sovereignty 
over  East  Jerusalem,  while  Egypt  held  that  the  'Old  City'  should  be 
returned  to  the  Arabst  as  it  was  an  integral  part  of  Gaza  and  the  West 
Bank.  The  U.  S.  adopted  a  vague  position  which  could  be  construed  as 
referring  implicitly  to  the  U.  N.  Plan  for  the  Internationalization  of 
jerusalem.  r- 
Despite  such  fundamental  differences  in  their  positions,  it  was  no 
secret  that  at  the  Camp  David'talks  they  agreed  after  long  and  arduous 
discussions  to  a  carefully-warded  paragraph  on  this  sensitive  issue  .7 358 
This  paragraph  will  be  quoted  and  examined  laterG.  However,  as  Carter 
recorded,  after  several  days  of  unanimous  agreement,  both  Sadat  and 
Begin  decided  that  there  were  already  enough  controversial  elements  in 
the  Accords9  and  requested  that  this  paragraph  be  deleted  from  the  final 
text.  " 
A  review  of  the  political  literature  on  Jerusalem  reveals  that  various 
names  have  been  used  to  refer  to  Jerusalem  or  certain  parts  of  the  city, 
e.  g.  the  Old  City#  the  Arab  City,  the  Walled  City,  Eastern  Jerusalem, 
the  New  City,  the  Jewish  Cityt  Western  Jerusalem  and  the  Holy  City. 
Moreover,  in  much  of  Arab  political  literature,  the  word  Jerusalem  or 
"Al  Qods"  is  usually  used  to  refer  to  the  Eastern  Arab  sector  of  the 
city  taken  by  Israel  in  1967.10  These  various  names  may  cause 
confusion.  It  may  be  useful  at  the  outset  to  refer  to  some  geographical 
facts  on  Jerusalem  to  clarify  the  exact  extent  of  the  area  under 
discussion. 
Jerusalem  is  located  on  the  ridge  of  the  Judean  Mountains  between  the 
mountains  of  Beth-El  in  the  north  and  of  Hebron  in  the  south.  To  the 
West  of  the  city  are  slopes  of  the  Judean  Mountains,  and  to  the  east 
lies  the  Judean  desert,  which  descends  to  the  Dead  Sea.  "  Jerusalemt  or 
the  Holy  City,  has  three  parts,  the  Walled  City,  the  Arab  quarter  north 
of  the  Walled  City,  and  the  New  City  west  of  it. 
So  far  as  the  Walled  City  is  concerned,  it  is  the  religious  focus  of 
Jerusalem.  Within  the  Walled  City  are  the  three  edifices  that  most 
link  each  of  the  three  great  monotheistic  religions  to  the  Holy  City: 
the  Church  of  the  Holy  Sepulchre,  the  Mosque  Haram  esh  Sharif,  and  the 
Wailing  Wall.  It  is  an  extremely  small  area,  whose  walls  were  erected 
by  the  Ottomans  in  1542.  The  population  within  the  Walled  City  has  been 359 
almost  entirely  Arab  for  over  a  thousand  years.  12  The  British  Mandatory 
Government's  census  for  1931  found  25,183  people  living  within  the 
Valled  City  at  that  time.  Of  this  total,  some  20,000  were  Arabs  (both 
Christian  and  Muslim),  about  5,000  were  Jews,  with  a  handful  of 
Armenians.  Subsequent  to  that  date,  there  was  a  steady  decline  in  the 
Jewish  population  within  the  Walled  City,  accounting  for  41000  in  1946 
and  about  2,000  in  April  1948.13 
Outside  the  Walled  City,  generally  running  north  of  the  walls  is  an 
area  populated  almost  entirely  by  Arabs.  This  area  is  known  as  the  Arab 
quarter.  14  The  words  "East  Jerusalem"  refer  to  the  area  embracing  the 
Walled  City  and  the  Arab  quarter  north  of  it. 
To  the  west  of  the  Walled  City  is  the  New  City,  by  far  the  most 
populous  sectiong  and  predominantly  Jewish.  It  was  established  in  the 
mid-nineteenth  century  by  a  number  of  American  Jews  who  sent  sizable 
contributions  to  foster  a  Jewish  community  in  the  Jerusalem  area16.  It 
began  as  a  housing  project  near  the  Walled  City  for  Jews.  From  this 
nucleus  the  New  City  grew  slowly  north  and  west  of  the  Walled  City.  The 
great  bulk  of  the  Jewish  population  of  Jerusalem  is,  however,  of  recent 
origin.  Only  after  the  establishment  of  the  British  Mandate  over 
Palestine  in  the  1920s  did  the  Jewish  Community  in  Jerusalem  grow  to  any 
significant  size.  'r,  By  1931  some  46,000  Jews  were  living  in  the  New 
City,  and  by  1946  the  number  had  grown  to  95,000,  the  increase  primarily 
the  result  of  Jewish  immigration  to  Palestine  following  the  rise  of 
Hitler.  By  1948  the  Jewish  population  in  the  New  City  exceeded 
1000000.17 
In  conclusion,  Jerusalem  is  essentially  two  cities;  an  Arab  East 
Jerusalem  and  a  Jewish  West  Jerusalem.  It  is  within  East  Jerusalem  that 360 
one  finds  virtually  all  of  the  Holy  Places;  tills  is,  in  fact,  the 
"Jerusalem"  of  religious  significance.  In  contrast,  West  Jerusalem  Is 
modern,  more  expressive  of  Western  culture,  and  linked  politically, 
economically  and  ideologically  with  the  Israeli  commi  nities  along  the 
Mediterranean  coast  rather  than  with  the  immediate  hinterland  of  the 
Holy  City.  '" 
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Jerusalem  is  one  of  the  oldest  cities  in  the  world  and  was  founded  by 
the  Canaanites  in  the  eighteenth  century  B.  C.  Thus  the  city  was  in 
existence  before  the  arrival  of  the  Israelites  in  the  land  of  Canaan. 
According  to  the  Jewish  Encyclopaedia,  Jerusalem  was  expressly  called  a 
"foreign  city"  not  belonging  to  the  Israelites.  - 
Since  its  foundation,  the  city  has  changed  hands  more  than  twenty-five 
times.  We  can  begin  with  the  Jebusites,  a  Canaanite  subgroup  who 
inhabited  the  city  for  some  800  years.  During  these  years  Jerusalem 
remained  a  Canaanite  city.  21ýý,  Around  1000  B.  C.  It  was  captured  by  David 
and  claimed  as  the  City  of  David.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that 
when  David  captured  the  city  he  did  not  displace  its  original 
inhabitants,  allowing  them  to  remain  in  their  city.  Later  it  was 
conquered  by  one  empire  after  another  Babylonian,  Persian,  Macedonian, 
Ptolemaic,  Selucid  and  Roman. 
In  638  A.  D.  the  Caliph  Omar  captured  Jerusalem  for  Islam.  Later  it  was 
held  by  Seljuk  Turks,  by  Christian  Crusaders,  and  by  Egyptian 
Mameluks.:  21 
During  the  four  centuries  from  151,7  to  1917,  Jerusalem,  as  part  of 
Palestine,  was  under  the  exclusive  control  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  For 
four  hundred  years,  a  united  city  was  governed  by  a  single  sovereign  in 
a  manner-  which  by  and  large  permitted  adequate  pursuit  of  the  three 
dominant  religious  faiths.  22 
From  1917  to  1947,  Jerusalem  was  under  British  control,  first  as 
occupiers  of  the  city  during  and  imm  diately  after  the  First  World  War 
and  then  as  the  administering  authority  under  the  League  of  Nations 
mandate  granted  in  1922.  During  this  period  the  city  was  governed  by  a 
single  sovereign. 362 
Thus,  as  far  as  title  is  concerned,  we  may  observe  that  during  3000 
years  of  histaryt  control  over  Jerusalem  has  been  almost  invariably 
acquired  by  conquest.  However,  in  1923,  by  Article  16  of  the  Treaty  of 
Lausanne  of  1923,  Turkey  renounced  all  rights  and  titles  to  Palestine 
and  agreed  that  the  future  of  the  territory  was  to  be  settled  by  the 
parties  concerned,  i.  e.  the  Principal  Allied  and  Associated  PowerS23. 
In  fact,  the  "Parties  concerned"  had  already  settled  the  future  of 
Palestine.  On  July  24,1922,  the  League  of  Nations,  with  the  assent  of 
the  Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  had  granted  a  mandate  in 
respect  of  Palestine  to  the  British  Government24 
Hence,  as  Lauterpacht  rightly  observed,  we  have  a  situation  in  which 
Turkey's  title  to  Palestine  devolved  upon  the  Principal  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers  which,  in  turn,  had  in  effect  conveyed  their  rights  to 
the  League  of  NationS.  26 
After  the  grant  of  the  mandate,  sovereignty  over  Palestine,  according 
to  the  prevailing  view,  was  vested  in  the  League  and  the  administering 
authority  acting  Jointly26.  In  1946,  the  League  of  Nations  was 
dissolved.  There  was,  however,  no  formal  conveyance  by  the  League  to 
the  U.  N.  of  the  rights  and  powers  of  the  former  in  relation  to  the 
mandated  territarieS27,  l  In  1950,  however,  the  International  Court  of 
Justice  in  an  advisory  Opinion  on  the  International  Status  nf  south-West 
Afr-jr&  expressed  the  view  that  the  status  of  a  mandated  territory 
transferred  from  the  League  of  Nations  to  the  United  Nations  could  be 
altered  only  with  the  consent  of  the  United  Nations.  20 
Towards  the  end  of  the  British  mandate,  the  Palestine  Partition 
Resolution  was  adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  in  1947  providing  for  the 
establishment  of  Jerusalem  as  corpus  separmtuz  under  a  special 363 
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JERUSALEM  INTERNATIONALIZED,  THE  CORPUS  SEPARATUM 
THE  CITY  OF  JERUSALEM  SHALL  BE  ESTABLISHED  AS  A  CORPUS  SEPARATUM 
UNDER  A  SPECIAL  INTERNATIONAL  REGIME  AND  SHALL  BE  ADMINISTERED  By 
THE  UNITED  NATIONS.  THE  TRUSTEESHIP  COUNCIL  SHALL  BE  DESIGNATED  TO 
DISCHARGE  THE  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  ADMINISTERING  AUTHORITY  ON 
BEHALF  OF  THE  UNITED  NATIONS. 
THE  CITY  OF  JERUSALEM  SHALL  INCLUDE  THE  PRESENT  MUNICIPALITY  OF 
JERUSALEM  PLUS  THE  SURROUNDING  VILLAGES  AND  TOWNS.  THE  MOST  EASTERN 
OF  WHICH  SHALL  BE  ABU  DIS:  THE  MOST  SOUTHERN  BETHLEHEM:  THE  MOST 
WESTERN  'EIN  KARIM  I  INCLUDING  ALSO  THE  BUILT-UP  AREA  OF  MOTSA  1;  AND 
THE  MOST  NORTHERN  SHU  FAT.  AS  INDICATED  ON  THE  ATTACHED  SKETCH-MAP 
(ABOVE). 
JERUSALEM  ACCORDING  TO  THE 
U.  N.  PARTITION  PLAN  ADOPTED 
By  THE  GENERAL  ASSEMBLY- 
NOVEMBER  29.1947.  SECTIONS  A 
AND  Ell  FROM  PART  III  OF  RESO- 
LUTION  181111)A. 364 
international  regime  to  be  administrated  by  the  Trusteeship  Council  of 
the  United  Nations.  2-:  0  Thus,  the  city  was  to  fall  outside  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Jewish  and  Arab  states  envisaged  by  the  Partition 
Resolution.  The  three  territorial  units,  Jerusalem  and  the  two 
independent  states,  were  to  be  linked  in  an  economic  union.  Under  this 
plan,  Jerusalem  would  have  been  a  city  of  approximately  equal  Arab  and 
Jewish  populations,  with  Moslem  Arabs  more  numerous  than  Christian 
Arabs.  30 
In  1948  the  first  Arab-Israeli  war  broke  out.  By  the  end  of  this  war, 
Jordanian  forces  had  seized  the  Arab  sector  of  the  city,  while  Israeli 
forces  had  captured  Western  Jerusalem.  Later,  on  April  3  1949,  Israel 
and  Jordan  signed  an  armistice  agreement  in  which  the  de  facto  division 
of  Jerusalem  and  its  consequent  non-internationalization  was 
crystalized3l.  Under  Article  8  of  this  agreement  free  access  to  the 
Holy  Places  in  the  city  was  guaranteed  by  the  parties.  32 
While  Jordan  and  Israel  took  steps  to  formalize  their  respective 
control  over  East  and  West  Jerusalem,  the  United  Nations  continued  to 
discuss  the  internationalizion  of  the  Holy  City.  On  December  11,1948, 
the  General  Assembly  asked  the  Palestinian  Conciliation  Commission  to 
present  "detailed  proposals  for  a  permanent  international  regime  for  the 
Jerusalem  area"'.  In  the  same  resolution,  the  General  Assembly  again 
affirmed  its  position  that  the  Holy  Places  "be  under  effective  United 
Nations  supervision"33. 
During  the  same  period,  the  Arab  League  Council,  in  October  1949 
adopted  a  resolution  in  favour  of  the  internationalization  of 
Jerusalem.  34  This  resolution  reflected  a  shift  in  Arab  policy  which  was 
not  accepted  by  Jordan.  In  1950,  the  Ruler  of  Jordan  declared  the 365 
unification  of  Jordan  and  the  Vest  Bank  with  East  Jerusalem  as  a  second 
capital  of  the  new  state:  3s.  In  the  same  year,  the  Knesset  adopted  a 
resolution  to  proclaiming  Jerusalem  the  capital  of  Israe136 
From  1949  to  1967  the  U.  N.  took  no  action  with  regard  to  the  status  of 
Jerusalem.  Lauterpacht  held  the  view  that  the  absence  of  the  question 
of  Jerusalem  from  discussions  in  the  U.  N.  for  fifteen  years  meant  that 
the  members  were  content  to  accept  the  de  facto  unilateral  control  of 
Israel  and  Jordan  over  the  Holy  Places  within  their  respective 
jurisdictions.  37 
In  1967  Israeli  forces  occupied  East  Jerusalem  during  the  Six-Day  War 
and  the  Jordanian  forces  which  had  governed  the  city  since  1948,  were 
driven  out.  As  soon  as  the  Israelis  entered  the  Old  City  they  took 
several  measures  to  reunite  the  administration  of  the  two  parts  of  the 
city.  28  On  June  27  the  Israeli  Knesset  enacted  three  laws  to  enable  the 
Israeli  authorities  to  take  the  necessary  measures  for  the  unification 
of  Jerusalem.  Under  this  enactment  East  Jerusalem  was  regarded  as 
part  of  the  municipal  City  of  Jerusalem.  39 
The  Israeli  action  on  Jerusalem  provoked  criticism  at  the  United 
Nations-40  Some  members  described  the  administrative  and  legislative 
measures  taken  by  Israel  for  the  unification  of  the  city  as 
annexat  JOU41.  On  July  4,1967,  the  General  Assembly  (by  a  vote  of  99  to 
0  with  20  abstentions)  adopted  a  resolution  in  which  it  expressed  its 
deep  concern  at  the  situation  in  Jerusalem  resulting  from  the  measures 
taken  by  Israel  to  change  the  status  of  the  city.  The  resolution 
considered  the  measures  'invalid'  and  called  upon  Israel  to  rescind 
them.  42 366 
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Although  U.  N.  resolutions  since  1967  have  emphasized  the  illegality 
and  nullity  of  Israeli  actions  in  the  Old  City  and  called  upon  Israel  to 
withdraw  from  the  Old  City  of  Jerusalem,  the  Israelis  have  refused  to 
abide  by  the  U.  N.  resolutions  in  this  respect.  This  point  will  be 
discussed  later. 
When  the  Camp  David  talks  opened  on  September  5,1978,  there  was  an 
agreement  among  Egypt,  Israel  and  the  United  States  that  Jerusalem  would 
be  an  undivided  city  with  free  access  to  all  the  Holy  Shrines  situated 
in  the  city.  43  However,  the  very  next  day,  Sadat  submitted  a  plan 
which,  Inter  alial  called  for  Israel  to  relinquish  control  over  Arab 
Jerusalem  and  for  Arab  sovereignty  and  administration  to  be  restored 
there.  The  relevant  version  of  the  Egyptian  proposal  at  Camp  David 
reads  as  follows: 
"Israel  shall  withdraw  from  Jerusalem  to  the  demarcation  lines  of  the 
Armistice  Agreement  of  1949  in  conformity  with  the  principle  of  the 
inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  war.  Arab  sovereignty 
and  administration  shall  be  restored  to  the  Arab  Sector. 
A  joint  municipal  council  composed  of  an  equal  number  of  Palestinian 
and  Israeli  members  shall  be  entrusted  with  regulating  and  supervising 
the  following  matters:,  (a)  Public  utilities  throughout  the  City;  (b) 
Public  transportation  and  traffic;  (c)Postal  and  telephone  services; 
(d)  Tourism. 
The  Parties  undertake  to  ensure  the  free  exercise  of  worship,  the 
freedom  of  access,  visit  and  transit  to  the  Holy  Places  without 
distinction  or  discrimination.  1144 
It  is  instructive  to  examine  the  genesis  and  meaning  of  this  formulat 
since  it  represents  thý  final  position  taken  by  Egypt  an  the  Jerusalem 368 
question  as  expressed  in  Sadat's  letter  appended  to  the  Treaty  Like  the 
military  withdrawal  from  Egypt's  territory,  the  legal  basis  of  Israel's 
withdrawal  from  East  Jerusalem  was  the  principle  of  the  inadmissibility 
of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  force.  Such  language  on  the 
inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  force  was  taken  from 
the  Preamble  to  Security  Council  Resolution  242.  The  prevailing  view 
was  that  Israel  is  obliged  under  the  Resolution  to  withdraw  from  all  the 
territories  it  seized  in  the  Six-Day  Var",  thus  rejecting  all  Israeli 
claims  that  East  Jerusalem  is  outside  the  scope  of  the  withdrawal 
envisaged  by  the  Resolution. 
This  view  is  consistent  with  the  Arab  League's  view  expressed  an  many 
occasions.  For  example,  the  Arab  League  Peace  Plan  adopted  in  Fez  on 
September  9,1982  is  based  on  several  principles,  among  which  is  "the 
withdrawal  of  Israel  from  all  Arab  territories  occupied  in  1967 
including  Arab  Al  Qods"46. 
The  view  that  Jerusalem  is  part  of  the  Arab  occupied  territories  was 
held  by  the  US  when  the  question  of  Jerusalem  was  debated  before  the 
Security  Council  in  1969.  The  US  position  as  expressed  by  Ambassador 
Yost,  in  July  3  1969,  will  be  examined  later.  It  may  be  sufficient  at 
this  stage  to  note  that  he  made  it  clear  that  the  US  considers  that  the 
part  of  Jerusalem  that  came  under  the  control  of  Israel  in  the  June  war 
is  occupied  territory.  47 
So  far  as  sovereignty  is  concerned,  it  is  clear  that  Egyptis  proposal 
on  Jerusalem  was  not  in  line  with  the  idea  of  the  unification  of 
Jerusalem.  Rather,  Egypt  preferred  a  divided  city-in  which  both  the 
Israelis  and  Arabs  could  exercise  full  sovereignty  over  their 
respective  sectors  of  the  city.  A  divided  Jerusalem  with  two  sovereigns 369 
was  inconsistent,  not  only  with  the  U.  N.  resolutions  on  Jerusalem,  but 
also  with  Israel's  position  calling  for  a  Unified  Jerusalem  under  its 
sovereignty. 
Egypt's  position  was  inconsistent  with  the  special  international  regime 
for  Jerusalem  which  was  defined  by  the  1947  Partition  Resolution  and 
then  redefined  by  General  Assembly  Resolution  149  on  December  11,1948. 
It  was  recommended  that  the  City  of  Jerusalem  be  established  as  mr-pim 
Ppparntu]a  under  a  special  international  regime,  to  be  administered'  by 
the  Trusteeship  Council  on  behalf  of  the  United  Nations.  This  regime 
0 
was  to  involve  the  appointment  of  a  governir,  responsible  to  the 
Trusteeship  Council,  the  establishment  of  a  special  police  force  whose 
members  were  to  be  recruited  from  outside  Palestine,  the  election  of  a 
legislative  council  and  the  demilitarization  of  the  City.  It  was 
reconnended  that  the  internationalization  should  cover  the  entire  area 
of  greater  Jerusalem.  Thus,  the  city  was  to  fall  outside  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Jewish  and  Arab  states  'envisaged  by  the  Partition 
Resolution.  48 
From  the  above,  it  is  clear  that,  unlike  the  Egyptian  proposal,  the 
relevant  U.  N.  resolutions  neither  approved  Arab  or  Israeli  sovereignty 
over  Jerusalem  nor  envisaged  a  divided  city.  Further,  Egypt's  demand 
for  Arab  sovereignty  over  East  Jerusalem  was  not  in  line  with  Israel's 
policy  and  practice  with  regard  to  East  Jerusalem  since,  1967  .  49 
As  far  as  the  Holy  Places  were  concerned,  Egypt's  demand  for  the  free 
exercise  of  worship  and  freedom  of  access  to  the  Holy  Places  was 
consistent,  with  the  relevant  U.  N.  resolutions  -  indeed  perhaps  the 
expression  "free  exercise  of  worship"  was  taken  from  Article,  13  of  the 
Mandate  over  Palestine-60 370 
Nevertheless,  it  may  be  noted  that,  while  Article  15  of  the  Mandate 
provided  that  the  freedom  of  access  to  the  Holy  Places  and  the  free 
exercise  of  worship  were  subject  to  the  maintenance  of  public  order  and 
morals,  Egypt's  proposal  contains  no  similar  limitations  or  conditions. 
At  this  points  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  Israel's  Draft  Resolution 
submitted  to  the  U.  N.  with  regard  to  the  Holy  Places  an  November  1947 
suggested  a  similar  restriction.  Article  4(7)  of  this  Draft  reads: 
"Subject  only  to  requirements  of  national  security,  public  order  and 
decorum,  healtho  liberty  of  access,  visit  and  transit  to  the  Holy  Places 
in  Jerusalem  shall  be  accorded  to  all  persons  without  distinction  in 
respect  of  nationality  in  conformity  with  the  rights  in  force  an  14  May 
194B.  "11 
A  similar  restriction  can  be  found  in  Article  29  of  the  Draft  Statute 
for  the  City  of  Jerusalem  prepared  by  the  Trusteeship  Council: 
"Subject  only  to  the  requirement  of  public  order  and  security  and  of 
public  morals.  and  public  healthl  freedom  of  entry  into  and  of  temporary 
residence  in  the  City  shall  be  ensured  to  all  foreign  pilgrims  and 
visitors  without  distinction  as  to  nationality  or  faith.  1162 
Similarlyl  Article  13(b)  of  Part  III  of  the  original  Partition 
Resolution  181  subjected  the  free  access  to  the  Holy  Places  and  the  free 
exercise  of  worship  to  the  requirement  of  public  order  and  decorum-,  " 
The  formulation  of  the  paragraph  on  the  proposed  Joint  municipal  council 
seems  to  imply  that  the  administration  of  the  city  would  be  shareds 
with  the  authority  of  both  the  Palestinians  and  Israelis  extending  to 
political  and  economic  spheres  as  well  as  other  matters.  Such  a  re- 
division  of  the  administration  of  the  city  was  not  accepted  by  Israel. 
It  could  also  mean  that.  the  Palestinians  would  participate  in  the 371 
administration  of  the  western  part  of  the  city,  the  sector  upon  which 
Israel  had  exercised  de  facto  full  sovereignty  since  1948. 
Finally,  Egypt's  proposal  defined  the  final  line  of  the  Israeli 
withdrawal  from  East  Jerusalem  in  terms  of  the  Armistice  line  of  1949. 
Such  reference  to  the  1949  Armistice  Agreement  between  Jordan  and  Israel 
could  mean  that  Egypt  was  rejecting  the  Israeli  demand  to  establish  a 
new  and  final  borderline  in  Jerusalem  which  would  be  different  from  the 
pre-June  1967  line.  64 
The  Egyptian  draft  on  Jerusalem  provoked  sharp  criticism  among  the 
Israeli  delegation-66  The  draft  was  totally  unacceptable  even  as  a 
starting  point  for  negotiations  for  several  reasons.  The  language  on  the 
inadmissibility  of  acquisition  of  territory  by  war  had  consistently  been 
objected  to  by  the  Israelis. 
Also,  the  reference  to  an  Israeli  withdrawal  to  the  4  June  1967  line  or 
the  1949  armistice  line  was  contrary  to  Israel's  long-standing  position 
that  the  pre-June  line  did  not  constitute  a  final  and  permanent 
international  boundary.  66 
Further,  so  far  as  sovereignty  over  East  Jerusalem  is  concerned,  the 
Israelis  were  not  willing  to  give  it  up  to  the  Jordanians  or  the 
Palestinians.  As  we  shall  discuss  later,  the  Israelis  have  their  own 
legal  claims  in  respect  of  sovereignty  over  East  Jerusalem.  67 
Finally,  had  Egypt's  proposal  been  accepted,  Jerusalem  would  have 
been  re-divided  again.  Israel  was  not  willing  to  accept  such  a  re- 
division.  Moreover,  before  entering  the  negotiationst  there  existed  an 
implicit  agreement  among  the  parties  that  the  Holy  City  must  remain 
undivided.  58 372 
Predictably,  the  sharp  differences  between  the  Egyptians  and  the 
Israelis  resulted  in  deadlock  on  the  Jerusalem  question. 
The  Americans  attempted  to  break  the  deadlock.  Carter,  who  was 
unofficially  informed  by  Sadat  that  Egypt's  proposal  did  not  represent 
its,  final  position,  r-11  set  about  drafting  an  American  proposal  which  he 
hoped  would  bridge  the  gap  between  the  parties. 
on  September  10,  an  American  draft  was  submitted.  Paragraph  B(5)  of 
this  draft  dealt  with  the  Jerusalem  question  in  the  following  terms: 
"Jerusalem,  the  city  of  peace,  shall  not  be  divided.  It  is  a  City  holy 
to  Jewl  Muslim  and  Christian  and  all  peoples  must  have  free  access  to  it 
and  enjoy  the  free  exercise  of  worship  and  the  right  to  visit  and 
transit  to  the  Holy  Places  without  distinction  or  discrimination.  The 
Holy  Places  of  each  faith  will  be  under  the  administration  of  their 
representatives.  For  peace  to  endure,  each  community  in  Jerusalem  must 
be  able  to  express  freely  its  cultural  and  religious  values  in  an 
acceptable  political  framework.  A  representative  municipal  council  shall 
supervise  essential  functions  in  the  city.  An  agreement  on  relationships 
in  Jerusalem  should  be  reached  in  the  negotiations  dealing  with  the 
final  status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  "60 
Clearly,  this  was  a  carefully-worded  paragraph  in  respect  of  which  some 
nbservations  require  to  be  made. 
In  the  first  place,  -  we  may  observe  that  the  key  features  of  the 
Jerusalem  clause  in  the  American  plan  closely  parallel  certain 
recommendations  of  a  1975  Middle  East  Study  Group  convened  by  the 
Brookings  Institution.  61  According  to  the  Report  of  this  Study  Groups 
the  Jerusalem  question  could  only  be  resolved  within  the  framework  of  a 
general  settlements  if  the  following  criteria,  as  a  minimum,  were 373 
fulfilled:  (a)  there  should  be  unimpeded  access  to  all  the  Holy  Places 
and  each  should  be  under  the  custodianship  of  its  own  faith;.  (b)  there 
should  be  no  barriers  dividing  the  city  which  would  prevent  free 
circulation  throughout  it;  (c)  each  national  group  within  the  city 
should,  if  it  so  desires,  have  substantial  political  autonomy  within  the 
area  where  it  predominates.  62 
The  wording  of  the  American  draft  distinguished  between  the  secular 
administration  of  the  City  of  Jerusalem  an  the  one  hand#  and  the 
religious  administration  of  the  Holy  Shrines  an  the  other.  In  respect 
of  the  formerl  the  text  contained  no  clear  language  on  the  question  who 
would  be  responsible  for  the  secular  administration  of  the  city. 
While  it  referred  to  a  "representative  municipal  council"  to  "supervise 
the  essential  functions",  there  was  no  clear  indication  of  the 
composition  of  this  council  or  what  was  meant  by  "essential  functions.  " 
Clearly,  this  vague  language  was  deliberately  employed.  So  f  ar  as 
religious  administration  is  concerned,  the  text  made  it  clear  that  the 
Holy  Places  of  each  faith  would  be  under  the  administration  of  their 
representatives. 
The  American  attitude  towards  the  religious  places  was  in  line  with 
the  U.  S.  policy  under  President  Lyndon  Johnston,  in  particular  his 
statement  of  June  19,1967: 
"There  must  be  adequate  recognition  of  the  special  interest  of  the 
three  great  religions  in  the  Holy  Places  of  Jerusalem.  1163 
This  statement  drew  a  distinction  between  the  City  of  Jerusalem  on  one 
hand  and  the  Holy  Places  on  the  other.  The  U.  S.  I  under  this  statement# 
was  only  interested  in  the  Holy  Places. 374 
Moreover,  this  clause,  unlike  Egypt's  proposal,  contained  no  mention 
of  restoring  Arab  sovereignty  over  East  Jerusalem.  Nor  did  it  refer 
to  any  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  Old  City  to  the  pre-June  lines.  To 
say  this  is  not  to  interpret  the  American  proposal  as  ruling  out  any 
possible  Israeli  withdrawal  or  the  restoration  of  Arab  sovereignty  over 
East  Jerusalem.  In  fact,  the  draft  made  it  clear  that  the  final  status 
of  the  city  must  be  negotiated  between  the  parties  concerned. 
The  reference  to  a  "municipal  council"  was  taken  from  Egypt's  draft. 
Yet,  the  Americans  avoided  any  reference  to  the  composition  of  that 
council.  In  other  words,  they  deleted  Egypt's  phrase  that  the  Council 
was  to  be  composed  of  an  equal  number  of  Palestinian  and  Israeli 
members".  Undoubtedly,  the  aim  of  such  deletion  was  to  satisfy  the 
Israelis  -  Further,  the  functions  of  that  council  were  not  defined.  The 
term  "essential  functionsis  provided  no  clear  indication  in'this  respect. 
One  must  admit  that  many  practical  difficulties  might  arise  in  respect 
of  this  composition  and  the  functions  of  that  council.  The  only 
alternative  to  overcome  such  difficulties  was  clear  language. 
The  phrase  "each  community  in,  Jerusalem  must  be  able  to  express  freely 
its  cultural  and  religious  values  in  an  acceptable  political  framework" 
was  used  to  satisfy  the  aspirations  of  the  Arab  Palestinians  in 
Jerusalem.  Clearly,  it  implied  some  kind  of  autonomy  for  the  Arab 
society  in  Jerusalem.  Ve  may  observe  that  the  word  "must"  was  used 
instead  of  other  words,  such  as  "should"  or  "may",  in  order  to  emphasize 
the  meaning  intended,  i.  e.  that  Arab  affairs  were  to  be  taken  out  of  the 
hands  of  the  Israelis.  In  other  words,  considerable  local  autonomy 
should  be  guaranteed  to  both  the  Palestinians  and  Israelis  in  Jerusalem. 375 
This  idea,  as  mentioned  earlier,  was  taken  from  the  recommendations  of 
the  1975  Middle  East  Study  Group  on  Jerusalem 
With  regard  to  free  access  to  the  city  and  the  freedom  of  worship,  the 
American  draft,  like  Egypt's  draft,  did  not  provide  that  such  freedom  of 
worship  could  be  subjected  to  conditions  of  Israel's  national  security 
or  public  order. 
Finallyt  no  reference  to  any  form  of  internationalization  of  Jerusalem 
was  made.  The  U.  S.  had  obviously  abandoned  its  earlier  view  an  the 
internationalization  of  Jerusalem  and  left  the  future  of  the  city  to  be 
decided  by  its  inhabitants  and  not  by  any  outside  power. 
From  an  Israeli  perspective,  the  text  was  acceptable.  It  contained  no 
mention  of  an  Israeli  withdrawal  from  East  Jerusalem.  Nor  did  it  refer 
to  any  restoration  of  Arab  sovereignty  over  East  Jerusalem.  Alsoo 
reference  to  the  inadmissibility  of  acquisition  of  territory  by  force 
was  deleted.  Finally,  there  was  no  reference  to  the  city  being 
divided.  Begin  described  this  text  as  "a  beautiful  number,  deeply 
appreciated  and  positive.  1'r-A  Yet,  Begin  proposed  the  insertion  of  the 
words  "the  capital  of  Israel"  after  the  word  "Jerusalem!  "Or-  so  as  to 
read  "Jerusalem  the  capital  of  Israel.  "  Begin's  proposal  was  dropped 
when  Dayan  ridiculed  the  idea  that  Sadat  might  accept  such  wording.  " 
The  Egyptians,  on  the  other  hand,  believed  that  this  text  reflected  a 
substantial  retreat  from  the  previous  US  position.  6  7  Carter  tried,  to 
convince  Sadat  that  it  would  be  better  not  to  attempt  to  solve  the 
Jerusalem  problem  at  Camp  David.  Rather,  it  was  better  for  Sadat  to  let 
y,  ing  Hussein  and  others  share  the  responsibility  for  any  agreement 
concerning  the  Holy  City.  c-0,  However,  perhaps  because  of  the  pressure 376 
exercised  on  Sadat  by  the  Egyptian  delegation,  Sadat  asked  the  Americans 
to  amend  their  text. 
Consequently,  the  Americans  amended  the  Jerusalem  clause  to  be  read  as 
follows:  "Jerusalem,  the  city  of  peace,  is  holy  to  Judaism,  Christianityl 
and  Islam.  and  all  peoples  must  have  free  access  to  it  and  enjoy  the 
free  exercise  of  worship  and  the  right  to  visit  and  transit  to  the  holy 
places  without  distinction  or  discrimination.  The  holy  places  of  each 
faith  will  be  under  the  administration  and  control  of  their 
representatives.  A  municipal  council  representative  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  city  shall  supervise  essential  functions  in  the  city  such  as 
public  utilities,  public  transportation,  and  tourism  and  shall  ensure 
that  each  community  can  maintain  its  own  cultural  and  educational 
institutions.  "69 
There  are  three  differences  between  the  original  and  the  amended  texts. 
While  the  original  version  contained  no  mention  of  the  proposed 
municipal  councill  the  phrase  "representatives  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
city"  was  inserted  after  the  word  "municipal  council.  "  The  purpose  of 
this  addition  was  to  confirm  the  idea  that  the  Arab  inhabitants  would 
participate  in  the  administration  of  the  city. 
The  amended  version  provided  three  examples  of  the  term  "essential 
functions-"  Indeed,  the  phrase  "such  as  public  utilities,  public 
transporation  and  tourise,  could  mean  that  the  secular  administration 
of  the  city  would  be  shared  with  the  authority  of  Arab  and  Israeli 
inhabitants  extending  to  civic9  public,  economic  and  religious  life  of 
the  city. 
The  first  draft  did  not  specify  which  authority  would  be  responsible 
for  guaranteeing  that  each  community  could  maintain  its  own  culture  and 377 
educational  institutions.  The  amended  draft  made  it  clear  that  the 
municipal  council  was  to  assume  this  responsibility. 
Despite  these  amendments  which  favoured  the  Arab  inhabitants  of 
Jerusalem,  the  version  remained  acceptable  to  the  Israelis  so  long  as  it 
did  not  call  for  their  military  withdrawal  from,  nor  refer  specifically 
to  the  restoration  of  Arab  sovereignty  over,  East  Jerusalem. 
As  to  the  Egyptians,  Sadat,  who  was  partly  satisfied  by  the  amended 
text,  was  'induced'  by  Carter  to  accept  the  text  on  the  understanding 
that  there  would  be  an  exchange  of  letters  confirming  the  historic  U.  S. 
position  that  East  Jerusalem  was  part  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  .  70 
on  September  14,  Sadat  informed  Carter  that  he  could  only  accept  the 
Jerusalem  clause  if  provision  was  made  for  the  flag  of  Islam  to  fly  over 
Islamic  Holy  Places,  although  he  expected  that  Begin  would  be  reluctant 
to  agree  to  this  because  of  Its  symbolism  of  savereignty,  71  As 
expected,  Begin  rejected  this  proposal. 
Yet,  on  September  16,  the  second  last  day  of  the  Camp  David  Conferencet 
Carter  told  the  Israelis  that  Sadat  accepted  the  paragraph  as  drafted$ 
but  that  he  wanted  "a  separate  exchange  of  letters  so  that  each  nation 
could  make  public  its  own  different  ideas  as  part  of  the  official 
records.  "  "The  Israelis  would  not  have  to  participate  in  the  exchange" 
Carter  added  "but  could  let  their  views  be  known  if  they  preferred.  "" 
In  accordance  with  Carter's  promise  to  Sadat,  the  Americans  prepared  a 
draft  letter  stating  the  U.  S.  position  on  Jerusalem.  It  read  in  part  as 
follows: 
"In  the  official  US  view  East  Jerusaelm  should  be  considered  occupied 
territories  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Geneva  Convention  of  1949 
and  its  final  status  should  be  resolved  in  future  negotiations.  "73 378 
The  wording  of  the  draft  indicates  clearly  that,  so  far  the  final. 
status  of  Jerusalem  was  concerned,  the  US  would  support  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Israeli  forces  and  the  restoration  of  Arab  sovereignty  over  East 
Jerusale  M.  74 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  there  was  nothing  new  in  the  formulation  of 
this  letter,  which  has  been  taken  from  statements  by  two  former  U.  S. 
ambassadors  to  the  United  Hations,  7&  the  Israelis  sharply  criticized  it. 
They  maintained  that  Carter  had  reversed  his  earlier  stand  on  supporting 
the  unification  of  JerusaleM.  76  They  also  considered  that  the  wording  of 
the  draft  letter  was  in  conflict  with  the  agreed  paragraph  an 
JerusaleM.  77  Further,  the  Israelis  doubted  that  international  law 
accorded  any  legal  effect  to  a  presidential  pronouncement  appended  to  an 
international  treaty.  70  Dayan  argued: 
"The  agreement  to  be  signed  was  an  Israel-Egypt  Agreement.  Why  then 
should  it  include  a  statement  an  the  position  taken  by  the  United 
States?  Was  it  an  agreement  between  Israel  and  the  United  StateS?  "79 
Hence,  the  Israelis  declared  that  they  would  not  sign  any  agreement  to 
which  was  attached  a  letter  proclaiming  Jerusalem  as  occupied  territory. 
Begin  threatened  to  walk  out  of  the  negotiations,  and  he  seemed  to  be 
serious.  90  This  resulted  in  a  crisis  which  threatened  to  terminate  the 
whole  proceedings.  81 
Ultimately,  it  was  agreed  that  the  U.  S.  would  restate  its  position  by 
referring  to  the  Goldberg  and  Yost  statementsp  but  would  not  quote  from 
them.  132 
From  the  Israeli  view,  Carter's  decision  to  omit  any  specific  reference 
to  Jerusalem  as  an  occupied  city  made  the  letter  impartial.  83  The 379 
reference  to  Goldberg  could  satisfy  Begino  and  the  reference  to  Yost 
could  satisfy  Sadat  in  part.  84 
However,  Quandt  believed  that  "in  substantive  terms  this  changed 
nothing.  But  somehow  Begin  was  able  to  accept  the  less  precise 
formulation.  "86 
Ve-proceed  now  to  examine  the  final  position  adopted  by  Egypt,  Israel 
and  the  U.  S.  as  expressed  in  the  letters  appended  to  the  Accords. 
As  regards  the  U.  S..  we  may  observe  at  the  outset  that,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  it  signed  the  Camp  David  agreements  simply  as  a  witness  and 
not  as  a  party,  it  found  it  necessary  and  proper  to  publicbyý  define  its 
position  on  the  issue  of  Jerusalem.  On  no  other  issue  did  the  U.  S.  feel 
compelled  to  set  forth  an  official  independent  viewpoint  in  the  final 
document.  " 
The  Carter  letter,  which  was  directed  to  Sadat  and  not  to  Begin,  07  read 
in  part  as  follows: 
"The  position  of  the  United  States  on  Jerusalem  remains  as  stated  -  by 
Ambassador  Goldberg  in  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  on  July  140 
1967,  and  subsequently  by  Ambassador  Yost  in  the  United  Nations  Security 
Council  on  July  1,1969.  "  88 
Two  points  are  worthy  of  note.  The  reference  to  statements  by  Goldberg 
and  Yost  indicates  clearly  that  there  was  nothing  new  in  respect  of  the 
U.  S.  position  vis  a  vis  Jerusalem.  In  facts  the  former  position,  adopted 
by  the  U.  S.  at  the  U.  N.  in  1967  and  1969,  had  been  examined  in,  several 
writings.  It  does  not  seem  necessary,  therefore,  to  repeat  what  had  been 
said.  89  Suffice  it  to  refer  in  brief  to  the  main  outlines  of  the 
Goldberg  and  Yost  statements,  noting  the  argument  that  there  existed  a 
contradiction  between  the  Goldberg  statement  and  that  of  Yost. 380 
On  July  14,1967  Ambassador  Goldberg  had  occasion  to  deliver  a  major 
policy  address  to  the  General  Assembly  on  the  subject  of  Jerusalem.  In 
the  face  of  Israel's  refusal  to  restore  the  status  quo  ante  as  called 
for  by  the  Assembly's  July  4  Resolution,  Pakistan  had  introduced  a  new 
draft  resolution  deploring  Israel's  stand  and  reiterating  the  call  to 
Israel  to  rescind  all  measures  taken.  Its  draft  resolution  was  adopted 
without  opposition  (by  a  vote  of  100  to  0  with  18  abstentions  including 
the  US).  `  In  explaining  the  US  vote,  Ambassador  Goldberg  indicated  his 
country's  position  on  the  Jerusalem  question.  "'  The  key  features  of 
this  position  can  be  summarized  briefly. 
As  regards  the  Israeli  occupation  of  East  Jerusalem,  there  was  no 
mention  of  Israel  as  a  military  occupier.  Nor  was  there  any  reference  to 
the  restoration  of  Jordanian  or  Arab  sovereignty  over  East  Jerusalem. 
As  regards  the  legislative  and  administrative  measures  taken  by  Israel 
for  the  unification  of  Jerusalem,  Goldberg  indicated  that  these  measures 
do  not  constitute  annexation  in  the  view  of  the  US  Government.  In  his 
words: 
"The  resolution  (of  the  General  Assembly  on  July  4)  does  not  fully 
correspond  to  our  views$  particularly  since  it  appears  to  accept  by  its 
call  for  recission  of  measures  that  the  administrative  measures  taken 
contitute  annexation  of  Jerusalem  by  Israel.  '192  This  may  be  understood 
as  implying  American  approval  of  the  measures  ,  taken  by  Israel.  Such 
approval,  however,  had  no  legal  effect  on  the  future  status  of  the  Holy 
City.  This  was  clearly  indicated  by  Goldberg: 
,,  With  regard  to  the  specific  measures  taken  by  the  government  of  Israel 
on  June  28,1  wish  to  make  it  clear  that  the  United  States  does  not 
accept  or  recognize  these  measures  as  altering  the  status  of  Jerusalem. 381 
My  Government  does  not  recognize  that  the  administrative  measures  taken 
by  the  Government  of  Israel  on  June  28  can  be  regarded  as  the  last  word 
on  the  matter,  and  we  regret  that  they  were  taken.  We  insist  that  the 
measures  taken  cannot  be  considered  other  than  interim  and  provisional, 
and  not  prejudging  the  final  and  permanent  status  of  Jerusalem.  "" 
This  view  on  the  effect  of  the  Israeli  measures  was  based  on  a 
statement  issued  by  the  State  Department  on  June  28,1967,  which 
confirmed  that  such  action  "cannot  be  regarded  as  determining  the  future 
of  the  Holy  Places  or  the  status  of  Jerusalem  In  relation  to  them.  ",  "* 
As  far  as  the  Holy  Places  were  concerned,  Goldberg  quoted  his  earlier 
statement  to  the  General  Assembly  on  July  3,1967: 
"the  safeguarding  of  the  Holy  Places,  and  freedom  of  access  to  them  for 
all,  should  be  internationally  guaranteed;  and  the  status  of  Jerusalem 
in  relation  to  them  should  be  decided  not  unilaterally  but  in 
consultation  with  all  concerned.  1196 
Goldberg  made  it  clear  that  the  above  statement  represents  the 
considered  and  continuing  policy  of  the  United  States  Government. 
However,  Goldberg  provided  no  answer  to  the  question  of  who  would  be 
responsible  for  guaranteeing  this  freedom.  Presumably  this  question 
would  be  determined  in  the  future  by  all  the  parties  concerned.  There 
was  no  specific  reference  to  Israel  assuming  this  responsibility. 
Goldberg  indicated  that  the  United  States  did  not  "believe  the  problem 
of  Jerusalem  can  realistically  be  solved  apart  from  the  other  related 
aspects  of  Jerusalem  and  of  the  Middle  Eastern  situation.  "ve  As  to  who 
would  have  permanent  sovereignty  over  East  Jerusalem,  Goldberg  referred 
to  the  U.  S.  vote  for  the  Latin  American  draft  which  called  for  the 
internationalization  of  Jerusalem.  "  Taking  into  account  the  fact  that 382 
the  statement  did  not  call  for  restoration  of  Jordanian  sovereignty 
over,  nor  approved  Israel's  occupation  off  East  Jerusalem,  it  is  clear 
that  the  U.  S.  adhered  to  its  previous  position  that  neither  Jordan  nor 
Israel  should  have  sovereignty  over  the  city;  rather  they  should 
administer  the  city  under  the  supervision  of  the  United  Nations.  ", 
There  is  no  better  quotation  summarizing  the  U,  S.  policy  on  Jerusalem 
than  that  contained  in  a  State  Department  memorandum: 
"We  believe  that  an  agreement  between  Israel  and  Trans-yordan  looking 
toward  the  division  of  Jerusalem  into  two  areas  to  be  administered  by 
the  two  countries  would  be  an  appropriate  solution  to  the  problem. 
However  the  United  States  cannot  support  any  arrangement  which  would 
purport  to  authorize  the  establishment  of  Israeli  or  Trans-Jordanian 
sovereignty  over  parts  of  the  Jerusalem  area  in  view  of  the  United 
Nations  resolutions  and  our  support  thereof.  The  Israelis  and  Trans-, 
Jordanians  should  be  supervised  in  their  administration  of  the  City  by  a 
United  Nations  Commissioner,  the  principle  of  the  ifiternationalization 
of  Jerusalem,  in  favour  of  which  the  world  community  has  votedt  thus 
being  maintained.  "" 
In  January  19,1969  the  Nixon  administration  replaced  the  Johnston 
administration.  Later  that  year,  when  the  issue  of  the  status  of 
Jerusalem  arose  before  the  Security  Council  as  a  result  of  a  Jordanian 
complaint  about  Israeli  action  in  the  city,  the  new  U.  S.  Ambassador  to 
the  U.  N.,  Charles  Yosto  had  occasion  to  deliver  a  major  policy 
statement  to  the  Security  Council,  upon-the  US  voting  for  Resolution  267 
of  July  3,1969  which  sharply  criticized  Israel  for  its  policy  in 
Jerusalem.  100  In  addressing  the  Council  on  July  1,  Yost  defined  his 
country's  Jerusalem  policy.  The  relevant  and  most  important  paragraph 383 
of  his  speech  described  Israel  as  a  military  occupier-  of  East 
Jerusalem: 
"The  United  States  considers  that  the  part  of  Jerusalem  that  came  under 
the  control  of  Israel  in  the  June  war,  like  other  areas  occupied  by 
Israel,  is  occupied  territory  and  hence  subject  to  the  provisions  of 
international  law  governing  -the  rights  and  obligations  of  an  occupying 
power.  11101 
A  careful  study  of  the  other  parts  of  the  Yost  speech  suggests  that, 
with  the  exception  of  the  above  paragraph,  it  was  in  line  with  the  views 
expressed  by  Goldberg  in  1967. 
An  important  question  arises  here  in  respect  of  the  above-mentioned 
statements,  namely,  whether  there  is  a  difference  between  the  U.  S. 
Jerusalem  policy  under  Goldberg  and  that  under  Yost.  According  to  a 
reasonable  viewl  the  U.  S.  policy  expressed  by  Yost  represented  a  radical 
departure  from  the  previous  U.  S.  position  indicated  by  Goldberg-102  The 
extent  to  which  the  Yost  statement  diverged  from  the  views  expressed  by 
his  predecessor  at  the  U.  N.  is  best  revealed  in  a  letter  which  appeared 
in  the  New  York  Times  in  March  1989,  written  by  Goldberg  himself: 
"The  facts  are  that  I  never  described  Jerusalem  as  occupied  territory. 
Ambassador  Yost  did,  in  his  speech  of  July  1  1969,  under  instructions 
from  President  Nixon,  and  his  statement  represented  a  departure  from  the 
policy  I,  President  Johnston  and  the  Department  of  State  pursued  with 
respect  to  Jerusalem  during  the  period  of  my  tenure  .  In  a  number  of 
speeches  at  the  U.  N.  in  1967,1  repeatedly  stated  that  the  armistice 
lines  fixed  after  1948  were  intended  to  be  temporary.  This,  of  coursep 
was  particularly  true  of  Jerusalem.  At  no  time  in  these  many  speeches 
did  I  refer  to  East  Jerusalem  as  occupied  territory.  I  made  it  clear 384 
that  the  status  of  Jerusalem  should  be  negotiable  and  that  the  armistice 
lines  dividing  Jerusalem  -were  no  longer  viable.  In  other  words, 
Jerusalem  was  not  to  be  divided  again.  " 
This  is  a  far  cry  from  Ambassador  Yost's  statement  that  we  conceived 
East  Jerusalem  to  be  occupied  territory,  to  be  returned  to  Jordanian 
sovereignty  ...  "101 
On  the  other  hand#  the  Carter  administration  held  the  view 
that  the  Yost  approach  did  not  represent  a  departure  from  the  preceding 
policy  as  expressed  by  Goldberg.  `  According  to  this  view,  the  concept 
of  Jerusalem  as  occupied  territory  was  inaugurated  by  Goldberg  and 
continued  by  Yost.  106 
The  weakness  of  this  view  lies  in  the  fact  that  there  is  no  reasonable 
explanation  as  to  why,  in  his  letter  to  Sadat,  President  Carter  found 
it  necessary  to  refer  to  both  U.  N.  statements  when  the  Yost  statement 
included  everything  in  the  Goldberg  statement  and  even  went  beyond  it. 
In  considering  the  legal  aspect  of  the  U.  S  position,  particularly  the 
reference  to  East  Jerusalem  as  occupied  territory  subject  to  the  law  of 
military  occupation$  some  comments  must  be  made. 
Clearly,  the  Americans  did  not  accept  Israel's  argument  that  it  had  a 
better  title  to  East  Jerusalem  than  Jordan.  Nor  did  they  accept  Israel's 
argument  that  the'law  of  military  occupation  was  not  applicable  to  the 
Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  because  Israel  replaced  a  military  occupier  in  East 
Jerusalem,  i.  e.  Jordan.  The  argument  that  the  law  of  military 
occupationlor-  cannot  be  applied  unless  the  ousted  sovereign  was 
legitimate  has  been  discussed  earlier.  107 
The  American  position  regarding  East  Jerusalem  was  consistent 
with  the  prevailing  view  that  Resolution  242  required  Israel  to  withdraw 385 
from  all  the  territories  occupied  in  1967,  including  East  Jerusalem.  It 
was  also  consistent  'with  several  other  U.  N.  resolutions,  particularly 
Security  Council  Resolution  465  of  March  1,1980,  which  criticized 
Israel  for  its  settlement-  policy  in  the  Vest  Bank  on  the  ground  that  it 
consituted  a  "flagrant  violation  of  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention"  and 
called  on  Israel  to  rescind  the  measures  taken  and  "to  dismantle  the 
existing  settlements  and  in  particular  to  cease,  on  an  urgent  basis, 
the  establishment,  construction  and  planning  of  settlements  in  the  Arab 
territories  occupied  since  1967l  including  Jerusalem.  "100 
The  precise  meaning  of  the  term  "occupied  territory"  had  not  been 
clarifiedt  i.  e.  whether  the  term  is  taken  to  refer  to  territories 
occupied  from  Jordan  or  territories  occupied  f  rom  the  United  Nations. 
It  might  be  argued  that  the  U.  N.  retained  a  residual  right  of 
sovereignty  in  Jerusalem  from  1948  to  1967  and  Israel's  entry  into  East 
Jerusalem  constituted  occupation  of  territory  appertaining  to  the  United 
Nations'09.  At  this  point,  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  U.  N. 
Committee  on  the  Exercise  of  Inalienable  Rights  of  the  Palestinian 
People,  in  a  paper  issued  in  1979  an  the  status  of  Jerusalem,  contended 
that  General  Assembly  and  Security  Council  resolutions  after  1967,  which 
declared  that  Israeli  actions  tending  to  change  the  legal  status  of 
Jerusalem  were  invalid,  must  be  taken  to  refer  to  the  legal  status  of 
nnrpus  separatum  of  the  original  Partition  Resolution.  110  Thus  a 
distinguished  writer  suggested  that  Israel  withdraw  from  East  Jerusalem 
to  be  replaced  by  a  U.  N.  administration.  "I 
The  term  "occupied  territory"  could  also  be  understood  as  referring  to 
territory  occupied  from  Jordan.  In  the  years  immediately  after  the  1967 
war,  there  was  an  international  understanding  that  Jordan  possessed  a 386 
reversionary  interest  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  was  the  legitimate 
negotiating  party  for  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Israel 
whereby  the  Vest  Bank,  including  East  Jerusalem,  with  allowances  for 
minor  territorial  adjustment,  would  finally  become  de  jure  a  recognized 
part  of  Jordan's  territory.  112  The  legal  argument  advanced  to  Justify 
Jordanian  rights  to  the  Vest  Bank  was  that  the  1949  Armistice  Agreement 
between  Israel  and  Jordan,  coupled  with  the  1950  Jericho  petition'13  of 
Arab  'notables  for  Arab  Palestine  to  be  joined  to  Transjordan  brought 
about  a  situation  whereby  Jordan  became  not  only  the  de  facto  but  the 
legitimate  sovereign  authority  -in  the  Vest  Bank  and  East  Jerusalem. 
These  acts,  it  was  said,  constituted  a  form  of  self-determination. 
According  to.  this  argument,  U.  N.  resolutions  since  1967  calling  for  the 
return  of  the  status  quo  ante  in  East  Jerusalem  refer  to  the  restoration 
of  Jordanian  authority.  114 
The  view  that  the  term  "Occupied  territory"  should  be  understood  to 
describe  territories  occupied  from  Jordan  can  be  supported  by  the  terms 
of  the  Rogers  Peace  Plan,  announced  by  the  American  Secretary  of  State 
on  December  9,1967-111  He  referred  to  a  Jordanian  authority  in  East 
Jerusalem  In  the  following  terms: 
"Arrangements  for  the  administration  of  the  unified  city  should  take 
into  account  the  interests  of  all  its  inhabitants  and  of  the  Jewish 
Islamic  and  Christian  communities.  And  there  should  be  roles  for  both 
Israel  and  Jordan  in  the  civic,  economic  and  religious  life  of  the 
city.  "Is 
Clearly,  the  formulation  of  this  last  sentence  implied  that  the 
administration  of  the  city  would  be  shared,  with  the  authority  of  both 
Jordan  and  Israel  extending  to  the  political  and  economic  spheres,  as 387 
well  as  the  religious.  In  other  words,  it  can  be  argued,  Jordanian 
sovereignty  was  to  be  restored. 
Such  an  approach,  which  implied  a  recognition  of  the  legality  of 
Jordanian  sovereignty  in  East  Jerusalem,  was  inconsistent  with  the 
previous  U.  S.  policy  Since  1948,  the  U.  S.  had  considered  the  Jordanian 
entry  into  East  Jerusalem  to  be  illegal.  In  1948  the  U.  S.  representative 
in  Security  Council  referred  to  the  Ruler  of  Jordan  as  "a  ruler  who  is 
occupying  land  outside  his  domain.  The  illegal  purposes  of  this 
government  invading  Palestine  with  armed  forces  ...  is  against  the  peace 
...  It  is  an  invasion  with  a  definite  purpose  ...  Therefore  we  have  the 
highest  type  of  the  international  violation  of  law.  "'  17 
Subsequently,  the  US  refused  to  recognise  Jordan's  annexation  of  the 
Vest  Bank,  including  East  Jerusalem.  lie 
The  position  of  the  U.  S.  concerning  the  final  status  of  Jerusalem  is  not 
clear.  Vhile  the  paragraph  agreed  on  Jerusalem,  as  well  as  the 
Goldberg  statement,  referred  to  a  united  city  and  functional 
internationalizationt  the  Carter  letter,  by  reference  to  the  Yost 
statement,  endorsed  a  separate  status  for  East  Jerusalem,  and  hence 
implicitly  a  commitment  by  the  U.  S.  to  support  two  legal  regimes  in  the 
city.  These  two  lines  of  policy,  as  has  been  rightly  observed,  were 
divergent  and  could  not  readily  be  reconciled.  119 
Subsequently,  the  Carter  administration  provided  more  clarification  on 
that  point.  In  Carter's  reply  to  questions  submitted  to  him  by  King 
Hussein  of  Jordan  in  respect  of  the  final  status  of  Jerusalem,  the  U.  S. 
President  stated: 
"The  final  status  of  Jerusalem  should  not  be  prejudged  by  the  unilateral 
actions  undertaken  in  Jerusalem  since  the  1967  war.  Vhatever  solution 388 
is  agreed  upon  should  preserve  Jerusalem  as  a  physically  undivided  city. 
It  should  provide  for  free  access  to  the  Jewish,  Muslim  and  Christian 
Holy  Places  without  distinction  or  discrimination  for  the  free  exercise 
of  worship.  It  should  assure  the  basic  rights  of  all  the  City's 
residents.  The  Holy  Places  of  each  faith  should  be  under  the  full 
authority  of  their  representatives.  0120 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  word  "physically"  was  deliberately  inserted 
b,  efore  the  word  "undivided".  Taking  into  consideration  the  fact  that 
previous  U.  S.  statements  used  the  word  "undivided"  without  being 
preceded  by  the  term  "physically",  one  may  wonder  as  to  the  precise 
meaning  of  this  term.  FortunatelYj  Secretary  Vance  interpreted  its 
meaning  in  his  testimony  before  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
on  March  21,1980.  He  stated: 
@'What  is  meantj  very  simply,  was  that  it  should  be  physically  undivided; 
that  never  again  should  there  be  barbed  wire  between  the  various  parts. 
It  did  not  purport  to  say  what  the  final  political  solution  should  be. 
It  did  not  speak  to  of  the  ultimate  question  of  sovereignty.  It  talked 
of  the  question  of  what  the  City  would  be  in  terms  of  its  physical 
characteristics.  "  121 
He  concluded  his  testimony  by  stating  that  "Our  policy  on  this  city  has 
remained  consistent  under  the  past  four  Presidents.  "122 
The  Begin  letter  appended  to  the  Agreements  defined  Israel's  position 
in  the  following  terms: 
on  28  June  1967l  Israel's  Parliament  (the  Knesset)  promulgated  and 
adopted  a  law  to  the  effect  :  "The  Government  is  empowered  by  a  decree 
to  apply  the  law,  the  Jurisdiction  and  administration  of  the  state  to 389 
any  part  of  Eretz  Israel  (Land  of  Israel-Palestine)"  ,  as  stated  in  that 
decree. 
On  the  basis  of  this  law,  the  Government  of  Israel  decreed  in.  July  1967 
that  Jerusalem  is  one  city  indivisible,  the  capital  of  the  State  of 
Israel.  " 
123 
The  wording  of  this  letter  indicates  clearly  that  there  is  no  change  in 
Israel's  position  vis-a-vis  East  Jerusalem  since  its  occupation  in 
1967,  particularly  the  administrative  and  legislative  measures  taken  on 
June  20,1967.  The  argument  for  and  against  these  Israeli  measures  is 
well  known.  It  does  not  seem  necessary  to  repeat  what  has  been  said  in 
this  respect,  124  and  it  may  be  sufficient  to  refer  in  brief  to  such 
measures  and  their  legality  under  international  law. 
Immediately  after  its  occupation  of  East  Jerusalem  during  the  1967  war, 
Israel  removed  the  barriers  of  brick  and  barbed  wire  separating  the  two 
parts  of  Jerusalem  and  proceeded  to  treat  the  city  as  one  united 
municipal  entity. 
126 
This  situation  was  formalized  by  the  Knesset  in  the  enactment  of  three 
laws  on  June  27,1907.  The  first  was  the  Law  and  Administration 
Ordinance  Amendment  Act  which  provided  that  Israeli  "law,  jurisdiction 
and  administration  shall  extend  to  any  area  of  Eretz  Israel  designated 
by  the  Government  by  order".  126  The  second  effected  an  amendment  to  the 
1934  Municipalities  Ordinance  Act  to  enable  the  Minister  of  the  Interior 
to  expand  by  proclamation  the  area  of  the  municipal  corporation  to 
include  any  area  designated  under  the  Law  and  Administration  Ordinance 
Act'27-  And  finally,  the  third  law  provided  for  the  protection  of  the 
Holy  Places  and  for  untrammeled  freedom  of  access  to  then120  The  next 
day,  June  28,1967,  the  Minister  of  the  Interiorl  on  the  basis  of  the 390 
revised  Law  and  Administration  Ordinance  Act,  designated  an  area 
embracing  East  Jerusalem  and  outlying  areas  as  part  of  the  municipal 
City  of  Jerusalem.  The  administrative  unification  of  the  City  was 
thereby  formally  completed.  129 
Israel's  announcement  that  the  law,  jurisdiction  and  administration  of 
the  State  of  Israel  were  being  applied  to  East  Jerusalem  provoked  bitter 
protest  from  Jordan  and  other  statest  including  the  U.  S.  130 
The  United  Nations  General  Assembly  adopted  two  Resolutions  without 
opposition  on  July  4  and  14l  1967,  declaring  Israel's  actions  "invalid" 
and  calling  upon  Israel  "to  rescind  all  measures  already  taken  and 
desist  forthwith  from  taking  any  action  which  would  alter  the  status  of 
Jerusalem.  "  131  Israel  refused  to  comply,  contending  that  no 
international  or  other  interest  would  be  served  by  the  institution  of 
divisions  and  barriers  which  would  only  sharpen  tension  and  generate 
discrimination.  111:  22  The  claim  was  made  that  Israel  was  responding  to 
"the  intrinsic  necessity  of  ensuring  equal  rights  and  opportunities  to 
all  the  city's  residents.  11133  This  answer  was  not  accepted  by  the 
General  Assembly.  134 
These  measures  were  the  subject  of  sharp  criticism  at  the  Security 
Council  in  several  resolutions  adopted  in  1968,36,1969'3r-  and  1971  1  37. 
For  instance,  Security  Council  Resolution  29a  adopted  on  September  25, 
1971  confirmed  that  "legislative  and  administrative  actions  taken  by 
Israel  to  change  the  status  of  the  City  of  Jerusalem,  including 
expropriation  of  land  and  properties,  transfer  of  populations  and 
legislation  aimed  at  the  incorporation  of  the  occupied  section  are 
totally  invalid  and  cannot  change  that  status". 391 
"Urgently  calls  upon  Israel  to  rescind  all  previous  measures  and 
actions  and  to  take  no  further  steps  in  the  occupied  section  of 
Jerusalem  which  may  purport  to  change  the  status  of  the  City,  or  which 
would  prejudice  the  rights  of  the  inhabitants  and  the  interests  of  the 
international  community#  or  a  just  and  lasting  peace.  "138 
Reacting  to  this  Resolution,  the  Israeli  government  issued  a  statement 
in  which  it  declared  its  rejection  in  the  following  terms: 
"The  -  Government  of  Israel  considers  that  there  was  no  justification 
whatever  for  raising  the  issue  of  Jerusalem  in  the  Security  Council,  nor 
for  the  Resolution  adopted.  The  Government  of  Israel  will  not  enter 
into  any  discussion  with  any  political  organ  on  the  basis  of  this 
Resolution.  Israel's  policy  on  Jerusalem  will  remain  unchanged.  11139 
In  the  period  following  the  conclusion  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  Israeli  practice  has  gone  a  long  way  in  tying  East 
Jerusalem  to  it  through  a  variety  of  measures,  including  the  extension 
of  public  services  and  the  establishment  of  settlements  in  the  area.  140 
On  March  1,1980,  the  Security  Council  unanimously  adopted  Resolution 
465  which  criticized  Israel  for  its  settlement  policy  on  the  West  Bank 
whichq  it  charged,  was  "a  flagrant  violation  of  the  Fourth  Geneva 
Convention  ..  and  ..  a  serious  obstruction  to  achieving  a  comprehensive, 
just  and  lasting  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  "141  The  resolution  called  on 
Israel  to  rescind  the  measures  taken  and  "to  dismantle  the  existing 
settlements  and  in  particular  to  cease  on  an  urgent  basis,  the 
establishment,  construction  and  planning  of  settlements  in  the  Arab 
territories  occupied  since  1967,  including  Jerusalem.  14142 
The  Israelis'  reaction  an  the  above  Resolution  came  very  soon.  Again 
they  challenged  the  will  of  the  U.  N.  On  July  31,1980,  the  Knesset 392 
passed  a  law  which  proclaimed  Jerusalem  the  eternal  capital  of  Israel. 
The  relevant  text  of  this  law  reads: 
111.  Jerusalem  united  in  its  entirity  is  the  capital  of  Israel. 
2.  Jerusalem  is  the  seat  of  the  President  of  the  State,  the  Knesset,  and 
the  Government,  and  the  Supreme  Court. 
3.  The  Holy  Places  shall  be  protected  from  desecration  and  any  other 
violation  and  from  anything  likely  to  violate  the  freedom  of  access  of 
the  members  of  the  different  religions  to  the  places  sacred  to  them  or 
their  feelings  with  regard  to  those  places.  "  143 
This  law  was  not  accepted  by  the  Egyptians  who  considered  it  to  be  a 
flagrant  violation  of  what  had  been  agreed  at  Camp  David,  and 
immediately  decided  to  stop  the  autonomy  negotiations  with  Israel.  144 
-  In  turno  the  Security  Council,  on  August  209  1980,  adopted  Resolution 
478  which  censured  Israel  for  its  enactment  of  the  "basic  law"  an 
Jerusalem  and  called  upon  all  member  states  maintaining  diplomatic 
missions  in  Jerusalem  to  withdraw  them  from  the  City.  14S 
A  final  and  important  question  arises  in  respect  of  Israel's  final 
position  vis-a-vis  East  Jerusalem,  namely,  whether  or  not  the  Israeli 
administrative  and  legislative  measures  taken  in  Jerusalem  before  and 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  Camp  David  Accords  were  permissible  under 
international  law?  On-  the  one  hand,  the  prevailing  view  is  that  these 
measures  are  a  flagrant  violation  of  international  law.  14r-  Opposing 
this  trend,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  views  held  by  Israel  and  some 
writers  supporting  it,  that  these  measures  are  not  illegal. 
Several  arguments  can  be  advanced,  in  support  of  the  view  held  by  an 
overwhelming  majority  of  U.  N.  members  that  the  Israeli  measures,  were 393 
illegal.  Firstf  it  was  argued  that  the  Israeli  action  is  in  violation 
of  its  obligation  under  the  Camp  David  Accords. 
The  Egyptians  argued  that  Israel's  law,  enacted  on  July  31,19800 
proclaiming  Jerusalem  the  eternal  capital  of  Israel,  constituted  a 
flagrant  violation  of  the  Camp  David  Accords.  At  Camp  David,  according 
to  the  Egyptians,  the  parties  agreed  that  the  final  status  of  Jerusalem 
should  be  left  to  future  negotiations.  147  Any  review  of  the  records  of 
the  negotiations  confirm  this  agreement.  It  follows  that  Israel  was 
obliged  not  to  decide  unilaterally  on  the  final  status  of  Jerusalem  as 
it  had  done  in  1980.148 
Perhaps,  the  weakness  of  this  argument  lies  in  the  fact  that  there  was 
no  provision  in  the  Camp  David  Accords  or  in  the  1979  Peace  Treaty  under 
which  Israel  was  obliged  to  negotiate  on  the  future  status  of  East 
Jerusalem.  Even  the  Carter  letter  an  the  U.  S.  position  concerning  East 
Jerusalem  was  addressed  to  Sadat,  but  not  to  Begin.  The  Israelis, 
therefore,  declared  themselves  in  no  way  bound  by  what  Carter  had 
written  to  Sadat. 
it  was  also  argued  that  the  Israeli  measures  constituted  annexation  of 
the  Arab  Sectort  rather  than  the  administrative  unification  of  the 
city.  149  If  this  were  true,  it  followed  that  this  annexation  must  be 
invalid  under  the  principle  of  the  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of 
territory  by  force.  This  is  a  well  established  and  recognized-principle 
of  international  law.  According  to  Quincy  Wight,  the  application  of 
this  principle  to  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  "clearly  required  that 
Israel  gained  no  political  advantage  by  its  occupation.  "160  In 
practicet  this  would  mean  that  Israel  had  no  right  to  annex  any  part  of 
the  territories  it  occupied  by  military  force  in  the  Six-Day  War.  161 394 
The  argument  that  these  measures  constituted  annexation  is  complicated 
by  the  fact  that  Israel  had  not  expressly  claimed  "sovereignty"  over  the 
Old  City.  Instead  it  spoke  of  re-unification,  and  of  reuniting  the 
administration  of  the  two  parts  of  the  City.  162 
However,  the  assumption  was  that  Israel  had  in  law  formally  annexed 
East  Jerusalem.  A  review  of  the  views  expressed  by  the  U.  N.  members 
during  the  discussion  of  Resolutions  2254  adopted  by  the  General 
Assembly  on  Ju  ly  17#  1967  and  252  adopted  by  the  Security  Council  on  May 
21,1968,  confirms  this  assumption.  Ic-3  In  the  Ruwaydi  and  Maches--v. 
- 
Ho.  'hron  Military  Court  Case  two  Judges  of  the  Israeli  Supreme  Court 
accepted  that  East  Jerusalem  was  formally  annexed  by  Israel.  164 
To  sum  up,  the  argument  here  is  based  on  the  distinction  made  by 
traditional  international  law  between  occupation  and  annexation  of  enemy 
territory.  Occupation  is  mere  control  of  enemy  territory  by  force  of 
arms  for  so  long  as  the  belligerent  is  able  to  maintain  his  position  or 
until  he  voluntarily  gives  it  up.  It  involves  no  termination  of  the  de- 
J.  um  rights  of  the  regular  sovereign,  only  a  temporary,  though  possibly 
prolonged,  de  facto 
. 
suspension  of  the  exercise  of  those  rights.  Under 
certain  circumstancess  occupation  may  be  legally  permitted-"' 
Annexation  involves  an  attempt  by  the  occupier  to  convert  his  physical 
right  of  occupation  into  a  legal  title  to  the  territory.  In  other 
wordso  he  seeks  to  change  sovereignty  over  the  territory  from  his  enemy 
to  himself.  Such  annexation  is  prohibited.  "' 
It  has  been  contended  the  Isreali  measures  in  East  Jerusalem  are  in 
violation  of  the  law  of  military  occupation.  The  international  law  of 
military  occupation  determines  the  extent  of  the  occupier's  jurisdiction 
and  its  power  to  make  and  enforce  law  in  the  occupied  territory.  The 395 
degree  of  erosion  of  the  internal  law  of  the  territory  so  occupied  is 
controlled  in  Article  43  of  the  Hague  Regulations  of  1907,  as  modified 
by  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention.  Article  43  of  the  former  reads: 
"The  authority  of  the  power  of  the  State,  having  passed  de  facto  into 
the  hands  of  the  Occupant,  the  latter  shall  do  all  in  his  power  to 
restore  and  ensure  as  far  as  possible,  public  order  and  safety, 
respecting  at  the  same  time,  unless  absolutely  prevented,  the  laws  in 
force  in  the  country.  "  IS7 
In  the  course  of  the  U.  N.  debates  on  the  Israeli  measures  in  Jerusalem, 
Lord  Caradon  said  on  behalf  of  the  United  Kingdom  that  the  Israeli 
measures  in  Jerusalem  were  invalid  because  they  went  beyond  the 
competence  of  the  occupying  power  as  defined  by  international  law.  158  A 
similar  view  was  expressed  by  Ambassador  Yost  in  the  course  of  the 
Security  Council  debates: 
"Among  the  provisions  of  international  law  which  bind  Israel,  as  they 
would  bind  any  occupier,  are  the  provisions  that  the  occupier  has  no 
right  to  make  changes  in  law  or  in  administration  other  than  those  which 
are  temporarily  necessitated  by  his  security  interest,  and  that  an 
occupier  may  not  confiscate  or  destroy  private  property.  The  pattern  of 
behaviour  authorized  under  the  Geneva  Convention  and  international  law 
is  clear:  the  occupier  must  maintain  the  occupied  areas  as  intact  and 
unaltered  as  possiblet  without  interfering  with  the  customary  life  of 
the  area,  and  any  changes  must  be  necessitated  by  immediate  needs  of  the 
occupation.  I  regret  to  say  that  the  actions  of  Israel  in  the  occupied 
portion  of  Jerusalem  present  a  different  picture,  one  which  gives  rise 
to  understandable  concerns  that  the  eventual  disposition  of  East 396 
Jerusalem  may  be  prejudiced  and  the  rights  and  activities  of  the 
population  are  already  being  affected  and  altered.  1116v 
Israel's  measures  have  been  said  to  be  a  "trespass  upon"t  and  a 
"usurpation  of  a  territory"  to  be  administered  by  the  U.  N.  11611 
As  is  wellknown,  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  recomm  nded 
the  internationalization  of  Jerusalem  by  its  Resolutions  181  of 
November  19,19471  194  of  December  11,1948,  and  303  of  December  9 
1949.161 
Israel  undertook  at  the  time  of  her  application  for  admission  to 
U.  N.  membership  to  implement  the  resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly 
concerning  the  internationalization  of  Jerusalem.  During  the  prolonged 
debate  that  preceded  Israel's  application  for  admission,  it  specifically 
undertook  to  respect  the  status  and  the  internationalization  of 
Jerusalem.  I  r-2  The  Resolution  of  the  General  Assembly  of  11  May  1949, 
which  recommended  Israel's  admission  to  U.  N.  membership,  expressly 
referred'to  Israel's  "declarations  and  explanations"  with  respect  to  the 
resolutions  on  Jerusalem.  'r-3  Israel  was  bound  by  her  "declarations  and 
explanations"  and  could  not  rely  an  a  breach  of  its  own  formal 
assurances  to  the  U.  N.  to  claim  title  over  Jerusalem. 
Cattan  maintained  that  these  resolutions  on  the  international  regime 
for  the  City  of  Jerusalem  are  still  valid  and  operative.  To  pro,  ýe  thist 
he  referred  to  the  U.  N.  resolutions  deploring  the  Israeli  measures  in 
Jerusalem  and  to  the  refusal  of  most  states  to  establish  their 
diplomatic  missions  in  Jerusalem.  164 
The  Israeli  measures  were  also  condemned  by  several  U.  N.  resolutions 
calling  on  Israel  to  rescind  them  and  to  withdraw  from  East  Jerusalem. 
The  argument  here  refers  to  U.  I.  resolutions  adopted  by  the  General 397 
Assembly  and  the  Security  Council  in  reaction  to  the  Israeli 
administrative  and  legislative  measures  taken  since  June  1907.  We  may 
refer  specifically  to  General  Assembly  Resolution  2253  adopted  an  July 
4.1967,  which  was  the  first  U.  N.  resolution  condemning  these  measures: 
"The  General  Assembly  .. 
1.  Considers  that  these  measures  are  invalid; 
2.  Calls  upon  Israel  to  rescind  all  measures  already  taken  and  to  desist 
forthwith  from  taking  any  action  which  would  alter  the  status  of 
Jerusalem.  11  1  11 
Again,  on  July  14,1967,  the  General  Assembly  adopted  Resolution  2254 
wherein  it  expressed  the  deepest  regret  and  concern  at  the 
noncompliance  by  Israel  with  Resolution  2253  and:  " 
2.  Reiterates  its  call  to  Israel  in  that  Resolution  to  rescind  all 
measures  already  taken  and  to  desist  forthwith  from  taking  any  action 
which  would  alter  the  status  of  Jerusalem.  ""', 
Similar  resolutions  were  adopted  by  the  Security  Council  in  May 
19681671  July  1969,  September  1969160  and  September  1971.169 
.  C)n  March  11  1980  a  strong  resolution  was  adopted  by  the  Security 
Council  in  which  it  confirmed  its  previous  position  in  respect  of  the 
Israeli  measures.  The  U.  S.  voted  for  this  resolution,  which  reads  in 
part: 
"The  Security  Council,,,, 
affirming  once  more  that  the  Geneva  Convention  relative  to  the 
Protection  of  Civilian  Persons  in  Time  of  Var,  of  12  August  1949  is 
applicable  to  the  Arab  territories  occupied  by  Israel  since  1967, 
including  Jerusalem.... 398 
Deploring  the  decision  of  the  government  of  Israel  officially  to 
support  Israeli  settlements  in  the  Palestinian  and  other  Arab 
territories  occupied  since  1967, 
Deeply  concerned  by  the  practices  of  the  Israeli  authorities  in 
implementing  that  settlement  policy  in  the  occupied  Arab 
territories,  including  Jerusalem,  and  its  consequences  for  the  local 
Arab  and  Palestinian  population.... 
Determines  that  all  measures  taken  by  Israel  to  change  the  physical 
character,  demographic  composition,  institutional  structure  or 
status  of  the  Palestinian  and  other  Arab  territories  occupied  since 
1967,  including  Jerusalem,  or  any  part  thereof  have  no  legal 
validity  and  that  Israel's  policy  and  practices  of  settling  parts  of 
its  population  and  new  immigrants  in  those  territories  constitute  a 
flagrant  violation  of  the  Geneva  Convention  relative  to  the 
Protection  of  Civilian  Persons  in  Time  of  Var  and  also  constitute  a 
serious  obstruction  to  achieving  a  comprehensive,  Just  and  lasting 
peace  in  the  Middle  East; 
Strongly  deplores  the  continuation  and  persistence  of  Israel  in 
pursuing  those  policies  and  practices  and  calls  upon  the  Government 
and  people  of  Israel  to  rescind  those  measuresl  to  dismantle  the 
existing  settlements  and  in  particular  to  cease,  on  an  urgent  basis$ 
the  establishment,  construction  and  planning  of  settlements  in  the 
Arab  territories  occupied  since  1967,  including  Jerusalem..  .  11170 
In  reaction  to  the  Israeli  law  of  July  1980  declaring  Jerusalem  in  its 
entirety  the  capital  of  Israel,  the  Security  Council  on  August  20,1980 
adopted  Resolution  478  censuring  Israel  for  its  enactment  of  the  "basic 399 
law"  on  Jerusalem  and  calling  upon  all  member  states  maintaining 
diplomatic  missions  in  Jerusalem  to  withdraw  them  from  the  City.  171 
There  Is  also  another  view  to  the  effect  that  Israeli  administrative 
and  legislative  measures  in  East  Jerusalem  were  not  illegal.  Several 
writers  have  attempted  to  find  legal  bases  for  Israel's  measures  in  East 
Jerusalem.  Three  main  arguments  have  been  advanced  in  this  respect. 
Israel,  it  is  alleged,  has  acquired  a  legal  title  to  East  Jerusalem, 
based  on  the  assumption  either  that  it  filled  the  sovereignty  vacuum 
arising  in  East  Jerusalem  after  the  end  of  the  Mandate  (which  was  not 
filled  by  Jordan's  occupation  of  East  Jerusalem  in  1948)  172,  or  that 
Israel  acquired  such  title  under  the  theory  of  "relative  title"  .1  73 
A  holder  of  the  view  that  Israel  filled  the  sovereignty  vacuum  is  E. 
Lauterpacht  who  stated 
"The  sovereignty  vacuum  arising  in  the  Old  City  at  the  end  of  the 
Mandate  was  not  filled  by  Jordan,  whose  status  there  was  one  of  de  factG 
occupation  protected  by  the  Armistice  Agreement.  Once  Jordan  was 
physically  removed  for  the  Old  City?  legitimate  measures  -  as  the  Israeli 
reactions  to  the  Jordanian  attack  on  5th  June  1967  -  undoubtedly  1. 
the  way  was  open  for  a  lawful  occupant  to  fill  the  still  subsisting 
vacaricy.  IfI74 
So  far  as  the  argument  for  Israel's  relative  title  to  East  Jerusalem  is 
concerned,  some  held  that  title  to  territory  is  normally  based  not  an  A 
00-/ 
claim  of  absolute  validity  but  rather  an  one  of  relative  validity  Thust 
e.  g.  j  in  the  Minquers  and'Crehns  case  the  International  Court  of  Justice 
decided  to  "appraise  the 
Lý 
relative  strength  Oýthe  opposing  claims  to 
sovereignty. 
11176  A  supporter  of  this  view  is  S.  Schwebel  who  wrote: 400 
"Having  regard  to  the  consideration  that  Israel  ..  Eacted]  defensively 
in  1948  and  1967..  and  her  Arab  neighbours..  Eacted]  aggressively  in  1948 
and  1967  ..  Israel  has  better  title  in  the  territory  of  what  was 
Palestine,  including  the  whole  of  Jerusalem,  than  do  Jordan  and 
Egypt-* 
W176 
Clearly,  the  argument  for  Israel's  territorial  title  to  East  Jerusalem 
is  based  on  the  two-fold  assumption:  that  Israel  was  exercising 
self-defence  against  Jordan  whose  previous  territorial  sovereignty  over 
East  Jerusalem  was  doubtful;  176  that  the  U.  N  resolutions  on  the 
internationalization  of  Jerusalem  were  no  longer  valid  or  effective 
since  they  contain  no  reference  to  such  a  concept  after  1949.177 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  law  of  military  occupation,  under  which 
these  Israeli  measures  could  be  valid,  is  not  applicable  to  East 
Jerusalem.  According  to  Blum: 
"The  traditional  rules  of  international  law  governing  belligerant 
occupation  are  based  on  a  two-fold  assumption,  namely,  (a)  that  it  was 
the  legitimate  sovereign  which  was  ousted  from  the  territory  under 
occupation,  and  (b)  that  the  ousting  side  qualifies  as  a  belligerent 
occupant  with  respect  to  the  territary.  "176 
Thusl  since  the  Kingdom  of  Jordan  never  had  the  status  of  a  legitimate 
sovereign  over  East  Jerusalem,  the  rules  of  international  law  limiting 
the  occupant's  duty  to  safeguard  the  reversionary  rights  of  the 
legitimate  sovereign  have  no  application  as  against  Israel.  179 
Also,  it  has  been  argued  that  even  if  it  were  assumed  that  Israel  was 
merely  a  "belligerent  occupant"  and  the  law  of  military  occupation  was 
applicable  to  the  Israeli  position  in  Jerusalem,  the  measures  adopted 401 
by  Israel  are  largely  "consistent  with  the  technical  maintenance  of  a 
condition  of  belligerent  occupation".  18' 
Lauterpacht  asserted  that  the  texts  of  the  three  Israeli  laws  of  June 
289  1967  did  not  include  any  explicit  or  implicit  reference  to  a  formal 
annexation  of  East  Jerusalem.  101  Along  the  same  lines,  Israeli 
officials  maintained  that  its  moves  in  Jerusalem  were  administrative 
and  not  political.  An  example  is  Israel's  reply,  dated  July  15  1967  to  a 
OIL-, 
letter  to  UN  Secretary  General  coaceping  Resolution  2253  of  the  General 
N 
Assembly  on  East  Jearusalem,  wherein  Foreign  Minister  Abba  Eban,  stated 
that,  the  term  "annexation"  used  by  supporters  of  the  Resolution  is  out 
of  place,  and  that  the  measures  adopted  relate  to  the  integration  of 
Jerusalem  in  the  administrative  and  municipal  spheres,  and  furnish  a 
legal  basis  for  the  protection  of  the  Holy  Places  In  Jerusalem.  182 
Similarlyt  the  text  of  the  Israeli  law  of  July  31,1980  declaring 
Jerusalem  the  capital  of  Israel  contained  no  mention  of  a  formal 
annexation.  193 
In  considering  the  Israeli  position  regarding  East  Jerusalem  in  the 
light  of  the  above  arguments  against  and  in  favour  of  the  legitimacy  of 
Israeli  measures  in  the  Old  City,  this  writer,  influenced  by  scores  of 
relevant  United  Nations  resolutionso  inclines  to  support  the  first  view. 
Certainly/,  'Lt  is  a  matter  of  justied  that  Israel  must  rescind  all  these 
measures  aiming  to  change  the  legal  status  of  the  Old  City.  Israel  has 
to  withdraw  and  the  Palestinians  should  be  entitled  to  decide  their  own 
future.  It  is  equally  true  that  it  is  difficult,  If  not  impossible,  for 
reasons  relating  to  principles  of  international  law  and  relevant  UK 
resolutions,  to  accept  the  continuing  Israeli  occupation  of  that  part  of 
Jerusalem  seized  in  1967.  However,  one  must  admit  that  politicalp 402 
historic,  religious  and  strategic  considerations,  e4  rather  than  legal 
ones  were  and  still  are  playing  an  important  role  in  shaping  Israeli 
decisions  regarding  East  Jerusalem.  This  has  to  be  taken  into  account 
in  understanding  the  Israeli  present  and  future  position  on  this  crucial 
issue. 
In  the  light  of  the  preceding  discussion  on  the  final  position  of 
Egypt,  the  US,  and  Israel,  it  would  be  correct  to  assert  that  it  is  more 
likely  that  the  resolution  of  the  Jerusalem  question  would  constitute 
the  main  obstacle  in  any  future  settlement  of  the  Palestinian  problem. 
Indeed,  It  is  a  difficult  problem  to  solve  satisfactorily.  Several 
pertinent  difficulties  may  arise  in  this  connection.  Three  may  be  cited 
because  of  their  importance.  First,  for  a  number  of  reasons,  there  is  a 
consensus  of  opinion  amongst  all  the  Arab  statesl  as  reflected  in 
relevant  Arab  League  Summit  resolutions,  that  Arab  suvereignty  over 
East  Jerusalem  (Al  Qods)  must  be  completely  restored.  Secondly, 
howeverl  for  reasons  discussed  earlier,  particularly  in  the  light  of  the 
fact  that  no  access  to  the  Holy  places  in  East  Jerusalem  was  given  to 
the  Israelis  when  the  Old  City  was  under  Arab  sovereignty  between  1948 
and  1907  ,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  Israelis  would  accept  the  restoration 
of  a  complete  Arab  sovereignty  over  East  Jerusalem.  Thirdly,  it  is 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  reasons  relating  to  principles  of 
international  law  and  relevant  UN  resolutionsp 
. 
to  accept  Israel  as  a 
sovereign  over  the  Old  City  which  it  seized  in  the  1967  War. 
To  say  this  is  not  to  argue  that  the  problem  of  the  status  of  Jerusalem 
is  absolutely  psoluble.  Indeed,  three  solutions  have  been  suggested 
and  the  future  of  the  Holy  City  ought  to  be  based  upon  one  of  them.  The 403 
first  solution,  as  put  forward  by  the  majority  proposal  of  the  UNSCOP  in 
1947l  is  the  internationalization  of  Jerusalem.  Resolution  194  of  the 
UK  General  Assembly  provided  that  the  city  should  "be  accorded 
special  and  separate  treatment  from  the  rest  of  Palestine  and  should  be 
placed  under  effective  United  Nations  Control  with  the  maximum  feasible 
local  autonomy  for  the  Arab  and  Jewish  communities"'  06.  A  new  scheme 
for  the  internationalization  of  the  city  to  the  degree  necessary  to 
achieve  agreement  among  the  main  parties  in  interest  may  be  derived.  A 
second  solution,  as  put  forward  by  others  such  as  Cont  Bernadotte,  is 
based  on  three  main  points:  no  integral  annexation,  maximum  local 
autonomy  for  Arab  and  Jewish  communities,  and  some  form  of  international 
guarantees  of  legitimate  international  interests.  106  A  third  solution  is 
to  return  to  pre-June  war  situation:  to  divide  the  city  between  two 
sovereigns. 
In  the  view  of  this  writert  a  settlement  which  based  generally  on  the 
second  solution  may,  in  the  light  of  the  present  circumstances,  have  the 
best  chances  of  being  accepted  by  the  parties.  Perhaps,  the  maim 
outlines  of  the  Brooking  Institution  Report  of  1975  with  regard  to 
Jerusalem,  which  was  adopted  by  the  Carter  administration  at  Camp  David, 
are  the  most  optimistic  basis  for  a  SolUtion.  187 
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is  important  now  is  to  consider  the  critical  lessons  we  can  learn  from  the 
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I.  Tbom  Terrltorlal  Issues.  - 
A  judgement  on  the  territorial  issues  under  the  1979  Treaty  must  begin  with 
its  benefits.  One  of  the  critical  problems  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  was  the 
extent  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal,  under  Resolution  242,  from  the  Arab 
territories  occupied  in  1967.  The  meaning  attributed  to  the  Resolution  in  the 
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standard  pro-Israel  argument  is  that  it  does  not  require  Israeli  withdrawal 
from  all  Arab  occupied  territories,  but  requires  withdrawal  to  such  lines  as 
would  constitute  "secure  boundaries"  for  Israel,  while  the  Arab  states  argue 
that  the  Resolution  requires  a  total  Israeli  withdrawal  from  all  the  occupied 
territories.  Correct  as  that  latter  view  may  be,  the  ambiguity  regarding  thý 
extent  of  the  withdrawal  has  been  decisively  settled  in  the  Peace  Treaty  which 
endorsed  the  concept  of  full  withdrawal.  This  would  no  doubt  affect  the  extent 
of  the  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  rest  of  the  Arab  occupied  territories. 
One  component  of  the  Egyptian-  Israeli  conflict  was  the  Israeli  settlement 
policy  in  Sinai.  As  Sadat  admitted,  one  of  the  Israeli  settlements  in  Sinai, 
Yamitt  was  among  the  main  reasons  behind  the  October  War  of  1973.  So  far  as 
these  settlements  are  concerned,  the  Israelis  held  the  view  that  the  settlements 
were  not  illegal  and  that  such  settlements  were  an  inalienable  Jewish  right 
and  an  integral  part  of  Israel's  national  security.  However,  regardless  of 
Israel's  numerous  attempts  to  justify  its  settlement  policy,  the  international 
community  without  any  exception  has  consistently  condemned  this  policy  as  an 
illegal  measure  and  a,  clear  violation  of  binding  international  conventions.  By 
endorsing  the  Egyptian  proposal  for  dismantling  all  the  Israeli  settlements  in 
Sinai,  the  authors  of  the  Treaty  adopted  a  reasonable  attitude  which 
w+rtainly  in  line  with  the  general  trend  of  international  practice.  Had  the 
Treaty  adopted  the  Israeli  view,  it  would  have  run  counter  to  the  norms  of 
international  law  as  well  as  the  relevant  UK  resolutions  in  this  respect.  In 
fact,  the  attitudes  of  the  Treaty  towards  the  Israeli  settlement  in  Sinai  were 
implicitly  praised  and  adopted  by  the  UK  Security  Council  in  its  resolution  465 
of  1980  which  calls  upon  Israel,  for  the  first  time,  in  clear  and  explicit 420 
language,  to  "dismantle  and  cease  the  establishment  of  settlements  in  the 
occupied  territories".  '  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  several  Israeli  officials 
declared  that  the  removal  of  the  Sinai  settlements  should  not  be  regarded  as  a 
precedent  applicable  to  other  Israeli  settlements  in  the  occupied  territories,  it 
is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  attitude  of  the  Peace  Treaty  towards  the 
settlements  in  Sinai  may  be  looked  upon  as  a  legal  precedent  applicable  to  all 
the  settlements  In  the  occupied  territories,  or  at  least  to  the  Golan  Heights  in 
Syria. 
The  dispute  over  Israeli  navigation  through  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  and  the  Straits 
of  Tiran  has  been  the  occasion  of  the  outbreak  of  two  wars  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  in  1956  and  1967.  As  far  as  the  legal  regime  of  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  is 
concerned,  it  seems  clear  that  until  the  conclusion  of  the  1979  Treaty  writers 
differed  in  their  opinions  as  to  the  regime  applicable.  A  number  of  them 
held  that  the  waters  of  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  possess  the  character  of  historic 
waters  as  the  Gulf  was  an  Arab  mare  claus=  for  over  thirteen  centuries  and 
therefore  should  be  treated  as  internal  waters;  others  oppose  this  view, 
arguing  that  the  Gulf  and  the  Straits  must  be  subject  to  the  regime  of 
territorial  seas  in  accordance  with  Article  16  (4)  of  the  1958  Geneva 
Convention  an  the  Territorial  Sea  of  1958  i.  e.,  to  a  regime  of  non-suspendable 
innocent  passage;  and  still  others  believed  that  the  Gulf  and  the  Straits 
constitute  international  waters  and  must  be,  therefore,  opened  for  non- 
suspendable  freedom  of  navigation  similar  to  navigation  on  the  high  seas. 
After  analysing  the  various  claims  and  examining  international  evidence 
(treatiest  uniliteral  acts,  etc.  ),  one  can  only  conclude  that  the  legal  system 
governing  the  Gulf  and  the  Straits  prior  to  the  1979  Treaty  was  uncertain.  No 421 
better  evidence  may  be  f  ound  to  support  this  suggestion  than  what  has  been 
concluded  by  the  International  Law  Commission  in  its  1956  Special  Report  that 
the  situation  of  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  is  "exceptional  -  possible  unique"'. 
As  noted  earliert  Article  V(2)  of  the  1979  Treaty  provides  that  the  Gulf  and 
the  Straits  are  international  waterways  open  to  all  nations  for  unimpeded  and 
non-suspendable  freedom  of  navigation.  Vhile  the  new  regime  established  under 
this  Article  does  not  cause  problems  of  practical  importance  in  relation  to 
Israeli  navigation,  certain  difficulties  have  been  raised  as  to  the  legal  nature 
of  the  new  regime.  Some  held  that  the  authors  intended  to  establish  a  regime 
that  goes  beyond  the  regime  of  innocent  passage  but  that  falls  short  of  the 
freedom  of  navigation  and  overflight  applicable  in  the  high  seas,  i.  e.,  to 
establish  a  regime  analogous  in  the  content  to  the  UN  Convention  on  the  Law  of 
the  Sea  regime  of  transit  passage,  which  assures  the  rights  of  international 
community  while  preserving  coastal  stateso  rights  of  protection  and  self- 
preservation.  Howeverg  after  examining  the  language  used  and  Egypt's  practice 
after  the  1979  Treaty,  we  have  concluded  that  the  new  regime  should  be  governed 
by  the  rules  governing  navigation  on  the  high  seas.  No  better  evidence  may  be 
found  to  support  this  conclusion  than  that  concluded  by  Reisman  who  indicated 
that  lointerpretated  logically  or  teleogically  Camp  David  produces  freedom  of 
navigation".  3 
Concerning  the  state  of  war  between  Egypt  and  Israel  which  was  dealt  in 
Article  1(1)  of  the  Treaty,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  that,  by  the  exchange 
of  instruments  of  ratification  at  the  US  Surveillance  Post  at  UK-Khashiba  in 
Sinai  on  April  25,1979,  the  31-year-old  state  of  war  between  Egypt  and  Israel 
was  officially  terminated.  It  is  obvious  that  the  termination  of  the  state  of 422 
war  was  part  of  Egypt's  obligation  stipulated  in  return  of  recovering  its 
territories  occupied  by  Israel.  Indeedt  this  is  in  line  with  Security  Council 
Resolution  242  upon  which  the  Camp  David  Accords  and  the  Peace  Treaty  were 
based.  Under  the  Resolution  the  formula  to  resolve  the  conflict  contained  two 
sets  of  corresponding  obligations  whose  fulfillment  would  lead  to  the 
achievement  of  peace.  As  mentioned  earlier,  Article  WI)  of  Resolution  242 
stipulates  the  "termination  of  all  claims  or  states  of  belligerency".  Despite 
the  reference  to  the  termination  of  the  state  of  war  in  the  text  of  the  Treaty 
as  from  the  date  of  ratification,  some  writers  argued  that  the  state  of  war  had 
been  legally  terminated  by  the  cessation  of  hostilities  in  1973.  The  wars 
between  Sweden  and  Poland  in  1716  and  between  Russia  and  Persia  in  1867  may  be 
mentioned  as  examples  where  the  status  of  war  had  been  terkinated  by  simple 
cessation  of  hostilities.  In  1950  the  Security  Council  in  its  resolution 
adopted  on  September  25,1951  considered  the  state  of  war  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  as  terminated  after  the  cessation  of  hostilities  under  the  1949  Armistice 
Agreement.  However,  the  prevailing  view  was  that  the  state  of  war  between 
Egypt  and  Israel  was  not  terminated  by  the  simple  cessation  of  hostilities.  In 
the-Ely.  ing  Tradert  the  Alexandria  Prize  Court.  rejected  the  claimant,  argumentg 
that  no  state  of  war  existed  between  Egypt  and  Israel.  4  Similarly,  state 
practice  suggests  that  many  states  refused  to  regard  termination  of  hostilities 
as  analagous  to  the  termination  of  the  status  of  war,  e.  g.,  despite  the 
unconditional  surrender  of  Germany  and  Japan  after  the  Second  World  War,  the 
US,  including  its  national  courts  and  authoritiesl  considered  themselves  at  a 
state  of  war  with  Japan  until  it  signed  the  1950  Peace  Treaty,  and  at  a  state 423 
of  war  with  Germany  until  it  adopted  the  1951  Act  which  ended  the  state  of  war 
between  them. 
From  the  aboveg  we  may  conclude  that  the  authors  of  the  Treaty  adopted  the 
reasonable  view  that  the  simple  cessation  of  hostilities  could  not  be  regarded 
as  an  alternative  to  the  formal  termination  of  the  state  of  war  between  Egypt 
and  Israel  which  was  one  of  the  main  legal  features  of  the  conf  lict  between 
1948  and  1979. 
The  recognition  of  the  state  of  Israel  and  the  establishment  of  diplomatic  and 
economic  relations  were  part  of  the  package-  deal  which  was  based  on  the 
formula  of  Resolution  242.  Howevert  the  establishment  of  full  diplomatic 
relationsq  as  well  as  economic  relationso  went  far  beyond  Resolution  242.  Under 
the  Resolution,  Egypt  was  only  obliged  to  terminate  the  state  of  war  and  to 
recognize  Israel's  right  live  in  secure  boundariest  but  no  economic  and 
diplomatic  relations  were  envisaged.  If  the  1979  Treaty  is  to  be  considered  as 
a  madell  then,  any  future  peace  treaty  between  Israel  and  other  Arab  states 
would  necessarily  include  the  establishment  of  such  relationships. 
A  final  benefit  which  deserves  mentioning  is  that,  under  the  1979  Peace  Treaty, 
and  after  the  Taba  Award,  of  September  29,1988,  the  permanent  international 
boundary  between  Egypt  and  Israel  was  finally  established.  It  is  the  same 
boundary  as  existed  between  Egypt  and  mandated  Palestine  as  governed  by  the 
1906  Agreement  between  Anglo-Egyptian  and  Turkish  representatives.  In 
implementation  of  the  1979  Treaty  and  the  Ma,  Awqrdo  Egypt  and  Israel  signed 
an  agreement  in  September  1989  whereby  the  final  and  permanent  border-line 
between  the  two  states  was  fixed.  In  fact,  the  eventual  resolution  of  the 
v 424 
dispute  over  Taba  by  arbitration  represents  an  important  addition  to  the  list 
of  successes  of  the  1979  Treaty. 
The  above  conclusions  an  the  benefits  of  the  Agreenent  are  in  line  with  the 
conclusions  reached  by  William  Quandt  when  he  referred  to  the  political  gains 
for  Egypt  and  Israel  in  the  following  terms: 
"By  these  standards  the  Egyptian-  Israeli  peace  treaty  looks  very  good. 
Egypt  recovered  its  territory  and  oil  f  ields,  and  was  able  to  turn  some  of 
its  energies  from  the  planning  of  war  to  the  challenge  of  development  ...  For 
Israel,  too,  the  Treaty  has  been  valuable.  On  the  strategic  level,  Egypt 
today  poses  no  military  danger.  This  means  that  most  of  Israel's 
formidable  arsenal  can  be  aimed  at  deterring  Syrian  threats.  A  one-front 
war  is  a  much  less  alarming  prospect  for  Israel  than  a  two-front  war. 
Israel  has  also  been  able  to  meet  its  oil  needs  by  purchasing  Egyptian 
oil.  ", 
As  well  as  its  benefits,  the  territorial  settlement  of  the  Egyptian-  Israeli 
conflict  has  its  defects.  It  would,  of  course,  be  f  oolish  to  underestimate  the 
effect  of  these  defects  upon  the  future  of  peace  between  Egypt  and  Israel  and 
upon  the  peace  process  in  the  Middle  East  as  a  whole. 
Turning  first'  to  the  issue  of  compensation  for  the  war  damage  and  the  oil 
taken  'by  Israel  during  its  occupation  of  Sinai,  it  is  important  to  emphasize 
that  the  critics  of  the  1979  Treaty  have  pointed  out  thaýbne  of  its 
shortcomings  is  the  failure  to  lay  down  definite  rules  of  compensation  and 
guidelines  concerning  the  many  problems  which  may  arise  in  this  respect.  As 
indicated  'earlierl  Article  VIII  of  the  1979  Peace  Treaty  which  speaks  of  "a 
claims  commission  for  the  mutual  settlement  of  all  financial  claims"  includes  a 425 
f  ormula  which  was  designed  to  glass  over  the  issue  rather  than  resolve  it.  In 
fact,  it  reflects  a  policy  of  postponement,  perhaps  permanently,  of  the. 
compensation  issue. 
Two  difficulties  have  arisen  concerning  compensation.  The  f  irst  concerns 
cases  whereq  as  a  result  of  military  operations  and/or  Israeli  occupation,  an 
Egyptian  or  foreign  national  has  suffered  a  loss  by  reason  of  injury  or  damage 
to  his  property  in  Sinai.  Ve  have  suggested  earlier  that  any  Egyptian  citizen 
-d  whose  property  was  requisiti6n4by  the  Israeli  settlements  is  entitled  under 
international  law  to  be  compensated.  Article  52  of  the  Hague  Regulations 
provides  "contributions  in  kind  shall  be  given  and  the  payment  of  the  amount 
due  shall  be  made  as  soon  as  possiblell.  r-  In  the  Kanjatzucas  v.  Germany  Case, 
the  German-Greek  Mixed  Arbitral  Tribunal  held  that  requisitions  without 
compensation  were  contrary  to  international  law: 
"Such  requisitions  were  lawful  as  complied  with  the  provisions  of  Article  521 
namelyl  that  the  payment  of  the  amount  due  should  be  made  as  soon  as  possible 
after  the  requisition;  and  that  as  nearly  nine  years  had  elapsed  since  the 
requisition  and  full  payment  had  not  been  made,  the  requisition  was  contrary  to 
International  Law  and  afforded  a  good  ground  for  the  recognition  of  the 
competence  of  the  Tribunal  and  an  award  of  compensation".  7 
Neverthelesso  under  the  1979  Treaty  no  owner  of  damaged  property  is  entitled 
to  receive  compensation.  In  other  words,  the  1979  Treaty,  due  to  Israel's 
rejectiont  produced  nothing  like  Article  78  of  the  1947  Peace  Treaty  between 
Italy  and  the  Allied  and  Associated  PowersO  which  has  several  provisions 
concerning  compensation,  in  particular  how  a  person  whose  property  had  been 426 
requisited  or  damaged  during  the  occupation  can  claim  f  or  compensation.  An 
example  is  Article  78  (4)  which  reads  as  follows: 
"In  cases  where  property  cannot  be  returned  or  where  as  a  result  of  the  war  a 
United  Nations  national  has  suffered  a  loss  by  reason  of  injury  or  damage  to 
property  in  Italy,  he  shall  receive  f  rom  the  Italian  Government  compensation  in 
lire  to  the  extent  of  two-thirds  of  the  sum  necessary,  at  the  date  of  payment, 
to  purchase  similar  property  or  to  make  good  the  loss  suffered".  9 
A  more  important  problem  concerning  compensation  is  that  of  Israeli 
exploitation  of  oil  fields  in  Sinai  since  the  Israeli  occupation  began  in  1967. 
Vhilst  Egypt  has  consistently  taken  the  Position  that  such  exploitation  violated 
international  law,  Israel  held  the  view  that  its  exploitation  of  the  oil  f  ields 
was  within  its  authority  as  an  occupying  power  and  thus  not  in  violation  of  the 
law  of  military  occupation.  -  The  reasons  in  support  of  these  two  conflicting 
views  are  not  our  concern,  nor  is  it  intended  here  to  repeat  all  that  has  been 
said  in  this  respect.  However,  one  may  be  entitled  to  assume  that  Egypt's 
precious  oil  resources  could  not  be  legally  taken  by  a  temporary  belligerent 
occupant  but  must  be  safeguarded  as  Article  55  of  the  Hague  Regulations 
expressly  requires.  No  better  evidence  may  be  found  to  support  this  suggestion 
than  what  was  concluded  by  the  -International  Military  Tribunal  at  Nuremberg  in 
The_Earhen.  and  Krupp  cases  that:  "at  the  outermost  limit  an  occupant  may  take 
no  more  property  from  the  occupied  territory  -  public  or  private,  movable  or 
immovable,  in  aggregate  than  is  necessary  to  -  meet  the  costs  of  the 
accupation"  '"- 
It  is  well  known  that  the  Sinai  oil  f  ields  were  producing  55%  of  Israel's  oil 
needs,  and  it  may  be  correct  to  say  that  omission  of  any  explicit  reference  to 427 
the  issue  leaves  the  way  open  for  invoking  all  kinds  of  allegations  which 
could  no  doubt  affect  the  peace  between  Egypt  and  Israel. 
It  may  be  added  that  Egypt  has  explicitly  maintained  that  it  is  entitled  under 
the  provisions  of  the  Peace  Treaty  to  get  compensation  for  the  oil  taken  by 
Israel.  In  1989  President  Xubarak  of  Egypt  restated  this  position,  which  was 
rejected  by  Israel.  " 
Another  important  shortcoming  in  the  territorial  settlement  under  the  1979 
Peace  Treaty  is  the  absence  of  reciprocity  in  the  provisions  an  the  security 
requirements.  Several  qualified  observers  have  maintained  that  Israel  enjoys  a 
privileged  position  under  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  stipulating  the  permanent 
demilitarization  of  Sinai.  We  have  indicated  earlier  that  under  Article  IV  of 
the  1979  Treaty  and  other  relevant  provisions,  whilst  a  very  small  I-'..  -  border 
area  of  Israeli  territory  was  to  be  a  limited  force  zone,  one  third  of  Egypt's 
territory  was  to  be  a  limited  force  and  demilitarized  zone.  Moreover,  while 
the  provisions  -provided  for  the  stationing  of  UK  or  international  forces  in 
Egypt's  territory,  only  UK  observers  (  but  not  forces)  will  be  allowed  to  stay 
in  Israeli  territory.  Furthermore,  Egypt  would  not  be  allowed  by  its  own 
decision  to  evacuate  the  international  forces  from  its  territory.  In  '  this 
respecto  Egypt  needs  either  Israeli  approval  or  a  Security  Council  resolution  in 
order  to  evacuate  such  foreign  f  orces  from  its  own  territory.  Surely  such 
conditions  are  undesirable,  since  they  could  be  interpreted  as  denying  Egypt's 
complete  sovereignty  over  part-  of  its  own  territory.  Also,  these  condictions 
went  beyond  what  had  been  envisaged  by  Resolution  242  and  the  Camp  David 
Framework  Agreement.  As  is  well-knownj  both  the  Resolution  and  the  Agreement 
refer  to  the  security  concerns  "of  all  parties"  and  to  the  security  of  "Israel 428 
and  its  neighbours".  In  the  negotiations  all  the  parties,  including  the  US 
Government,  endorsed  the  principle  of  reciprocity  on  the  security  requirements. 
No  party  has  accepted  that  these  requirements  are  to  be  one-sided  only.  There 
is  no  better  quotation  in  this  regard  than  a  passage  from  Mahmoud  Riad  In 
which  he  indicated  that: 
"if  circumstances  had  f  orced  Egypt  to  sign  on  its  own  an  agreement  which 
denied  it  complete  sovereignty  over  part  of  its  own  territories,  then  every 
Egyptian  would  feel  that  the  security  of  Egypt  was  in  danger  and  that  Israel 
that  attacked  Egypt  twice,  in  1956  and  19670  might  be  more  tempted  to  do  so 
again  in  the  future".  1:  2 
Bearing  in  mind  that  Article  IV  (4)  permits  that  these  security  arrangements 
may,  -  at  the  request  of  either  party,  be  reviewed  and  amended  by  mutual 
agreement  of  the  Parties,  we  suggest  that  a  revision  of  the  conditions  would 
be  useful  in  order  to  lessen  their  shortcomings.  Looked  upon  as  a  model  for 
other  peace  treaties  with  Israel,  such  a  revision  of  the  1979  Peace  Treatyl 
which  would  enhance  the  chances  for  a  permanent  peace  in  the  area,  cannot  be 
avoided. 
0 
Another  type  of  difficulty  appears  to  be  in  cases  where  Israel,  under  the 
pretext  of  exercising  the  right  of  self-defence,  could  attack  an  Arab  state.  In 
such  a  situation$  it  is  possible  to  anticipate  a  contradiction  between  Egypt's 
obligations  under  the  Arab  Joint  Defence  Pact  of  1951  on  one  hand  and  its 
obligations  under  the  1979  Peace  Treaty  an  the  other.  Article  2  of  the  Arab 
Defence  Pact  stipulates  that  armed  aggression  against  any  one  or  more  member 
would  be  considered  as  an  attack  against  all.  Article  6  of  that  Pact  provides 
for  the  establishment  of  a  Joint  Defence  Council,  which  would  be  competent  to 429 
decide  (by  a  two-third  majority)  whether  an  act  of  aggression  had  occurred. 
Thus,  even  if  Egypt  was  to  vote  that  Israel  was  not  the  aggressor  in  the  case 
of  an  act  of  anticipatory  self-defence,  it  would  be  obliged  to  intervene  against 
Israel  if  two-thirds  of  the  parties  to  the  Defence  Pact  condemned  Israel,  whilst 
in  the  meantime  it  is  obliged  under  Article  VI  (5)  of  the  Peace  Treaty  not  to 
intervene  militarily  against  Israel  because  of  its  obligation  under  any  other 
treaty.  As  indicated  earlier  Article  VI  of  the  1979  Treaty  stipulates  the 
rationale  of  the  Egyptian-  Israeli  Peace  Treaty  over  other  obligations  which 
either  State  has  entered.  So  far  as  this  problem  is  concerned,  Israel  insisted 
that  the  target  of  Article  VI  is  the  Arab  Defence  Pact  and  therefore  demands 
that  Egypt  must  withdraw  from  the  De  fence  Pact  so  as  to  avoid  such  a  possible 
contradiction.  Vhile  Egypt  has  explicitly  maintained  that  its  obligations  under 
the  Defence  Pact  are  part  of  its  obligations  under  Article  51  and  52  of  the  UK 
Charter  and  therefore  that  it  cannot  renounce  the  Defence  Pact. 
Bearing  in  mind  that  the  1979  Treaty  does  not  provide  a  mechanism  to  deal 
with  controversies  concerning  the  interpretation  and  execution  of  the  Treaty, 
the  foregoing  conflicting  interpretations  could  lead  in  certain  circumstances  to 
a  serious  consequence  which  might  threaten  the  peace  between  Egypt  and  Israel. 
Undoubtedly,  the  absence  of  any  specific  provision  for  a  mechanism  to  deal 
with  disputes  concerning  the  interpretation  and  execution  of  the  Treaty  which 
are  not  settled  by  diplomatic  negotiations  represents  an  important  shortcoming 
in  the  Treaty.  A  review  of  the  Treaties  of  Peace  of  1949  between  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers  on  the  one  hand  and  Bulgaria,  Finland,  Hungary,  Italy  and 
Romania  -  an  the  other  reveals  that  they  all  included  provisions  for  the 
settlement  of  disputes  which  may  arise  out  of  their  operation;  the  provisions 430 
are  almost  identical  in  terms.  Part  XI  of  the  Treaty  with  Italy,  for  example, 
provides  in  Article  87  that  such  controversies  are  to  be  submitted  to  the 
Ambassadors  in  Rome  of  Great  Britainj  the  United  States,  the  Soviet  Union  and 
of  France.  If  this  dispute  has  not  been  resolved  by  them  within  a  period  of 
two  months, 
"it  shall,  unless  the  parties  to  the  dispute  mutually  agree  upon  another  means 
of  settlementl  be  referred  at  the  request  of  either  party  to  a  Commission 
composed  of  one  representative  of  each  party  and  a  third  member  selected  by 
mutual  agreement  of  the  two  parties  from  nationals  of  a  third  country.  Should 
the  two  parties  fail  to  agree  within  a  period  of  one  month  upon  the  appointment 
of  the  third  member,  the  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations  may  be 
requested  by  either  party  to  make  the  appointement".  1:  3 
Likewiset  the  Peace  Treaty  with  Japan  which  was  signed  in  San  Francisco  on 
September  8,1951  provides  that  disputes  concerning  the  interpretation  or 
execution  of  the  peace  treaty  which  were  not  resolved  by  a  special  claims 
tribunal  or  by  other  agreed  means  were  to  be  referred  at  the  request  of  any 
party  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice  for  settlement.  14 
Having  in  their  mind  the  importance  of  such  a  mechanism  for  the  interpretation 
of  the  Treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  both  the  Egyptians  and  Americans  in 
their  proposals  at  Camp  David  in  1978  suggested  in  Article  2(5)  and  Para.  A.  1. 
respectively  that  the  parties  would  "accept  the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the 
International  -Court  of  Justice  with  respect  to  all  disputes  emanating  from  the 
application  or  the  interpretation  of  their  contractual  arrangements". 
Neverthelessl  Israel  rejected  these  proposals.  Instead,  the  parties  agreed  in 
Article  VII  that,  if  disputes  concerning  interpretation  cannot  be  settled  by 431 
negotiations,  they  shall  be  resolved  by  conciliation  or  submitted  to  arbitration. 
It  is  not  intended  here  to  appraise  the  foregoing  Article.  For  present 
purposes,  it  is  enough  to  suppose  that  the  methods  laid  down  by  Article  VII  to 
deal  with  disputes  arising  out  of  the  Treaty's  interpretation  are  not  entirely 
satisfactory.  No  better  evidence  may  be  found  to  support  this  suggestion  than 
the  failure  of  these  methods  to  settle  the  disputes  over  the  meaning  of  certain 
provisions  concerning  the  Palestinians  raised  by  conflicting  interpretations 
submitted  by  the  parties.  This  failure  prevented  the  implementation  of  the 
Agreement  an  the  West  Bank.  If  the  1979  Treaty  had  established  an  effective 
mechanism,  similar  to  those  of  the  post  World  War  II  peace  treaties,  the 
Palestinian  clause  might  have  been  implemented. 
At  this  point  it  should  be  added  that,  despite  the  strong  argument  that  the 
eventual  resolution  of  the  Taba  problem  by  arbitration  represented  a  success  of 
the  methods  defined  in  Article  VII  of  the  Treaty,  nevertheless  one  may  be 
entitled  to  suggest  that  such  a  success  was  an  exception.  A  careful  study  of 
the  Taba  Case  reveals  that,  whilst  Israel  rejected  any  form  of  arbitration  over 
Taba  after  the  failure  of  the  negotiations  to  settle  the  problem  in  1983,  Egypt 
was  not  able  to  force  Israel  to  accept  arbitration  for  more  than  four  years. 
Nevertheless,  by  reasons  partly  of  US  intensive  political  pressure  on  Israel  and 
partly  of  Egypt's  implicit  threats  to  abrogate  the  Treaty,  the  Israeli  Cabinet 
in  January  1988  decided  to  accept  binding  international  arbitration  an  the 
issue.  In  fact,  the  resolution  of  the  dispute  over  Taba  by  means  of  arbitration 
was  a  success  for  American  and  Egyptian  diplomatic  efforts  rather  than  a 
success  for  the  vague  mechanism  established  by  Article  VII  of  the  1979  Treaty. 432 
Again,  if  the  Treaty  had  provided  for  an  effective  mechanism,  it  would  not  have 
been  taken  more  than  seven  years  to  settle  the  Taba  dispute. 
II.  Thp  PalestInlanal  Clamp: 
A  judgement  of  the  provisions  dealing  with  the  Palestinians  under  the  1979 
Peace  Treaty  and  the  Camp  David  Accords  must  begin  with  its  defects.  One  of  the 
essential  defects  of  the  Agreement  concerning  the  Palestinians  is  that  it  was 
concluded  in  the  absence  of  any  Palestinian  or  any  authorized  person  who  could 
speak  on  behalf  of  the  Palestinians.  So  far  as  this  defect  is  concerned, 
attention  will  be  paid  only  to  a  few  points: 
Because  the  Palestinians  were  not  legally  represented  at  Camp  David  or  at  the 
negotiations  that  led  to  the  1979  Treaty,  the  provisions  dealing  with  their 
issues  are  not  binding  on  the  Palestinian  people.  This  being  the  case,  the 
drafters,  who  realized  that  any  agreement  reached  an  the  Palestinian  problem 
could  be  rejected,  were  reluctant  to  give  the  problem  more  effort  and  time.; 
Moreover,  because  of  the  fact  that  Egypt  could,  not  speak  for  the  Palestinians 
or  make  binding  commitments  on  their  behalf,  Egypt  felt  obliged  to  be  a  staunch 
advocate  of  general  principles  in  a  situation  in  which  details  were  of  more 
importance  to  the  Israelis  and  to  the  Palestinians. 
Finallyl  the  absence  of  the  Palestinians  from  the  peace'  negotiations  led  to  the 
absurd  conclusion  that  they  were,  in  practice#  represented  mainly  by  the 
Egyptians  and  sometimes  by  the  Americans.  Both  have  been  accused  of  being  not 
sufficiently  aware  of  the  realities  of  the  situation  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 
President  Carter  admitted  that  it  was  not  until  he  visited  the,  Vest  Bank  as  a 
private  citizen  in  1983  that  he  become  aware  of  many  of  the  realities  of  the 433 
situation  there.  Also,  Dayan  criticized  Egyptian  officials'  lack  of 
comprehension  of  many  of  the  realities  of  the  situation  in  Gaza  and  the  Vest 
Bank. 
So  far  as  the  scope  of  the  Palestinian  provisions  is  concerned,  we  have 
indicated  earlier  that  several  important  aspects 
lof 
the  Palestinian  question 
were  excluded.  Among  these  is  the  question  of  East  Jerusalem.  It  is  important 
to  emphasize  that  critics  of  the  Camp  David  Accords  and  the  1979  Peace  Treaty 
have  pointed  out  one  of  its  shortcomings  as  failing  to  produce  any  provisions 
on  the  problem  of  East  Jerusalem. 
One  component  of  the  Jerusalem  problem  was  the  Israeli  occupation  of  the  Arab 
sector  of  the  city  in  the  Six-Day  War  of  1967.  As  indicated  earlier,  Israel 
maintained  that  the  sovereignty  vaccum  arising  in  the  Old  City  at  the  end  of 
the  mandate  was  not  filled  by  Jordan,  whose  status  there  was  one  of  the-AP. 
f.  qnto  occupation.  It  follows  that,  once  Jordan  was  physically  removed  from 
East  Jerusalem  by  legitimate  measures,  namely  Israeli  defensive  action  an  June 
5,1967,  the  way  was  open  for  Israel,  as  a  lawful  occupant,  to  fill  the  still 
subsisting  vacancy.  However,  it  seems  quite  clear  that  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  states  are  not  prepared  to  agree  to  this  Israeli  view.  It  is  not 
intended  here  to  repeat  what  had  been  said  in  this  respect.  For  present 
purposes  it  is  enough  to  refer  to  the  Security  Council  Resolution  465  of  1980 
(adopted  by  a  majority  including  the  US)  whereby  East  Jerusalem  was  described 
as  an  occupied  territory. 
Another  aspect  of  the  Jerusalem  question  is  the  Israeli  administrative  and 
legislative'  measures  taken  in  East  Jerusalem.  Among  these  measures  are  the 
Israeli  administrative  unification  and/or  annexation  of  the  Arab  city,  the 434 
establishment  of  Israeli  settlements  and  attempts  to  change  the  demographic 
structure  of  the  Arab  city.  As  far  as  these  measures  are  concerned  whilst  the 
Israelis  considered  that  their  settlement  policy  in  East  Jerusalem  is  within  the 
limits  of  law  of  military  occupation  and  that  the  administrative  unification  of 
the  city  does  not  constitute  a  formal  annexation,  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
states  oppose  this  view,  arguing  that  it  is  in  violation  D:  f  the  rules  L.;. 
international  law  as  well  as  the  UK  Charter.  In  fact,  several  UK  resolutions 
call  upon  Israel  to  rescind  these  measures  an  the  ground  that  they  are  in 
violation  of  the  law  of  military  occupation. 
From  the  foregoing,  we  may  conclude  that  the  omission  of  such  an  important 
question  as  Jerusalem  was  not  only  unreasonable  but  also  undesirable.  This 
omission  was  understood  by  some  as  an  endorsement  by  Egypt  and  the  US  of 
Israel's  annexation  and  unification  of  the  Holy  City  as  its  capital.  Others 
emphasized  that  the  omission  reflected  the  failure  of  the  framers  to  meet  the 
aspirations  of  the  Palestinian  people,  thus  failing  to  achieve  a  comprehensive 
peace  as  required  by  Resolution  242. 
The  attitude  towards  the  Palestinian  refugees  represents  another  shortcoming 
attributed  to  the  provisions  on  the  Palestinians.  Several  qualified  observers 
criticized  the  solution  provided  by  the  Treaty  for  the  refugee  problem  because 
it  was  not  in  conformity  with  the  UK  resolutions  relating  to  the  Palestinian 
refugees,  Also,  it  was  criticized  for  not  laying  down  a  workable  solution  for 
all  the  groups  of  Palestinian  refugees.  As  notedý  earlier,  the  framers  made  a 
distinction  between  the  "old"  refugees  who  fled  in  1947-1948  and  "new"  refugees 
of  1967  war.  Vhilst  an  agreed  procedure  would  be  established  by  Israel  for  the 
resolution  of  the  former's  problem,  it  has  been  agreed  that  the  latter  group 435 
would  only  allowed  to  return  subject  to  the  consent  of  the  Israeli  authorities. 
However,  the  authors  of  the  Camp  David  Accords  made  an  uneasy  distinction 
among  the  refugees  of  the  latter  group  by  providing  that  the  right  to  return  is 
not  applicable  to  the  1967  refugees  in  general  but  only  to  those  who  have  been 
forcibly  transferred  or  expelled.  In  practice,  suppose  that  two  persons  A  and  B 
left  the  West  Bank  after  Israel's  occupation  in  1967,  and  that  A  was  expelled  by 
the  Israelis  while  B  fled  because  of  his  fears.  Under  the  Camp  David  Accords 
only  A  could  be  allowed  to  return.  To  deprive  B  of  the  right  to  return  to  his 
homeland  is  clearly  in  violation  of  various  UK  resolutions  in  this  respect,  as, 
for  example,  the  Security  Council  Resolution  237  adopted  an  June  14,1967  and 
reaffirmed  by  the  General  Assembly  an  July  4,1967  whereby  the  Security  Council 
calls  upon  the  Government  of  Israel  to  facilitate  the  return  of  those 
inhabitants  who  have  fled  the  areas  since  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  It  is 
also  inconsistent  with  Resolution  3236  adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  in  1974 
whereby  the  Assembly  affirmed  the  inalienable  right  of  the  Palestinians  to 
return  to  their  homes  and  property  from  which  they  have  been  displaced  and 
uprooted. 
It  may  be  added  that  the  Committee  on  the  Exercise  of  the  Inalienable  Rights 
of  the  Palestinian  People,  established  in  1975  by  the  General  Assembly  to 
prepare  a  programme  of  implementation  to  enable  the  Palestinians  to  exercise 
the  rights  recognized  in  Resolution  3236,  recommended  a  Palestinian  return  In 
two  phases.  The  first  phase  would  involve  refugees  of  the  Six  Days'  war  of 
1967  who  had  f  led  areas  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  now  occupied  by  Israel.  In 
the  second  phase,  Arab  refugees  would  be  permitted  to  return  to  areas  in  Israel 
from  which  they  had  fled  during  the  original  hostilities  of  1947-48. 436 
Turning  to  the  provisions  an  the  autonomy  plan  for  the  inhabitants  of  the  Vest 
Bank  and  Gaza,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  that  several  qualified  observers 
have  criticized  the  authors,  not  only  for  their  failure  to  work  out  a 
satisfactory-for-tila  acceptable  to  all  the  parties,  but  also  because  the  wording 
of  these  provisions  was  extremely  vague  and  imprecise  and  might  give  rise  to 
differencies  of  opinions  on  various  words  and  expressions  which  had  been  used. 
The  first  imprecise  term  which  does  cause  problems  of  practical  importance  is 
"full  autonomy".  As  noted  earlier,  autonomy  is  not  a  term  of  legal  art,  nor  has 
it  an  accepted  precise  meaning.  Consequently,  we  were  confronted  with  two 
sharply  opposing  points  of  view  an  the  nature  of  Palestinian  autonomy.  The 
Egyptians  understood  the  term  as  a  reference  to  an  extensive  degree  of  autonomy 
similar  to  a  de  fanta  government  and  as  the  precursor  to  Palestinian  self- 
determination  and  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  West  Bank.  The  Israelis  held' 
that  autonomy  meant  a  limited  form  of  administrative  self-government  under 
circumstances  in  which  Israel  retained  control  over  both  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza.  Nevertheless,  despite  the  ,  conclusion,  demonstrated  earlier,  that  a 
reasonable  understanding  of  the  language  would  support  Egypt's  view  that  the 
term  "autonomy"  was  intended  by  the  authors  to  refer  to  a  wide  and  extensive 
degree  of  autonomy,  however,  one  may  be  entitled  to  suppose  that  the  term 
"autonomy"  was  acceptable  to  Egypt  and  Israel  mainly  because  it  would  enable 
them  to  invoke  all  kinds  of  interpretations  as  to  its  meaning.  Undoubtedlyt 
this  is  an  undesirable  suggestion  but  it  is  a  possible  understanding  of  the 
intention  of  the  parties. 
Another  type  of  difficulty  appears  to  be  in  the  exact  meaning  of  the  phrase 
"the  representatives  of  the  Palestinian  people"  used  in  paragraph  (A)  1.  The 437 
parties  concerned  differed  in  their  opinions  as  to  the  correct  interpretation  of 
this  phrase.  The  US  interprets  it  not  in  terms  of  any  single  group  or 
organization  as  representing  the  Palestinian  people,  but  as  encompassing  those 
elected  or  chosen  for  participation  in  negotiations  provided  that  they  would 
accept  the  purposes  of  the  negotiations  as  defined  in  Resolution  242  and  in  the 
Camp  David  Agreement  as  well  as  being  prepared  to  live  in  peace  with  Israel. 
The  Israelis  opposed  this  view,  arguingthat  the  phrase  does  not  encompass  the 
PLO.  Egypt  held  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  language  of  the  Camp  David  Accords 
which  prevents  the  PLO  from  representing  the  Palestinian  people.  However,  the 
Camp  David  Accords  neither  permit  nor  prevent  the  PLO  from  taking  part  in  the 
negotiations  and,  after  the  PLO's  acceptance  of  Resolution  242  in  November  1988, 
there  is  nothing  from  a  legal  view  which  prevents  the  PLO  from  assuming  such  a 
role.  To  support  this  conclusion,  we  may  refer  to  the  conclusion  of  Bernard 
Lewis  thatt  in  negotiations  to  end  a  conflict,  one  does  not  choose  the 
representatives  of  the  other  side.  He  went  an  f  urther  to  say  that  "it  is  not 
for  the  Israelis  or  any  other  outside  party  to  choose,  or  impose  any  veto  on 
Palestinian  representation".  '  Ir, 
Similar  difficulties  have  been  raised  concerning  the  meaning  of  other  phrases 
in  the  Camp  David  Agreement  as  "self-governing  authority",  "the  legitimate 
security  concerns  of  the  parties"  and  "the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people  and  their  Just  requirements".  It  is  not  intended  here  to  repeat  what  has 
been  said  earlier  in  respect  of  conflicting  interpretations  submitted  by  the 
parties.  For  the  present  purpose  it  is  enough  to  indicate  that  there  has  simply 
been  no  meeting  of  minds  between  Israel  and  Egypt  on  the  meaning  of  these 
phrases.  Greater  precision  in  defining  and  redefining  such  terms  is  desirable. 438 
Concerning  the  election  of  the  self-governing  authority,  it  is  important  to 
emphasize  that  critics  of  the  Camp  David  Agreement  have  pointed  out  one  of  its 
shortcomings  the  omission  of  provisions  to  deal  with  questions  which  may 
arise  out  of  the  elections.  As,  for  example,  who  will  supervise  the  elections  7 
Who  will  be  eligible  to  elect  and  to  be  elected  ?  Will  Israel  have  the  right 
to  object  to  any  candidate  ?  Whether  the  Israeli  settlers  will  take  part  in 
these  elections  -  While  these  questions  do  not  raise  problems  of  principle, 
they  do  cause  problems  of  practical  importance  which  are  both  difficult  and  of 
immediate  concern  to  the  parties  involved. 
Among  the  main  components  of  the  Palestinian  problem  is  the  Israeli  military 
occupation  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  Camp  David  Agreement,  however,  has 
no  provision  for  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  area.  Instead,  the  Agreement 
speaks  of  redeployment  of  Israeli  forces  into  specified  security  locations. 
Apart  from  the  uncertainity  relating  to  the  definitions  and  the  geographical 
position  of  these  security  locations  and  the  number  of  forces  which  will  remain 
in  theml  the  absence  of  specific  provisions  on  the  final  Israeli  withdrawal  has 
been  considered  as  one  of  its  main  defects  for  several  reasons.  In  the  first 
place,  it  is  inconsistent  with  Resolution  242  which  undoubtedly  called  for  a 
final  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  area,  and  Resolution  242  is  the  legal  basis  of 
the  Camp  David  Accords  and  the  1979  Peace  Treaty.  Moreover,  the  failure  to 
resolve  the  issue  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal  represented  a  failure  to  achieve  the 
comprehensive  peace  promised  by  the  parties.  Finally  and  most  significantlyl 
this  failure  may  be  looked  upon  as  a  double-standard  in  dealing  with  different 
parts  of  the  occupied  territories,  that  is  to  sayl  while  the  Security  Council 
made  no  distinction  whatsoever  between  the  Arab  territories  occupied  in  1967, 439 
whether  they  belonged  to  Egypt,  Syria  or  the  Palestinians,  as  they  all  should  be 
evacuated  by  the  Israeli  forces,  the  authors  of  the  1979  Treaty  and  the  Camp 
David  Accords  laid  down  an  uneasy  and  undesirable  distinction  between 
Palestinian  and  Egyptian  territory.  By  providing  for  a  total  and  final 
withdrawal  from  the  Sinai  and  at  the  same  time  ignoring  a  similar  withdrawal 
from  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza,  the  authors  left  their  Agreement  open  for  sharp 
criticism. 
Another  shortcoming  is  the  absence  of  any  provision  an  the  Israeli  settlements 
in  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank.  It  is  submitted  that  the  Israeli  settlement  policy 
in  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank  is  illegal  under  the  rules  of  international  law  and 
according  to  the  various  UN  resolutions  condemning  such  policy  and  calling  upon 
Israel  to  dismantle  the  settlements.  In  fact,  there  is  a  consensus  of  opinion 
among  states  as  to  the  illegality  of  these  settlements.  There  is  no  need  to 
repeat  here  what  was  said  in  this  respect.  From  the  foregoing,  one  may  be 
entitled  to  suggest  that  the  attitude  of  the  Accords  and  the  Treaty  towards  the 
Israeli  settlements  in  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank  runs  counter,  not  only  to  the 
general  trend  of  international  law  in  this  respect,  but  also  to  the  attitude  of 
the  Peace  Treaty  itself  towards  the  Israeli  settlements  in  Sinai  which  the 
authors  agreed  to  dismantle.  Again,  we  are  confronted  with  a  double-standard 
in  dealing  with  Palestinian  issues. 
As  far  as  the  f  inal  status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  is  concerned$  it  is  clear 
that  the  authors  failed  to  settle  these  problems  by  including  only  a  sentence  to 
the  effect  that  negotiations  would  deal  with  all  outstanding  issues  after  the 
transitional  period.  This  approach  towards  the  final  status  of  the  area  has 
left  the  door  open  for  the  parties  to  submit  two  sharply  opposing  points  of 440 
view  on  that  crucial  issue.  The  Egyptians  hold  that  the  Palestinians  will  be 
entitled  after  the  transitional  period  to  exercise  the  right  of  self- 
determination,  including  the  formation  of  the  Palestinian  state,  if  they  choose 
to  do  so.  The  Israelis  believe  that  the  Camp  David  Accords  exclude  the  choice 
of  an  independent  Palestinian  state;  and  therefore  the  area  could  remain  under 
permanent  ýIsraell  sovereignty  after  the  transitional  period,  The  Americans 
believed  that  self-government  by  the  Palestinians  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza,  In 
association  with  Jordan,  offers  the  best  chance  for  a  durable,  just  and  lasting 
peace. 
It  is  suggested  that  the  timing  of  the  implementation  of  the  Agreement  on  the 
Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  was  badly  phrased,  as  well  as  not  binding  on  Israel.  The 
language  on  the  implementation  of  the  Sinai  Agreement  referred  to  fixed  and 
binding  dates  which  were  included  in  the  text  of  the  Treaty.  Nevertheless,  when 
it  comes  to  implementing  the  Agreement  an  the  Palestinians,  the  authors  speak 
of  target,  rather  than  f  ixed,  dates.  Moreover,  such  target  dates  were  not 
included  in  the  text  of  the  Agreement;  instead  they  were  referred  to  in  a 
separate  letter  attached  to  the  Peace  Treaty.  Comparing  the  latter  to  the  dates 
of  the  Sinai  Agreement,  one  may  be  entitled  to  suppose  that  there  does  exist  a 
double-standard  in  dealing  with  the  Palestinians.  Indeed,  this  may  cast  doubts 
an  the  real  intention  of  the  parties,  or  at  least  on  the  Israeli  intention  as  to 
the  implementation  of  the  Palestinian  clause.  President  Carter  admitted  in 
1983  that  he  miscalculated  Israeli  Intention  as  to  implementing  the  Agreement 
on  the  West  Bank: 441 
"From  Begin's  point  of  view,  the  peace  agreement  with  Egypt  was  the  significant 
act  for  Israel;  the  references  to  the  Vest  Bank  and  Palestinians  were  to  be 
f  inessed.  "  I  '- 
From  a  political  viewpoint,  several  qualified  observers  have  maintained  that 
the  authors  of  the  Accords  and  the  Treaty  overestimated  the  role  that  Egypt 
could  play  in  laying  the  groundwork  for  a  negotiated  settlement  of  the 
Palestinian  issue.  In  fact,  during  the  post-Camp  David  autonomy  negotiations, 
the  Egyptians  tried  to  negotiate  on  behalf  of  the  Palestinians,  but  realized 
that  their  ability  to  make  arrangement  for  others  was  limited.  Similarly,  they 
misjudged  the  attitude  of  King  Hussein  and  the  Palestinian  leaders  by  assuming 
that  they  might  be  willing  to  take  part  in  negotiations. 
Despite  all  the  foregoing  defects  which  have  been  presented  by  a  number  of 
leading  writers  for  holding  that  the  Accords  and  the  Treaty  failed  to  achieve, 
or  to  lay  down,  bases  for  a  comprehensive  peace,  nevertheless  one  may  be 
entitled  to  suggest  that  there  may  be  a  number  of  benefits  for  the  Agreement  on 
the  Palestinians  which  perhaps  could  open  the  way  for  a  final  and  comprehensive 
solution.  It  is  submitted  that  Para.  A.  1.  (c)  of  the  Agreement  pointed  out  that 
the  solution  must  recognize  "the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  and 
their  just  requirements.  "  Undoubtedly,  this  is  the  first  document  in  which 
Israel  recognized  in  writing  that  the  Palestinians  had  legitimate  rights. 
Moreover,  it  was  agreed  that  the  negotiations  to  determine  the  final  status  of 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  are  to  be  "based  an  the  provisions  and  principles  of  UK 
Security  Council  Resolution  242.11  Surely,  there  are  ample  reasons  to  argue  that 
these  words  on  Resolution  242  had  been  phrased  in  such  a  manner  as  to  show 442 
that  the  resolution  must  be  applied  to  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  Logically,  this 
would  lead  tol  or  at  least  keep  the  door  open  for,  a  final  and  total  Israeli 
withdrawal  from  the  area. 
Further,  although  the  proposed  autonomy  does  not  meet  the  aspirations  of  the 
Palestiniansl  nor  their  just  requirements  under  international  law,  Israel's 
commitment  in  an  international  agreement  that  the  Palestinians  would  be  given 
"full  autonomy".  should  not  be  underestimated.  In  fact,  Israel  did  commit  itself 
Wj".  &.  4- 
to  a  proces  if  faithfully  implemented,  would  have  led  to  the  withdrawal  of  the 
military  government  and  the  establishment  of  an  elected  Palestinian  self- 
governing  body.  This  autonomy  process,  for  political  and  legal  reasons,  would 
become  irreversible.  Surely,  if  the  "Palestinian  elected  body"  acted 
responsibly,  then  Israelp  after  the  transitional  period,  could  be  politically,  if 
not  legally,  obliged  to  abandon  sovereignty  over  the  area. 
For  all  the  defects  presented  earlier,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Agreement 
on  the  Palestinians  was  not  implemented.  Perhaps,  because  of  these  defects,  it 
appears  that  both  Egypt  and  Israel  no  longer  adhere  to  the  Camp  David  formula. 
For  example,  a  review  of  the  Shamir  Plan  of  May  1989  whereby  he  speaks  of 
"transitional"  self-rule  leading  to  "permanent"  self-rule  reveals  how  far  Israel 
has  denounced  its  commitments  under  the  Camp  David  Agreement.  On  the  other 
hand,  Egypt  made  it  clear  that,  because  the  circumstances  have  changed#  the 
Camp  David  formula  is  no  longer  an  appropriate  framework  for  the  solution  of 
the  Palestinian  problem.  This  is  due  partly  to  the  Palestinian  uprising,  and 
partly  to  the  fact  that  the  Palestinians  have  accepted  Resolution  242  and 
declared  their  own  state  in  1988. 443 
III  rqlnp  'naVid  me  a  imndfll 
We  have  to  distinguish  between  Camp  David  as  a  model  f  or  negotiations  (a 
process)  and  -Camp  David  as  a  model  for  other  peace  treaties. 
So'  far  as  the  former  is  concerned,  some  believe  that  it  could  be  a  model  for 
future  negotiations  between  Israel  and  its  other  Arab  neighbours.  Under 
American  auspices  an  agreement  based  on  the  "territory  for  peace"  formula  could 
be  produced.  In  other  words,  Camp  David  could  be  seen  as  something  of  a  model 
for  Arab-Israeli  peace  negotiations  as  an  alternative  to  the  idea  of  an 
international  conference.  From  a  legal  view,  this  could  be  accepted  since  the 
Security  Council  Resolution  338*  speaks  of  negotiations  under  "appropriate 
auspices".  Such  auspices  could  be  the  UNj  the  US  or  an  international  conference. 
Howevert  this  view  was  criticized  an  the  ground  that,  for  several  political 
reasonso  the  Camp  David  Accords  do  not  provide  a  model  that  can  be  easily 
copied  in  future  negotiations.  Among  these  reasons  is  the  fact  that  by 
removing  Egypt's  considerable  strength  from  the  military  equation  vis-a  vis 
Jordanj  Syria  and  the  Palestinians,  Israel  was  greatly  strengthed.  According 
to  some#  this  weakness  of  the  Arab  positions  could  make  negotiations  with 
Israel  impossible  or  at  least  the  Arab  leaders  cannot  expect  to  gain  as  much 
from  negotiations  as  Sadat  did. 
Perhaps  for  this  reason,  the  Camp  David  model  for  negotiations,  in  which  the 
US  would  play  an  active  role  to  help  the  parties  concerned  in  achieving  an 
agreements  is  no  longer  supported  by  Egypt.  Instead,  the  idea  of  having  an 
international  conference  to  discuss  all  the  remaining  problems  of  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict,  including  the  Palestinian  issue,  is  nowadays  widely  accepted  by 
international  society.  Nevertheless,  Israel  opposes  the  idea  an  the  ground  that 444 
such  an  international  conference  would  put  much  pressure  on  Israel  and  thus 
weaken  its  bargaining  poSition.  17 
This  writer,  however,  believes  that  the  Camp  David  process  provides  a  rare 
opportunity  to  understand  how  a  powerful  mediator  can  play  an  important  role  in 
solving  the  complicated  issues  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict.  Having  in  mind  the 
fact  that  there  was  nothing  new  at  Camp  David,  the  situation  was  not  more  than 
heads  of  states  at  a  summit  deciding  grave  issues  of  war  and  peace,  one  may 
conclude  that,  theoretically,  Camp  David  as  a  model  and  pattern  f  or 
negotiations  can  be  copied.  In  a  recent  study  published  in  January  1991,  Tom 
Princen  reached  a  similar  conclusion:  lr- 
Concerning  Camp  David  as  a  model  for  other  peace  treaties  with  Arab  States  a 
distinction  should  be  made  between  the  agreement  on  Sinai  and  that  on  the 
Palestinians". 
Apart  from  the  Palestinian  clause,  the  Egyptian-  Israeli  Peace  Treaty,  though 
far  short  of  an  ideal  model,  did  establish  the  important  precedents  of  trading 
territory  and  the  dismantling  of  settlements  for  a  binding  peace  treaty  and 
elaborate  security  arrangements.  Surely,  such  precedents  would  be  useful  in  any 
future  agreements  between  Israel  and  Arab  states. 
Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  basic  approach  to  the  question  of  the 
Palestinian  people  at  the  Camp  David  Accords  was  not  the  right  one,  this 
writer  believes  that  the  Camp  David  formula  provided  a  unique  opportunityl  at 
least  as  a  starting  point,  for  working  out  a  formula  accepted  by  all  the  parties 
concerned  provided  that  the  Palestinians  and  the  Israelis  have  to  give  up  any 
preconditions  which  are  not  accepted  by  the  other  party,  that  is  to  say#  the 
Israelis  have  to  abandon  the  precondition  that  they  would  have  a  right  to  veto 445 
the  choice  of  Palestinian  spokesmen.  On  the  Palestinian  side,  there  has 
hitherto  been  a  precondition  that  they  will  not  enter  into  any  negotiations 
unless  the  result,  a  Palestinian  state,  is  determined  in  advance. 
IV.  ReGam"fIndatiOns 
It  is  pertinent  to  end  these  conclusions  with  the  suggestion  that,  instead  of 
the  separate  negotiations  resulting  sometimes  in  agreements  binding  only 
between  the  nations  concerned,  sometimes  in  failure  to  agree,  and  sometimes  even 
in  failure  after  the  agreement  was  concluded  (e.  g.  the  Peace  Agreement  of  1983 
between  Lebanon  and  Israel  which  was  abrogated  in  1984)0  there  should  be  a 
multilateral  conference  including  all  the  states  concerned  as  well  as  the 
permanent  members  of  the  UN  Security  Council,  or  alternatively  only  of  Israel 
and  Arab  States  still  in  conflict  with  it,  at  which  peace  agreements  would  be 
simultaneously  negotiated.  The  propo4  agreement  should: 
1.  Def  ine  precisely  and  exactly  the  border  between  Israel  and  each  of  the  Arab 
neighbouring  states.  Otherwise,  in  the  absence  of  such  a  precise  definition  of 
the  boundaries  with  Israel,  there  could  afterwards  arise  disputesp  like  the 
Egyptian-  Israeli  dispute  over  Tabal  which  might  have  been  avoided  by  more 
careful  drafting  of  the  agreement, 
2.  There  should  be  some  mechanism  for  compulsory  settlement  of  any  dispute  in 
the  future. 
3.  The  principle  of  reciprocity  should  be  regarded  as  the  basis  an  which  the 
parties  can  agree  to  special  security  arrangements.  It  would  be  a  mistake  to 
apply  these  requirements  only  to  one  side. 446 
4.  Some  provision  ought  to  be  made  with  respect  to  the  water  resources 
problems  which  already  exist  between  Israel  on  the  one  hand  and  Syria,  Lebanon 
and  the  Palestinians  in  the  West  Bank  on  the  other. 
5.  There  should  be  provisions  to  deal  precisely  with  all  the  financial  claims 
which  might  arise. 
6.  Finally,  the  suggested  agreement  should  be  based  on  the  "territory  f  or 
peace"  formula  upon  which  the  Security  Council  Resolution  242  was  based.  This 
would  mean  that  Israel  has  to  give  up  all  the  occupied  Arab  territories  in 
return  for  a  genuine  and  permanent  peace. 447 
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Prime  Minister  Begin's  Autonomy  Plan 
28  December.  1977 
1.  The  administration  of  the  Military  Government  in  Judea,  Samaria  and  the 
Gaza  district  will  be  abolished. 
2.  In  Judea,  Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district,  administrative  autonomy  of  the 
residentsl  by  and  for  them,  will  be  established. 
3.  The  residents  of  Judea,  Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district,  will  elect  an 
Administrative  Council  composed  of  11  members.  The  Administrative  Council  will 
operate  in  accordance  with  the  principles  laid  down  in  this  paprer. 
4.  Any  resident,  18  years  old  and  above,  without  distinction  of  citizenship, 
or  if  stateless,  will  be  entitled  to  vote  in  the  elections  to  the  Administrative 
Council. 
5.  Any  resident  whose  name  is  included  in  the  list  of  candidates  for  the 
Administrative  Council  and  who,  on  the  day  the  list  is  submitted,  is  25  years 
old  or  abovet  will  be  entitled  to  be  elected  to  the  Council. 
6.  The  Administrative  Council  will  be  elected  by  general,  direct,  personall 
equal  and  secret  ballot. 
7.  The  period  of  office  of  the  Administrative  Council  will  be  four  years  from 
the  day  of  its  election. 
8.  The  Administrative  Council  will  sit  in  Bethlehem. 
9.  All  the  administative  affairs  relating  to  the  Arab  residents  of  the  areas 
of  Judea#  Samaria  and  Gaza  district  will  be  under  the  direction  and  within  the 
competence  of  the  Administrative  Council.  ý 
10.  The  Administrative  Council  will  operate  the  following  Departments: 
education;  religious  affairs;  finance;  transportation;  construction  and  housing; 
industry;  commerce  and  tourism;  agriculture;  health;  labour  and  social  welfare; 
rehabilitation  of  refugees;  and  the  administration  of  Justice  and  supervision  of 
local  police  forces;  and  promulgate  regulations  relating  to  the  operation  of 
these  Departments. 450 
11.  Security  and  public  order  in  the  areas  of  Judea,  Samaria  and  the  Gaza 
district  will  be  the  responsibility  of  the  Israeli  authorities. 
12.  The  Administrative  Council  will  elect  its  own  chairman. 
13.  The  first  session  of  the  Administrative  Council  will  be  convened  30  days 
after  the  publication  of  the  election  results. 
14.  Residents  of  Judea,  Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district,  without  distinction  of 
citizenshipp  or  if  stateless,  will  be  granted  free  choice  (option)  of  either 
Israeli  or  Jordanian  citizenship. 
15.  A  resident  of  the  areas  of  Judea,  Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district  who 
requests  Israeli  citizenship  will  be  granted  such  citizenship  in  accordance  with 
the  citizenship  law  of  the  state. 
16.  Residents  of  Judea,  Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district  who,  in  accordance  with 
the  right  of  free  option,  choose  Israeli  citizenship,  will  be  entitled  to  vote 
for,  and  be  elected  to,  the  Knesset  in  accordance  with  the  election  law. 
17.  Residents  of  Judea,  Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district  who  are  citizens  of 
Jordan  or  who,  in  accordance  with  the  right  of  free  option  will  become  citizens 
of  Jordan,  will-  elect  and  be  eligible  for  election  to  the  Parlinent  of  the 
Hashemit  Kingdom  of  Jordan  in  accordance  with  the  election  law  of  that 
countary. 
18.  Questions  arising  from  the  vote  to  the  Jordanian-  Parliament  by  residents 
of  Judeat  Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district  will  be  clarified  in  negotiations 
between  Israel  and  Jordan. 
19.  A  committee  will  be  established  of  representatives  of  Israel,  Jordan  and 
the  Administrative  Council  to  examine  existing  legislation  in  Judea,  Samaria  and 
the  Gaza  district,  and  to  determine  which  legislation  will  continue  in  force 
which  will  be  abolished,  and  what  will  be  the  competence  of  the  Administrative 
Council  to  promulgate  regulations.  The  rulings  of  the  committee  will  be  adopted 
by  unanimous  decision. 
20.  Residents  of  Israel  will  be  entitled  to  acquire  land  and  settle  in  the 
area  of  Judea,  Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district.  Arabs,  residents  of  Judea, 
Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district,  who,  in  accordance  with  the  free  option  granted 
themp  will  become  Israeli  citizens,  will  be  entitled  to  acquire  land  and  settle 
in  Israel. 21.  A  committee  will  be  established  of  representatives  of  Israel,  Jordan  and 
the  Administrative  Council  to  determine  norms  of  immigration  to  the  areas  of 
Judeat  Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district.  The  committee  will  determine  the  norms 
whereby  Arab  refugees  residing  outside  Judea,  Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district  will 
be  permitted  to  immigrate  to  these  areas  in  reasonable  numbers.  The  rulings  of 
the  committee  will  be  adopted  by  unanimous  decision. 
22.  Residents  of  Israel  and  residents  of  Judea,  Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district 
will  be  assured  freedom  of  movement  and  freedom  of  economic  activity  in  Israel 
Judea,  Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district. 
23.  -  The  Administrative  Council  will  appoint  one  of  its  members  to  represent 
the  Council  before  the  Government  of  Israel  for  deliberation  an  matters  of 
common  interest,  and  one  of  its  members  to  represent  the  Council  before  the 
Government  of  Jordan  for  deliberation  on  matters  of  common  interest. 
24.  Israel  stands  by  its  right  and  its  claim  of  sovereignty  to  Judea,  Samaria 
and  the  Gaza  district.  In  the  knowledge  that  other  claims  exist,  it  proposes, 
for  the  sake  of  the  agreement  and  the  peace,  that  the  question  of  sovereignty  in 
the  areas  be  left  open. 
25.  Vith  regard  to  the  administration  of  the  holy  places  of  the  three 
religions  in  Jerusalent  a  special  proposal  will  be  drawn  up  and  submitted  that 
will  include  the  guarantee  of  freedom  of  access  to  members  of  all  the  faiths  to 
the  shrines  holy  to  them. 
26'.  These  principles  will  be  subject  to  review  after  a  five-year  period. APPIENDIX  11 
Egyptian  Proposal  at  Camp  David 
September  So  1978 
Framework  For  The  Unsprehensive  Peace  Settlement 
Of  The  Xiddle  East 
Following:  The  historic  initiative  of  President  Sadat  which  rekindled  the  hopes 
of  all  nations  a  better  future  for  mankind. 
In  view  of  the  firm  determination  of  the  peoples  of  the  Middle  East,  together 
with  all  peace-loving  nations,  to  put  an  end  to  the  unhappy  past#  spare  this 
generation  and  the  generations  to  come  the  scourge  of  war  and  open  a  new 
chapter  in  their  history  ushering  in  an  era  of  mutual  respect  and 
understanding. 
Desirous  to  make  the  Middle  East,  the  cradle  of  civilization  and  the  birthplace 
of  all  Divine  missionso  a  shining  model  for  coexistence  and  cooperation  among 
nations. 
Determined  to  revive  the  great  tradition  of  tolerance  and  mutual  acceptance 
free  from  prejudice  and  discrimination. 
Determined  to  conduct  their  relations  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  the  accepted  norms  of  international  law  and 
legitimacy. 
Committed  to  adhere  to  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights. 
Desirous  to  develop  between  them  good-neighborly  relations  in  accordance  with 
the  Declaration  of  Principles  of  International  Law  concerning  Friendly  Relations 
and  Cooperation  Among  States  in  Accordance  with  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations. 
Bearing  in  mind  that  the  establishment  of  peace  and  good-  neighborly  relations 
should  be  founded  upon  legitimacy,  justice,  equality  and  respect  for  fundamental 
rights  and  that  good  neighbors  should  demonstrate,  in  their  acts  and  claims,  a 
strict  adherence  to  the  rule  of  law  and  a  genuine  willingness  to  assume  their 453 
mutual  obligation  to  refrain  from  any  infringement  upon  each  other's  sovereignty 
or  territorial  integrity. 
Convinced  that  military  occupation  and/or  the  denial  of  other  peoples'  rights 
and  legitimate  aspirations  to  live  and  develop  freely  are  incompatible  with  the 
spirit  of  peace. 
Considering  the  vital  interests  of  all  peoples  of  the  Xiddle  East  as  well  as 
the  universal  interest  that  exists  in  strengthening  Vorld  Peace  and  security. 
Article  1 
The  -Parties  express  their  determination  to  reach  a  comprehensive  settlement  of 
the  Middle  East  problem  through  the  conclusion  of  peace  treaties  on  the  basis 
of  the  full  implementation  of  Security  Council  Resolutions  242  and  338  in  all 
their  parts. 
Article  2 
The  Parties  agree  that  the  establishment  of  a  just  and  lasting  peace  among  them 
requires  the  fulfillment  of  the  following: 
First:  Withdrawal  of  Israel  from  the  occupied  territories  in  accordance  with 
the  principle  of  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  War. 
In  Sinai  and  the  Golan,  withdrawal  shall  take  place  to  the  international 
boundaries  between  mandated  Palestine  and  Egypt  and  Syria  respectively. 
In  the  Vest  Banki  Israel  shall  withdraw  to  the  demarcation  lines  of  the  1949 
Armistice  Agreement  between  Israel  and  Jordan  with  such  insubstantial 
alterations  as  might  be  mutually  accepted  by  the  Parties  concerned.  It  is  to  be 
understood  that  such  alterations  should  not  reflect  the  weight  of  conquest. 
Security  measures  shall  be  introduced  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  below 
mentioned  with  a  view  to  meeting  the  Parties'  legitimate  concern  for  security 
and  safeguarding  the  rights  and  aspirations  of  the  Palestinian  people. 
Withdrawal  from  the  Gaza  Strip  shall  take  place  to  the  demarcation  lines  of 
the  1949  Armistice  Agreement  between  Egypt  and  Israel. 
Israeli  withdrawal  shall  commence  immediately  after  the  signing  of  the  peace 
treaties  and  shall  be  completed  according  to  a  time-table  to  be  agreed  upon 
within  the  period  referred  to  in  Article  6. 454 
Second:  Removal  of  the  Israeli  settlements  in  the  occupied  territories 
according  to  a  time-table  to  be  agreed  upon  within  the  period  referred  to  in 
Article  6. 
Third:  Guaranteeing  the  security,  sovereignty,  territorial  integrity  and 
inviolability  and  the  political  independence  of  every  State  through  the 
f  ollowing  measures: 
(a)  The  establishment  of  demilitarized  zones  astride  the  borders. 
(b)  The  establishment  of  limited  armament  zones  astride  the  borders. 
(c)  the  stationing  of  United  Nations  forces  astride  the  borders. 
(d)  The  stationing  of  early  warning  systems  an  the  basis  of  reciprocity. 
(e)  Regulating  the  acquisition  of  arms  by  the  Parties  and  the  type  of  their 
armament  and  weapons  system. 
(f)  The  adherence  by  all  the  Parties  to  the  Treaty  an  the  Ron-Proliferation  of 
nuclear  weapons.  The  Parties  undertake  not  to  manufacture  or  acquire  nuclear 
weapons  or  other  nuclear  explosive  devices. 
(g)  Applying  the  principle  of  innocent  passage  to  transit  through  the  Straits 
of  Tiran. 
(h)  The  establishment  of  relations  of  peace  and  good-neighborly  cooperation 
among  the  Parties. 
Fourth:  An  undertaking  by  all'  the  Parties  not  to  resort  to  the  threat  or  the 
use  of  force  to  settle  disputes.  Any  disputes  shall  be  settled  by  peaceful  means 
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  33  of  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations. 
The  Parties  also  undertake  to  accept  the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  with  respect  to  all  disputes  emanating  from  the 
application  or  the  intprpretation  of  their  contractual  arrangements. 
Fifth:  Upon  the  signing  of  the  peace  treaties,  the  Israeli  military  Government 
in  the  'West  Bank  and  Gaza  shall  be  abolished  and  authority  shall  be  transferred 
to  the  Arab  side  in  an  orderly  and  peaceful  manner.  There  shall  be  a 
transitional  period  not  to  exceed  five  years  from  the  date  of  the  signing  of 
the  "Framework"  during  which  Jordan  shall  supervise  the  administration  of  the 
Gaza  Strip. 455 
Egypt  -  and  Jordan  shall  carry  out  their  responsibility  in  cooperation  with 
freely  elected  representatives  of  the  Palestinian  people  who  shall  exercise 
direct  authority  over  the  administration  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza 
simultaneously  with  the  abolition  of  the  Israeli  military  government. 
Six  months  before  the  end  of  the  transitional  period,  the  Palestinian  people 
shall  exercise  their  fundamental  right  to  self-detedrmination  and  shall  be 
enabled  to  establish  their  responsibility  in  the  Gaza  Strip  and  the  Vest  Bank, 
shall  recommend  that  the  entity  be  linked  with  Jordan  as  decided  by  their 
peoples. 
Palestinian  refugees  and  displaced  persons  shall  be  enabled  to  exercise  the 
right  to  return  or  receive  compensation  in  accordance  with  relevant  United 
Nations  resolutions. 
Sixth:  Israel  shall  withdraw  from  Jerusalem  to  the  demarcation  lines  of  the 
Armistice  Agreement  of  1949  in  conformity  with  the  principle  of  the 
inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  war.  Arab  sovereignty  and 
administration  shall  be  restored  to  the  Arab  sector. 
A  joint  municipal  council  composed  of  an  equal  number  of  Palestinian  and 
Israeli  members  shall  be  entrusted  with  regulating  and  supervising  the 
f  ollowing  matters: 
(a)  Public  utilities  throughout  the  City. 
(b)  Public  transportation  and  traffic. 
(c)  Postal  and  telephone  services. 
(d)  Tourism. 
The  Parties  undertake  to  ensure  the  free  exercise  of  worship,  the  freedom  of 
accesso  visit  and  transit  to  the  holy  places  without  distinction  or 
discrimination. 
Seventh:  Synchronized  with  the  implementation  of  the  provisions  related  to 
withdrawal,  the  Parties  shall  proceed  to  establish  among  them  relationships 
normal  to  States  at  peace  with  one  another.  To  this  end,  they  undertake  to  abide 
by  all  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations.  Steps  taken  in  this 
respect  include: 
(a)  Full  recognition. 
(b)  Abolishing  economic  boycott. 456 
(c)  Ensuring  the  freedom  of  passage  through  the  Suez  Canal  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  the  Constantinople  Convention  of  1888  and  the  Declaration  of 
the  Egyptian  Government  of  April  24,1957. 
(d)  Guaranteeing  that  under  their  jurisdiction  the  citizens  of  the  other 
Parties  shall  enjoy  the  protection  of  the  due  process  of  law. 
Eighth:  Israel  undertakes  to  pay  full  and  prompt  compensation  f  or  the  damage 
which  resulted  from  the  operations  of  its  armed  f  orces  against  the  civilian 
population  and  installations,  as  well  as  its  exploitation  of  natural  resouices 
in  occupied  territories. 
Article  3 
Upon  the  signing  of  this  "Framework"q  which  represents  a  comprehensive  and 
balanced  package  embodying  all  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the  Parties,  other 
Parties  concerned  shall  be  invited  to  adhere  to  it  under  the  Middle  East  Peace 
Conference  in  Geneva. 
Article  4 
The  representatives  of  the  Palestinian  people  shall  take  part  in  the  peace  talks 
to  be  held  after  the  signing  of  the  "Framework". 
Article  5 
The  United  States  shall  participate  in  the  talks  on  matters  related  to  the 
modalities  of  the  implementation  of  the  agreements  and  working  out  the  time- 
table  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  obligations  of  the  Parties. 
Article  6 
Peace  treaties  shall  be  concluded  within  three  months  from  the  signing  of  this 
"Framework"  by  the  Parties  concerned,  thus  signalling  the  beginning  of  the  peace 
process  and  setting  in  notion  the  dynamics  of  peace  and  co-existance. 
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Article  7 
The  Security  Council  shall  be  requested  to  endorse  the  Peace  Treaties  and  ensure 
that  their  provisions  shall  not  be  violated.  The  Council  shall  also  be  requested 
to  guarantee  the  boundaries  between  the  Parties. 
Article  8 
The  Permanent  Members  of  the  Security  Council  shall  be  requested  to  underwrite 
the  Peace  Treaties  and  ensure  respect  f  or  their  provisions.  They  shall  also  be 
requested  to  conf  or=  their  policies  and  actions  with  the  undertakings  contained 
in  this  Framework. 
Article  9 
The  United  States  shall  guarantee  the  implementation  of  this  "Framework"  and 
the  peace  treaties  in  full  and  in  good  faith. 458 
APPENDIX  III 
First  Draft  of  the  American  Proposal 
At  Camp  David.  September  10,1978 
A  Framework  For  Peace  In  The  Xiddle  Rm  Agreed 
At  Camp  David 
Muhammad  Anwar  Al-Sadatj  President  of  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt,  and  Xenachem 
Begin,  Prime  Minister  of  Israel,  met  with  Jimmy  Carter,  President  of  the  Jjnited 
States  of  America,  at  Camp  David  from  September  5  to-  ,  1978,  and  have  agreed 
on  the  following  framework  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  They  invite  other 
parties  to  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  to  adhere  to  it. 
Preamble 
The  search  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East  must  be  guided  by  the  following: 
-  After  four  wars  during  thirty  years,  despite  intensive  human  efforts,  the 
Middle  East,  which  is  the  cradle  of  civilization  and  the  birthplace  of  three 
great  religions,  does  not  yet  enjoy  the  blessings  of  peace.  The  people  of  the 
Middle  East  yearn  for  peace  so  that  the  vast  human  and  natural  resources  of  the 
region  can  be  turned  to  the  pursuits  of  peace  and  so  that  this  area  can  become 
a  model  for  coexistence  and  cooperation  among  nations. 
-  The  historic  initiative  of  President  Sadat  in  visiting  Jerusalem  and  the 
reciprocal  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Begin  to  Ismailia,  the  constructive  peace 
proposals  made  by  both  leaders,  as  well  as  the  warm  reception  of  these  missions 
by  the  peoples  of  both  countries,  have  created  an  unprecedented  opportunity  for 
peace  which  must  not  be  lost  if  this  generation  and  future  generations  are  to 
be  spared  the  tragedies  of  war. 
-  The  provisions  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  the  other  accepted 
norms  of  international  law  and  legitimacy  now  provide  accepted  standards  for 
the  conduct  of  relations  among  all  states. 
-  The  only  agreed  basis  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict 
is  United  Nations  Security  Council  Resolution  242,  supplemented  by  Resolution 459 
338.  Resolution  242  in  its  preamble  emphasizes  the  obligation  of  Member  States 
in  the  United  Nations  to  act  in  accordance  with  Article  2  of  the  Charter. 
Article  2,  among  other  points,  calls  for  the  settlement  of  disputes  by  peaceful 
means  and  for  Members  to  refrain  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force.  Egypt  and 
Israel  in  their  agreement  signed  September  4,1975l  agreed:  "The  Parties  hereby 
undertake  not  to  resort  to  the  threat  or  used  of  force  or  military  blockade 
against  each  other.  "  They  have  both  also  stated  that  there  shall  be  no  more  war 
between  them.  In  a  relationship  of  peace,  in  the  spirit  of  Article  2, 
negotiations  between  Israel  and  any  neighbor  prepared  to  negotiate  peace  and 
security  with  it  should  be  based  on  all  the  provi  sions  and  principles  of 
Resolution  242#  including  the  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by 
war  and  the  need  to  work  f  or  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in  which  every  state  in 
the  area  can  live  in  security  within  secure  and  recognized  borders.  Negotiations 
based  on  these  principles  are  necessary  with  respect  to  all  f  ronts  of  the 
conf  lict-the  Sinai,  the  Golan  Heights,  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza,  and  Lebanon. 
-  Peace  is  more  than  the  juridical  end  of  the  state  of  belligerency.  It  should 
encompass  the  full  range  of  normal  relations  between  nations.  Progress  toward 
that  goal  can  accelerate  movement  toward  a  new  era  of  reconciliation  in  the 
Middle  East  marked  by  cooperation  in  promoting  economic  development,  in 
maintaining  stability,  and  in  assuring  security. 
-  Security  is  enhanced  by  a  relationship  of  peace  and  by  cooperation  between 
nations  which  enjoy  normal.  relations.  In  addition,  under  the  terms  of  peace 
treaties,  the  sovereign  parties  can  agree  to  special  security  arrangements  such 
as  demilitarized  zones,  limited  armaments  areas,  early  warning  stations,  special 
security  forces,  liaison,  agreed  measures  for  monitoring,  and  other  arrangements 
that  they  agree  are  useful. 
Agreement 
Taking  these  -factors  into  account,  Egypt  and  Israel  are  determined  to  reach  a 
just,  comprehensive,  and  durable  settlement  of  the  Middle  East  conflict  through 
the  conclusion  of  peace  treaties  on  the  basis  of  the  full  implementation  of 
Security  Council  Resolution  242  and  338  in  all  their  parts.  Their  purpose  is  to 
achieve  peace  and  good  neighborly  relations.  They  recognize  that,  for  peace  to 460 
endure,  it  must  involve  all  those  who  have  been  principal  parties  to  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict;  it  must  provide  security;  and  it  must  give  the  peoples  who 
have  been  most  deeply  affected  by  the  conflict,  including  the  Palestinians,  a 
sense  that  they  have  been  dealt  with  fairly  in  the  peace  agreement.  They 
therefore  agree  that  this  Framework  as  appropriate  is  intended  by  them  to 
constitute  a  basis  for  peace  not  only  between  Egypt  and  Israelt  but  also 
between  Israel  and  each  of  its  other  neighbors  which  is  prepared  to  negotiate 
peace  with  Israel  on  this  basis.  Vith  that  objective  in  mind,  they  have  agreed 
to  proceed  as  follows: 
A.  Egypt-Israel 
1.  Egypt  and  Israel  undertake  not  to  resort  to  the  threat  or  the  use  of 
force  to  settle  disputes.  Any  disputes  shall  be  settled  by  peaceful  means  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  33  of  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations.,  In  the  event  of  disputes  arising  from  the  application  or  interpretation 
of  their  contractual  agreements,  the  two  parties  will  seek  to  reach  a  settlement 
by  direct  negotiations.  Failing  agreement,  the  parties  accept  the  compulsory 
jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  with  respect  to  all  disputes 
emanating  from  the  application  or  the  interpretation  of  their  contractual 
arrangements. 
2.  In  order  to  achieve  peace  between  them,  they  have  agreed  to  negotiate 
without  interruption  with  'a  goal  of  concluding  within  three  months  from  the 
signing  of  this  Framework  a  peace  treaty  between  them,  while  inviting  the  other 
parties  to  the  conflict  to  proceed  simultaneously  to  negotiate  and  conclude 
similar  peace  treaties  with  a  view  to  achieving  a  comprehensive  peace  in  the 
area.  Israel  has  agreed  to  the  restoration  of  the  exercise  of  full  Egyptian 
sovereignty  in  the  Sinai  up  to  the  internationally  recognized  border  between 
Egypt  and  Israelq  and  Egypt  has  agreed  to  establish  full  peace  and  normal 
relations  with  Israel.  Security  arrangements,  the  timing  of  withdrawal  of  all 
Israeli  forces  from  the  Sinai,  and  the  elements  of  a  normal,  peaceful 
relationship  between  them  have  been  discussed  and  will  be  defined  in  the  peace 
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3.  Egypt  and  Israel  agree  that  freedom  of  passage  through  the  Suez  Canalq  the 
Strait  of  Tiran,  and  the  Gulf  of  Suez  should  be  assured  for  ships  of  all  flags, 
including  Israel. 
B.  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
1.  Egypt  and  Israel  will  participate  in  negotiations  an  resolution  of  the 
Palestinian  problem  in  all  its  aspects.  The  solution  must  recognize  the 
legitimate  rights  of  -  the  Palestinian  people  and  enable  the  Palestinians  to 
participate  in  the  determination  of  their  own  future. 
2.  To  this  endo  negotiations  relating  to  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  should 
provide  for  links  between  these  areas  and  Jordan  and  should  proceed  in  three 
stages: 
(a)  Egypt  and  Israel  hereby  agree  that  the  following  should  be  the  main 
elements  of  a  settlement  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza:  In  order  to  ensure  a 
peaceful  and  orderly  transfer  of  authority,  there  should  be  transitional 
arrangements  for  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  for  a  period  not  exceeding  five  years, 
In  order  to  provide  full  autonomy  to  the  Inhabitants;  under  these  arrangements 
the  Israeli  military  government  and  administration  will  be  abolished  and 
withdrawn  as,  soon  as  a  self-governing  authority  can  be  freely  elected  by  the 
inhabitants  of  these  areas  to  replace  the  existing  military  government.  This 
transitional  arrangement  should  derive  its  authority  for  self-government  from 
Egypt  and  Israelt,  and  Jordan,  when  Jordan  joins  the  negotiations.  To  negotiate 
the  details  of  a  transitional  arrangement,  the  Government  of  Jordan  will  be 
invited  to  Join  the  negotiations  an  the  basis  of  this  Framework.  These  new 
arrangements  should  give  due  consideration  both  to  the  principle  of  self- 
government  by  the  inhabitants  of  these  territories  and  to  the  legitimate 
security  concerns  of  Egypt,  Israel$  Jordan  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  Vest  Bank 
and  Gaza. 
(b)  Egypt,  Israell  and  Jordan  will  determine  the  modalities  for  establishing 
the  elected  self-governing  authority  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  delegations 
nay  include  Palestinians  from  ,  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  parties  will 
negotiate  an  agreement  which  will  define  the  powers  and  responsibilities  of  the 
self-governing  authority.  The  Agreement  will  provide  for  the  withdrawal  of 462 
Israeli  armed  forces  and  the  redeployment  of  some  of  then  to  limited  and 
specified  security  points.  It  will  also  include  arrangements  for  assuring 
internal  and  external  security  and  public  order,  Including  the  respective  roles 
of  Israeli  armed  forces  and  local  police. 
(c)  When  the  self-governing  authority  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  is 
inauguratedt  the  transitional  period  will  begin.  Within  three  years  after  the 
beginning  of  the  transitional  period,  Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan  and  the  self- 
governing  authority  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  will  undertake  negotiations  for  a 
peace  treaty  which  will  settle  the  final  status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  after 
the  transitional  period  and  its  relationship  with  its  neighbors  an  the  basis  of 
all  of  the  principles  of  UK  Security  Council  Resolution  242,  including  the 
mutual  obligations  of  peace,  the  necessity  for  security  arrangements  for  all 
parties  concerned  folloeing  the  transitional  period,  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli 
forces,  a  just  settlement  of  the  refugee  problem,  and  the  establishment  of 
secure  and  recognized  boundaries.  The  boundaries  and  security  arrangements  must 
both  satisfy  the  aspirations  of  the  Palestinians  and  meet  Israel's  security 
needs.  They  may  incorporate  agreed  minor  modifications  in  the  temporary 
armistice  lines  which  existed  beyween  1949  and  1967.  The  peace  treaty  will 
define  the  rights  of  the  citizens  of  each  of  the  parties  to  do  busines,  to  work, 
to  live,  and  to  carry  an  other  transactions  in  each  other's  territory  on  a 
reciprocal  basis. 
3.  All  necessary  measures  will  be  taken  and  provisions  made  to  assure 
Israel's  security  during  the  transitional  period  and  beyond.  To  assist  in 
providing  security  during  and  beyond  the  transitional  period: 
(a)  Egypt  and  Israel  propose  that  Jordan  and  Egypt  assign  personnel  to  the 
police  forces  of  the  self-governing  autholrity  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza, 
respectively.  They  will  also  maintain  continuing  liaison  an  internal  security 
matters  with  the  designated  Israeli  authorities  to  ensure  that  no  hostile 
threats  or  acts  against  Israel  or  its  citizens  originate  from  the  West  Bank  or 
Gaza.  The  numbers,  equipment,  and  responsibilities  of  such  Egyptian  and 
Jordanian  personnel  will  be  defined  by  the  agreement.  By  mutual  agreement, 
United  Nations  forces  or  observers  may  also  be  introduced  during  the 
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(b)  The  nature  of  the  Israeli  security  presence  during  the  transitional  period 
and  beyond  will  be  agreed  in  the  negotiations  described  in  paragraphs  B2  (b) 
and  (c)  above. 
4.  During  the  transitional  period,  the  negotiating  parties  (Egypt,  Israeli 
Jordan,  the  self-governing  authority)  will  constitute  a  continuing  committee  to 
reach  mutual  agreements  applicable  during  that  period  on: 
(a)  Issues  involving  interpretation  of  the  agreement  or  issues  unforeseen 
during  the  negotiation  of  the  agreement,  if  not  resolvable  by  the  self- 
governing  authority; 
(b)  the  return  of  agreed  numbers  of  persons  displaced  from  the  Vest  Bank  in 
1967  and  of  Palestinian  refugees  together  with  necessary  measures  in  connection 
with  their  return  to  prevent  disruption  and  disorder. 
5.  Jerusalem#  the  city  of  peace,  shall  not  be  divided.  It  is  a  city  holy  to  Jew, 
Xuslimo  and  Christian  and  all  peoples  must  have  free  access  to  it  and  enjoy  the 
free  exercise  of  worship  and  the  right  to  visit  and  transit  to  the  holy  places 
without  distinction  or  discrimination.  The  holy  places  of  each  faith  will  be 
under  the  administration  of  their  representatives.  For  peace  to  endure,  each 
community  in  Jerusalem  must  be  able  to  express  freely  its  cultural  and 
religious  values  in  an  acceptable  political  framework.  A  representative 
municipal  council  shall  supervise  essential  functions  In  the  city.  An  agreement 
an  relationships  In  Jerusalem  should  be  reached  in  the  negotiations  dealing 
with  the  final  status  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza. 
6.  Egypt  and  Israel  agree  to  work  with  each  other  and  with  other  interested 
parties  to  achieve  a  Just  and  permanent  solution  of  the  problems  of  Palestinian 
and  Jewish  refugees. 
7.  If  Jordan  is  unable  to  join  these  negoltiations,  Egypt,  Israel,  and  the 
Inhabitants  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  will  proceed  to  establish  and  administer 
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C.  Settlements 
(Language  to  be  Inserted) 
D.  Associated  Principles 
1.  Egypt  and  Israel  believe  that  the  principles  and  provisions  described 
below  should  apply  to  peace  treaties  on  all  fronts. 
2.  Synchronized  with  the  implementation  of  the  provisions  related  to 
withdrawal,  signatories  shall  proceed  to  establish  among  themselves 
relationships  normal  to  states  at  peace  with  one  another.  To  this  end,  they 
should  undertake  to  abide  by  all  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations.  Steps  to  be  taken  in  this  respect  include: 
(a)  full  recognition,  Including  diplomatic,  economic  and  cultural  relations; 
(b)  abolishing  economic  boycotts  and  barriers  to  the  free  movement  of  goods 
and  people; 
(c)  guaranteeing  that  under  their  jurisdiction  the  citizens  of  the  other 
parties  shall  enjoy  the  protection  of  the  due  process  of  law. 
3.  Signatories  should  agree  to  provide  for  -  the  security  and  respect  tbed 
sovereignty.  territorial  integrityand  inviolability  and  the  political 
independence  of  each  state  pegotiating  peace  through  measures  such  as  the 
following: 
(a)  the  establishment  of  demilitarized  zones; 
(b)  the  establishment  of  limited  armament  zones; 
(c)  the  stationing  of  United  Nations  forces  or  observer  groups  as  agreed; 
W  the  stationing  of  early  warning  systems  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity; 
(e)  regulating  the  size  of  their  armed  forces  and  the  types  of  their  armament 
and  weapons  systems. 
4.  Signatories  should  explore  possibilities  for  regional  economic  development 
In  the  context  of  both  traditional  arrangements  and  final  peace  treaties,  with 
the  objective  of  contributing  to  the  atmosphere  of  peace,  cooperation  and 
friendship  which  is  their  common  goal. 
5.  Claims  Commisions  may  be  established  for  the  mutual  settlement  of  all 
f  Inancial  claims. 6.  The  United  States  shall  be  invited  to  participate  in  the  talks  on  matters 
related  to  the  modalities  of  the  implementation  of  the  agreements  and  working 
out  the  timetable  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  obligations  of  the  parties. 
7.  The  United  Nations  Security  Council  shall  be  requested  to  endorse  the  peace 
treaties  and  ensure  that  their  provisions  shall  not  be  violated.  The  permanent 
members  of  the  Security  Council  shall  be  requested  to  underwrite  the  peace 
treaties  and  ensure  respect  for  their  provisions.  They  shall  also  be  requested 
to  conform  their  policies  and  actions  with  the  undertakings  contained  in  this 
Framework. AF'IP33NIDIX  IV 
THE  Camp  David  Accords,  September  17,1978 
A  Framework  For  Peace  in  the  Middle  East  Agreed 
At  Camp  David 
Muhammad  Anwar  al-Sadat,  President  of  the  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt,  and 
Menachem  Begin,  Prime  Minister  of  Israel,  met  with  Jimmy  Carter,  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  at  Camp  David  from  September  5  to  September 
17,1978,  and  have  agreed  an  the  following  framework  for  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  They  invite  other  parties  to  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  to  adhere  to  it. 
Preamble 
The  search  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East  must  be  guided  by  the  following: 
-The  agreed  basis  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  conflict  between  Israel 
and  its  neighbors  is  United  Nations  Security  Council  Resolution  242,  in  all  its 
parts. 
-After  four  wars  during  thirty  years,  despite  intensive  human  efforts,  the 
Middle  East,  which  is  the  cradle  of  civilazation  and  the  birthplace  of  three 
great  religions,  does  not  yet  enjoy  the  blessing  of  peace.  The  people  of  the 
Middle  East  yearn  for  peace  so  that  the  vast  human  and  natural  resources  of  the 
region  can  be  turned  to  the  pursuits  of  peace  and  so  that  this  area  can  become 
a  model  for  coexistence  and  cooperation  among  nations. 
-The  historic  initative  of  President  Sadat  in  visiting  Jerusalem  and  the 
reception  accorded  to  him  by  the  Parliament,  government  and  people  of  Israel, 
and  the  reciprocal  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Begin  to  Ismailia,  the  peace 
proposals  made  by  both  countries,  have  created  an  unprecedented  opportunity  for 
peace  which  must  not  be  lost  If  this  generation  and  future  generations  are  to 
be  spared  the  tragedies  of  war. 
-The  provisions  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  the  other  accepted 
norms  of  international  law  and  legitimacy  now  provide  accepted  standards  for 
the  conduct  of  relations  among  all  states. 467 
-To  achieve  a  relationship  of  peace,  in  the  spirit  of  Article  2  of  the  United 
Nations  Charter,  future  negotiations  between  Israel  and  any  neighbor  prepared  to 
negotiate  peace  and  security  with  it,  are  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  carrying 
out  all  provisions  and  principles  of  Resolution  242  and  338. 
-Peace  requires  respect  for  the  sovereignty,  territorial  integrity  and 
political  independence  of  every  state  in  the  area  and  their  right  to  live  in 
peace  within  secure  and  recognized  boundaries  free  from  threats  or  acts  of 
force.  Progress  toward  that  goal  can  accelerate  movement  toward  a  new  era  of 
reconciliation  in  the  Xiddle  East  marked  by  cooperation  in  promoting  economic 
development,  in  maintaining  stability,  and  in  assuring  security. 
-Security  Is  enhanced  by  a  relationship  of  peace  and  by  cooperation  between 
nations  which  enjoy  normal  relations.  In  addition,  under  the  terms  of  peace 
treatiest  the  parties  can,  an  the  basis  of  reciprocity,  agree  to  special  security 
arrangements  such  as  demilitarized  zones,  limited  armaments  areas,  early 
warning  stations,  the  presence  of  international  forces,  liason,  agreed  measures 
for  monitoring,  and  other  arrangements  that  they  agree  are  useful. 
Framework 
Taking  these  factors  into  account,  the  parties  are  determined  to  reach  a  just, 
comprehensive,  and  durable  settlement  of  the  Xiddle  East  conflict  through  the 
conclusion  of  peace  treaties  based  on  Security  Council  Resolutions  242  and  338 
in  all  their  parts.  Their  purpose  is  to  achieve  peace  and  good  neighborly 
relations.  They  recognize  that,  for  peace  to  endure,  it  must  involve  all  those 
who  have  been  most  deeply  affected  by  the  conflict.  They  therefore  agree  that 
this  framework  as  appropriate  is  intended  by  them  to  constitute  a  basis  for 
peace  not  only  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  but  also  between  Israel  and  each  of 
its  other  neighbors  which  is  prepared  to  negotiate  peace  with  Israel  on  this 
basis.  With  that  objective  in  mind,  they  have  agreed  to  proceed  as  follows: 
A.  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
1.  Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan  and  the  representatives  of  the  Palestinian  people 
should  participate  in  negotiations  on  the  resolution  of  Palestinian  problem  in 
all  its  aspects.  To  achieve  that  objective,  negotiations  relating  to  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  should  proceed  in  three  stages: 468 
(a)  Egypt  and  Israel  agree  that,  in  order  to  ensure  a  peaceful  and  orderly 
transfer  of  authority,  and  taking  into  account  the  security  concerns  of  all  the 
parties,  there  should  be  transitional  arrangements  for  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza 
for  a  period  not  exceeding  five  years.  In  order  to  provide  full  autonomy  to  the 
inhabitants,  under  these  arrangements  the  Israeli  military  government  and  its 
civilian  administration  will  be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  a  self-governing  authority 
has  been  freely  elected  by  the  inhabitants  of  these  areas  to  replace  the 
existing  military  government.  To  negotiate  the  details  of  a  transitional 
arrangement,  the  Government  of  Jordan  will  be  invited  to  join  the  negotiations 
an  the  basis  of  this  framework.  These  new  arrangements  should  give  due 
consideration  both  to  the  principle  of  self-government  by  the  inhabitants  of 
these  territories  and  to  the  legitimate  security  concerns  of  the  parties 
involved. 
(b)  Egypt,  Israel  and  Jordan  will  agree  an  the  modalities  for  establishing  the 
elected  self-governing  authority  In  the  Vest-Bank  and  Gaza.  The  delegations  of 
Egypt  and  Jordan  may  include  Palestinians  from  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  or  other 
Palestinians  as  mutually  agreed.  The  parties  will  negotiate  an  agreement  which 
will  define  the  powers  and  responsibilities  of  the  self-governing  authority  to 
be  exercised  In  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza.  A  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces 
will  take  place  and  there  will  be  a  redeployment  of  the  remaining  Israeli  forces 
into  specified  security  locations.  The  agreement  will  also  include  arrangements 
for  assuring  internal  and  external  security  and  public  order.  A  strong  local 
police  force  will  be  established,  which  may  include  Jordanian  Citizens.  In 
addition,  Israeli  and  Jordanian  forces  will  participate  in  joint  patrols  and  in 
the  manning  of  control  posts  to  assure  the  security  of  the  borders. 
(c)  When  the  self-governing  authority  (administrative  council)  in  the  Vest 
Bank  and  Gaza  Is  established  and  inaugurated,  the  transitional  period  of  five 
years  will  begin.  As  soon  as  possible.  but  not  later  than  the  third  year  after 
the  beginning  of  the  transitional  period,  negotiations  will  take  place  to 
determine  the  final  status  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  and  its  relationship  with 
its  neighbors,  and  to  conclude  a  peace  treaty  between  Israel  and  Jordan  by  the 
end  of  the  transitional  period.  These  negotiations  will  be  conducted  among 
Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan,  and  the  elected  representatives  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 469 
Vest  Bank  and  Gaza.  Two  separate  but  related  committees  will  be  convened,  one 
committee,  consisting  of  representatives  of  the  four  parties  which  will 
negotiate  and  agree  an  the  f  Inal  status  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza,  and  its 
relationship  with  its  neighbors,  and  the  second  committee,  consisting  of 
representatives  of  Israel  and  representatives  of  Jordan  to  be  Joined  by  the 
elected  representatives  of  the  Inhabitants  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza,  to 
negotiate  the  peace  treaty  between  Israel  and  Jordan,  taking  into  account  the 
agreement  reached  an  the  f  inal  status  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza.  The 
negotiations  shall  be  based  an  all  provisions  and  principles  of  UK  Security 
Council  Resolution  242.  The  negotiations  will  resolve,  among  other  matters,  the 
location  of  the  boundaries  and  the  nature  of  the  security  arrangements.  The 
solution  from  the  negotiations  must  also  recognize  the  legitimate  rights  of  the 
Palestinian  people  and  their  just  requirements.  In  this  way,  the  Palestinians 
will  participate  in  the  determination  of  their  own  future  through: 
(1)  The  negotiations  among  Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan  and  the  representatives  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  and  other  outstanding  issues  by  the 
end  of  the  transitional  period. 
(2)  Submitting  their  agreement  to  a  vote  by  the  elected  representatives  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza. 
(3)  Providing  for  the  elected  representatives  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Vest 
Bank  and  Gaza  to  decide  bow  they  shall  govern  themselves  consistent  with  the 
provisions  of  their  agreement. 
(4)  Participating  as  stated  above  in  the  work  of  the  committee  negotiating 
the  peace  treaty  between  Israel  and  Jordan. 
2.  All  necessary  measures  will  be  taken  and  provisions  made  t9  assure  the 
security  of  Israel  and  its  neighbors  during  the  transitional  period  and  beyond. 
To  assist  In  providing  such  security,  a  strong  local  police  force  will  be 
constituted  by  the  self-governing  authority.  It  will  be  composed  of  Inhabitants 
of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  police  will  maintain  continuing  liaison  an 
internal  security  matters  with  the  designated  Israeli,  Jordanian,  and  Egyptian 
officers. 
3.  During  the  transitional  period,  representatives  of  Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan,  and 
the  self-governing  authority  will  constitute  a  continuing  committee  to  decide  by 470 
agreement  an  the  modalities  of  admission  of  persons  displaced  from  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  in  1967,  together  with  necessary  measures  to  prevent  disruption 
and  disorder.  Other  matters  of  common  concern  may  also  be  dealt  with  by  this 
committee. 
4.  Egypt  and  Israel  will  work  with  each  other  and  with  other  interested 
parties  to  establish  agreed  procedures  for  a  prompt,  Just  and  permanent 
implementation  of  the  resolution  of  the  refugee  problem. 
B.  Egypt-Israel 
1.  Egypt  and  Israel  undertake  not  to  resort  to  the  threat  or  the  use  of 
force  to  settle  disputes.  Any  disputes  shall  be  settled  by  peaceful  means  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  33  of  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations. 
2.  In  order  to  achieve  peace  between  them,  the  parties  agreed  to  negotiate  in 
good  faith  with  a  good  faith  with  a  goal  of  concluding  within  three  months  from 
the  signing  of  this  Framework  a  peace  treaty  between  them,  while  inviting  the 
other  parties  to  the  conflict  to  proceed  simultaneously  to  negotiate  and 
conclude  similar  peace  treaties  with  a  view  to  achieving  a  comprehensive  peace 
in  the  area.  The  Framework  for  the  conclusion  of  a  Peace  Treaty  between  Egypt 
and  Israel  will  govern  the  peace  negotiations  between  them.  The  parties  will 
agree  an  the  modalities  and  the  timetable  for  the  implementation  of  their 
obligations  under  the  treaty. 
C.  Associated  Principles 
1.  Egypt  and  Israel  state  that  the  principles  and  provisions  described  below 
should  apply  to  peace  treaties  between  Israel  and  each  of  its  neighbors-Egypt, 
Jordant  Syria  and  Lebanon. 
2.  Signatories  shall  establish  among  themselves  relationships  normal  to 
states  at  peace  with  one  another.  To  this  end,  they  should  undertake  to  abide 
by  all  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations.  Steps  to  be  taken 
in  this  respect  include: 
(a)  full  recognition; 
(b)  abolishing  economic  boycotts; 
(c)  guaranteeing  that  under  their  jurisdiction  the  citizens  of  the  other 
parties  shall  enjoy  the  protection  of  the  due  process  of  law. 471 
3.  Signatories  should  explore  possibilities  for  economic  development  in  the 
context  of  final  peace  treaties,  with  the  objective  of  contributing  to  the 
atmosphere  of  peace#  cooperation  and  friendship  which  is  their  common  goal. 
4.  Claims  Commissions  may  be  established  for  the  mutual  settlement  of  all 
financial  claims. 
5.  The  United  States  shall  be  invited  to  participate  in  the  talks  an  matters 
related  to  the  modalities  of  the  implementation  of  the  agreements  and  working 
out  the  timetable  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  obligations  of  the  parties. 
6.  The  United  Nations  Security  Council  shall  be  requested  to  endorse  the  peace 
treaties  and  ensure  that  their  provisions  shall  not  be  violated.  The  permanent 
members  of  the  Security  Council  shall  be  requested  to  underwrite  the  peace 
treaties  and  ensure  respect  for  their  provisions.  They  shall  also  be  requested 
to  conform  their  policies  and  actions  with  the  undertakings  contained  in  this 
Framework. 
Framework  For  The  Conclusion  Of  A  Peace  Treaty 
Between  Egypt  And  Israel 
In  order  to  achieve  peace  between  them,  Israel  and  Egypt  agree  to  negotiate  in 
good  faith  with  a  goal  of  concluding  within  three  months  of  the  signing  of  this 
framework  a  peace  treaty  between  them. 
It  is  agreed  that: 
The  site  of  the  negotiations  will  be  under  a  United  Nations  flag  at  a  location 
or  locations  to  be  mutually  agreed. 
All  of  the  principles  of  UK  Resolution  242  will  apply  in  this  resolution  of 
the  dispute  between  Israel  and  Egypt. 
Unless  otherwise  mutually  agreed,  terms  of  the  peace  treaty  will  be 
implemented  between  two  and  three  years  after  the  peace'treaty  is  signed. 
The  following  matters  are  agreed  between  the  parties: 
(a)  the  full  exercise  of  Egyptian  sovereignty  up  to  the  internationally 
recognized  border  between  Egypt  and  mandated  Palestine; 
(b)  the  'withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces  from  the  Sinai; 472 
(c)  the  use  of  airfields  left  by  the  Israelis  near  El  Arish,  Rafah,  Ras  en 
Yaqb,  and  Sharm  el  Sheikh  for  civilian  purposes  only,  including  possible 
commercial  use  by  all  nations; 
(d)  the  right  of  free  passage  by  ships  of  Israel  through  the  Gulf  of  Suez  and 
the  Suez  Canal  an  the  basis  of  the  Constantinople  Convention  of  1888  applying 
to  all  nations;  the  Strait  of  Tiran  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  are  international 
waterways  to  be  open  to  all  nations  for  unimpeded  and  nonsuspendable  freedom 
of  navigation  and  overflight; 
(e)  the  construction  of  a  highway  between  the  Sinai  and  Jordan  near  Elat  with 
guaranteed  free  and  peaceful  passage  by  Egypt  and  Jordan;  and 
(f)  the  stationing  of  military  forces  listed  below. 
Stationing  of  Forces 
A.  No  more  than  one  division  (mechanized  or  infantry)  of  Egyptian  armed 
forces  will  be  stationed  within  an  area  lying  approximately  50  kilometers  (km) 
east  of  the  Gulf  of  Suez  and  the  Suez  Canal. 
B.  Only  United  Nations  forces  and  civil  police  equipped  with  light  weapons  to 
perform  normal  police  functions  will  be  stationed  within  an  area  lying  west  of 
the  international  border  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba,  varying  In  width  from  20  km  to 
40  km. 
C.  In  the  area  within  3  km  east  of  the  international  border  there  will  be 
Israeli  limited  military  forces  not  to  exceed  four  infantry  battalions  and 
United  Nations  observers. 
D.  Border  patrol  units,  not  to  exceed  three  battalions,  will  supplement  the 
civil  police  In  maintaining  order  in  the  area  not  included  above. 
The  exact  demarcation  of  the  above  areas  will  be  as  decided  during  the  peace 
negotiations. 
Early  warning  stations  may  exist  to  insure  compliance  with  the  terms  of  the 
agreement. 
United  Nations  forces  will  be  stationed:  (a)  in  part  of  the  area  in  the  Sinai 
lying  within  about  20  km  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea  and  adjacent  to  the 
international  border,  and  (b)  In  the  Sharm  el  Sheikh  area  to  ensure  freedom  of 
passage  through  the  Strait  of  Tiran;  and  these  forces  will  not  be  removed 473 
unless  such  removal  is  approved  by  the  Security  Council  of  the  United  NatiOnS 
with  a  unanimous  vote  of  the  live  permanent  members. 
After  a  peace  treaty  is  signed,  and  after  the  interim  withdrawal  is  complete, 
normal  relations  will  be  established  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  includ#g:  full 
recognition,  including  diplomatic,  economic  and  cultural  relations;  termination 
of  economic  boycotts  and  barriers  to  the  free  movement  of  goods  and  people;  and 
mutual  protection  of  citizens  by  the  due  process  of  law. 
Interim  Vithdrawal 
Between  three  months  and  nine  months  after  the  signing  of  the  peace  treaty,  all 
Israeli  forces  will  withdraw  east  of  a  line  extending  from  a  point  east  of  El 
Arish  to  Ras  Xuhammad,  the  exact  location  of  this  line  to  be  determined  by 
mutual  agreement. 
Letter  From  Israel  Prime  Minister  Menachem  Begin 
To  President  Jimmy  Carter,  September  171  1978 
Dear  Mr.  President: 
I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  during  two  weeks  af  ter  my  return  home  I 
will  submit  a  motion  before  Israel's  Parliament  (the  Knesset)  to  decide  on  the 
following  question: 
If  during  the  negotiations  to  conclude  a  peace  treaty  between  Israel  and 
Egypt  all  outstanding  issues  are  agreed  upon,  "are  you  In  favor  of  the  removal 
of  the  Israeli  settlers  from  the  northern  and  southern  Sinai  areas  or  are  you 
In  favor  of  keeping  the  aforementioned  settlers  in  those  areas?  " 
The  vote,  Mr.  President,  on  this  Issue  will.  be  completely  free  from  the  usual 
Parliamentary  Party  discipline  to  the  effect  that,  although  the  coalition  is 
being  now  supported  by  70  members  out  of  120,  every  member  of  the  Knesset,  as 
I  believe,  both  on  the  Government  and  the  Opposition  benches  will  be  enabled  to 
vote  in  accordance  with  his  own  conscience. 
Letter  From  President  Jimmy  Carter  To  Egyptian 
President  Anwar  El  Sadat,  September  22,1978 
Dear  Xr.  President: 474 
I  transmit  herewith  a  copy  of  a  letter  to  me  from  Prime  Minister  Begin  setting 
forth  how  he  proposes  to  present  the  issue  of  the  Sinai  settlements  to  the 
Knesset  for  the  latter's  decision. 
In  this  connection,  I  understand  from  your  letter  that  Knesset  approval  to 
withdraw  all  Israeli  settlers  from  Sinai  according  to  a  timetable  within  the 
period  specified  for  the  implementation  of  the  peace  treaty  is  a  prerequisite  to 
any  negotiations  an  a  peace  treaty  between  Egypt  and  Isrfael. 
Letter  From  Egyptian  President  Anwar  El  Sadat  To 
President  Jimmy  Carter,  September  17,1978 
Dear  Xr.  President: 
In  connection  with  the  "Framework  for  a  Settlement  in  Sinai"  to  be  signed 
tonight,  I  would  like  to  reaffirm  the  position  of  the  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt 
with  respect  to  the  settlements: 
1.  All  Israeli  settlers  must  be  withdrawn  from  Sinai  according  to  a  timetable 
within  the  period  specified  for  the  implementation  of  the  peace  treaty. 
2.  Agreement  by  the  Israeli  Government  and  its  constitutional  institutions  to 
this  basic  principle  is  therefore  a  prerequisite  to  starting  peace  negotiations 
for  concluding  a  peace  treaty. 
3.  If  Israel  fails  to  meet  this  commitment,  the  "Framework"  shall  be  void  and 
Invalid. 
Letter  From  President  Jimmy  Carter  To  Israeli  Prime 
Xinister  Menachem  Begin,  September  22,1978 
Dear  Mr.  Prime  Minister: 
I  have  received  your  letter  of  September-  17,1978,  describing  how  you  intend  to 
place  the  question  of  the  future  of  Israeli  settlements  in  Sinai  before  the 
Knesset  for  Its  decision. 
Enclosed  Is  a  copy  of  President  Sadat's  letter  to  me  on  this  subject. 
Letter  From  Egyptian  President  Anwar  El  Sadat  To 
President  Jimmy  Carter,  September  17,1978 
Dear  Xr.  President: 475 
I  an  writing  to  you  to  reaffirm  the  position  of  the  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt  with 
respect  to  Jerusalem: 
1.  Arab  Jerusalem  is  an  integral  part  of  the  West  Bank.  Legal  and  historical 
Arab  rights  in  the  City  must  be  respected  and  restored. 
2.  Arab  Jerusalem  should  be  under  Arab  sovereignty. 
3.  The  Palestinian  inhabitants  of  Arab  Jerusalem  are  entitled  to  exercise 
their  legitimate  national  rights,  being  part  of  the  palestinian  People  In  the 
Vest  Bank. 
4.  Relevant  Security  Council  Resolutions,  particularly  Resolutions  242  and  267, 
must  be  applied  with  regard  to  Jerusalem.  All  the  measures  taken  by  Israel  to 
alter  the  status  of  the  city  are  null  and  void  and  should  be  rescinded. 
5.  All  peoples  must  have  free  access  to  the  City  and  enjoy  the  free  exercise  of 
worship  and  the  right  to  visit  and  transit  to  the  holy  places  without 
distinction  or  discrimination. 
6.  The  holy  places  of  each  faith  may  be  placed  under  the  administration  and 
control  of  their  representatives. 
7.  Essential  functions  in  the  City  should  be  undivided  and  a  joint  municipal 
council  composed  of  an  equal  number  of  Arab  and  Israeli  members  can  supervise 
the  carrying  out  of  these  functions.  In  this  way,  the  City  shall  be  undivided.  - 
Letter  From  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Menachem  Begin 
To  President  Jimmy  Carter,  September  17,1978 
Dear  Mr.  President: 
I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you,  Mr.  President,  that  on  28  June  1967  Israel's 
Parliament  (The  Knesset)  promulgated  and  adopted  a  law  to  the  effect:  "the 
Government  Is  empowered  by  a  decree  to  apply  the  law,  the  jurisdiction  and 
administration  of  the  State  to  any  part  of  Eretz  Israel  (land  of  Israel- 
Palestine)#  as  stated  in  that  decree". 
On  the  basis  of  this  law,  the  Government  of  Israel  decreed  in  July  1967  that 
Jerusalem  is  one  city  Indivisible,  the  Capital  of  the  State  of  Israel. 476 
Letter  From  President  Jimmy  Carter  To  Egyptian 
President  Anwar  El  Sadat,  September  22,1978 
Dear  Mr.  President: 
I  have  received  your  -letter  of  September  17,1978,  setting  forth  the  Egyptian 
position  an  Jerusalem.  I  am  transmitting  a  copy  of  that  letter  to  Prime  Minister 
Begin  for  his  information. 
The  position  of  the  United  States  on  Jerusalem  remains  as  stated  by 
Ambassador  Goldberg  In  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  on  July  14,1967, 
and  subsequently  by  Ambassador  Yost  in  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  on 
July  1.1989. 
Letter  From  Egyptian  President  Anwar  El  Sadat  To 
President  Jimmy  Carter,  September  17l  1978 
Dear  Mr.  President: 
In  connection  with  the  "Framework  for  Peace  in  the  Middle  East,  "  I  am  writing 
you  this  letter  to  inform  you  of  the  position  of  the  Arab  Republic  of  Egyptq 
with  respect  to  the  implementation  of  the  comprehensive  settlement. 
To  ensure  the  implementation  of  the  provisions  related  to  the  Vest  Bank  and 
Gaza  and  in  order  to  safeguard  the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people, 
Egypt  will  be  prepared  to  assume  the  Arab  role  emanating  from  these  provisions, 
following  consultations  with  Jordan  and  the  representatives  of  the  Palestinian 
people. 
Letter  From  President  Jimmy  Carter  To  Israeli  Prime 
Minister  Menachem  Begin,  September  22,1978 
Dear  Mr.  Prime  Minister: 
I  hereby  acknowledge  that  you  have  informed  me  as  follows: 
A)  In  each  paragraph  of  the  Agreed  Framework  Document  the  expressions 
"Palestinians"  or  "Palestinian  People"  are  being  and  will  be  construed  and 
understood  by  you  as  "Palestinian  Arabs.  " 
B)  In  each  paragraph  in  which  the  expression  "West  Bank"  appears,  it  is 
being,  and  will  be,  understood  by  the  Government  of  Israel  as  Judea  and  Samaria. Letter  From  Secretary  Of  Def  ense  Harold  Brown  To 
Israeli  Defense  Minister  Ezer  Veizman, 
Accompanying  The  Documents  Agreed  To  At  Camp 
David,  Released  September  29,1978 
Dear  Mr.  Minister: 
The  U.  S.  understands  that,  in  connection  with  carrying  out  the  agreements 
reached  at  Camp  David$  Israel  intends  to  build  two  military  airbases  at 
appropriate  sites  in  the  Negev  to  replace  the  airbases  at  Eitam  and  Etzion 
which  will  be  evacuated  by  Israel  in  accordance  with  the  peace  treaty  to  be 
concluded  between  Egypt  and  Israel.  We  also  understand  the  special  urgency  and 
priority  which  Israel  attaches  to  preparing  the  new  bases  in  light  of  its 
conviction  that  it  cannot  safely  leave  the  Sinai  alrbases  until  the  new  ones  are 
operatioinal. 
I  suggest  that  our  two  governments  consult  an  the  scope  of  the  two  new 
airbases  as  well  as  on  related  forms  of  assistance  which  the  United  States 
might  appropriately  provide  in  light  of  the  special  problems  which  may  be 
presented  by  carrying  out  such  a  project  on  an  urgent  basis.  The  President  is 
prepared  to  seek  the  necessary  Congressional  approvals  for  such  assistance  as 
may  be  agreed  upon  by  the  U.  S.  side  as  a  result  of  such  consultations. 478 
APIPUND  IXV 
The  Treaty  Of  Peace  Between  Egypt  And  Israel 
Washington,  March  17,1979. 
The  Government  Of  the  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt 
and  the  Government  of  the  State  of  Israel 
Preamble 
Convinced  of  the  urgent  necessity  of  the  establishment  of  a  just 
comperrhensive  and  lasting  peace  in  the  Middle  East  In  accordance  with 
Security  Council  Resolution  242  and  338. 
Reaffirming  their  adherence  to  the  Framework  for  Peace  in  the  Middle 
East  Agreed  at  Camp  David  dated  September  17,1978; 
Noting  that  the  aforementioned  Framework  as  appropriate  is  intended  to 
constitute  a  basis  for  peace  not  only  between  Egypt  and  Israel  but  also 
between  Israel  and  eacn-of  its  other  Arab  neighbors  which  is  prepared  to 
negotiate  peace  with  it  on  this  basis. 
Desiring  to  bring  to  an  end  the  state  of  war  between  them  and  to 
establish  a  peace  In  which  every  state  in  the  area  can  live  in  security; 
Convinced  that  the  conclusion  of  a  Treaty  of  Peace  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  Is  an  important  step  in  the  search  for  comprehensive  peace  in  the 
area  and  for  the  attaintment  of  the  settlement  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict  In  all  its  aspects. 
Inviting  the  other  Arab  parties  to  this  dispute  to  join  the  peace 
process  with  Israel  vuided  bv  and  based  an  the  principles  of  the 
aforementioned  Framework  ;  Desiring  as  well  TO  deveLop  friendly 
relations  and  cooperation  between  themselves  in  accordance  with  the 
United  Nations  Charter  and  the  principles  of  international  law  governing 
international  relations  in  times  of  peace;  Agree  to  the  following 
provisions  in  the  free  exercise  of  their  sovereignty,  in  order  to 
implement  the  "Framework  for  the  Conclusion  of  a  Peace  Treaty  between 
Egypt  and  Israel" 479 
Article  1 
1  The  state  of  war  between  the  parties  will  be  terminated  and  peace 
will  be  established  between  them  upon  the  exchange  of  instruments  of 
ratification  of  this  Treaty.  2-Israel  will  withdraw  all  its  armed  forces 
and  civilians  from  the  Sinai  behind  the  international  boundary  between 
Egypt  and  mandated  Palestine,  as  provided  in  the  annexed  protocol  (Annex 
1),  and  Egypt  will  resume  the  exercise  of  its  full  sovereignty  over  the 
Sinai.  3-Upon  completion  of  the  interim  withdrawal  provided  for  in  Annex 
1,  the  Parties  will  establish  normal  and  friendly  relations,  in 
accordance  with  Article  111  (3). 
Article  II 
The  permanent  boundary  between  Egypt  and  Israel  is  the  recognized 
international  boundary  between  Egypt  and  the  former  mandated  territory 
of  Palestine,  as  shown  an  the  map  at  Annex  II  without  prejudice  to  the 
issue  of  the  status  of  the  Gaza  Strip.  The  Parties  recognize  this 
boundary  as  inviolable.  Each  will  respect  the  territorial  integrity  of 
the  other,  including  their  territorial  waters  and  air  space. 
Article  III 
1-The  Parties  will  apply  between  them  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  of 
the  United  Nations  and  the  principles  of  international  law  governing 
relations  among  states  In  times  of  peace.  In  particular  a-They  recognize 
and  will  respect  each  other's  sovereigntyl  territorial  integrity  and 
political  independdence; 
b-They  recognize  and  will  respect  each  other  s  right  to  live  in  peace 
within  their  secure  and  reecognized  boundaries; 
c-They  will  refrain  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force,  directly  or 
indirectly,  against  each  other  and  will  settle  all  disputes  betweenn 
then  by  peaceful  means. 
2-Each  party  undertakes  to  ensure  that  acts  or  threats  of  belligerency, 
hostility,  or  violence  do  not  originate  from  and  are  not  committed  from 
within  its  territory,  or  any  forces  subject  to  its  control  or  by  any 
other  forces  stationed  an  its  territory,  against  the  population, 480 
citizens  or  property  of  the  other  Party.  Each  Party  also  undertakes  to 
refrain  iron  organizing,  Instigating,  inciting,  assisting  or 
participating  in  acts  or  threats  of  belligerency,  hostility,  subversion 
or  violence  against  the  other  Party,  anywhere,  and  undertakes  to  ensure 
that  perpetrators  of  such  acts  are  brought  to  justice. 
3-The  Parties  agree  that  the  normal  relationship  established  between 
them  will  include  full  recognition,  diplomatic,  economic  and  cultural 
relations,  ternination  of  economic  boycotts  and  discriminatory  barries 
to  the  free  movement  of  people  and  goods,  and  will  guarantee  the  mutual 
enjoyment  by  citizens  of  the  due  process  of  law.  Thy  process  by  which 
they  undertake  to  achieve  such  a  relationship  parallel  to  the 
implementation  of  other  provisions  of  this  Treeaty  is  set  out  in  the 
annexed  protocol  EAnnex  111  3. 
Article  IV 
1-In  order  to  provide  maximum  security  for  both  Parties  on  the  basis  of 
reciprocity,  agreed  security  arrangements  will  be  established  including 
limited  force  zones  in  Egyptian  and  Israeli  territory,  and  United 
Nations  forces  and  observers,  described  in  detail  as  to  nature  and 
timing  in  Annex  1,  and  other  security  arrangements  the  Parties  nay  agree 
upon. 
2-The  Parties  agree  to  the  stationing  of  United  Nations  personnel  in 
areas  described  in  Annex  1.  The  Parties  agree  not  to  request  withdrawal 
of  the  United  Nations  personnel  will  not  be  removed  unless  such  removal 
is  approved  by  the  Security  Council  of  the  United  Nations,  with  the 
affirmative  vote  of  the  five  Permanent  Members,  unless  the  Parties 
otherwise  agree. 
3-A  Joint  Commision  will  be  established  to  facilitate  the  implementation 
of  the  Treaty,  as  provided  for  in  Annex  1. 
4-The  security  arrangements  provided  for  in  paragraphs  1  and  2  of  this 
Article  may  at  the  request  of  either  party  be  reviewed  and  amended  by 
mutual  agreement  of  the  Parties. 
krticle  V 
1-Ships  of  Israel,  and  cargoes  destined  for  or  coming  from  Israel,  shall 
enjoy  the  right  of  free  passage  through  the  Suez  Canal  and  its 481 
approaches  through  the  Gulf  of  Suez  and  the  Mediterranean  Sea  on  the 
basis  of  the  Constantinople  Convention  of  1888,  applying  to  all  nations. 
Israeli  nationalsg  vessels  and  cargoes,  as  well  as  persons,  vessels  and 
cargoes  destined  for  or  coming  from  Israel,  shall  be  accorded 
non-discriminatory  treatment  in  all  matters  connected  with  usage  of  the 
canal. 
2-The  Parties  consider  the  Strait  of  Tiran  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  to  be 
international  waterways  open  to  all  nations  for  unimpeded  and 
non-suspendable  freedom  of  navigation  and  overflight.  The  Parties  will 
respect  each  other's  right  to  navigation  and  overflight  for  access  to 
either  country  through  the  Strait  of  Tiran.  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba. 
Article  VI 
1-This  Treaty  does  not  affect  and  shall  not  be  interpreted  as  affecting 
in  any  way  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the  Parties  under  the  Charter 
of  the  United  Nations.  2-The  Parties  undertake  to  fulfill  in  good  faith 
their  obligations  under  this  Treaty;  without  regard  to  action  or 
inaction  of  any  other  party  and  Independently  of  any  instrument  external 
to  this  Treaty. 
3-They  further  undertake  to  take  all  the  necessary  measures  for  the 
application  in  their  relations  of  the  multilateral  conventions  to  which 
they  are  parties,  including  the  submission  of  appropriate  notifaction  to 
the  Secretary  General  of  the  United  Nations  and  other  depositaries  of 
such  conventions. 
4-The  Parties  undertake  not  to  enter  into  any  obligation  in  conflict 
with  this  Treaty. 
5-Subject  to  Article  103  of  the  United  Nations  Charter,  in  the  event  of 
a  conflict  between  the  obligations  of  the  Parties  under  the  present 
Treaty  and  any  of  their  obligations,  the  obligations  under  this  Treaty 
will  be  binding  and  implemented. 
krtIcle  VII 
1-Disputes  arising  out  of  the  application  or  interpretation  of  this 
Treaty  shall  be  resolved  by  negotiations. 
2-Any  such  disputer.  which  cannot  be  settled  by  negotiations  shall  be 
resolved  by  conciliation  or  submitted  to  arbitration. 482 
Irticle  VIII 
The  Parties  agree  to  establish  a  claims  commission  for  the  mutual 
settlement  of  all  financial  claims. 
Article  II 
1-This  Treaty  shall  enter  into  force  upon  exchange  of  instruments  of 
ratifaction. 
2-This  Treatysupersedes  the  Agreement  between  Egypt  and  Israel  of 
September,  1975- 
;  -3-All  protocolst  annexes,  and  maps  attached  to  this  Treaty  shall  be 
regarded  as  an  integral  part  hereof. 
4-The  Treaty  shall  be  communited  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the  United 
Nations  for  registration  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article 
102  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations. 
Annex  I 
Protocol  Concerning  Israeli  Vithdrawal  And  Security  Arrangements 
Article  I 
Concept  of  Vithdrawal 
Urael  will  complete  withdrawal  of  all  its  armed  forces  and  civilians 
from  the  Sinai  not  later  than  three  years  from  the  date  of  exchange  of 
Instruments  of  ratifaction  of  this  Treaty. 
2-To  ensure  the  mutual  security  of  the  Parties,  theimplementation  of 
phased  withdrawal  will  be  accompanied  by  the  military  measures  and 
establishment  of  zones  set  out  in  this  Annex  and  In  Map  1,  hereinafter 
referred  to  as  %the  Zones'. 
3-The  withdrawal  from  the  Sinai  will  be  accomplished  In  two  phases; 
a.  The  Interim  withdrawal  behind  the  line  from  east  of  ElArish  to  Ras 
Xuhammed  as  delineated  on  Nap  2  within  nine  months  from  the  date  of 
exchange  of  instruments  of  ratifaction  of  this  Treaty. 
b.  The  final  withdrawal  from  the  Sinai  behind  the  international 
boundary  not  later  than  three  years  from  the  date  of  exchange  of 
instruments  of  ratifaction  of  this  Treaty. 
4-A  Joint  Commission  will  be  formed  immediately  after  the  exchange  of 
Instruments  of  ratifaction  of  this  Treaty  in  order  to  supervise  and 
coordinate  movements  and  schedules  during  the  withdrawal,  and  to  adjust 483 
plans  and  timetables  as  necessary  within  the  limits  established  by 
paragraph  3,  above.  Details  relating  to  the  Joint  Commision  are  set  out 
in  Article  IV  of  the  attached  Appendix.  The  Joint  Commission  will  be 
dissolved  upon  completion  of  final  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  Sinai. 
krticle  II 
Determination  of  Final  Lines  and  Zones 
1-In-order  to  provide  maximum  security  for  both  Parties  after  the  final 
withdrawal@  the  lines  and  the  Zones  delineated  an  Mapl  are  to  be 
established  and  organized  as  follows: 
a.  Zone  A 
(1)  Zone  A  is  bounded  an  the  east  by  line  A(  red  line  )  and  on 
the  west  by  the  Suez  Canal  and  the  east  coast  of  the  Gulf  of 
Suez,  as  shown  an  -Map  1. 
(2)  An  Egyptian  armed  force  of  one  mechanized  infantry  division 
and  its  military  installations  and  field  fortifactions,  will  be 
in  this  Zone. 
MThe  main  elements  of  that  Division  will  consist  of:  (a)  Three 
mechanized  infantry  brigades. 
(b)  one  armed  brigade. 
(c)  Seven  field  artillery  battalions  including  up  to  126  artillery 
pieces. 
(d)  Seven  anti-aircraft  artillery  battalions  including  individual's 
urface-to-air  missiles  and  up  to  126  anti-aircraft  guns  of  37  mm  and 
above. 
(e)  Up  to  230  tanks. 
(f)  Up,  to  480  armored  personnel  vehicles  of  all  types. 
(g)  Up  to  a  total  of  twenty-two  thousand  personnel. 
b;  Zone.  B 
(1)  Zone  B  is  bounded  by  line  B  (green-line)  an  the  east  and  by 
line  A  (red  line)  an  the  west,  as  shown  on  Map  1. 
(2)  Egyptian  border  units  of  four  battalions  equipped  with  light 
weapons  and  wheeled  vehicles  will  provide  security  and  supplement 
the  civil-  police  in  maintaining  order  in  Zone  B.  The  main  elements 
of  the  four  Border  Battalions  will  consist  of  up  to  a  total  of  four 
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(3)  Land  based#  short  range,  low  powerg  coastal  warning  points  of 
the  border  patrol  units  may  be  established  an  the  coast  of  this 
Zone. 
WThere  will  be  in  Zone  B  field  fortifactions  and  military 
installations  for  the  four  border  battalions. 
c.  Zone  C 
(1)  Zone  C  is  boundered  by  line  B(green  line)  an  the  west  and  the 
International  Boundary  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  on  the  east,  as  shown  on 
Map  1. 
(2)  only  United  Nations  forces  and  Egyptian  civil  police  will  be 
stationed  in  Zone  C. 
(3)  The  Egyptian  civil  police  armed  with  light  weapons  will  perform 
normal  police  functions  within  this  Zone. 
(4)  The  United  Nations  Force  will  be  deplored  within  Zone  C  and  perform 
its  functions  as  defined  in  Article  VI  of  this  Annex. 
(5)  The  United  Nations  Force  will  be  stationed  mainly  in  camps  located 
within  the  following  stationing  areas  shown  on  Mapl,  and  will  establish 
its  precise  locations  after  consultations  with  Egypt  :  (a)  In  that  part 
of  the  area  in  the  Sinai  lying  within  about  20  Km.  of  the  Xediterranean 
Sea  and  adjacent  to  the  International  Boundary. 
W  In  the  Sharm  el  Sheikh  area. 
d.  Zone  D 
(1)  Zone  D  is  bounded  by  line  D  (blue  line)  on  the  east  and  the 
international  boundary  on  the  west,  as  shown  an  Mapl. 
(2)  In  this  Zone  there  will  be  an  Israeli  limited  force  of  four 
infantry  battalionso  their,  military  installations,  and  field 
fortifactionst  the  United  Nations  observers. 
(3)  The  Israeli  forces  in  Zone  D  will  not  include  tanks,  artillery  and 
anti-aircraft  missiles  except  individual  surface-to-air  missiles. 
(4)  The  main  elements  of  the  four  Israeli  infantry  battalions  will 
consist  of  up  to  180  armored  personnel  vehicles  of  all  types  and  up  to  a 
total  of  four  thousand  personnel. 
2.  Access  across  the  international  boundary  shall  only  be  permitted 
through  entry  check  points  designated  by  each  Party  and  under  its 
control.  Such  access  shall  be  in  accordance  with  laws  and  regulations  of 
each  country. 485 
3.  Only  those  field  fortificationst  military  installationa,  forcest  and 
weapons  specifically  permitted  by  this  Annex  shall  be  in  the  Zones. 
Article  III 
Aerial  Xilitary  Regine 
1.  Flights  of  combat  aircraft  and  reconnaisance  flights  of  Egypt  and 
Israel  shall  take  place  only  over  Zones  Aand  D,  respectively. 
2.  Only  unarmed,  non-combat  aircraft  of  Egypt  and  Israel  will  be 
stationed  in  Zones  A  and  D,  respectively. 
3.  only  Egyptian  unarmed  transport  aircraft  will  take  off  and  land  in 
Zone  B  and  up  to  eight  such  aircraft  may  maintained  in  Zone  B.  The 
Egyptian  border  units  may  be  equipped  with  unarmed  helicopters  to 
perform  their  functions  in  Zone  B. 
4.  The  Egyptian  civil  police  may  be  equipped  with  unarmed  police 
helicopters  to  perform  normal  police  functions  in  Zone  C. 
5.  Only  civilian  airfields  may  be  built  in  the  Zones. 
6.  'Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  this  Treaty,  only  those 
military  aerial  activities  specifically  permitted  by  this  Annex  shall  be 
allowed  in  the  Zones  and  the  airspace  above  their  territorial  waters. 
Article  IV 
Naval  Regime 
1.  Egypt  and  Israel  may  base  and  operate  naval  vessels  along  the  coasts 
of  Zones  A  and  D,  respectively. 
2.  Egyptian  coast  guard  boats,  lightly  armed,  may  be  stationed  and 
operate  in  the  territorial  waters  of  Zone  B  to  assist  the  border  units 
in  performing  their  functions  in  this  Zone. 
3.  Egyptian  civil  police  equipped  with  light  boats,  lightly  armedo 
shall  perform  normal  police  functions  within  the  territorial  waters  of 
Zone  C. 
4.  Nothing  in  this  Annex  shall  be  considered  as  derogating  from  the 
right  of  innocent  passage  of  the  naval  vessels  of  either  party. 
5.  only  civilian  maritime  ports  and  installations  may  be  built  in  the 
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6.  Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  this  Treaty,  only  those  naval 
activities  specifically  permitted  by  this  Annex  shall  be  allowed  in  the 
Zones  and  in  their  territorial  waters. 
Article  V 
Early  Varning  Syste=B 
Egypt  and  Israel  may  establish  and  operate  early  warning  systems  only  in 
Zones  A  and  D  respectively. 
Article  VI 
United  Nations  Operations 
1.  The  Parties  will  requst  the  United  Nations  to  provide  forces  and 
observers  to  supervise  the  implementation  of  this  Annex  and  employ  their 
best  efforts  to  prevent  any  violation  of  its  terms. 
2  Vith  respect  to  these  United  Nations  forces  and  observers,  as 
appropriate#  the  Parties  agree  to  request  the  following  arrangements: 
a.  operation  of  check  pointsl  reconnaissance  patrols#  and  observation 
posts  along  the  international  boundary  and  line  B,  and  within  Zone  C. 
b.  Periodic  verification  of  the  implementation  of  the  provisions  of 
this  Annex  will  be  carried  out  not  less  than  twice  a  month  unless 
otherwise  agreed  by  the  Parties. 
c.  Additional  verifications  within  48  hours  after  the  receipt  of  a 
request  from  either  Party. 
d.  Ensuring  the  freedom  of  navigation  through  the  Strait  of  Tiran  in 
accordance  with  Article  V  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace. 
3.  The  arrangements  described  in  this  article  for  each  zone  will  be 
implemented  in  Zones  At  B,  and  C  by  the  United  Nations  Force  and  in  Zone 
D  by  the  United  Nations  Observers. 
4.  United  Nations  verification  teams  shall  be  accompanied  by  liaison 
officers  of  the  respective  Party. 
5.  The  United  Nations  Force  and  observers  will  report  their  findings  to 
both  Parties. 
6.  The  United  Nations  Force  and  Observers  operationg  in  the  Zones  will 
enjoy  freedom  of  movement  and  other  facilities  necessary  for  the 
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7.  The  United  Nations  Force  and  Observers  are  not  empowered  to 
authorize  the  crossing  of  the  international  boundary. 
- 
13.  The  Parties 
shall  agree  on  the  nations  from  which  the  United  Nations  Force  and 
Observers  will  be  drawn.  They  will  be  drawn  from  nations  other  than 
those  which  are  permanent  members  of  the  United  Nations  Security 
council. 
9.  The  Parties  agree  that  the  United  Nations  should  make  those  command 
arrangements  that  will  best  assure  the  effective  implementation  of  its 
responsibilities. 
Article  VII 
Liaison  Systen 
Upon  dissolution  of  the  Joint  Commision,  aliaison  system  between  the 
Parties  will  be  established.  This  liaison  system  is  intended  to  provide 
an  effective  method  to  asses  progress  in  the  implementation  of 
obligations  under  the  present  Annex  and  to  resolve  any  problem  that  may 
arise  in  the  course  of  implementation,  and  refer  other  unresolved 
matters  to  the  higher  military  authorities  of  the  two  countries 
respectively  for  consideration.  It  is  also  intended  to  prevent 
situations  resulting  from  errors  or  misinterpretation  on  the  part  of 
either  Party. 
2.  An  Egyptian  liaison  office  will  be  established  in  the  city  of 
El-Arish  and  an  Israeli  liaison  office  will  be  established  in  the  city 
of  Beer-Sheba.  Each  office  will  be  headed  by  an  officer  of  the 
respective  country,  and  assisted  by  a  number  of  officers. 
3.  A  direct  telephone  link  between  the  two  offices  will  be  set  up  and 
also  direct  telophone  lines  with  the  United  Nations  command  will  be 
maintained  by  both  offices. 
Irticle  VIII 
Respect  For  Var  Menorials 
Each  Party  undertakes  to  preserve  in  good  condition  the  War  Memorials 
erected  in  the  memory  of  soldiers  of  the  other  Party,  namely  those 
erected  by  Israel  in  the  Sinai  and  those  erected  by  Egypt  in  Israel,  and 
shall  permit  access  to  such  monuments.. 488 
krticle  Il 
Interim  Arrangements 
The  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces  and  Civilians  behind  the  interim 
withdrawal  line,  and  the  conduct  of  the  forces  of  the  Parties  and  the 
United  Nations  prior  to  the  final  withdrawal,  will  be  governed  by  the 
attached  Appendix  and  Maps  2  and  3. 
Appendix  To  Annex  I 
Organization  of  Novenents  in  the  Sinai 
Article  I 
Principles  of  Vithdrawal 
1.  The  withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces  and  civilians  from  the  Sinai  will  be 
accomplished  in  two  phases  as  described  in  Article  1  of  Annex  1.  The 
description  and  timing  of  the  withdrawal  are  included  in  this  Appendix. 
The  joint  Commision  will  develop  and  present  to  the  Chief  Coordinator  of 
the  United  Nations  forces  in  the  Middle  East  the  details  of  these  phases 
not  later  than  one  month  before  the  initation  of  each  phase  of 
withdrawal. 
2.  Both  Parties  agree  on  the  following  principles  for  the  sequence  of 
military  movements. 
a.  Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  Article  1X,  paragraph  2j  of 
this  Treaty,  until  Israeli  armed  forces  complete  withdrawal  from  the 
current  J  and  M  Lines  established  by  the  Egyptian-  Israeli  Agreement 
of  September  1975,  hereinafter  reffered  to  as  the  1975  Agreement,  up 
to  the  interim  withdrawal  line,  all  military  arrangements  existing 
under  that  Agreement  will  remain  in  effect,  except  those  military 
arrangements  otherwise  provided  for  in  this  Appendix. 
b.  As  Israeli  armed  forces  withdraw.  United  Natians  foreas  will 
immediately  enter  the  evacuated  areas  to  establish  interim  and 
temporary  buffer  zones  as  shown  on  Maps  2  and  3,  respectively,  for 
the  purpose  of  maintaining  a  seperation  of  forces.  United  Nations 
forces  deployment  will  precede  the  movement  of  any  other  personnel 
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c.  Within  a  period  of  seven  days  after  Israeli  armed  forces  have. 
evacuated  any  area  located  in  Zone  A,  units  of  Egyptian  armed  forces 
shall  deploy  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Artivle  II  of  this 
Appendix.  ' 
d.  Within  a  period  of  seven  days  after  Israeli  armed  forces  have 
evacuated  any  area  located  in  Zone  A  or  B,  Egyptian  border  units 
shall  deploy  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  II  of  this 
Appendix,  and  will  function  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
Article  II  of  Annex  I.  e.  Egyptian  civil  police  will  enter  evacuated 
areas  immediately  after  the  United  Nations  forces  to  perform  normal 
police  functions. 
f.  Egyptian  naval  units  shall  deploy  in  the  Gulf  of  Suez  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  II  of  this  Appendix. 
g.  Except  those  movements  mentioned  abovet  deployments  of  Egyptian 
armed  forces  and  the  activities  covered  in  Annex  I  will  be  effected 
In  the  evacuated  areas  when  Israeli  armed  forces  have  completed 
their  withdrawal  behind  the  interim  withdrawal  line. 
Article  II 
Subphases  of  the  Withdrawal  to  the  Interfis  Withdrawal  Line 
1.  The  withdrawal  to  the  interim  withdrawal  line  will  be  accomplished 
in  subphases  as  described  in  this  Article  and  as  shown  an  Map  3.  Each 
subphase  will  be  completed  within  the  indicated  number  of  months  from 
the  date  of  the  exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification  of  this  Treaty. 
a.  First  subphase:  within  two  months,  Israeli  armed  forces  will 
withdraw  from  the  area  of  El  Arish,  including  the  town  of  El  Arish 
and  its  airfieldo  shown  as  Area  1  on  Map  3. 
b.  Second  subphase:  within  three  monthsl  Israeli  armed  forces  will 
withdraw  from  the  area  between  line  M  of  the  1975  Agreement  and  line 
A,  shown  as  Area  II  an  Map  3. 
c.  Third  subphase.  -  within  five  months,  Israeli  armed  forces  will 
withdraw  from  the  areas  east  and  south  of  Area  III  shown  as  Area  III 
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d.  Fourth  subphase:  within  seven  monthei  Israeli  armed  forces  will 
withdraw  from  the  area  of  El  Tor-Ras  El  Kenisa,  shown  as  Area  IV  on 
Map  3. 
e.  Fifth  subphase:  within  nine  months,  Israeli  armed  forces  will 
withdraw  from  the  remaining  areas  west  of  the  interim  withdrawal 
line,  including  the  areas  of  Santa  Katrina  and  the  areas  east  of  the 
Giddi  and  Mitla  passes,  shown  as  Area  V  an  Map  3,  thereby  completing 
Israeli  withdrawal  behind  the  interim  withdrawal  line. 
2.  Egyptian  forces  will  deploy  in  the  areas  evacuated  by  Israeli  armed 
forces  as  follows: 
a.  Up  to  one-third  of  the  Egyptian  armed  forces  in  the  Sinai  in 
accordance  with  the  1975  Agreement  will  deploy  in  the  portions  of 
Zone  A  lying  within  Area  I,  untill  the  completion  of  interim 
withdrawal.  Thereafter,  Egyptian  armed  forces  as  described  in 
Article  II  of  Annex  I  will  be  deployed  in  Zone  A  up  to  the  limits  of 
the  interim  buffer  zone. 
b.  The  Egyptian  naval  activity  in  accordance  with  Article  IV  of 
Annex  I  will  commence  along  the  coasts  of  Areas  II,  III,  and  IV, 
upon  completion  of  the  second,  third,  and  fourth  subphases, 
respectively. 
c.  Of  the  Egyptian  border  units  described  in  Article  II  of  Annex  I, 
upon  completion  of  the  first  subpbase  one  battalion  will  be  deployed 
in  Area  I.  A  second  battalion  will  be  deployed  in  Area  II  upon 
completion  of  the  second  subphase.  A  third  battalion  will  be 
deployed  in  Area  III  upon  completion  of  the  third  subphase.  The 
second  and  third  battalions  mentioned  above  may  also  be  deployed  in 
any  of  the  subsequently  evacuated  areas  of  the  southern  Sinai. 
3.  United  Nations  forces  in  Buffer  Zone  I  of  the  1975  Agreement  will 
redoplay  to  enable  the  deployment  of  Egyptian  forces  described  above 
upon  the  completion  of  the  first  subphaseo  but  will  otherwise  continue 
to  function  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  that  Agreement  in  the 
remainder  of  that  zone  until  the  completion  of  interim  withdrawal,  as 
indicated  in  Article  I  of  this  Appendix. 
4.  Israeli  convoys  may  use  the  roads  south  and  east  of  the  main  road 
junction  east  of  El  Arish  to  evacuate  Israeli  forces  and  equipment  up  to 
the  completion  of  interim  withdrawal.  These  convoys  will  proceed  in 491 
daylight  upon  four  hours  notice  to  the  Egyptian  liaison  group  and  United 
Nations  forces,  will  be  escorted  by  United  Nations  forces,  and  will  be 
in  accordance  with  schedules  coordinated  by  the  Joint  Commision.  An 
Egyptian  liaison  officer  will  accompany  convoys  to  assure  un  interrupted 
movement.  The  Joint  Commision  may  approve  other  arrangements  for 
convoys. 
Article  III 
United  Nations  Forces 
1.  The  Parties  shall  request  that  United  Nations  forces  be  deployed  as 
necessary  to  perform  the  functions  described  In  this  Appendix  up  to  the 
time  of,  completion  of  final  Israeli  withdrawal.  For  that  purpose,  the 
Parties  agree  to  the  redoployment  of  the  United  Nations  Emergency  Force. 
2.  United  Nations  forces  will  supervise  the  implementation  of  this 
Appendix  and  will  employ  their  best  efforts  to  prevent  any  violation  of 
its  terms. 
3.  Vhen  United  Nations  forces  deploy  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  Articles  I  and  II  of  this  Appendix,  they  will  perform  the  functions 
of  verification  in  limited  force  zones  in  accordance  with  Article  VI  of 
Annex  I,  and  will  establish  check  points,  reconnaissance  patrols,  and 
observation  posts  in  the  temporary  buffer  zones  described  in  Article  II 
above.  Other  functions  of  the  United  Nations  forces  which  concern  the 
interim  buffer  zone  are  described  in  Article  V  of  this  Appendix. 
Article  IV 
Joint  Commision  and  Liaison 
1.  The  Joint  Commision  referred  to  in  Article  IV  of  this  Treaty  will 
function  from  the  date  of  exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification  of 
this  Treaty  up  to  the  date  of  completion  of  final  Israeli  withdrawal 
from  the  Sinaai. 
2.  The  Joint  Commision  will  be  composed  of  representatives  of  each 
Party  headed  by  senior  officers.  This  Commision  shall  invite  a 
representative  of  the  United  Nations  when  discussing  subjects  concerning 
the  United  Nations,  or  when  either  Party  requests  United  Nations 
presence.  Decisions  of  the  Joint  Commision  will  be  reached  by  agreement 
of  Egypt  and  Israel. 492 
3.  The  Joint  Commision  will  supervise  the  implementation  of  the 
arrangements  described  in  Annex  II  and  this  Appendix.  To  this  end,  and 
by  agreement  of  both  Parties,  it  will: 
a.  coordinate  military  movements  described  in  this  Appendix  and 
supervise  their  implementation; 
b.  address  and  seek  to  resolve  any  problem  arising  out  of  the 
implementation  of  Annex  I  and  this  Appendix,  and  discuss  any 
violations  reported  by  the  United  Nations  Force  and  Observers  and 
refer  to  the  Governments  of  Egypt  and  Israel  any  unresolved 
problems; 
c.  assist  the  United  Nations  Force  and  Observers  in  the  execution 
of  their  mandates,  and  deal  with  the  timetable  of  the  periodic 
verifications  when  referred  to  it  by  the  Parties  as  provided  for  in 
Annex  I  and  in  this  Appendix; 
d.  organize  the  demarcation  of  the  international  boundary  and  all 
'lines  and  zones  described  in  Annex  I  and  this  Appendix; 
e.  supervise  the  handing  over  of  the  main  installation  in  the  Sinai 
from  Israel  to  Egypt; 
f.  agree  on  necessary  arrangements  for  finding  and  returning 
missing  bodies  of  Egyptian  and  Israeli  soldiers; 
g.  organize  the  setting  up  and  operation  of  entry  check  points 
along  the  El  Arish-Ras  Muhammed  line  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  Article  4  of  Annex  III; 
h.  conduct  its  operations  through  the  use  of  Joint  liaison  teams 
consisting  of  one  Israeli  representative  and  one  Egyptian 
representative,  provided  from  a  standing  Liaison  Groupt  which  will 
conduct  activities  as  directed  by  the  Joint  Commision; 
i.  provide  liaison  and  coordination  to  the  United  Nations  command 
implementing  provisions  of  the  Treatyl  and,  through  the  joint 
liaison  teams,  maintain  local  coordination  with  the  United  Nations 
Force  stationed  in  specific  areas  or  United  Nations  Observers 
monitoring  specific  areas  for  any  assistance  as  needed; 
J.  discuss  any  other  matters  which  the  Parties  by  agreement  may 
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4.  Meeting  of  the  Joint  Commission  shall  be  held  at  least  once  a  month. 
In  the  event  that  either  Party  or  the  Command  of  the  United  Nations 
Force  requests  a  special  meeting,  it  will  be  convened  within  24  hours. 
5.  The  Joint  Commision  will  meet  in  the  buffer  zone  until  the  completion 
of  the  Interim  withdrawal  and  in  El  Arish  and  Beer-Sheba  alternately 
afterwards.  The  first  meeting  will  be  held  not  later  than  two  weeis 
after  the  entry  into  force  of  this  Treaty. 
Article  V 
Definition  of  the  Interim  Buffer  Zone  and  Its 
Activities 
1.  An  interim  buffer  zone,  by  which  the  United  Nations  Force  will 
effect  a  separation  of  Egyptian  and  Israeli  elements,  will  be 
established  west  of  and  adjacent  to  the  interim  withdrawal  line  as  shown 
on  Map  2  after  implementation  of  Israeli  withdrawal  and  deployment 
behind  the  interim  withdrawal  line.  Egyptian  civil  police  equipped  with 
light  weapons  will  perform  normal  police  functions  within  this  zone. 
2.  The  United  Nations  Force  will  operate  check  points,  reconnaissance 
patrols,  and  observation  posts  within  the  Interim  buffer  zone  in  order 
to  ensure  compliance  with  the  terms  of  this  Article. 
3.  In  accordance  with  arrangements  agreed  upon  by  both  Parties  and  to 
be  coordinated  by  the  Joint  Commision,  Israeli  personnel  will  operate 
military  technical  installations  at  four  specific  locations  shown  an  Map 
2  and  designated  as  Mmap  central  coordinate  57163940),  T2  (map  central 
coordinate  59351541)l  T3  (map  central  coordinate  59331527)l  and  T4  (map 
central  cordinate  61130979)  under  the  following  principles: 
a.  The  technical  installatias  shall  be  manned  by  technical  and 
administrative  personnel  equipped  with  small  arms  required  for  their 
protection  (revolvers,  rifles,  sub-machine  gunst  light  machine  guns 
hand  grenades,  and  ammunition),  as  follows: 
T1-up  to  150  personnel 
T2and  T3-up  to  350  personnel 
T4-up  to  200  personnel 
b.  Israeli  personnel  will  not  carry  weapons  outside  the  sites, 
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c.  Only  a  third  party  agreed  to  by  Egypt  and  Israel  will  enter  and 
conduct  inspections  within  the  perimeters  of  technical  installations 
in  the  buffer  zone.  The  third  party  will  conduct  inspections  in  a 
random  manner  at  least  once  a  month.  The  inspections  will  verify  the 
nature  of  the  operation  of  the  installatias  and  the  weapons  and 
personnel  therein.  The  third  party  will  in  diately  report  to  the 
Parties  any  divergence  from  an  installations  visual  and  electronic 
surveillance  or  communicatkons  role.  d.  Supply  6f  the  installations, 
visits  for  technical  and  administrative  purposes,  and  replacement  of 
personnel  and  equipment  situated  in  the  sites,  may  occur 
uninterrruptedly  from  the  United  Nations  check  points  to  the 
perimeter  of  the  technical  installations,  after  checking  and  being 
escorted  by  only  the  United  Nations  forces. 
e.  Israel  will  be  permitted  to  introduce  into  its  technical 
installations  items  required  for  the  proper  functioning  of  the 
installations  and  personnel. 
f.  As  detrmined  by  the  Joint  Commision,  Israel  will  be  permitted  to: 
(1)  Maintain  in  its  installations  fire-fighting  and  general 
maintenance  equipment  as  well  as  wheeled  administrative  vehicles 
and  mobile  engineering  equipment  necessary  for  the  maintenance 
of  the  sites.  All  vehicles  shall  be  unarmed. 
(2)  Within  the  sites  and  in  the  buffer  zone,  maintain  roads, 
water  lines,  and  communications  cables  which  serve  the  sites.  At 
each  of  the  three  installation  locations  (Tl,  T2  and  T3,  and 
T4),  this  maintenance  may  be  performed  with  up  to  two  unarmed 
wheeled  vehicles  and  by  up  to  twelve  unarmed  personnel  with  only 
necessary  equipment,  including  heavy  engineering  equipment  if 
needed.  This  maintenance  may  be  performed  three  times  a  weeko 
except  for  special  problems,  and  only  after  giving  the  United 
Nations  four  hours  notice.  The  teams  will  be  escorted  by  the 
United  Nations. 
g.  Movement  to  and  from  the  technical  installations  will  take  place 
only  during  daylight  hours.  Access  to,  and  exit  from,  the  technical 
installations  shall  be  as  follows: 495 
(1)  T1:  through  a  United  Nations  check  point,  and  ViB  the  road 
between  Abu  Aweigila  road  and  the  Gebel  Libni  road  (at  Km.  161), 
as  shown  on  Map  2. 
(2)  T2  and  T3.,  through  a  United  Nations  checkpoint  and  via  the 
road  constructed  across  the  buffer  zone  to  Gebel  Katrina,  as 
shown  an  Map  2. 
(3)  T2,  T3,  and-T4:  via  helicopters  flying  within  a  corridor  at 
the  times,  and  according  to  a  flight  profilej  agreed  to  by  the 
Joint  Commision.  The  helicopters  will  be  checked  by  the  United 
Nations  Force  at  landing  sites  outside  the  perimeter  of  the 
installations. 
h.  Israel  will  inform  the  United  Nations  Force  at  least  one  hour  in 
advance  of  each  intended  movement  to  and  from  the  installations. 
i.  Israel  shall  be  entitled  to  evacuate  sick  and  wounded  and  summon 
medical  experts  and  medical  teams  at'any  time  after  giving  immediate 
notice  to  the  United  Nations  Force. 
4.  The  details  of  the  above  principles  and  all  other  matters  in  this 
Article  requiring  coordination  by  the  Parties  will  be  handled  by  the 
Joint  Commision. 
5.  These  technical  installations  will  be  withdrawn  when  Israeli  forces 
withdraw  from  the  interim  withdrawal  line,  or  at  a  time  agreed  by  the 
Parties. 496 
krticle  VI 
Dispcoition,  of  Installations  and  Xilitary  Barriers 
Dispositions  of  installations  and  military  barriers  will  be  determined 
by  the  Parties  in  accordance  the  following  guidelines: 
1.  Up  to  three  weeks  before  Israeli  withdrawal  from  any  area,  the  Joint 
Commision  will  arrange  for  Israeli  and  Egyptian  liaison  and  technical 
teams  to  conduct  a  Joint  inspection  of  all  appropriate  installations  to 
agree  upon  condition  of  structures  and  ariicles  which  will  be 
transferred  to  Egyptian  control  and  to  arrange  for  such  transfer.  Israel 
will  declarel  at  that  time,  its  plans  for  disposition  of  installations 
and  articles  within  the  installations. 
2.  Israel  undertakes  to  transfer  to  Egypt  all  agreed  infrastructure, 
utilities,  and  installations  intact,  inter  alia,  airfields,  roads, 
pumping  stations#  and  ports.  Israel  will  present  to  Egypt  the 
information  necessary  for  the  maintenance  and  operation  of  these 
facilities.  Egyptian  technical  teams  will  be  permitted  to  observe  and 
familiarize  themselves  with  the  operation  of  these  facilities  for  a 
period  of  up  to  two  weeks  prior  to  transfer. 
3.  Vhen  Israel  relinquishes  Israeli  military  water  points  near  El  Arish 
and  El  Tor,  Egyptian  technical  teams  will  assume  control  of  those 
installations  and-  ancillary  equipment  in  accordance  with  an  orderly 
transfer  process  arranged  beforehand  by  the  Joint  Commision.  Egypt 
undertakesýto  continue  to  make  available  at  all  water  supply  points  the 
normal  quantity  of  currently  available  water  up  to  the  time  Israel 
withdraws  behind  the  international  boundary,  unless  otherwise  agreed  in 
the  Joint  Commision. 
4.  Israel  will  make  its  best  effort  to  remove  or  destroy  all  military 
barriers,  including  obstacles  and  minefieldst  in  the  araes  and  adjacent 
waters  from  which  it  withdraws,  according  to  the  following  concept: 
a.  Military  barriers  will  be  cleared  first  from  areas  near 
populations,  roads,  and  major  installations  and  utilities. 
b.  For  these  obstacles  and  minefields  which  cannot  be  removed  or 
destroyed  prior  to  Israeli  withdrawal,  Israel  will  provide  detailed 
naps  to  Egypt  and  the  United  Nations  through  the  Joint  Commision  not 497 
later  than  15  days  before  entry  of  United  Nations  forces  into  the 
affected  areas. 
c.  Egyptian  military  engineers  will  enter  those  areas  after  United 
Nations  forces  enter  to  conduct  barrier  clearance  operations  in 
accordance  with  Egyptian  plans  to  be  submitted  prior  to 
implementation. 
Article  VII 
Surveillance  Activities 
1,  Aerial  surveillance  activities  during  the  withdrawal  will  be  carried 
out  as  follows: 
a.  Both  Parties  request  the  United  States  to  continue  airborne 
surveillance  flights  in  accordance  with  previous  agreements  untill 
the  completion  of  final  Israeli  withdrawal. 
b.  'Flight  profiles  will  cover  the  Limited  Farces  Zones  to  monitor 
the  limi  tations  on  forces  and  armaments,  and  to  detrimine  that 
Israeli  armed  forces  have  withdrawn  from  the  areas  described  in 
Article  II  of  Annex  I,  Article  II  of  this  Appendixt  and  Maps  2  and 
3,  and  that  these  forces  thereafter  remain  behind  their  lines. 
Special  inspection  flights  may  be  flown  at  the  request  of  either 
Party  or  of  the  United  Nations. 
c.  Only  the  main  elements  in  the  military  organizations  of  each 
Party,  as  described  in  Annex  I  and  in  this  Appendixt  will  be 
reported. 
2.  Both  Parties  request  the  United  States  operated  Sinai  Field  Mission 
to  continue  its  operations  in  accordance  with  previos  agreements  until 
completion  of  the  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  area  east  of  the  Giddi  and 
Mitla  Passes.  Thereafter,  the  Mission  will  be  terminated. 
Article  VIII 
Exercise  of  Egyptian  Sovereignty 
Egypt  will  resume  the  exercise  of  its  full  sovereignty  over  evacuated 
parts  of  the  Sinai  upon  Israeli  withdrawal  as  provided  for  in  Article  I 
of  this  Treaty. 498 
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JOINT  LETTER  TO  PRESIDENT  CARTER  FROM  PRESIDENT  SADAT  AND 
PRIME  MINISTER  BEGINXrch  26,1979 
Dear  Mr.  President: 
This  letter  confirms  that  Egypt  and  Israel  have  agreed  as  follows: 
The  Goverments  of  Egypt  and  Israel  recall  that  they  concluded  at  Camp 
David  and  signed  at  the  Vhite  House  on  September  17,1978,  the  annexed 
documents  entitled  "A  Framework  for  Peace  in  the  Middle  East  Agreed  at 
Camp  David*  and  "Framework  for  the  conclusion  of  a  Peace  Treaty  between 
Egypt  and  Israel.  " 
For  the  purpose  of  achieving  a  comprehensive  peace  settlement  in 
accordance  with  the  above  mentioned  Frameworks,  Egypt  and  Israel  will 
proceed  with  the  implementation  of  those  provisions  relating  to  the  Vest 
Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip.  They  have  agreed  to  start  negotiations  within  a 
month  after  the  exchange  of  the  instruments  of  ratifaction  of  the  Peace 
Treaty.  In  accordance  with  the  "Framework  for  Peace  in  the  Middle  East,  " 
the  Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan  is  invited  to  join  the  negotiations.  The 
Delegations  of  Egypt  and  Jordan  may  include  Palestinians  from  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  or  other  Palestinians  as  mutually  agreed.  The 
purpose  of  the  negotiation  shall  be  to  agree,  prior  to  the  elections,  an 
the  modalities  for  establishing  the  elected  self-governing  authority 
(administrative  council),  define  its  powers  and  responsibilities,  and 
agree  upon  other  related  issues.  In  the  event  Jordan  decides  not  to  take 
part  in  the  negotiations,  the  negotiations  will  be  held  by  Egypt  and 
Israel. 
The  two  Governments  agree  to  negotiate  continuously  and  in  good  faith 
to  conclude  these  negotiations  at  the  earliest  possible  date.  They  also 
agree  that  the  objective  of  the  negotiations  is  the  establishment  of  the 
self-governing  authority  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  in  order  to  provide 
full  autonomy  to  the  inhabitants. 
Egypt  and  Israel  set  for  themselves  the  goal  of  completing  the 
negotiations  within  one  year  so  that  elections  will  be  held  as 
expeditiously  as  possible  after  agreement  has  been  reached  between  the 
parties.  The  self-governing  authority  referred  to  in  the  "Framework  for 
Peace  in  the  Middle  East"  will  be  established  and  inagurated  within  one 
month  after  it  has  been  elected,  at  which  time  the  transitional  period 
of  five  years  will  begin.  The  Israeli  military  government  and  Its 502 
civilian  administration  will  be  withdrawn,  to  be  replaced  by  the 
self-governing  authority,  as  specified  in  the  "Framework  for  Peace  in 
the  Middle  East.  "  A  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces  will  then  take 
place  and  there  will  be  a  redeployment  of  the  remaining  Israeli  forces 
into  specified  security  locations. 
This  letter  also  confirms  our  understanding  that  the  United  States 
Government  will  participate  fully  in  all  stages  of  negotiations. 
Explanatory  Note 
President  Carter,  upon  receipt  of  the  Joint  Letter  to  him  from  President 
Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin,  has  added  to  the  American  and  Israeli 
copies  the  notion:  "I-have  been  informed  that  the  expression  "West  Bank" 
is  understood  by  the  Government  of  Israel  to  mean  "Judea  and  Samaria". 
This  notation  is  in  accordance  with  similar  procedures  established  at 
Camp  David. 
LETTERS  REGARDING  EXCHANGE  OF  AMBASSADORS 
Karch  26,1979 
Dear  Xr.  President: 
In  response  to-  your  request,  I  can  confirm  that,  within  one  month 
after  the  completion  of  Israel  s  withdrawal  to  the  interim  line  as 
provided  for  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  Egypt  will 
send  a  resident  ambassador  to  Israel  and  will  recieve  a  resident  Israeli 
ambassador  in  Egypt. 
Sincerely, 
Anwar  El-Sadat 
March  26,1979 
Dear  Mr.  Prime  Minister: 
I  have  received  a  letter  from  President  Sadat  that,  within  one  month 
after  Israel  completes  its  withdrawal  to  the  interim  line  In  Sinai,  as 
provided  for  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  Egypt  will 503 
send  a  resident  ambassador  to  Israel  and  will  receive  in  Egypt  a 
resident  Israeli  ambassador. 
I  would  be  grateful  if  you  will  confirm  that  this  procedure  will  be 
agreeable  to  the  Government  of  Israel. 
Sincerely 
JIXXY  CARTER APP:  ENDIX  VI 
Government  of  Egypt  Proposed  Model  of  Full 
Autonomy  For  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip, 
28  January,  1980 
1-Introduction 
(a)  The  Camp  David  Framework  stipulates  the  withdrawal  of  the  military 
government  and  its  civilian  administration,  and  the  transfer  of  its  authority  to 
the  self-governing  authority  which  will  replace  it. 
(b)  In  reviewing  the  powers  and  responsibilities  of  the  military  government 
and  its  civilian  administration,  the  working  group  was  seeking  to  envisage, 
through  a  practical  approach,  the  powers  and  responsibilities  to  be  exercised 
by  the  SGA  in  the  context  of  its  replacement  of  the  military  government  and  its 
civilian  administration  as  stated  in  the  Camp  David  Framework.  That  was  the 
purpose  of  the  survey  of  the  current  situation,  it  was  a  way  out  of  the  deadlock 
caused  by  the  conceptual  discussion  of  the  comprehensive  approachl  and  a  step 
to  provide  the  parties  with  basic  information  for  discussing  the  transfer  of 
authority.  Indeedt  the  presentations  of  the  powers  and  responsibilities  of  the 
military  government  and  its  civilian  administration  were  meant  to  lead  the 
working  group,  in  the  light  of  these  presentations,  and  in  the  context  of  the 
transfer  of  authority,  to  prepare  a  model  for  the  powers  and  responsibilities  to 
be  exercised  by  the  SGA. 
This  method  was  endorsed  by  the  decision  taken  at  the  London  meeting  of  the 
heads  of  delegation  an  October  26,1979: 
"...  Presentations  an  the  current  situation  will  provide  the  parties  with  basic 
information  for  discussing  transfer  of  authority  as  stated  in  the  Camp  David 
Framework.  " 
This  led  subsequently  to  the  call  of  the  plenary  on  December  19,1979  to  the 
working  group: 
"To  proceed  to  prepare  for  the  plenary's  future  consideration  a  proposed  model 
for  the  powers  and  responsibilities  to  be  exercised  by  the  SGA". 505 
(c)  Vhen  the  method  is  thus  set  in  perspective,  it  becomes  clear  that  when  a 
model  of  the  powers  and  responsibilities  of  the  SGA  is  to  be  prepared$  the 
guiding  frame  should  be  the  powers  and  responsibilities  of  the  military 
government  and  its  civilian  administration  and  that  the  focal  points  in 
discussing  such  a  model  should  be:  ý 
1-  Vithdrawal  of  the  Israeli  military  government  and  its  civilian 
administration. 
2-  The  transfer  of  authority. 
3-Organs  of  the  SGA  which  will  take  over  from,  and  replace,  the  military 
government  and  its  civilian  administration. 
II-The  Xilitary  Government  and  its  Civilian  Administration 
(a)  On  June  7,1967,  the  Israeli  military  command  published  proclamation  No.  2 
entitled  "Laws  and  administration  proclamation".  A  section  of  which  is 
concerned  with  the  assumption  of  government  by  the  Israeli  defence  forces,  and 
under  the  title  "Assumption  of  powers"  it  reads: 
"Any  power  of  government,  legislation,  appointment,  or  administration  with 
respect  to  the  region  or  its  inhabitants  shall  henceforth  vest  in  me  alone  and 
shall  be  exercised  only  by  me  or  a  person  appointed  by  me  to  that  end  or 
acting  on  my  behalf.  " 
(b)  The  Israeli  military  government  currently  exisiting  in  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  Strip  has  full  comprehensive  authority.  It  assumes  the  power  of 
formulating  all  policies  and  coordinating  all  activities.  Its  decision  making 
emanates  from  different  and  interconnected  channels  of  Israeli  cabinet  and 
interministerial  levels  as  well  as  a  chain  of  military  command  leading  to  the 
area  or  regional  commander  (one  for  the  West  Bank  and  one  for  Gaza)  who  was 
vested  with  full  legislative  and  executive  authority  in  the  area  as  shown  in  the 
aforementioned  proclamation.  Mandatory  orders  issued  by  the  military  commander 
presented  legislative  enactment  and  revisions.  Policy  is  determined  according 
to  considerations  adopted  by  the  office  of  the  coordinator  of  activities,  the 
Israeli  ministry  concerned  and  the  regional  command. 
(c)  Administrative  authority  is  delegated  to  regional  and  district  commanders. 
Routine  administrative  duties  and  conduct  of  ordinary  activities  are  left  to  the 506 
relevant  institutions  that  were  already  operating  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  or 
to  newly  organized  units  of  administrative  service. 
The  civil  administration  of  the  military  government  is  carried  out  by 
branches,  each  branch  supervising  a  number  of  units.  The  units  carry  out  the 
conduct  of  every  day  life.  Heads  of  units  who  operate  in  the  areas  are  directly 
subordinated  through  the  chief  of  branch  to  the  military  commander  while  they 
come,  at  the  same  time,  under  the  corresponding  ministries  in  Israel  an 
professional  matters.  From  the  ministry  they  get  instructions  on  professional 
matters,  how  to  act,  how  to  deal  with  the  problems  arising  out  of  thed  daily 
life.  From  the  commander,  through  the  chief  of  branch,  they  get  the  policy,  the 
command. 
(d)  The  military  government  and  its  civilian  administration  is  therefore 
composed  of  different  levels  manifesting  different  layers  of  authority.  One 
layer  legislates  and  formulates  policies  while  another  layer  executes  and 
carries  out  the  policies.  I 
The  Camp  David  Framework  stipulates  the  transfer  of  both.  It  is  not  a  matter 
of  transferring  the  administrative  set-up  which  implements  the  orders  but  first 
and  foremost  transferring  the  strata  of  authority  which  holds  the  power  to 
issue  the  orders. 
(e)  It  may  be  recalled  that  the  civil  administration  of  the  military 
government  is  mainly  composed,  even  now,  of  local  inhabitants.  According  to 
the  figures  of  December  1978  there  were  in  the  Vest  Bank  11,165  local  employees 
in  the  civil  administration  (and  only  980  Israelis)  while  in  Gaza  there  are 
local  director-generals  heading  14  of  the  main  units. 
Sol  it  may  be  said,  that  even  now  the  Palestinian  people  in  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  Strip  are  bearing  most  of  the  responsibility  for  running  the  affairs  of 
their  daily  life  but  only  carrying  out  decisions  which  were  made  for  them  and 
implementing  policies  which  were  formulated  over  their  heads. 
When  the  Camp  David  Framework  promises  them  full  autonomy,  it  can  only  mean 
that  under  the  SGA  they  will  be  able  to  take  their  own  decisions  and  formulate 
their  own  policies. 
The  full  autonomy  which  the  Camp  David  Framework  provides  for  cannot  amount 
to  a  reorganization  of  what  the  Palestinians  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip 507 
already  have,  but  rather  the  transformation  of  that  set-up  in  an  authority 
which  is  self-governing.  Hence,  the  withdrawal  of  the  military  government  and 
the  transfer  of  its  manifold  authority  to  the  inhabitants. 
III-  Vithdrawal  of  the  Xilltary  Governzent  and  the  Transfer  of  Authority 
(a)  The  first  step  in  establishing  the  SGA  should  be  the  withdrawal  of  the 
military  government,  the  Camp  David  Framework  for  peace  states  clearly  that: 
"The  Israeli  military  government  and  its  civilian  administration  will  be 
withdrawn  as  soon  as  self-governing  authority  has  been  freely  elected  by  the 
inhabitants  of  these  areas  to  replace  the  existing  military  government.  " 
The  joint  letter  of  March  26,1979  states  that:  "The  Military  Government  and 
its  civilian  administration  will  be  withdrawn,  to  be  replaced  by  the  SGA.  " 
(b)  Distinction  is  made  in  both  the  Camp  David  Framework  and  the  Joint  letter 
between  two  kinds  of  withdrawals: 
1-  The  withdrawal  of  the  military  government  and  its  civilian  administration 
which  is  total  and  absolute.  It  is  an  unqualified  withdrawal;  and 
.  2-  A  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces  which  is  going  to  be  partial  and 
there  will  be  a'  redeployment  of  the  remaining  forces  into  specified  security 
locations. 
(c)  The  withdrawal  of  the  military  government  and  its  civilian 
administration,  which  occurs  as  soon  as  the  SGA  is  elected,  is  the  first  step 
towards  the  assumption  by  the  SGA  of  its  powers  and  responsibilities.  The 
transfer  of  authority  takes  place  by  handing  over  the  powers  and 
responsibilities  of  the  military  government  and  its  civilian  administration  to 
the  newly  elected  SGA.  The  SGA  replaces  the  outgoing  regime. 
(d)  In  this  respect,  the  following  elements  should  be  stressed: 
(1)  The  transfer  of  authority  implies  the  handing  over  of  all  powers  and 
responsibilities  presently  exercised  by  the  military  government  and  its  civilian 
administration. 
(2)  The  transfer  of  authority  should  be  carried  out  in  a  peaceful  and  orderly 
manner. 
(3)  Whenever  Palestinian  Institutions  already  exist  in  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  Strip,  as  part  of  the  prevailing  system  of  civil  service,  they  will,  in  the 
course  of  such  transfer  of  authority,  take  over  the  functions  of,  and  replace, 508 
the  military  government  and  its  civilian  administration.  It  is  only  when  new 
functions,  or  new  powers,  are  transferred  to  the  SGA  which  were  not  exercised 
before  under  the  military  regime  by  the  Palestinian  people  that  new  organs 
should  be  sought. 
(e)  Stress  should  be  focused  more  on  the  powers  and  functions  that  are  not 
exercised  by  the  Palestinian  people  under  the  military  regime  so  that  the 
necessary  relevant  organs  would  be  suggested.  The  Palestinian  people  already 
played  the  major  role  in  the  civil  service  which  obeyed  the  commands  and 
implemented  the  policies  of  the  military  regime.  Under  the  autonomy  there  will 
be  need  for  an  organ  to  fulfill  their  newly  acquired  powerf  to  make  their  own 
decisions  and  formulate  their  own  policies.  The  elected  body  of  the  SGA  is 
obviously  that  organ. 
IV-  Powers  and  Responsibilities  to  be  Exercised  by  the  Self-Governing  Authority 
For  a  model  of  powers  and  responsibilities  to  be  exercised  by  the  SGA,  some 
keywords  and  guidelines  from  the  Camp  David  Framework  for  peace  should  be 
stressed  at  the  outset. 
(a)  It  is  a  self-governing  authority,  which  means  that  it  governs  itself  by 
itself.  It  is  a  self-generating  authority.  No  outside  source  vests  it  with  its 
authority. 
(b)  It  provides  full  autonomy,  and  not  an  impaired  or  partial  autonomy. 
(c)  This  self-governing  authority  with  full  autonomy  comes  through  free 
elections.  It  is  a  democratic  structure  of  a  government  by  the  people  and  for 
the  people.  As  an  elected  body  it  has  a  representative  character  and  its 
membership  fulfill  the  functions  and  exercise  the  powers  that  an  elected 
representative  body  usually  does. 
1-  Nature  of  the  SGA 
The  SGA  is  an  interim  arrangement  for  a  period  not  exceeding  5  years.  This 
transitional  process,  at  the  outset  of  which  the  Israeli  military  government  and 
its  civilian  administration  will  be  withdrawn  and  the  SGA  established,  can 
demonstrate  that  the  practical  problems  arising  from  a  transition  to  peace  can 
be,  satisfactorily  resolved.  The  transitional  period  is  aimed  at  bringing  about 
the  changes  in  attitudes  that  can  assure  a  final  settlement  which  realizes  the 509 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  while  assuring  the  security  of  all. 
the  parties.  The  purpose  of  this  transitional  arrangement  is: 
(a)  To  ensure  a  peaceful  and  orderly  transfer  of  authority  to  the  Palestinian 
people  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip. 
(b)  To  help  the  Palestinian  people  to  develop  their  own  political,  economic 
and  social  institutioins  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  so  as  to  give 
expression  to  the  principle  of  full  autonomy  which  the  SGA  provides. 
(c)  To  provide  the  proper  conditions  for  the  Palestinian  people  to  participate 
in  negotiations  leading  to  the  solution  of  the  Palestinian  problem  in  all  its 
aspects  and  the  realization  of  their  legitimate  rights  including  their  right  to 
self-determination. 
2-  Scope  of  the  SGA: 
(a)  The  jurisdiction  of  the  SGA  will  encompass  all  of  the  Palestinian 
territories  occupied  after  5  June  1967  and  which  are  delineated  in  the  relevant 
armistice  agreements  of  1949  (Egyptian-  Israeli  armistice  agreement  of  2  April, 
1949  regarding  the  Gaza  Strip  and  Jordanian-  Israeli  armistice  agreement  of  24 
February,  1949  regarding  the  West  Bank  including  Arab  Jerusalem). 
(b)  Authority  of  the  SGA  extends  to  the  inhabitants  as  well  as  the  land  in 
the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip. 
(c)  All  powers  and  responsibilities  of  the  SGA  apply  to  the  Vest  Bank  and 
Gaza  Strip  which  shall  be  regarded  under  the  autonomy  as  one  territory  and 
integral  whole. 
(d)  All  changes  in  the  geographic  character,  the  demographic  composition  and 
the  legal  status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  or  any  part  thereof  are  null 
and  void  and  must  be  rescinded  as  they  Jeopardize  the  attainment  of  the 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  as  provided  for  in  the  Camp  David 
Framework. 
This  applies  in  particular  to 
1-  East  Jerusalem,  the  annexation  of  which  by  Israel  is  null  and  void  and  must 
be  rescinded.  Relevant  Security  Council  Resolutions,  particularly  Resolutions 
242  and  267  must  be  applied  to  Jerusalem  which  Is  an  integral  part  of  the  Vest 
Bank.  Legal  and  historical  Arab  rights  in  the  City  must  be  respected  and 
restored. 510 
2-  Israeli  settlements  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  are  illegal  and,  in  the 
course  of  a  final  settlement  should  be  withdrawn. 
During  the  transitional  period  there  should  be  a  ban  on  the  establishment  of 
new  settlements  or  enlarging  the  existing  ones.  After  the  inauguration  of  the 
SGA  all  settlers  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  will  come  under  the  authority  of  the 
SGA. 
3-  General  Powers  and  Responsibilities  of  the  SGA 
1-  Promulgation  of  laws  and  regulations 
2-Policy  formulation  and  supervision 
3-Budgetary  provisions 
4-  Taxation 
5-  Employment  of  staff 
6-  Issuance  of  identity  and  travel  documents 
7-  Control  of  in  and  out  movement  of  persons  and  goods 
a-  Power  to  assume  obligations  and  own  property 
9-  Power  to  bold  title  to  public  land 
10-  Power  to  sue  and  to  be  sued 
11-  Power  to  enter  into  contracts 
12-Power  to  participate  in  negotiations  on  the  final  status  of  the  Vest  Bank 
and  Gaza  Strip  and  to  ascertain  in  the  views  of  the  Palestinians 
13-  Assuming  responsibility  for; 
(a)  Public  administration; 
(b)  Public  services; 
(c)  Public  order  and  internal  security  and  police; 
(d)  Public  domain  and  natural  resources; 
(e)  Economic  and  financial  fields; 
(f  )  Social  and  cultural  f  ields; 
(g)  Human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms; 
14-  Administration  of  Justice. 
4-  Structure  of  the  SGA 
(a)  The  SGA  will  be  composed  of  80-100  members  freely  elected  from  the 
Palestinian  people  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip. 
(b)  The  structure  of  the  SGA  contains  two  main  organs: 511 
-  An  assembly  of  the  SGA  composed  of  all  freely  elected  representatives  from 
the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza. 
-A  council  composed  of  10-15  members  to  be  elected  from  among  the 
membership  of  the  assembly. 
(c)  The  Assembly: 
(1)  It  will  take  over,  and  replace,  the  authority  of  the  military  government  in 
enacting  laws  and  regulations,  formulating  and  supervising  policies,  adopting 
the  budget,  levying  taxes,  etc... 
(2)  Its  internal  organization  of  a  chairman  with  one  or  more  vice-chairmen, 
its  rules  of  procedure  and  the  number  and  composition  of  its  committees  will  be 
determined  by  the  Assembly  itself. 
(d)  The  Council: 
(1)  It  assumes  the  actual  administration  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  and 
implements  the  policies  formulated  by  the  assembly  in  the  different  domains. 
(2)  It  covers  the  whole  range  of  activities  and  has  full  power  in  organizing, 
operating,  employing  staff  and  supervising  the  following  executive  branches; 
Education-  Information  and  Culture-  Transportation  and  Communications-  Health- 
Social  Velfare-  Labour-  Tourism-  Internal  Security-  Housing-  Religious  Affairs- 
Agriculture-  Economy  and  Finance-  Commerce-  Industry-  Administration  of 
Justice. 
(3)  The  Council  will  constitute  its  divisions  as  it  deems  necessary  for  the 
proper  conduct  of  its  functions  and  will  determine  the  number  of  divisions,  the 
internal  organization  of  divisions  and  the  machinery  for  coordination  as  befits 
the  best  and  the  most  effective  conduct  of  its  activities.  It  may  get  in  this 
respect,  and  if  requested,  expert  help  from  the  parties. 
(e)  The  Judicial  authority  will  be  manifested  in  a  system  of  courts  of  law, 
courts  of  appeal  and  supreme  court  enjoying  full  guarantees  for  independence 
and  efficiency  in  their  administration  of  justice. 
M  The  SGA  will  have  a  representative,  alongside  with  the  representatives  of 
Israels  Egypt  (and  Jordan),  on  the  continuing  committee  in  accordance  with 
Article  3  of  the  Camp  David  Framework.  Katters  of  common  concern  to  Israel 
and  the  SGA  which  need  mutual  arrangements  could  be  dealt  with  through  the 
committee. 
-  lfthý 5-  Seat  of  the  SGA 
The  seat  of  the  SGA  will  be  East  Jerusalem, 
6-  Additional  Arrangements 
(a)  As  soon  as  the  SGA  is  established  and  inaugurated  in  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  Strip,  a  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces  will  take  place  and  there  will 
be  a  redeploymedntg  of  the  remaining  Israeli  forces  into  specified  security 
locations.  Permission  will  be  required  for  any  movement  of  military  troops 
into  or  through  the  territory. 
(b)  The  Camp  David  Framework  requires  the  parties  to  negotiate  an  agreement 
which  includes,  inter  alia,  arrangements  for  assuring  internal  security  and 
public  order.  Responsibilities  for  security  and  public  order  will  be  decided 
jointly  by  the  parties  including  the  Palestinians,  the  Israelis,  the  Egyptians 
(and  the  Jordanians). 
(c)  A  strong  police  force  will  be  established  in  the  Vest  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip. 
It  will  be  constituted  by  the  SGA  and  composed  of  the  people  of  the  Vest  Bank 
and  Gaza  Strip. 513 
APP:  ENDIX  VII 
Israel  Autonomy  Proposal,  January  1982 
In  the  Camp  David  Agreement  signed  on  17  September  1978  between  Egypt 
and  Israel,  with  the  United  States  signing  as  a  witness,  agreement  was 
reached  on  a  plan  for  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  Palestinian 
Arabs,  that  includes  a  proposal  for  full  autonomy  for  the  Palestinian 
Arabs  living  in  Judea,  Samaria  and  Gaza.  The  manner  of  establishing 
this  autonomy,  as  well  as  its  powers,  were  to  be  determined  in 
negotiations  between  the  signatories  (Jordan  was  invited  to  participate, 
but  did  not  respond).  It  was  Israel  that  f  irst  raised  the  idea  of 
autonomy  that  was  later  to  serve  as  the  basis  of  the  Camp  David 
agreement.  For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  Palestinian  Arab 
inhabitants  of  Judea-Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district,  they  were  offered  an 
opportunity  of  this  kind  to  conduct  their  own  affairs  by  themselves. 
Since  1979,  talks  have  been  held  for  the  implementation  of  this 
agreement;  there  were  intermissions  in  the  negotiations,  but  talks  were 
resumed  intensively  in  the  summer  of  1981,  leading  to  a  thorough-going 
clarification  of  the  positions  of  the  parties.  At  these  talks  Israel 
put  forward  its  proposals  with  regard  to  the  self-governing  authority 
(administrative  council),  its  powers,  responsibilities  and  structure  as 
well  as  other  related  issues.  The  main  points  of  Israel's  proposals,  as 
submitted  in  the  course  of  the  negotiations  were  as  follows: 
Scope,  Jurisdiction  and  Structure  of  the  Self-Governing  Authority 
(Adninistrative  Council)  : 
1.  The  Camp  David  accords  set  forth  the  establishment  of  a  self- 
governing  authority  (administrative  council)  that  will  comprise  one  body 
representing  the  Arab  inhabitants  of  Judea,  Samaria  and  the  Gaza 
district,  who  will  choose  this  body  in  free  elections,  and  it  will 
assume  those  functional  powers  that  will  be  transferred  to  it.  Thus  the 
Palestinian  Arabs  will  for  the  first  time  have  an  elected  and 
representative  body,  in  accordance  with  their  own  wishes  and  free' 
choicep  that  will  be  able  to  carry  opt  the  functions  assigned  to  it  as 
an  administrative  council. 
2.  The  members  of  the  administrative  council  will  be  able,  as  a  groups 
to  discuss  all  subjects  within  the  councills  competencet  apportioning 514 
among  themselves  the  spheres  of  responsibility  for  the  various 
functions.  Within  the  domain  of  its  assigned  powers  and 
responsibilities,  the  council  will  be  responsible  for  planning  and 
carrying  out  its  activities. 
Powers  of  the  Self-Governing  Authority  (Administrative  Council): 
La.  Under  the  terms  of  the  Camp  David  agreement,  the  parties  have  to 
reach  an  agreement  on  the  powers  and  responsibilities  of  the  authority. 
Israel's  detailed  proposals  include  a  list  of  powers  that  will  be  given 
to  the  authority  and  that,  by  any  reasonable  and  objective  criterion, 
represent  a  wide  and  comprehensive  range  of  fields  of  operation. 
Without  any  doubt,  the  transferring  of  these  powers  constitutes  the 
bestowal  of  full  autonomy-  in  the  full  meaning  of  that  tern. 
b.  The  powers  to  be  granted  the  authority,  under  these  proposals,  are 
in  the  following  domains: 
1.  Administration  of  Justice:  Supervision  of  the  administrative  system 
of  the  courts  in  the  areas;  dealing  with  matters  concerned  with  the 
prosecution  system  and  with  the  registration  of  companiest  partnership, 
patents,  trademarks,  etc. 
2.  Agriculture:  All  branches  of  agriculture  and  fisheries,  nature 
reserves  and  parks. 
3.  Finance:  Budget  of  the  administrative  council  and  allocations  among 
its  various  divisions;  taxation. 
4.  Civil  Service:  Appointment  and  working  conditions  of  the  Council's 
employees.  (Today,  the  civil  service  of  the  inhabitants  of  Judea-Samaria 
and  Gaza,  wit1lin  the  framework  of  the  Military  Government's  Civilian 
Administrationj  numbers  about  12,000  persons.  ) 
5.  Education  and  Culture.,  Operation  of  the  network  of  schools  in  the 
areas,  from  kindergarten  to  higher  education;  supervision  of  cultural, 
artistic  and  sporting  activities. 
6.  Health:  Supervision  of  hospitals  and  clinics;  operation  of  sanitary 
and  other  services  related  to  Public  health. 
7.  Housing  and  Public  Works:  Construction,  housing  for  the  inhabitants 
and  public  works  projects. 
8.  Transportation  and  Communications:  Maintenance  and  coordinations 
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9.  Labour  and  Social  Welfare:  Welfare,  labour  and  employment  services, 
including  the  operation  of  labour  exchanges. 
10.  Municipal  Affairs:  Matters  concerning  municipalities  and  their 
effectived  operation. 
11.  Local  Police:  Operation  of  a  strong  local  police  force,  as  provided 
for  in  the  Camp  David  agreement,  and  maintenance  of  prisons  for  criminal 
offenders  sentenced  by  the  courts  in  the  areas. 
12.  Religious  Affairs:  Provision  and  maintenance  of  religious 
facilities  for  all  religious  communities  among  the  Arab  inhabitants  of 
Judea-Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district. 
13.  Industry,  Commerce  and  Tourism:  Development  of  industry,  commerce, 
workshops  and  tourist  services. 
2.  The  council  will  have  full  powers  in  its  spheres  of  competence  to 
determine  its  budget,  to  enter  into  contractual  obligations,  to  sue  and 
be  sued  and  to  engage  manpower.  It  will,  moreover,  have  wide  powers  to 
promulgate  regulations,  as  required  by  a  body  of  this  kind.  In  the 
nature  of  things,  in  view  of  the  free  movement  that  will  prevail  between 
Judea-Samaria  and  the  Gaza  district  and  Israel  and  for  the  general 
welfare  of  the  inhabitants,  arrangements  will  be  agreed  upon  in  the 
negotiations,  in  a  number  of  domains,  for  cooperation  and  coordination 
with  Israel.  The  administrative  council  will,  hence,  have  full  scope  to 
exercise  its  wide-ranging  powers  under  the  terms  of  the  autonomy 
agreement.  These  powers  embrace  all  walks  of  life,  and  will  enable  the 
inhabitants  of  thq  areas  concerned  to  enjoy  full  autonomy. 
3.  Size:  The  size  of  thý  administrative  council,  whose  representative 
character  finds  expression  in  its  establishment  through  free  elections, 
by  the  Arab  inhabitants  of  Judea,  Samaria  and  Gaza.  Clearly,  the 
criterion  for  determining  the  number  of  its  members  must  be  the 
functions  that  the  council  is  empowered  to  perform.  We  propose, 
therefore,  that  the  number  of  members  will  conform  with  the  functions 
listed  above'. 
4.  Free  elections:  Elections  to  the  administrative  council,  under 
Israel's  proposals,  will  be  absolutely  free,  as  stipulated  in  the  Camp 
David  agreement.  Under  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  the  parties  will 
agree  upon  the  modalities  of  the  elections;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  in  past 
negotiations  a  long  list  of  principles  and  guidelines  has  already  been 516 
prepared  in  this  matter.  In  these  free  elections,  all  the  rights 
pertaining  to  a  peaceful  assembly,  freedom  of  expression  and'  secret 
balloting  will  be  preserved  and  assured,  and  all  necessary  steps  will  be 
taken  to  prevent  any  interference  with  the  election  process.  The 
holding  of  an  absolutely  free  and  unhampered  election  process  will  thus 
be  assured  in  full,  under  the  law,  and  in  keeping  with  the  tradition  of 
free  elections  practiced  in  democratic  societies.  These  elections  will, 
in  many  respects,  constitute  a  new  departure  in  the  region  around  us 
which  in  most  of  its  parts  is  not  too  close  to  the  ways  of  democracy, 
and  in  which  free  elections  are  a  rare  phenomenon.  It  is  of  some 
interest,  thereforet  to  note  that  Judea-Samaria  and  Gaza  under  Israel's 
Military  Government  since  1967,  have  exemplified  the  practical 
possibility  of  totally  free  elections  in  these  areas.  In  1972,  and 
again  in  1976,  Israel  organized  free  elections  in  these  areas  based  on 
the  tradition  and  model  of  its  own  democratic  and  liberal  tradition  and 
custom;  voters  and  elected  officials  alike  concede  that  these  were  free 
elections  in  the  fullest  sense.  The  elections  in  the  administrative 
council  will  be  organized  and  supervised  by  a  central  elections 
committee  whose  composition  has  been  agreed  upon  by  the  parties. 
5.  Time  of  elections  and  establishment  of  the  self-governing  authority 
(Administrative  council);  The  elections  will  be  held  as  expeditiously  as 
possible  after  agreement  will  have  been  reached  on  the  autonomy.  This 
was  set  forth  in  the  Joint  letter  of  the  late  President  Sadat  and  of 
Prime  Minister  Begin  to  President  Carter,  dated  26  March  1979,  setting 
for  the  manner  in  which  the  self-governing  authority  (administrative 
council)  is  to  be  established,  under  the  terms  of  the  Camp  David 
agreement. 
6.  Within  one  month  following  the  electionsl  the  self-governing 
authority  (administrative  council)  is  to  be  established  and  inaugurated, 
and  at  that  time  the  transitional  period  of  five  years  will  begin- 
again,  in  conformity  with  the  Camp  David  agreement  and  the  joint  letter. 
7.  Hence,  every  effort  will  be  made  to  hold  elections  without  delay 
once  an  agreement  is  reached,  to  be'followed  by  the  establishment  of  the 
self-governing  authority  (administrative  council). 
8.  Following  the  elections  and  the  establishment  of  the  self-governing 
authority  (administrative  council)  the  military  government  and  its 517 
civilian  administration  will  be  withdrawnj  a  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed 
forces  will  take  place,  and  there  will  be  a  redeployment  of  the 
remaining  Israeli  forces  into  specified  security  locations,  in  full- 
conformity  with  the  Camp  David  agreement.  Israel  will  present  to  the 
other  parties  in  the  negotiations  the  map  of  the  specified  security 
locations  of  the  redeployment.  It  goes  without  saying  that  all  this 
will  be  done  for  the  purpose  of  safeguarding  the  security  of  Israel  as 
well  as  of  the  Arab  inhabitants  of  Judea-Samaria  and  Gaza  and  of  the 
Israeli  citizens  residing  in  these  areas. 
9.  All  of  the  above  indicates  Israel's  readiness  to  observe  the  Camp 
David  agreement  fully  and  in  every  detail,  in  letter  and  spirit,  while 
safeguarding  the  interests  of  all  concerned. APPIEND  IXVIII 
Agreement  Regarding  The  Permanent  Boundary 
Between  Egypt  And  Israel,  26  February,  1989 
The  Governments  of  Egypt  and  Israel, 
Reaffirming  their  adherence  to  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  26 
March  1979,  and  their  respect  for  the  inviolability  and  sanctity  of  the 
permanent  boundary  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  which  is  the  recognized 
international  boundary  between  Egypt  and  the  former  mandated  territory  of 
Palestine, 
Recognizing  as  final  and  binding  upon  them  the  Award  of  29  September  1988 
of  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  established  by  the  Compromis  of  10  September  1986, 
Having  mutually  located  the  recognized  international  boundary  between 
boundary  Pillar  91  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba, 
Have  agreed  as  follows: 
1.  The  permanent  boundary  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  as  defined  in  Article  11 
of  the  Treaty  of  Peace$  meets  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  at  the  point  marked  by  the  two 
governments  on  the  ground,  as  recorded  in  Annex  A. 
2.  On  or  before  noon,  March  15,1989,  Israel  will  withdraw  behind  the 
recognized  international  boundary. 
Innex  A 
The  surveyors  of  the  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt  and  the  State  of  Israel,  meeting 
on  February  24,1989,  determined  that  the  permanent  boundary  between  Egypt  and 
Israel,  as  defined  in  Article  II  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  follows  a  straight  line 
between  agreed  Boundary  Pillar  91  and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba.  The  surveyors  of  the 
two  countries  marked  that  line  on  the  ground  with  two  markers,  one  on  the 
northern  side  of  the  road  (as  shown  on  the  attached  sketch)  and  one  an  the 
ridge  immediately  above  the  road.  The  surveyors  agreed  that  tomorrow,  February 
27,  the  latter  marker  will  be  replaced  by  a  more  permanent  marker  and  an 
additional,  similar  marker  will  be  erected  on  the  same  line  where  the  line  meets 
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Addendum  To  Annex  A 
On  7  March  1989  the  surveyors  of  the  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt  and  the  State  of 
Israel  augmented  the  local  description  of  the  two  permanent  markers  established 
on  27  February  1989  Pursuant  to  Annex  A  of  the  document  signed  an  26  February 
1989  by  recording  the  distances  from  these  two  markers  to  BP91  and  by  tying, 
through  surveying  measurements,  to  two  agreed  points  an  the  Hotel  and  an  agreed 
point  an  the  top  of  the  "granite  knob". 
The  above  were  recorded  on  the  attached  description  card  which,  together  with 
this  Addendum  are  an  integral  part  of  Annex  A. 
The  parties  agreed  that  a  measurement  of  the  angle  between  the  prolongation  of 
the  line  between  B.  P.  90  and  B.  P.  91  and  the  line  connecting  B.  P.  91  and  the  two 
above  noted  markers  will  be  carried  out  within  the  Framework  of  the 
documentation  of  the  entire  permanent  boundary  in  the  near  future  to  be 
coordinated  between  the  parties. 
Agreed  Xinutes 
Concerning  Tourism  In  South  Sinai  Through  Checkpoint  lumber  4 
Delegations  from  Egypt  and  Israel  met  during  January  and  February  1989  in 
order  to  promote  tourism  between  the  two  countries  on  a  reciprocal  basis  and  to 
their  mutual  benefit.  At  the  end  of  these  meetings  the  Egyptians  delegation 
advised  the  Israeli  delegation  that  the  competent  Egyptian  authorities  issued 
appropriate  regulations  necessary  for  the  implementation  of  the  following 
regulations  and  the  following  agreed  arrangements  regarding  tourists  of  all 
nationalities.  These  regulations  are  to  be  communicated  to  all  Egyptian 
consulates  abroad.  The  Israeli  delegation  advised  the  Egyptian  delegation'that 
Israel  shall  provide  reciprocal  arrangements  on  a  proportional  basis  upon 
Egypt's  request, 
Passports: 
In  addition  to  the  use  of  regular  passports,  the  Egyptian  authorities  shall 
recognize  Israeli  regular  passports  valid  for  travel  only  to  Egypt,  provided 
such  passports  are  valid  for  at  least  two  months  as  of  the  date  of  entry.  The 
Egyptian  delegation  requested  to  see  and  approve  a  sample  In  advance  of  use. 
Regular  collective  passports  (for  group.  tours  and  large  families)  for  around  25 520 
persons  would  be  valid  for  a  single  entry  provided  such  passports  are  valid  for 
at  least  two  months  as  of  the  date  of  entry. 
Misas: 
All  tourists  entering  South  Sinai  wifl  be  exempted  from  tourist  visasl  and  entry 
and  exit  stamps  will  be  stamped  either  on  the  passport  upon  the  tourist's 
request  or  on  the  regular  registration  forms  upon  entry.  Such  stamps  will  be 
valid  for  a  period  of  14  days. 
Ecew 
No  fee  will  be  charged  for  persons  traveling  less  than  one  kilometer  from  the 
checkpoint. 
rustoms: 
There  will  be  only  random  spot  checks  and  checks  of  suspicious  persons.  Anyone 
having  anything  to  declare,  such  declaration  will  be  noted  by  officials  on  the 
exit  form. 
Currency: 
In  accordance  with  agreed  Technical  Arrangements:  (a)  facilities  will  be 
provided  in  the  Sonesta  Hotel  on  a  24-hour  basis  for  the  exchange  of  Israeli 
currency  for  Egyptian  currency  and  vice  versa;  and  (b)  Israeli  currency  obtained 
through  this  procedure  will  be  convertible  into  U.  S.  dollars  by  the  Bank  of 
Israel. 
Vehicles 
Private  passenger  vehicles  and  rental  cars:  Customs  authorities  will  register 
car  license  plate  number,  owner  name,  and  driver  name;  they  will  affix  a  sticker 
valid  for  multiple  entries  for  one  kilometer  for  a  period  of  stay  of  up  to  14 
days.  These  rules  will  also  apply  to  authorized  service  and  supply  vehicles 
attending  to  the  needs  of  the  hotel,  authorized  hotel  shuttles  and  tour  buses 
carrying  passengers  from  Israel  to  the  hotel  and  vice  versa,  and  to  emergency 
vehicles,  the  passage  of  which  will  be  expedited  by  both  sides. 
Vehicles  crossing  the  border  shall  be  covered  by  appropriate  Egyptian  insurance' 
valid  for  up  to  14  days,  or  longer  up  to  one  year  -  if  requested. Tprminal  Hours: 
The  delegations  agreed  to  extend  the  working  hours  of  their  respective 
terminals  to  0600-2400  hours.  They  further  agreed  to  re-evaluate  the  need  for 
and  length  of  such  extension  after  three  months. 
'Fnod  Regulations# 
Importation  of  food  for  personal  consumption  will  be  allowed  subject  to  health 
and  customs  requirements. 
r,  pneral: 
Appropriate  liaison  will  be  established  between  managers  of  the  Israeli  and 
Egyptian  terminals. 
The  Egyptian  authorities  will  look  into  the  possibility  of  designating  a 
confined  camping  area  that  would  be  equipped  with  facilities. 
All  rules  and  regulations  with  respect  to  tourism  agreed  to  between  Egypt  and 
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